Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

English

Madison Lara v. Commissioner PA State Police

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

Essential Utilities Inc v. Swiss Re Corporate Solutions Elite Insurance Corp

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-17-2025 
USA v. Joshua Hall 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Joshua Hall" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 53. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/53 
This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1303 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
                                       
v. 
 
JOSHUA HALL, 
    Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No.1:23-cr-00114-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
December 9, 2024 
____________ 
 
Before:  BIBAS, CHUNG, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 17, 2025) 
____________ 
 
OPINION1 
____________ 
CHUNG, Circuit Judge. 
 Joshua Hall appeals the District Court’s imposition of a special condition, 
 
1 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
computer monitoring, on Hall’s two-year term of supervised release.  Hall argues that the 
computer monitoring condition infringes upon his First and Fourth Amendment rights 
because it chills his speech and invades his privacy interests.  Hall therefore requests that 
we vacate the computer monitoring condition.  We conclude that the District Court’s 
imposition of the condition was not plain error and will affirm.  
I. BACKGROUND2 
 
Between September 2019 and December 2020, Hall used a crowdfunding website 
and several fake social media accounts to raise funds that he claimed would go towards 
supporting President Trump’s reelection campaign.  In reality, Hall appropriated the 
money for his own use.  Hall was indicted due to this conduct.  While on pretrial release, 
Hall abused alcohol repeatedly and, on one occasion, called the office of a sitting United 
States Congressman and threatened to kill him.  As a result, Hall was charged in a 
superseding indictment with transmitting an interstate communication containing a threat 
to injure another person.  On December 21, 2022, after having previously pleaded guilty 
to both counts, Hall was sentenced for both offenses to twenty months’ imprisonment and 
three years’ supervised release.   
Hall’s term of supervised release began on October 6, 2023, and throughout the 
fall of 2023, Hall cycled in and out of alcohol rehabilitation facilities, often leaving each 
facility after only a few days.  These untimely departures were contrary to a condition of 
his supervised release that he participate in an inpatient substance abuse treatment 
 
2 Because we write for the parties, we recite only facts pertinent to our decision. 
 
3 
program.   
Hall was also subject to another condition that he disclose all of his online 
accounts to his probation officer.  On January 9, 2024, Hall announced that he was 
running for Congress via an undisclosed X (formerly Twitter) account.  Hall also used 
this account to issue another threat to the same United States Congressman.  Hall’s 
probation officer petitioned the District Court to issue an arrest warrant for Hall’s 
violation of the conditions of his supervised release.  Hall was arrested, highly 
intoxicated, shortly thereafter.   
The District Court held a supervised release revocation hearing on February 5, 
2024.  At that hearing, the District Court noted that Hall had violated the condition 
requiring that he report all online accounts to his probation officer when he failed to 
disclose his X account.  App. 51.  Because of this violation, and Hall’s refusal to accept 
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, the District Court revoked Hall’s supervised 
release.  The District Court said its “main concern” in sentencing was “community 
protection and deterrence,” App. 54, and Hall was sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment 
followed by a two-year term of supervised release.  The District Court imposed several 
conditions on Hall’s term of supervised release, including a special condition that 
required the installation of computer monitoring software and unannounced searches of 
his computers.  App. 55.  Hall did not object to this condition at his revocation hearing. 
Hall timely brought this appeal, arguing that the computer monitoring condition 
violates the First and Fourth Amendments.  For the reasons discussed below, we find that 
the computer monitoring condition is constitutional, and we therefore affirm the District 
 
