Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

English

Raffaella Spone v. Matthew Reiss

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-5-2025 
USA v. James Byrd 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. James Byrd" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 185. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/185 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
Nos. 23-1216 & 23-3021 
_______________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JAMES TARIC BYRD, 
   Appellant 
 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Nos. 2:17-cr-00299-001; 2:21-cr-00227-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 8, 2024 
 
Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 5, 2025) 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant James Byrd challenges his conviction on four bases, arguing that the 
District Court erred by revoking his right to proceed pro se, denying his counsel’s motion 
to withdraw, removing him from the courtroom and proceeding in absentia, and 
instructing the jury.  We will affirm.  
I. DISCUSSION1 
A.      Right to Self-Representation 
Once a defendant invokes his right to self-representation, it can be terminated 
when he “deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.”  United 
States v. Taylor, 21 F.4th 94, 104 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806, 834 n.46 (1975)).  Conduct that is “openly hostile” and “repeatedly disrupt[s] the 
proceedings” suffices to revoke a defendant’s right to proceed pro se.  United States v. 
Mabie, 663 F.3d 322, 329 (8th Cir. 2011).   
Here, Byrd’s conduct far surpasses this threshold.  He repeatedly refused to 
participate in pretrial proceedings.  He levied abusive and expletive-laden insults on the 
District Court.  See, e.g., App. 107 (“You can’t order me to do shit.”); id. at 117 (“[F]—k 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and our jurisdiction arises 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court’s revocation of a defendant’s right to 
represent himself de novo, see United States v. Noble, 42 F.4th 346, 350 (3d Cir. 2022), 
and a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw, decision to proceed in absentia, and 
refusal to give a requested jury instruction for abuse of discretion, see United States v. 
Bellille, 962 F.3d 731, 738 (3d Cir. 2020); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970); 
United States v. Titus, 78 F.4th 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2023).  But we review statements of the 
law in jury instructions de novo.  Titus, 78 F.4th at 602 
 
3 
 
you and this courtroom.”).  And he made sexually explicit and threatening comments to 
the District Judge. 
 The right to self-representation “is not a license to abuse the dignity of the 
courtroom,” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46, and the District Court did not err by revoking 
Byrd’s right to represent himself here.    
B.      Motion to Withdraw from Representation 
Byrd next contends that the District Court erred by denying his attorney’s motions 
to withdraw.  While an attorney must be discharged where there is “good cause” 
stemming from “a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication, or an 
irreconcilable conflict” with the client, United States v. Senke, 986 F.3d 300, 309–10 (3d 
Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1098 (3d Cir. 1995)), the 
denial of a motion to withdraw does not violate the Sixth Amendment “unless the district 
court’s ‘good cause’ determination was clearly erroneous or the district court made no 
inquiry into the reason for the defendant’s request to substitute counsel,” Goldberg, 67 
F.3d at 1098. 
Here, the District Court did not err on either occasion.  Byrd contends that his 
attorney’s initial motion was motivated by an irreconcilable conflict based on the 
attorney’s refusal to call a witness.  But decisions over which witnesses to call are 
entrusted to counsel’s discretion.  See McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414, 422, 424 
(2018).  And the District Court’s later inquiry established that Byrd and his attorney 
remained in contact, and that the latter was committed to representing Byrd despite these 
 
4 
 
challenges.  This dispute falls well short of the “complete breakdown of communication” 
that would justify substitution.  Senke, 986 F.3d at 309. 
The District Court’s second denial was also proper.  We have held that “good 
cause for the substitution” does not exist when the breakdown in the attorney-client 
relationship is “entirely [the defendant’s] fault.”  United States v. Noble, 42 F.4th 346, 
351 (3d Cir. 2022).  Here, the motion was clearly prompted by Byrd’s unprovoked 
physical assault on his attorney.  And once again, the District Court probed the reasons 
for the motion and heard testimony from Byrd’s attorney, which established that counsel 
was recommitted to representing Byrd. 
Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in either instance.   
C. Proceeding In Absentia 
Byrd’s challenge to the District Court’s decision to proceed in absentia fares no 
better.  A defendant “can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned 
by the judge . . . he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, 
disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the 
courtroom.”  Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 
43(c)(1)(C).   
Here, the District Judge warned Byrd that “[i]f you yell out in my courtroom, I 
will have you removed,” App. 265, and we harbor no doubt that Byrd’s physical assault 
constituted disorderly behavior that prevented the trial from continuing.  Of course, the 
District Court could have permitted Byrd to return once he was “willing to conduct 
himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and 
 
5 
 
judicial proceedings.”  Allen, 397 U.S. at 343.  But even when efforts were made to 
facilitate his participation, Byrd repeatedly refused to attend, seemingly with the goal of 
manufacturing a mistrial.2  And each day, the District Court diligently confirmed that his 
absence was voluntary.   
In the face of this obstinance, the District Court did not err by proceeding with 
Byrd in absentia.  
D. Jury Instructions 
Finally, Byrd contends that the District Court erroneously rejected his proposed 
instructions in favor of the Government’s, which clarified that “[t]he defendant does not 
have to be in federal custody to qualify as an inmate” for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1791.  Answering Br. 10 (No. 23-3021).  But the Government’s proposed instruction 
accurately reflected our precedent holding that the term “an inmate of a prison” properly 
reaches any defendant “detained in a facility in which federal prisoners are held.”  United 
States v. Hendrickson, 949 F.3d 95, 100–01 (3d Cir. 2020).  Byrd does not dispute that 
federal prisoners were held at the Allegheny County Jail along with him, so the District 
Court did not err by giving that instruction.  
II. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgments. 
 
2 Byrd was permitted to return to the courtroom to testify in his own defense. 


USA v. James Byrd

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-10-2025 
USA v. Olugbenga Lawal 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Olugbenga Lawal" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 194. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/194 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1100 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
OLUGBENGA LAWAL, 
a/k/a Razak Aolugbengela, 
        Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
District Court No. 1:22-cr-00011-001 
District Judge:  Honorable Maryellen Noreika 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
January 16, 2025 
____________ 
 
Before:  PHIPPS, FREEMAN, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed   March 10, 2025) 
____________ 
 
OPINION1 
____________ 
CHUNG, Circuit Judge. 
 
