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Et Tu, Zimmerman? Is Foreknowledge Useful After All?
Get PDFDean Zimmerman is an open theist. However, he has constructed an argument to the effect that, if simple foreknowledge (foreknowledge without middle knowledge) did exist, this knowledge would be providentially useful to God. I show that his argument fails: if simple foreknowledge did exist, it would be providentially useless
Omnipotence: Dean Zimmerman, Negative Nelly, and the Divine Delegates
Get PDFShould an omnipotent being be able to limit its own power? Along with Swinburne, Dean Zimmerman answers in the affirmative. My intuitions push in the opposite direction. The ability to limit one's own power constitutes a vulnerability. In this paper, I argue that a great deal hangs on this issue. If God cannot revoke His own omnipotence, then only a necessarily existent being can ever create anything truly ex nihilo. Moreover, if God cannot revoke His own omnipotence, then it turns out that theism entails idealism. No wonder that Zimmerman resists. I prefer to take the plunge and endorse idealism
Scholars and Literati at the Collegium Societatis Iesu Lovaniensis (1542–1773)
Get PDFThis note is a summary description of the set of scholars and literati who taught at the Collegium Societatis Iesu Lovaniensis, the Jesuit College in the city of Leuven, from its inception in 1542 to its dissolution in 1773
CEDAW, 15 mai 2023, Tahereh Mohammdi Bandboni e.a. c. Suisse, comm. n° 173/2021: Le refus de recourir aux autorités de son pays d’origine pour demander la protection contre les violences de genre ne peut conduire à un rejet automatique de la demande d’asile
No full textLe Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination à l’égard des femmes est saisi par une ressortissante de la République islamique d’Iran ainsi que son mari lesquels s’opposent à la décision prise par le tribunal administratif fédéral suisse de les renvoyer vers leur pays d’origine. L’auteure affirme que si elle devait être expulsée, elle serait exposée à un risque imminent de violence et de torture en République islamique d’Iran en violation des articles 1 à 3, 15 et 16 de la Convention. De son côté, l’État partie considère qu’il existe, dans certaines localités, des centres d’accueil pour les victimes de violences fondées sur le genre et juge problématique le fait que l’auteure n’ait pas porté l’affaire devant les autorités iraniennes avant de quitter son pays. Le Comité conclut que l’État partie n’a pas dûment pris en considération le risque réel, personnel et prévisible que courrait l’auteure de devenir victime de formes graves de violences fondées sur le genre si elle était renvoyée dans son pays d’origine. Cette affaire pose ainsi la question de l’exigence pour les personnes victimes de violence de genre de s’adresser aux autorités de leur pays d’origine pour demander la protection avant toute sollicitation d’une protection internationale
Haute Cour d’Afrique du Sud (Gauteng Division, Pretoria), 12 février 2024, Ashago v. Minister of Home Affairs and Others, no 2024-002723: Le jeu des incriminations connexes liées à la répression de l’entrée irrégulière sur le territoire est-il conciliable avec le principe de non-refoulement ?
No full textLa Haute Cour d’Afrique du Sud confirme une application simultanée de deux régimes répressifs et restrictifs de liberté distincts à l’occasion de l’entrée irrégulière d’un demandeur de protection internationale. Celui-ci a utilisé une identité frauduleuse pour obtenir un rendez-vous à l’office d’accueil des réfugiés. Arrêté d’abord pour l’entrée illégale et le séjour illégal en Afrique du Sud sur la base de la loi sur l’immigration, cette charge est abandonnée lors du recours du requérant et est remplacée par la charge de fraude sur la base de la loi relative à la procédure pénale. La Cour ne désapprouve pas ce changement de régime pour poursuivre la détention. Elle n’examine pas la législation relative aux réfugiés et considère que la détention n’empêche pas le requérant d’introduire sa demande de protection internationale
La professionnalisation en communication : Voies de recherche à venir et terrains prospectifs
Get PDFScholars and Literati at the University of Utrecht (1636–1800)
Get PDFThis note is a summary description of the set of scholars and literati who taught at the University of Utrecht from its inception in 1636 to 1800. For more detailed information about these individuals, please visit the comprehensive database available at https://shiny-lidam.sipr.ucl.ac.be/scholars/
Is Christian Belief Supernatural? : Grace, Nature and the Cognitive Science of Religion
Get PDFThe Cognitive Science of Religion represents a contemporary attempt at a naturalistic explanation of religion. There is debate as to whether its account of how religious beliefs arise is reconcilable with the religious account, which holds that religious beliefs are caused by God. In my paper, I argue that these two accounts cannot be reconciled when it comes to the specific question of how Christian religious beliefs arise if one accepts an important theological doctrine of the supernaturality of Christian belief. This doctrine implies that there can be no natural explanation for how Christian beliefs arise because they are a gift of divine grace. This leads to a conundrum for Christian theists: they can either reject the CSR account of how their religious beliefs arise, or they can reject the supernaturality of Christian belief. I argue that the latter is preferable. I then draw on the work of the theologian Denis Edwards to illustrate how one can drop this doctrine without abandoning some other fundamental tenets of Christian theology
Simplicidad divina radical
Get PDFmany philosophers have combined a Platonic metaphysics about abstract entities and a theistic conception according to which God is the creator of ‘heaven and earth’, of all ‘visible and ‘invisible’. Supposedly, God is the unique entity a se, i. e., the unique entity on which every other depends ontologically. It has been a traditional contention of Platonists, nevertheless, that abstract things, like universals or numbers, are independent. How are these theses compatible? Several critics have argued that they are not. A theist ontology imposes —for them— the outright rejection of Platonism or, eventually, a milder form of Platonism that substitutes universals and other abstracta by ‘concepts’ or ‘ideas’ in the divine intellect. Philosophers of Platonic convictions have tried to assuage the conflict introducing restrictions in divine aseity or by subjecting universals to some form of ‘absolute creation’. None of these attempts has been successful. In this work a different approach is presented and defended. It is argued that the universal of ‘deity’, W, is identical to God. This is a radicalization of the doctrine of divine simplicity
The Problem of People and Their Matter
Get PDFIf I am a material thing, there would seem to be such an entity as the matter now making me up. In that case the matter and I must be either one thing or two. This creates an awkward dilemma. If we’re one thing, then I have existed for billions of years and I am human only momentarily. But if we’re two, then my matter would seem to be a second person. Dean Zimmerman and others take the repugnance of these alternatives to show that I’m not a material thing, but rather an immaterial one. This paper explores a way of avoiding the dilemma without giving up materialism: there is no such entity as the matter making me up, but only a lot of particles