4 
Court’s order in full.  
II. DISCUSSION3 
 
A district judge may impose a special condition on a term of supervised release 
after considering factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).  Special conditions that restrict 
the defendant’s First or Fourth Amendment rights “will be upheld if (1) they are directly 
related to deterring [the] defendant and protecting the public and (2) are narrowly 
tailored.”  United States v. Santos Diaz, 66 F.4th 435, 448 (3d Cir. 2023).  A condition is 
not “narrowly tailored” if it restricts a constitutional freedom “without any resulting 
benefit to public safety.”  United States v. Holena, 906 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2018). 
Regardless of the type of condition imposed, “[w]e insist on some evidence that 
the special conditions imposed are tangibly related to the goals of supervised release.  To 
justify special conditions, district courts must find supporting facts.  We may affirm if we 
can ascertain any viable basis in the record for the restriction.”  Holena, 906 F.3d at 290–
91 (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 144 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (“Conditions of supervised release must be supported by some evidence that 
the condition imposed is tangibly related to the circumstances of the offense, the history 
 
3  The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  Hall did not object to 
the conditions of his supervised release, so we review for plain error.  See Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 52(b); United States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2009).  To satisfy the 
plain-error standard, Hall must establish that (1) the District Court erred; (2) the error was 
clear or obvious under the law at the time of review; and (3) the error affected substantial 
rights, that is, the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.  Johnson v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997).  If all three elements are established, we may, but need 
not, exercise our discretion to award relief.  Id. 
 
5 
of the defendant, the need for general deterrence, or similar concerns.”). 
Hall argues that the District Court plainly erred in imposing the computer 
monitoring condition because the condition unconstitutionally infringes upon his First 
and Fourth Amendment rights.  We disagree. 
A. Hall’s First Amendment Argument 
 
The computer monitoring condition was imposed for the purposes of deterring 
Hall from making more threats to injure others, protecting the public from those threats, 
and rehabilitating Hall.  App. 54; see Holena, 906 F.3d at 295.  (“[R]estrictions must be 
tailored to deterring crime, protecting the public, or rehabilitating the defendant.”).  
Hall’s personal computer has been integral to the majority of Hall’s charged conduct—
from making a fraudulent online fundraising account, to impersonating others via fake 
social media accounts, to making threats against a Congressman on X.  Moreover, the 
computer monitoring condition was not imposed reflexively upon Hall’s release.  Rather, 
it was imposed only after Hall misled his probation officer about the existence of his X 
account, demonstrating a need to obtain more reliable information about Hall’s social 
media use.  Finally, the computer monitoring condition lasts only as long as the term of 
Hall’s supervised release and therefore extends no longer than necessary to address the 
purposes of imposing supervised release on Hall in the first place.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583(d)(1); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2, comment. (n.4).  On plain error review, we will affirm.  
There is a “viable basis in the record” to support the District Court’s imposition of the 
condition, Holena, 906 F.3d at 290–91 (3d Cir. 2018), and condition is “tangibly related 
 
6 
to the goals of supervised release.”  See Holena, 906 F.3d at 290.4  We perceive no “clear 
or obvious error under the law,” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, in the District Court’s tailoring 
of the condition to address Hall’s failure to comply with a previous condition of release 
and the District Court’s concern for community protection and deterrence.  Santos Diaz, 
66 F.4th at 448. 
B. Hall’s Fourth Amendment Argument 
 
Next, Hall argues that the District Court plainly erred in imposing the search 
portion of the computer monitoring condition because it infringes his privacy interests 
under the Fourth Amendment.  Again, we disagree. 
“Defendants on supervised release enjoy less freedom than those who have 
finished serving their sentences,” Holena, 906 F.3d at 295, so Hall has a reduced privacy 
 
4  Hall relies on various cases to support his argument that the computer monitoring 
condition “has a chilling effect on his ability to express political views,” and thus violates 
his First Amendment rights.  The District Court did not plainly err by failing to sua 
sponte consider these cases, especially when considering that those cases are readily 
distinguishable from Hall’s. Compare App. 55 (special condition imposing no restriction 
on Hall’s access to the internet, social media posting, or run for Congress); with Cooksey 
v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 236 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (agency 
threatened to remove Appellant’s website unless he complied with certain guidelines, 
provided a “red-pen mark-up of his website,” and threatened to continuously monitor his 
website to ensure compliance); Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 57–58 (1st Cir. 
2003) (finding that the Appellant had First Amendment standing where he alleged that he 
“faced ... a real threat of prosecution” because of his investigative reporting and where 
Appellant could not “limit his exposure other than [by] curtail[ing] his investigative and 
journalistic activities”).  Hall’s references to Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98 
(2017)—where the Supreme Court found that a law prohibiting registered sex offenders 
from ever accessing certain websites violated the First Amendment—are equally 
unpersuasive.  See United States v. Browder, 866 F.3d 504, 511 n.26 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(noting that Packingham was not on point as “[i]t involved an internet ban—not internet 
or computer monitoring—and that ban extended beyond the completion of a sentence.”). 
 