1 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
Olugbenga Lawal was found guilty of conspiracy to commit money laundering 
after a jury trial.  He filed a motion for acquittal and, in the alternative, for a new trial.  
The District Court denied the motion.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.  
I. BACKGROUND2 
Olugbenga Lawal was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit money 
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).  Evidence at trial reflected that the leader 
of the conspiracy was an individual referred to as “Classic Baggie,” who led a criminal 
organization based in Nigeria.  Lawal was based in Indiana and his co-defendants 
Michael Hermann and other members of the “Miami Crew” were based in Florida.  
Classic Baggie and his organization made millions of dollars through internet-based fraud 
schemes, including romance fraud.  The Miami Crew would send Lawal illicit proceeds 
from these fraud schemes at the direction of Classic Baggie, who referred to Lawal as his 
“partner … [i]n the romance fraud thing.”  Appx. 371.  Fraud victims sometimes directly 
sent money to Lawal, and the evidence reflected that Lawal had direct knowledge of 
these deposits.  After receipt, Lawal would help repatriate the money back to Nigeria 
through currency transactions and by purchasing cars in the United States and shipping 
the cars to Nigeria.   
Lawal and his co-defendants used a number of accounts held by shell entities to 
effect the involved transactions.  Lawal primarily used accounts held by himself and a 
shell company he registered called Luxe Logistics LLC, as well as the bank account of 
 
2 Because we write for the parties, we recite only facts pertinent to our decision. 
 
3 
Opeyemi Opaleye.  Opaleye was an automobile exporter who purchased cars in the 
United States for customers in Nigeria and shipped the cars to Nigeria.  This made 
Opaleye a convenient channel through which Lawal could take illicit United States funds 
from crime victims and convert them to Nigerian Naira for Classic Baggie.3 
After Lawal was found guilty, he filed a motion for judgment of acquittal under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, or, in the alternative, a new trial under Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.  The District Court denied his motion.  Lawal timely 
appealed.   
II. DISCUSSION4 
Lawal argues that his motion for a judgment of acquittal should have been granted 
because there was neither sufficient evidence that he knew the illicit nature of the 
proceeds, nor that he joined the conspiracy knowing of its illegal purpose and with the 
intent to further that purpose.  He also argues that we should grant a new trial because the 
verdict is against the weight of the evidence at trial.  We disagree.  
A. Motion for Acquittal 
The government charged Lawal with conspiracy to commit money laundering; 
 
3  For instance, Lawal would deposit checks into Opaleye’s United States account 
and Opaleye would then transfer an equivalent amount of Naira from Opaleye’s Nigerian 
account to a Nigerian account held by Lawal.  This allowed illicit proceeds to be 
converted into Naira without the proceeds being directly traceable to Nigerian accounts 
and without crossing international borders. 
4  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
 
4 
specifically, that Lawal conspired with others to achieve the criminal purpose of 
concealment money laundering or spending money laundering.5  To convict Lawal of 
conspiracy to commit either form of money laundering, the jury had to find with 
sufficient evidence that (1) an agreement was formed between two or more persons to 
achieve the specified money laundering purpose(s); (2) Lawal knowingly joined the 
conspiracy intending to achieve its purpose(s); and (3) Lawal knew of the criminal 
purpose(s) of the conspiracy.  United States v. Fallon, 61 F.4th 95, 115 (3d Cir. 2023).  
The jury found Lawal guilty under both theories of the government’s case, meaning they 
unanimously concluded that he joined the conspiracy knowing both its purpose to commit 
spending money laundering and to commit concealment money laundering. 
We review “the grant or denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal” de novo 
“and independently appl[y] the same standard as the district court.”  United States v. 
Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005).  Therefore, we “review the record in the light 
 
5  The elements of concealment money laundering are that (1) the defendant 
conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction; (2) involving the proceeds of a 
specified unlawful activity; (3) with knowledge that the transaction involves the proceeds 
of some unlawful activity; and (4) with knowledge that the transaction was designed in 
whole or in part to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership or control of the 
proceeds of that activity.  Fallon, 61 F.4th at 116.  The elements of spending money 
laundering are “(1) the defendant engaged or attempted to engage in a monetary 
transaction; (2) involving criminally derived property of at least $10,000; (3) that the 
property was in fact derived from specified unlawful activity; (4) that the defendant acted 
knowingly, that is, with knowledge that the property was derived from the proceeds of a 
criminal offense; and (5) that the transaction occurred in the United States.”  United 
States v. Greenidge, 495 F.3d 85, 100 (3d Cir. 2007) (footnote omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 
1957.   
 
 
5 
most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could 
have found proof of guilt[] beyond a reasonable doubt based on the available evidence.  
A finding of insufficiency should be confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is 
clear.”  Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).   
1. The Evidence was Sufficient to Support Finding Lawal Knowingly 
Joined the Conspiracy. 
Lawal largely claims that the circumstantial nature of the evidence offered against 
him made it insufficient to raise a reasonable inference that he knew the illicit nature of 
the proceeds he handled and that he knowingly joined the conspiracy knowing of either 
alleged criminal purpose.6  United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 425 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (“Circumstantial inferences drawn from the evidence must bear a logical or 
convincing connection to established fact.” (internal quotations omitted)).  We disagree.   
The government introduced testimony from Hermann that Classic Baggie referred 
to Lawal as his “partner” in the romance fraud scheme, direct evidence that Lawal knew 
of the fraudulent origin of the money he handled.  Additional evidence at trial reflected a 
level of trust from Classic Baggie and activity by Lawal that a rational juror could have 
found confirmed Classic Baggie’s statement.  For instance, though Lawal’s purported 
business was selling cars, only about $1 million of the approximate $2 million he 
received in criminal proceeds was used to purchase vehicles.  Of the cars purchased, the 
 
6  Lawal does not contest that the funds were, in fact, the proceeds of a specific 
unlawful activity (wire fraud).  Rather, he asserts that the evidence was insufficient to 
conclude he knew the criminal nature of the proceeds, an element of both concealment 
money laundering and spending money laundering.   
 