7 
interest in his computers while he is on supervised release.  See United States v. 
Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 187 (3d Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Balon 384 F.3d 
38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) Indeed, nearly two decades ago, the Supreme Court held that 
because individuals on supervised release have a significantly diminished expectation of 
privacy, the Fourth Amendment does not categorically prohibit the suspicionless search 
of those individuals.  See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 849, 857 (2006).5 
Taking into account Hall’s reduced privacy interest in his computers, we must 
consider whether the computer monitoring condition imposes a “greater deprivation of 
liberty than is reasonably necessary.”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2); Holena, 906 F.3d at 291 
(“A defendant’s conduct should inform the tailoring of his condition[].”).  While the 
monitoring condition contains no limitations on when the probation officer may search 
Hall’s computers, the searches are limited in purpose to “determin[e] whether the 
computer contains any prohibited data prior to installation of the monitoring software, to 
determine whether the monitoring software is functioning effectively after installation, 
and to determine whether there have been attempts to circumvent the monitoring software 
after installation” and apply only for the length of Hall’s supervised release.  This 
condition is clearly geared towards ensuring the proper functioning of the means (the 
software) for deterring further violations and addressing Hall’s lack of candor with his 
 
5  Hall argues that probation and supervised release should be treated differently and 
that therefore Samson does not apply here, but Hall cites to no caselaw to support this 
conclusion, and several Courts of Appeal have applied Samson in the context of federal 
supervised release.  See, e.g., United States v. Rusnak, 981 F.3d 697, 712 (9th Cir. 2020); 
United States v. Winding, 817 F.3d 910, 916 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Supervised release is akin 
to parole.”). 
 
8 
probation officer.  We again perceive no “clear or obvious error under the law,” Johnson, 
520 U.S. at 467, in the District Court’s tailoring of the condition given that it is “directly 
related to deterring [the] defendant and protecting the public.”  Santos Diaz, 66 F.4th at 
448.  This is especially so in light of the ample “viable bas[e]s in the record for the 
restriction” such as Hall’s violation of the terms of his initial supervised release by 
misusing his personal computer and failing to accurately report his activities on that 
computer.  Holena, 906 F.3d at 290–91 (3d Cir. 2018).  Considering the above, the 
District Court did not commit plain error in imposing the computer monitoring condition. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order, imposing the 
computer monitoring condition on Hall’s term of supervised release. 


USA v. Joshua Hall

USDC for the District Court of the Virgin Island

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-17-2025 
Joan Gillham v. Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Joan Gillham v. Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 54. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/54 
This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL  
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT  
_____________ 
No. 23-2478 
______________ 
 
JOAN GILLHAM, 
       
Appellant 
 
v.  
 
SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS; 
TANISHA BAILEY-ROKA, in her Official Capacity as Virgin Islands Chief 
Disciplinary Counsel, and in her individual capacity; and 
VIRGIN ISLANDS BAR ASSOCIATION 
____________ 
On Appeal from the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands 
(District Court No. 1:22-cv-0044) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kent A. Jordan, Circuit Judge1 
____________ 
Argued:  December 9, 2024 
___________ 
Before:  CHAGARES, Chief Judge, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and FISHER, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: January 17, 2025) 
 
 
1 The Honorable Kent A. Jordan, Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit, sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 291(b). 
2 
 
Joan L. Gillham, Esq. [ARGUED] 
P.O. Box 823921 
Dallas, TX 75382 
 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
Timothy J. Anzenberger, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Adams & Reese 
1018 Highland Colony Parkway 
Suite 800 
Ridgeland, MS 39157 
 