6 
evidence did not reflect that he provided any vehicle to a victim in exchange for any 
funds deposited, and that, to the contrary, the subject lines on victims’ checks reflected 
other intended purposes for the funds such as “house remodeling” or “legal.”   
Furthermore, after receiving notice from banks on multiple occasions that his 
accounts were being closed due to suspected criminal activity, activities that a rational 
juror could conclude would lead an innocent dupe to cease business with Classic Baggie,7 
Lawal continued to open accounts, facilitate transactions, register a shell company, buy 
cars, and engage in currency exchanges.  Similarly, the jurors considered testimony that 
Classic Baggie funneled substantial sums of money to Lawal.  Rational jurors could 
conclude that such trust would not be instilled in an unwitting figure, who could 
inadvertently jeopardize the flow of millions of dollars in proceeds back to Classic 
Baggie.   
Opaleye testified that Lawal had direct access and control of Opaleye’s account 
and used that control to deposit funds that the evidence established were illicit proceeds.  
In addition, a romance-fraud victim testified that he deposited a check directly into 
Opaleye’s account, that he photographed the deposit receipt, and that, in general, he took 
such photographs to show his catfish8 that he had made the deposits.  And the evidence 
showed that Lawal possessed the photograph taken by the romance-fraud victim.  Given 
 
7 This is especially true given that the jury heard this was Opaleye’s course of 
conduct once he was alerted that illicit funds may have been deposited into this account.  
8  A person assuming a false identity and feigning interest in a romance-fraud victim. 
 
7 
that Lawal possessed the receipt photo and given that he was the only member of the 
conspiracy with direct access to Opaleye’s account, a rational juror could infer that Lawal 
had direct contact with a romance-fraud victim (or his catfish), shepherding the transfer 
of funds to Opaleye’s account. 
Finally, there was also testimony from a money laundering expert that Lawal’s 
conduct was consistent with the money laundering trade and inconsistent with legitimate 
business operations, e.g., dissipating funds quickly so that victims and banking 
institutions could not recoup funds once the fraud was discovered.  A rational juror could 
have credited this testimony and concluded that regularly acting in a manner inconsistent 
with legitimate business practices, and consistent with the money laundering trade, 
reflected a knowledge that the proceeds were illicit.  Viewed in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution, see Brodie, 403 F.3d at 133, this cumulative evidence is an ample 
basis from which a rational juror could reasonably infer that Lawal knew the funds were 
illicit. 
Relying on the same argument (i.e. that a rational juror could not conclude he 
knew the proceeds were illicit), Lawal asserts that the evidence was also insufficient to 
establish that he knew the criminal purposes of the conspiracy.  We reject that argument 
for the same reasons.  Evidence sufficient to support that Lawal knew he was transacting 
in the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity and that he, in fact, engaged in 
transactions involving such proceeds was sufficient to demonstrate that he knew one 
criminal purpose of the conspiracy was spending money laundering.  And the evidence 
described above would permit a rational juror to conclude that Lawal knew the other 
 
8 
criminal purpose of the conspiracy and that he joined the conspiracy intending to further 
that purpose, concealment money laundering.  United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 
340 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Lawal cites testimony that loosely supports his narrative that he did not know he 
was part of the conspiracy—for example, Opaleye’s testimony suggesting that Lawal was 
in the legitimate business of exporting cars to Nigeria and the expert testimony of Edward 
Koby Jr. that sometimes one or more money launderers in a criminal scheme do not know 
of the illegal objective of the criminal activity.  While the jury could have drawn the 
inferences desired by Lawal, it was not required to do so.  United States v. Claxton, 685 
F.3d 300, 312 n.19 (3d Cir. 2012)  
B. Motion for a New Trial 
Lawal argues that the evidence “preponderates heavily” against the jury’s verdict, 
again because most of the government’s evidence was circumstantial, and therefore that 
we should grant a new trial.  Opening Br. at 20.  “We review a district court’s denial of a 
Rule 33 motion [for a new trial] for abuse of discretion.”  United States v. Salahuddin, 
765 F.3d 329, 346 (3d Cir. 2014).  “A district court can order a new trial on the ground 
that the jury’s verdict is contrary to the weight of evidence only if it believes that there is 
a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has occurred — that is, that an innocent 
person has been convicted.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).   
We cannot find that the District Judge abused its discretion in denying Lawal’s 
motion for a new trial.  Nothing strikes us as arbitrary or capricious when considering the 
District Court’s conclusion that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, 
 
9 
much of which is detailed above.  While Lawal argues for his favored interpretation of 
the evidence, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to reject his position, 
especially when viewing the trial record as a whole.  See id. at 348.   
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons presented above, we will affirm.  


USA v. Olugbenga Lawal

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-17-2025 
Jonathan Valentin v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department 
of Labor a 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Jonathan Valentin v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Labor a" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 
209. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/209 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2411 
__________ 
 
JONATHAN VALENTIN, 
                                                       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA  
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-00629) 
District Judge:  Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 5, 2025 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 17, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Jonathan Valentin appeals pro se from an order of the District Court dismissing his 
civil complaint with prejudice.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.  
Valentin filed his initial complaint against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
Department of Labor and Industries (“PA DOL”), its “Deputy Chief Council (sic),” and 
the North Philadelphia PA Career Link Office (“CareerLink”), seeking redress for 
employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. §§ 951-963.  On his complaint form, he checked slots indicating that he was 
discriminated against on the basis of his race (Hispanic) and national origin (Puerto 
Rico).  He also indicated that the discriminatory conduct included a failure to hire, failure 
to stop harassment, unequal terms and conditions of employment, and retaliation.  In an 
order entered February 21, 2024, the District Court granted Valentin’s motion to proceed 
in forma pauperis (IFP), and sua sponte dismissed the complaint with prejudice against 
“Deputy Chief Council” and without prejudice against the other defendants for failure to 
state a claim for relief.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The order provided Valentin 
with leave to amend within 30 days.   
Valentin filed a 242-page amended complaint solely against the PA DOL, alleging 
the same discriminatory conduct (minus failure to hire) under the same statutes.  That 
complaint was dismissed without prejudice at screening for failure to state a claim for 
relief pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and for failure to provide a short plain statement of 
the claims as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.  The District Court 
specifically noted that Valentin’s allegations were conclusory and insufficient to state a 
3 
 
plausible claim for discrimination against the PA DOL.  Valentin was again provided 
leave to file an amended complaint.  He was advised that he must present a clear 
narrative explaining the “who, what, where, and why” of his discrimination claims, and 
that he could not rely on his exhibits to state the substance of his claims.  ECF No. 19 at 
10 (citation omitted). 
Valentin filed a second-amended complaint against “PA DOL, et al.”   The 
District Court determined that the amended complaint failed to cure the deficiencies of 
the first two, and dismissed the matter with prejudice.  Valentin appeals. 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  To the extent the 
District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 
§ 1915(e)(2)(ii), we exercise plenary review, see Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 
(3d Cir. 2000), and to the extent its dismissal was for failure to comply with Rule 8, we 
review for abuse of discretion, see In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d 
Cir. 1996).  To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007)).  The complaint “must not be ‘so undeveloped that it does not provide a 
defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by [Fed. R. Civ. P. 8].’”  
Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Phillips v. 
Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)).   
It is difficult to discern Valentin’s claims.  The bulk of his allegations seem to be 
directed at Pennsylvania CareerLink, an initiative of the PA DOL offering career services 
4 
 
to Pennsylvania employers and potential employees.  See ECF No. 30 at 60.  As the 
District Court noted, Valentin’s claims appear to be based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b), a 
provision of Title VII which makes it unlawful for an employment agency “to fail or 
refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual 
because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for 
employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”1   
We agree with the District Court that the complaint is wholly insufficient to state a 
plausible employment discrimination claim.  As the District Court more fully explained, 
the allegations in the complaint are vague and conclusory, and, even taken as true and 
viewed with the exhibits, are insufficient “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery 
will reveal evidence” that PA DOL, or its initiative CareerLink, is liable for misconduct 
under § 2000e-2(b) or the PHRA.  Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d 
Cir. 2016); see also Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (“a court must 
consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, 
as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon 
these documents”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an 
exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”). 
 
1 As used in the statute, the term “employment agency” includes any governmental 
agency “regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an 
employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(a), (c).  For purposes of evaluating the complaint, we assume this includes 
CareerLink.    
5 
 
Briefly, Valentin claimed that he “enrolled” with CareerLink in April 2016 for 
vocational training and job placement.  He claimed that he “began to experience 
harassment and discrimination in late 2015 after an employment offer with TJX 
Marshalls” a CareerLink client, “ended sooner than expected leading to several 
complaints involving racial slurs and segregation to” a CareerLink office.  ECF No. 28 at 
1, 17.  Valentin did not clarify this statement, nor allege further facts which might put 
CareerLink on notice that it had engaged in unlawful discrimination.  Moreover, the 
exhibits he referenced suggest that the alleged “harassment” was the result of his “credit 
history,” “criminal record” and “pending court fees,” rather than a protected status.  ECF 
No. 29 at 71-72.   
 Valentin also made vague allegations that CareerLink denied him “[on-the-job 
training (OJT)] job placement” and “[OJT] employment funding” as the result of “racial 
barriers,” and that he filed a complaint as a result of “harassment and unfair treatment.”  
ECF No. 28 at 18-19. But he failed to allege specific facts, nor are there any fair 
inferences to be drawn from the complaint or exhibits, to suggest that CareerLink denied 
him job training or placement on account of his race or national origin.2  Instead, 
 
2 For example, Exhibit G includes vague references to discrimination.  See ECF No. 29 at 
29-32.  It includes an email regarding the complaint that Valentin apparently filed with 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission against CareerLink.  He claimed to be a 
member of a “protected class” based on his status as a “first time ex offender and a 
Hispanic, lation (sic) minority.”  Id. at 31.  He alleged that “as a member of multiple 
protected classes both job placement and federal funding  . . .was denied to me on several 
occasion.”  Id.  But he explained that he did not receive OJT employment opportunities, 
and was requested to complete “additional requirements” because of his “criminal record 
and lack of bilingual English Spanish speaking capacity.”  Id.  He stated that CareerLink 
“attempted to request” that he complete additional requirements before offering him OJT 
6 
 
Valentin quoted at length from Title VII and the PHRA, and made other opaque 
references to unlawful conduct.  See, e.g., id. at 19 (alleging “a willful display of 
harassing behavior and [d]iscrimination while in participating (sic) and in attendance and 
in employment [s]ervices partly due to Plaintiff’s involvement in a number of other work 
related Civil Rights employment complaint”).   
Finally, we agree with the District Court that Valentin had the opportunity to 
address the pleading deficiencies in his amended complaint, and that any further 
amendment would be futile.  See Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 
289, 292 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that "[a]mendment of the complaint is futile if the 
amendment will not cure the deficiency in the original complaint or if the amended 
complaint cannot withstand a renewed motion to dismiss"). 
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
 
 
employment opportunities, and “on several occasions,” “attempted to force” him into “a 
segregated minimum wage workforce.”  Id.   
 