Evan A. Moeller, Esq. 
Adams & Reese 
1221 McKinney Street 
Houston, TX 77010 
 
Kevin A. Rames, Esq. 
K A Rames 
Suite 3 
2111 Company Street 
Christiansted, VI 00820 
  
Counsel for Appellee Virgin Islands Bar Association 
 
Paul L. Gimenez [ARGUED] 
Superior Court of the Virgin Islands 
Office of General Counsel 
P.O. Box 70 
St. Thomas, VI 00804 
 
Pamela L. Colon, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Suite 3 
2155 King Cross Street 
Christiansted, VI 00820 
 
Counsel for Appellees Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands and Tanisha Bailey-Roka, in 
her Official Capacity as Virgin Islands Chief Disciplinary Counsel, and in her individual 
capacity 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Chief Judge. 
Joan Gillham, an attorney proceeding pro se, challenges certain requirements to 
practice law in the Virgin Islands and the defendants’ actions to enforce those 
requirements.  The District Court dismissed Gillham’s complaint and denied leave to 
amend.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.   
I.2 
 Joan Gillham is an attorney who practices law in the Virgin Islands and resides in 
Texas.  As a lawyer practicing in the Virgin Islands, Gillham was subject to the 
jurisdiction’s annual attorney registration requirement.  Gillham alleges that she 
attempted in 2019 to file her registration statement and pay the accompanying fee, and 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court rejected her filing but accepted the fee payment.  
Gillham re-filed her registration statement and paid the late fee, but the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court issued an order stating that Gillham was not compliant with the annual 
registration requirement.  Although Tanisha Bailey-Roka, chief disciplinary counsel for 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, later moved to dismiss the case against Gillham 
regarding her failure to comply with the annual registration requirement, the Virgin 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 We write primarily for the parties and so recite only those facts pertinent to our 
decision.   
4 
 
Islands Supreme Court case remains open because Gillham’s motion for sanctions against 
Bailey-Roka is still pending.   
Gillham also challenges the requirement that she include a physical business and 
home address, instead of a P.O. box, in her annual registration statement.  Finally, 
Gillham challenges a 2021 rule proposed by the Virgin Islands Bar Association (“VIBA”) 
and promulgated by the Virgin Islands Supreme Court that automatically confers 
reciprocal continuing legal education credit for several states but not Texas.  Based on all 
of this, Gillham alleges violations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Due 
Process Clause pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as the Equal Protection Clause.   
The defendants moved to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings, and Gillham 
opposed the motions.  The District Court held a status conference at which it reviewed 
the deficiencies in Gillham’s complaint that had been identified in the defendants’ motion 
papers and by the court’s own review.  The District Court granted Gillham an opportunity 
to move for leave to file an amended complaint, and Gillham did so.  The District Court 
held that Gillham failed adequately to address those deficiencies, denied leave to amend, 
and dismissed the case.  Gillham timely appealed. 
II.3 
We exercise plenary review over the grant of a motion to dismiss or a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings.  See Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 32 (3d Cir. 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1331 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
5 
 
2011).  We review the denial of a motion for leave to amend for abuse of discretion.  See 
Menkes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 762 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2014). 
After consideration of all contentions raised by the appellant, we will affirm for 
substantially the same reasons articulated by the District Court.  We write briefly to 
address Gillham’s claim that the District Court erred in concluding that the abstention 
doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), justified the dismissal of her claims 
for damages.  A district court may dismiss claims for injunctive relief but may not 
dismiss claims for damages based on Younger abstention.  See Borowski v. Kean Univ., 
68 F.4th 845, 850 (3d Cir. 2023).  Nevertheless, a district court may dismiss a claim for 
damages on any other valid ground, including a determination that the defendants are 
immune from a claim for money damages.  See Lui v. Comm’n, Adult Ent. of the State of 
Del., 369 F.3d 324, 328 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 The District Court articulated several independent grounds for the dismissal of 
Gillham’s claim for damages.  First, as the District Court noted, neither the Virgin Islands 
government nor its officers acting in their official capacities are “persons” that can be 
sued under § 1983.  See Durant v. Husband, 28 F.3d 12, 14 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994).  Second, 
the District Court held that Gillham failed meaningfully to address numerous dispositive 
issues raised by the District Court and the defendants, including that the defendants were 
immune from any damages claim because they enjoyed sovereign, absolute, or qualified 
immunity.  Appendix 14.  The District Court did not, as Gillham contends, dismiss her 
claims for damages or deny leave to amend based on Younger abstention.   
6 
 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 