Jonathan Valentin v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Labor a

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-1-2025 
USA v. Shawn Tribbett 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Shawn Tribbett" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 251. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/251 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1857 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
SHAWN TRIBBETT, also known as Marsh, also known as Mellow, 
Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 1:15-cr-00171-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Renée M. Bumb 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 25, 2025 
____________ 
 
Before:  BIBAS, PHIPPS, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 1, 2025) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. 
After violating the conditions of his supervised release for the second time by 
repeatedly failing drug tests, Shawn Tribbett received a sentence of 14 months’ 
imprisonment followed by 30 months’ supervised release.  He now disputes only the 
substantive reasonableness of the imposition of the 30 months’ supervised release.  In 
reviewing the District Court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion, we will affirm the sentence.  
BACKGROUND 
In 2016, after Tribbett pleaded guilty to four drug- or gun-related offenses, he was 
sentenced for each count.1  Those sentences ran concurrently so that altogether Tribbett 
would serve 70 months in prison followed by three years’ supervised release.  Each of those 
sentences imposed several conditions on his supervised release.  Among those, Tribbett 
was prohibited from committing any federal, state, or local crimes while on supervision.  
He also had to refrain from the illegal possession or use of drugs and the use of alcohol.  
In October 2020, after he had served the prison sentence and been on supervised 
release for a little over a year, Tribbett tested positive for four different narcotics.  Over the 
next three months, he failed two more drug tests.   
Tribbett’s situation deteriorated in March 2021.  On March 12, he skipped a random 
drug test.  On March 18, he tested positive for three controlled substances.  And on 
March 30, he was arrested for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl.   
 
1 Those charges consisted of one count of conspiracy to engage in firearms trafficking, see 
18 U.S.C. § 371, for which he received a 60-month prison sentence followed by 
three years’ supervised release; two counts of being a felon in possession, see id. 
§ 922(g)(1), for each of which he received a 70-month prison sentence followed by three 
years’ supervised release; and one count of distribution and possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), for which he received a 70-month 
prison sentence followed by three years’ supervised release.   
3 
Until that arrest, Tribbett’s probation officer had been reporting Tribbett’s 
infractions to the District Court but was consistently recommending against any punitive 
action.  In response to Tribbett’s arrest for fentanyl possession with intent to distribute, 
however, the probation officer petitioned the District Court to issue a warrant for his arrest, 
and it did so.   
After Tribbett’s arrest, the District Court held a hearing to address whether 
Tribbett’s supervised release should be revoked and, if so, what his prison sentence should 
be.  The District Court resolved both of those issues against Tribbett’s continued supervised 
release.  It determined that he had violated the conditions in each of his four supervised 
release sentences and revoked his supervised release.  The District Court then sentenced 
Tribbett to four six-month prison terms, to be served consecutively, along with four 24-
month terms of supervised release, to be served concurrently.  Those terms of supervised 
release were subject to similar crime and drug and alcohol conditions as those that 
governed Tribbett’s initial terms of supervised release.   
As before, Tribbett served the prison term and began his term of supervised release.  
But three days into the supervised release, on January 10, 2023, Tribbett tested positive for 
alcohol.  Between February 15 and May 6, he failed eight drug tests.  Even with awareness 
of those violations, Tribbett’s probation officer did not request any intervention by the 
District Court on the ground that it would interfere with Tribbett’s admission to an inpatient 
substance abuse rehabilitation program.   
Tribbett was admitted to that program on May 15.  Twelve days later, he was 
discharged for threatening staff and residents with violence.  At that point, his probation 
officer petitioned the District Court for an arrest warrant.  The District Court issued the 
warrant, and Tribbett was taken into custody.  
4 
This time, he was charged with three violations of the conditions of his supervised 
release.  Those were a Grade A violation for possession with intent to distribute crack 
cocaine, a Grade B violation for possession of crack and methamphetamine, and a Grade C 
violation for being discharged from an inpatient treatment facility.  At a hearing, Tribbett 
pleaded guilty to the Grade B violation, and the District Court dismissed the Grade A and 
the Grade C violations at the Government’s request.   
Based on the Grade B violation, the District Court revoked Tribbett’s supervised 
release.  It also sentenced him to a prison term of 14 months on each of the four 2016 drug- 
or gun-related offenses, to run concurrently, followed by 30 months’ supervised release on 
a single count and 16 months on the other three, to run concurrently.   
Through a notice of appeal, Tribbett invoked this Court’s appellate jurisdiction, and 
he now disputes only the substantive reasonableness of the 30-month term of supervised 
release.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3221.   
DISCUSSION 
To succeed in his challenge, Tribbett must establish that “no reasonable sentencing 
court would have imposed the same sentence” for the reasons provided.  United States v. 
Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  He cannot do so.  
The District Court imposed the 30-month term of supervised release to deter 
Tribbett from using illegal drugs, to allow him to continue to receive drug and alcohol 
treatment, and to help structure his life.  Those considerations are permissible bases for 
imposing a term of supervised release.  See United States v. Sicher, 239 F.3d 289, 291–93 
(3d Cir. 2000) (implying that the conditions on supervised release may include promoting 
rehabilitation from drug addiction); see also United States v. D’Ambrosio, 105 F.4th 533, 
538 (3d Cir. 2024) (explaining that supervised release is designed to “‘fulfill[] 
5 
rehabilitative ends’ and is intended ‘to assist individuals in their transition to community 
life.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000))).2   
Even still, Tribbett now argues that the District Court was unreasonable.  As he sees 
it, in light of his history of failing to comply with the conditions of supervised release, he 
was likely to violate those terms again, and so sentencing him to supervised release would 
“trap[] him in an endless cycle of release, inevitable violation, and additional 
punishment.”  Appellant’s Opening Br. 22.  But there is no rule that a defendant’s pattern 
of noncompliance with supervised-release conditions renders imposing supervised release 
unreasonable.  Cf. United States v. Clark, 726 F.3d 496, 502–03 (3d Cir. 2013).  Thus, even 
in light of Tribbett’s multiple violations of multiple terms of supervised release, the District 
Court did not err by imposing a 30-month term of supervised release. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court.   
 
2 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (directing that sentencing courts, “in determining 
whether to include a term of supervised release, and, if a term of supervised release is to 
be included, in determining the length of the term and the conditions of supervised release, 
[to] consider the factors set forth in [§ 3553 sub]section[s] . . . (a)(2)(B), [and] (a)(2)(D)”); 
id. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (directing the sentencing court to consider “the need for the sentence 
imposed . . . to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”); id. § 3553(a)(2)(D) 
(directing the sentencing court to consider “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to 
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or 
other correctional treatment in the most effective manner”). 


USA v. Shawn Tribbett

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-3-2025 
Scott Corsnitz v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of 
Environ 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Scott Corsnitz v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Environ" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 265. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/265 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-1783 
__________ 
 
SCOTT CORSNITZ; 
GWENDOLYN CORSNITZ, 
   Appellants 
 
v. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION; FELICIA LAMPHERE; RON EBERT; ANDREA BLOSSER; SCOTT 
WILLIAMSON; DEREK ENDERS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-01363) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 1, 2025 
Before:  BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 3, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Scott and Gwendolyn Corsnitz (together, the “Corsnitzes”) appeal pro se from the 
District Court’s order dismissing their complaint.  We will affirm the District Court’s 
order and judgment with a modification that the entire dismissal be without prejudice. 
I. 
 The Corsnitzes alleged that,1 in 2012, they bought a 72-acre property in Dauphin 
County, Pennsylvania, with the intention to farm the property.  In 2014, the Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) received a confidential complaint that 
earth disturbance activities were happening at the property.  Over the next two years, 
DEP employees Lamphere, Ebert, Blosser, Williamson, and Enders (the “Individual 
Defendants”), acting in their official capacities with DEP, entered the property several 
times without notice to, or permission from, the Corsnitzes.   
In 2016, the Individuals Defendants participated in issuing a formal DEP 
Administrative Order (“AO”) which asserted that the Corsnitzes’ earth disturbance 
activities violated state environmental laws.  The AO directed the Corsnitzes to comply 
with various remediation efforts.  The Corsnitzes filed an appeal to the Environmental 
Hearing Board, which issued a February 2018 order dismissing the appeal based on an 
adjudication that the AO was reasonable, necessary and lawful.  The Commonwealth 
 
1 In this appeal from the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint, we consider the 
allegations in the complaint and the public records of the state administrative and judicial 
proceedings that form the basis of the plaintiffs’ claims.  See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 
F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). 
3 
 
Court quashed the Corsnitzes’ petition for review as untimely, and the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court denied review 
In 2021, DEP filed a petition in the Commonwealth Court asserting that the 
Corsnitzes had not complied with the AO.  In March 2022, the Commonwealth Court 
entered an order which directed the Corsnitzes to comply with essentially the same 
remediation efforts described in the AO, and which provided for a fine of $100 per day 
for each day they failed to comply with the court’s order.  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court denied the Corsnitzes’ petition for allowance of appeal in August 2022 and denied 
reconsideration in September 2022.   
The Corsnitzes filed a counseled complaint in the District Court in September 
2022.  They named DEP and the Individual Defendants, in their official capacities only, 
as defendants.  See ECF 1 at ¶¶ 26, 31.2  The complaint brought civil rights claims under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought a declaration that the defendants’ actions constituted an 
unconstitutional trespass and taking; an injunction prohibiting the defendants from all 
enforcement actions related to the site; and money damages.  The District Court granted 
the defendants’ motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds, dismissing some 
claims with prejudice and others without prejudice.  This appeal ensued.   
II. 
 
2 The District Court construed the complaint to assert claims against the Individual 
Defendants solely in their official capacities, and the Corsnitzes have not objected to that 
construction, so we do the same.  See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 
(1985); Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1990). 
4 
 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Merritts v. Richards, 62 F.4th 
764, 772 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2023).  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds.  See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 
F.3d 690, 694 (3d Cir. 1996). 
III. 
 We agree with the District Court’s determination that the Corsnitzes’ claims are 
similar to certain claims we addressed in Merritts, 62 F.4th at 772, and that the 
defendants are likewise entitled to sovereign immunity here.  The Eleventh Amendment 
generally protects a state or state agency from suit in federal court unless Congress has 
specifically abrogated the state’s immunity, or the state has waived it.  See Pennhurst 
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100–01 (1984); Karns v. Shanahan, 879 
F.3d 504, 513 (3d Cir. 2018); Pennsylvania v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 681 F.3d 503, 504 
(3d Cir. 2012).  The Eleventh Amendment also protects state officials from suit when the 
suit is in fact against the state.  See A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 
372 F.3d 572, 580 (3d Cir. 2004) (“A suit against a governmental official in his or her 
official capacity is treated as a suit against the governmental entity itself.”).  Here, the 
Corsnitzes’ claims, which were brought against a Pennsylvania state agency, DEP, and 
against its employees acting in their official capacities only, are barred by sovereign 
immunity.  See generally Merritts, 62 F.4th at 772.  
The Corsnitzes have primarily argued that the Ex parte Young exception to 
sovereign immunity applies to their claims against the Individual Defendants.  See Ex 
5 
 
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908).  Among other conditions for this exception to 
apply to official-capacity claims, “there must be both an ongoing violation of federal law 
and a request for relief that can be properly characterized as prospective.”  Merritts, 62 
F.4th at 771.  Neither of those conditions is met by the complaint here.  The Corsnitzes 
failed to allege an ongoing violation, as the alleged trespasses by the named defendants 
happened in the past.  See id. at 772.  And the state’s acquisition of a right to enforce the 
conditions of the DEP Administrative Order occurred in a “proceeding that concluded 
before this lawsuit was filed.”  Id.  The “lingering effects of that discrete past action do 
not convert it into an ongoing violation.”  Id.3  Moreover, the relief that the Corsnitzes 
seek is not prospective, as they essentially seek a “reparative injunction” to cure the 
effects of past actions taken by the DEP and its employees.  Id.  Thus, the Ex parte 
Young exception does not apply here. 
The Corsnitzes also argue that the defendants have waived sovereign immunity, 
but there is no support for that argument given the civil rights claims that were raised 
 