Joan Gillham v. Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-27-2025 
Henry Washington v. Robert Gilmore 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Henry Washington v. Robert Gilmore" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 68. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/68 
This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
______________ 
 
No. 23-2277  
______________ 
 
HENRY UNSELD WASHINGTON, 
             Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT GILMORE, Warden; TRACY SHAWLEY, Warden’s Assistant;  
S.P. DURCO, RHU Commander; P.E. BARKEFELT, RHU Lieutenant;  
A.J. MORRIS, Lieutenant; C. WILLIAMS, Lieutenant; G. CRABLE, Sergeant; J.M. 
SMITH, Sergeant; ROBERT NELSON, Corrections Officer; T.S. OSWALD, Corrections 
Officer; L. COMER, Corrections Officer; T.I. BENNETT, Property Officer/Corrections 
Officer; R. HENDRICKS, Corrections Officer; J. CODDY, Corrections Officer;  
J. HEGETER, Corrections Officer; D. FARRIER, Corrections Officer;  
M. STUMP, Corrections Officer; G. TAIT; J.D. SUHAN, Corrections Officer; IRMA 
VIHLIDAL, Health Care Administrator; B. JIN, Medical Director; M. PARK; Doctor; P. 
DASCANI, Doctor; M. COMER, P.A.; E. MATTES, P.A.; E. MWUARA, P.A.;  
P. DENNISON, Corrections Officer 
 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. No. 2:15-cv-01031) 
District Judge: David S. Cercone 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 26, 2024  
 
 
Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion Filed: January 27, 2025) 
 
2 
 
   
OPINION* 
   
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Henry Washington is an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections (the DOC). He alleges, among other things, that Irma Vihlidal, the Correc-
tions Health Care Administrator, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to ad-
dress his complaints about the quality of his medical care. A magistrate judge recom-
mended that the District Court enter summary judgment for Vihlidal. Washington did not 
object to that report and recommendation (the R&R), so the District Court adopted it in 
full without additional explanation. Because we agree that there is no genuine factual dis-
pute about whether Vihlidal was deliberately indifferent to Washington’s serious medical 
needs, we affirm. 
I. Background 
Washington is a diagnosed hypochondriac. To treat his hypochondria, the DOC 
enacted a plan to ensure a clinician visited him every two weeks. In addition to those 
scheduled visits, the DOC also allows him to submit sick-call requests. This meant he 
was often seen by a clinician once a week, if not more. Although Washington’s doctors 
never detected serious medical issues during their visits, he repeatedly complained about 
the quality of his care. Vihlidal was the prison official responsible for reviewing and 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
3 
 
responding to his complaints. Her oversight was administrative, not medical, and in-
volved tasks like reviewing Washington’s complaints and discussing his care with medi-
cal staff. 
Washington claims that Vihlidal met with him three times between 2009 and 2015 
and failed to address his medical complaints adequately each time. According to Wash-
ington, these purported failures amounted to deliberate indifference to his serious medical 
needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In July 2018, Vihlidal moved for summary 
judgment. The magistrate judge recommended that the District Court grant the motion 
because, among other things, “[t]here is nothing in the record that would lead a reasona-
ble jury to find that . . . Vihlidal was not justified in believing that [Washington] was in 
capable hands.” 
Despite receiving an express warning from the magistrate judge that he must ob-
ject to the R&R to preserve his appellate rights, Washington failed to do so. The District 
Court then adopted the R&R in full without additional reasoning. Washington now ap-
peals the District Court’s order to the extent that it entered summary judgment for 
Vihlidal. 
II. Discussion 
Because Washington failed to object to the R&R and the District Court did not add 
any independent reasoning, we review that Court’s order granting summary judgment for 
plain error. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 2011); see generally Orie v. 
Dist. Att’y Allegheny Cnty., 946 F.3d 187, 193–94 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting we may review 
an order de novo if the District Court added independent reasoning).  
 