3 On appeal, the Corsnitzes have claimed that the threat, or imposition, of a $100 daily 
fine constitutes an ongoing violation.  See Appellants’ Br. at 10.  But they did not raise 
this argument in the District Court, and they have not developed it on appeal.  See 
Higgins v. Bayada Home Health Care Inc., 62 F.4th 755, 763 (3d Cir. 2023) (“Because 
[Appellant] failed to develop her [ ] argument below and has made only passing reference 
to it on appeal, we deem that argument forfeited.”).  In any event, the Corsnitzes failed to 
plead the personal involvement of any of the named defendants in this alleged ongoing 
violation, as it appears that the Commonwealth Court is the entity that would impose any 
such fine.  See generally Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(explaining that a “defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in 
the alleged wrongs”). 
6 
 
here.  See generally Lavia v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The 
Pennsylvania legislature has, by statute, expressly declined to waive its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.”) (citing 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8521(b)).  To the extent that the 
Corsnitzes argue that Congress abrogated Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity here, we 
note that Congress did not do so through the enactment of § 1983, the federal law 
pursuant to which the Corsnitzes proceeded.  See Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 
299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020). 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court, but with a 
modification that the entire dismissal be without prejudice.  See Merritts, 62 F.4th at 772 
(explaining that a dismissal on the basis of sovereign immunity “should normally be 
without prejudice”); see also Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(“modify[ing] the order of dismissal . . . to reflect that these claims are dismissed without 
prejudice”). 
 


Scott Corsnitz v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Environ

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-8-2025 
Eric Malone v. Toyota Motor Sales 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Eric Malone v. Toyota Motor Sales" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 271. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/271 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2831 
__________ 
 
ERIC RAY MALONE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, INC. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-00242) 
District Judge:  Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 1, 2025 
Before:  RESTREPO, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 8, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION*
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Appellant Eric Malone appeals the District Court’s September 19, 2024, order 
dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Malone did not 
establish diversity of citizenship between the parties.  We will affirm the judgment.   
I. 
Malone filed his complaint in the District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania in August 2023, seeking to confirm an arbitration award issued in his favor 
by the California Dispute Settlement Program.1  For subject-matter jurisdiction, Malone 
relied solely on diversity of citizenship.  Appellee filed a motion to dismiss arguing that 
the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case because there is no 
diversity of citizenship between the parties as Appellee is a California corporation and 
Malone is a citizen of California.  Malone filed an opposition brief and an affidavit 
arguing he was a citizen of Pennsylvania.  The District Court held an evidentiary hearing 
in July 2024 “[t]o clarify [Malone’s] domicile” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.  
After the hearing, the District Court determined that Malone had failed to prove he was a 
Pennsylvania citizen at the time of filing his complaint.  The District Court thus 
dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Alternatively, the District 
 
1  Malone had previously sought to confirm the same award in the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California, which dismissed the complaint in December 
2022 after determining both parties were citizens of California.  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal in October 2023.  While the current case was pending, Malone 
filed a petition seeking to confirm the same award in the Superior Court of California.  
After a hearing, that court denied Malone’s petition and granted a petition by Appellees 
to vacate the arbitration award. 
3 
 
Court dismissed the complaint as being precluded by the Superior Court of California’s 
order vacating the arbitration award. Malone appealed.2 
II. 
 By failing to address diversity jurisdiction in his opening brief, Malone has likely 
forfeited appellate review of the District Court’s determination.  See Ctr. for Biological 
Diversity v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 937 F.3d 533, 542 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting that 
“arguments in favor of jurisdiction[] can be forfeited”); see also Blakely v. Schlumberger 
Tech. Corp., 648 F.3d 921, 931-32 (8th Cir. 2011) (ruling that because appellant “ha[d] 
not actually challenged the district court’s conclusion that it lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction . . . she ha[d] waived any argument to this effect on appeal”); Lara v. Comm’r 
Pa. State Police 125 F.4th 428, 432 n.5 (3d Cir. 2025) (reiterating that “an issue is 
[forfeited] unless a party raises it in its opening brief” (quotation marks omitted)).   
 In any event, the District Court did not clearly err in finding that Malone was a 
citizen of California at the time he filed his complaint.  See Johnson, 724 F.3d at 345.  
We have explained that “[c]itizenship is synonymous with domicile, and the domicile of 
an individual is his true, fixed and permanent home and place of habitation.”  McCann v. 
Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).  The District 
Court determined that Malone was domiciled in California because it was “apparent from 
 
2  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a dismissal for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction is de novo, Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 
176 (3d Cir. 2000); however, we review a District Court’s factual findings of citizenship 
for clear error.  See Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 345 (3d Cir. 
2013).   
4 
 
the record that [Malone] ha[d] been litigating this case from California,” and because 
Malone testified at the evidentiary hearing that “he ha[d] not resided in Pennsylvania 
since June 2012” and stated in a letter that he had been “a resident of California for the 
past ten years.” 
In his reply brief, Malone asserts that “his place of employment is in State 
College, Pennsylvania” and that “his residence is in either Oil City, Pennsylvania, or 
Hollidaysburg, Pennsylvania,” but he offered no documentary evidence of the same.  
Before the District Court, the only evidence he submitted supporting a residence in 
Pennsylvania was a voter registration card post-dating the filing of the complaint.  A 
review of Malone’s testimony from the evidentiary hearing, along with the fact that he 
continues to litigate his appeal from a California address, supports the District Court’s 
finding that Malone’s domicile at the time of filing was in California.  Thus, the parties 
were not diverse as required for the District Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.3 
 
3  We note that both parties have filed additional motions in this case.  We grant 
Appellee’s motion to supplement the appendix and file a medical note relevant to the 
jurisdictional issue under seal, as it was sealed in the District Court.  We direct the 
Clerk’s Office to seal that document for 25 years.  We deny, however, Appellant’s 
motions to file his reply brief under seal and to seal the entire appellate record, as 
Appellant’s motions fail to provide “with particularity the reasons why sealing is deemed 
necessary.”  3d Cir. L.A.R. 106.1(a).  We also deny Appellant’s motion to proceed IFP 
for purposes of counsel, motion for appointment of counsel, motion to transfer 
proceedings to California state court, and motion for a stay of the appellate proceedings.  
We also deny Appellee’s request for an order requiring Appellant to seek leave of this 
5 
 
 
Court before submitting any further filings in this matter.  Finally, to the extent Malone 
seeks any other relief through his additional motions, it is denied. 
 