4 
 
To prove an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim, “a plaintiff must 
make (1) a subjective showing that ‘the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his or 
her medical needs’ and (2) an objective showing that ‘those needs were serious.’” Pear-
son v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (brackets omitted) (quoting 
Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)). “If a prisoner is under the care of 
medical experts,” then “a non-medical prison official,” like Vihlidal, “will generally be 
justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 
236 (3d Cir. 2004). “This follows naturally from the division of labor within a prison.” 
Id. “[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assis-
tants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not 
be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indiffer-
ence.” Id. 
Washington points to no record evidence that Vihlidal knew or had reason to be-
lieve that his doctors were mistreating him. Claiming, without more, that a non-medical 
prison official “failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was 
already being treated by the prison doctor” is not enough to show deliberate indifference. 
Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993). But that is all Washington alleges. 
If anything, the record suggests that Vihlidal had every reason to believe Washington was 
receiving appropriate care—he received precautionary medical visits biweekly as well as 
frequent additional sick-call visits.  
 
5 
 
On this record, we cannot say the District Court plainly erred in holding that there 
is no genuine factual dispute about whether Vihlidal knew or had reason to believe Wash-
ington was being mistreated. We thus affirm. 


Henry Washington v. Robert Gilmore

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-10-2025 
USA v. Michael Waggoner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Michael Waggoner" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 193. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/193 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_________________ 
 
No. 24-1573 
_________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL SHANE WAGGONER, 
  Appellant 
   
  ________________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1:12-cr-00309-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
________________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 6, 2024 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and McKEE, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed March 10, 2025)  
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.   
2 
 
 Michael Waggoner appeals the 16-month prison sentence he received for violating 
the conditions of his supervised release, as well as the District Court’s imposition of a 
condition of supervised release prohibiting him from viewing adult pornography. We will 
affirm the 16-month sentence but vacate the challenged condition of supervised release.1 
I. 
 In 2013, Waggoner pled guilty to possession of child pornography, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5), and failure to register under the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 2250. The District Court sentenced 
Waggoner to 10 years of imprisonment followed by 15 years of supervised release.  
 In July 2021, Waggoner began supervised release. Less than a year later, in 
September 2022, the Probation Office filed a petition to revoke Waggoner’s supervised 
release, alleging that he had violated several conditions of supervision. Waggoner 
admitted to using a computer at the library to view pornography and offering an 
intellectually disabled adult money in exchange for oral sex. Finding that Waggoner had 
violated the conditions of supervised release, the District Court sentenced Waggoner to 8 
months of imprisonment followed by 10 years of supervised release. 
 In May 2023, Waggoner began his new term of supervised release. Again, less 
than a year later, the Probation Office filed a petition to revoke Waggoner’s supervised 
release, alleging that he had violated several conditions of supervision. Waggoner 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
3 
 
admitted to possessing an unauthorized cellphone for six months without informing his 
probation officer, and using it to view adult pornography. Although no child pornography 
was found on the phone, Waggoner admitted to searching for images of children peeing.  
The District Court determined that Waggoner’s Guidelines range was 4 to 10 
months of imprisonment. Defense counsel conceded “that the court could justify a 
sentence probably a little bit above the guideline range.”2 After listening to Waggoner’s 
allocution, and considering the “appropriate factors set forth in Section 3553,” the 
District Court concluded that Waggoner posed “a significant danger to the community” 
due to his repeated “deceitful and deceptive behaviors.”3 The District Court expressed 
concern that Waggoner had not been deterred from reoffending by his previous sentences 
and that he presented a “high risk [of] recidivism.”4 Accordingly, the District Court 
sentenced Waggoner to a term of 16 months of imprisonment because it was “necessary 
to deter Mr. Waggoner and to protect the community from future criminal activity.”5 The 
District Court also sentenced Waggoner to an additional 10 years of supervised release. 
As a condition of supervised release, the District Court prohibited Waggoner from 
viewing or possessing “any ‘visual depiction’ (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256), including 
any photograph, film, video, or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or 
produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of ‘sexually explicit conduct’ (as 
 
2 Appx. 53. 
3 Appx. 53–54. 
4 Appx. 54. 
5 Appx. 54. The District Court also found that a sentence above the Guidelines range was 
justified by Application Note 3 of USSG § 7B1.4.  
4 
 
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256).”6 Defense counsel asked the District Court for clarification 
as to whether this condition prohibited Waggoner from viewing adult pornography. 
Rather than clarifying the scope of the District Court’s condition, the judge sought 
guidance from the probation officer. The probation officer advised that Waggoner also 
had a condition requiring treatment, and that as part of his treatment, Waggoner would 
“sign[] a contract with the treatment provider not to view any pornography, whether it’s 
adult or child pornography.”7 The District Court found that the probation officer had 
“clarifie[d]” the condition.8 Despite imposition of a special condition that explicitly 
forbid Waggoner from viewing or possessing “sexually explicit conduct,” the District 
Court adamantly stated that it had not imposed any condition prohibiting Waggoner from 
viewing adult pornography.  
II. 
 Waggoner argues that his 16-month sentence is procedurally and substantively 
unreasonable. Generally, we review whether a revocation sentence is procedurally and 
substantively reasonable for abuse of discretion.9 Because Waggoner raises procedural 
reasonableness for the first time on appeal, however, plain error review applies to that 
issue.10  
 
6 Appx. 8. 
7 Appx. 55. 
8 Appx. 55. 
9 See United States v. Thornhill, 759 F.3d 299, 307 n.9 (3d Cir. 2014). 
10 See United States v. Packer, 83 F.4th 193, 198 (3d Cir. 2023). 
5 
 
When reviewing  a sentence for reasonableness, we first consider whether the 
district court committed any “significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or 
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, 
failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly 
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an 
explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.”11 Second, we consider the 
substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed, “tak[ing] into account the totality of 
the circumstances.”12 “[I]f the district court’s sentence is procedurally sound, we will 
affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on 
that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”13 
Waggoner contends that the District Court “erred in its weighing of the [§] 
3553(a) factors” because the violation was “relatively minor” and he “quickly took 
responsibility for his mistake.”14 In fashioning a sentence, however, the District Court 
properly calculated the Guidelines range and considered the appropriate § 3553(a) 
factors, as well as Waggoner’s allocution. While the District Court acknowledged 
Waggoner was “aware[] of his addiction to child pornography” and understood “his 
responsibility . . . to stop that conduct,” the District Court concluded, based on 
Waggoner’s history, that he is at “very high risk” of recidivism.15 Although Waggoner’s 
 
11 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
12 Id. 
13 United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009). 
14 Opening Br. 21. 
15 Appx. 54. 
6 
 
phone did not contain any child pornography, the District Court noted that Waggoner had 
used the unauthorized cellphone to “search[] for nude young boys.”16 The District Court 
sentenced Waggoner above the Guidelines because it was “necessary to deter Mr. 
Waggoner and to protect the community from future criminal activity.”17 Under these 
circumstances, it cannot be said that no reasonable court would have imposed a 16-month 
sentence for Waggoner’s second violation of supervised release. Accordingly, the 16-
month sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable.  
III. 
Waggoner also appeals the District Court’s imposition of a condition of supervised 
release prohibiting him from viewing or possessing “sexually explicit conduct.”18 We 
review a district court’s decision to impose conditions of supervised release for abuse of 
discretion.19 A district court acts within its discretion if it meets the following two 
criteria: “First, the condition must be reasonably related to the factors set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) & (2)(B)-(D). . . . Second, a condition must involve no greater 
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the deterrence, public 
protection and/or correctional treatment for which it is imposed.”20 
To its credit, the government concedes that this condition should be vacated from 
the judgment “[b]ecause the written judgment conflicts with the district court’s 
 
16 Appx. 54. 
17 Appx. 54. 
18 Appx. 8. 
19 United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2001). 
20 Id.  
7 
 
unambiguous statements at the sentencing hearing that it did not intend to impose a 
freestanding condition that prohibited Waggoner from viewing adult pornography.”21 
Given that the District Court apparently did not realize the condition it imposed forbid 
adult pornography, it could not have considered whether the condition was reasonably 
related to the § 3553(a) factors. “Although a ban on accessing sexually explicit material 
involving children would certainly be reasonable, there are First Amendment 
implications for a ban that extends to explicit material involving adults.”22 “[T]o avoid 
First Amendment infirmity, [such] a probation condition must be ‘narrowly tailored’ and 
‘directly related’ to the goals of protecting the public and promoting . . . rehabilitation.”23 
Because the District Court failed to even recognize that it was imposing such a ban, it 
could not have been narrowly tailored to involve no greater deprivation of liberty than 
was reasonably necessary. Moreover, the District Court’s misleading and conflicting 
messages as to whether Waggoner was prohibited from viewing adult pornography 
violated Waggoner’s due process rights “by failing to provide [him] with adequate notice 
of what he may and may not do, chilling his First Amendment rights in the process.”24  
Rather than eliminate this condition when defense counsel asked for clarification 
as to whether it prohibited the viewing of adult pornography, the District Court 
exacerbated the problem by deferring to the probation officer. After seeking guidance 
 
21 Answering Br. 19. 
22 United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 151 (3d Cir. 2007). 
23 Loy, 237 F.3d at 264 (quoting United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir. 
1999)). 
24 Id. at 267. 
8 
 
from the probation officer as to whether a ban would apply, the officer explained that 
Waggoner would “sign[] a contract with the treatment provider not to view any 
pornography, whether it’s adult or child pornography. So that is a condition of the 
court.”25 The District Court then informed defense counsel: “I think that clarifies it.”26 
However, “a probation officer may not decide the nature or extent of the punishment 
imposed upon a probationer. This limitation extends not only to the length of a prison 
term imposed, but also to the conditions of probation or supervised release.”27 The 
District Court’s reliance on the probation officer to interpret whether a prohibition on 
adult pornography applied was tantamount to an impermissible delegation of judicial 
authority.  
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the challenged condition of supervised 
release and affirm all other aspects of Waggoner’s sentence. We will remand to the 
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
25 Appx. 55 
26 Id. 
27 United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 250 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 


USA v. Michael  Waggoner

Stern, Shai

Biton, Itay

The Regulatory Triad: Reimagining Environmental Law in the Post-Chevron Era

Kohn, Laurie S.

Justice Delayed by Design: The Harms of Our Protracted Divorce System

Catroppa, Vincent

Participation Rights of Homeschooled Students in Public School Athletics: Is Denying Homeschooled Students Access to Public School Extracurriculars Legal or Wise?

Villanova University

Not a member yet

Madison Lara v. Commissioner PA State Police

Essential Utilities Inc v. Swiss Re Corporate Solutions Elite Insurance Corp

Madison Lara v. Commissioner PA State Police

USA v. Joshua Hall

Joan Gillham v. Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands

Henry Washington v. Robert Gilmore

USA v. Michael Waggoner

The Regulatory Triad: Reimagining Environmental Law in the Post-Chevron Era

Justice Delayed by Design: The Harms of Our Protracted Divorce System

Participation Rights of Homeschooled Students in Public School Athletics: Is Denying Homeschooled Students Access to Public School Extracurriculars Legal or Wise?

40,620

41,076