Eric Malone v. Toyota Motor Sales

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-9-2025 
Susan Chung v. Commissioner Social Security 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Susan Chung v. Commissioner Social Security" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 277. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/277 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 24-1974 
_____________ 
 
SUSAN CHUNG, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the  
District of New Jersey 
(District Court No. 3:23-cv-00272) 
District Court Judge: Honorable Georgette Castner 
_____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to �ird Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 19, 2025 
 
(Filed: April 9, 2025) 
 
Before:  Chagares, Chief Judge, Bibas and Rendell, Circuit Judges. 
_________ 
O P I N I O N* 
_________ 
 
* �is disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Susan Chung challenges a determination by an administrative law judge 
(ALJ) denying her claim for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. �e District 
Court upheld the ALJ’s decision. Because the ALJ’s decision was supported by 
substantial evidence, we will affirm. 
I. 
Chung sought disability benefits for alleged impairments sustained over her 26-
year career as a financial aid counselor. Following two hearings and a remand from the 
Appeals Council, the ALJ denied Chung’s claim. 
Dr. Susan Richman, a treating specialist in occupational medicine, opined on 
Chung’s limitations in sitting, standing, lifting, handling, and other areas, stating that 
Chung had “marked” limitations in the use of her hands and could rarely or never reach 
or grasp objects. 18F at R. 771; 36F at R. 969. �e ALJ found these opinions to have 
“reduced persuasiveness” because they were “not consistent with or supported by the 
objective medical evidence.” A46. Several of Dr. Richman’s treatment records lacked 
“exam findings,” relying on Chung’s “allegations” about her symptoms, and Dr. Richman 
had proposed only “conservative” treatment. A46. �e ALJ also contrasted Dr. Richman’s 
opinions with examinations conducted by Chung’s primary care physician, Dr. Anna Lee, 
showing “within normal limits musculoskeletal exams and independence in [activities of 
daily living] and ambulation.” A46. And Dr. Richman’s diagnosis of “moderate” carpal 
tunnel syndrome was not supported by a 2018 electromyogram (EMG) finding the 
condition to be “mild.” A46. Similarly, the ALJ discounted an opinion from treating 
3 
 
physiatrist Dr. Luguang Yang that Chung could only “occasionally” use her hands and 
rarely or never use her arms for reaching, 28F at R. 859, concluding it was “not supported 
by the exam findings” in Dr. Yang’s records, A45. 
Treating psychologist Dr. Marc Burd opined Chung was limited in remembering 
and carrying out instructions and that Chung would likely be absent from work more than 
three times per month. �e ALJ found these opinions to have “significantly reduced 
persuasiveness” given that Dr. Burd’s treatment records contained “largely normal mental 
status examinations and GAF [global assessment of functioning] scores.” A44. �e ALJ 
also noted the absence of “any explanation” for Dr. Burd’s opinion on absences. A44. A 
similar report and questionnaire from examining psychologist Dr. Laura Cohen were 
unpersuasive because the “check-box” questionnaire was “not supported by or consistent 
with the objective medical evidence.” A45. Although Chung had a “depressed mood, flat 
affect, and difficulty concentrating,” as well as poor to fair reasoning, she had a fair fund 
of knowledge and was fully oriented. A45. Also, several times Dr. Lee had found Chung 
“not . . . depressed at all” on routine screenings. A45. Chung’s own reports of “reading 
the newspaper, doing puzzles, and playing games with her family” indicated she had 
“some ability with regard to understanding, memory, concentration, and the ability to 
apply information.” A44 (citations omitted). �e ALJ agreed with Drs. Burd and Cohen 
that Chung had mental limitations, “but not to the degree opined.” A45. 
Doctors from New Jersey’s Division of Disability Services (DDS) had reviewed 
Chung’s medical records and found Chung not disabled. �e ALJ discounted the portion 
of DDS’s written decision stating that Chung could only “occasionally” “perform 
4 
 
handling, fingering, and feeling . . . due to carpal tunnel syndrome and epicondylitis,” 
concluding that “the DDS consultants did not have the opportunity to examine [Chung] 
personally and did not have the opportunity to review the entire record,” and Chung “is 
noted to have only mild carpal tunnel syndrome.” A43-44. 
�e ALJ found Chung’s own “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and 
limiting effects of these symptoms . . . not entirely consistent with the medical evidence 
and other evidence in the record.” A41. Chung could “perform personal care,” drive, 
shop, and walk; had “no problems handling stress and . . . no problems handling changes 
in her routine after an adjustment period”; “was still able to do a lot of housework”; and 
had until recently participated in family game nights. A40-42. Chung’s treatment records 
did show limitations but not to the degree alleged by her. For example, Dr. Richman’s 
progress notes indicated pain in Chung’s “neck, back, shoulders, arms, and hands,” which 
limited her ability to perform daily activities, A41, and Dr. Yang’s notes showed pain, 
tenderness, and limited range of motion, but also “normal gait, normal muscle tone and 
[deep tendon reflexes], [and] no significant muscle atrophy,” A42. Dr. Burd’s notes 
showed depression and anxiety, but “good memory, normal attention and concentration, 
and normal thought processes.” A43. And records from Dr. Lee showed “full range of 
motion of the neck and the extremities, normal muscle tone, a normal gait, and normal 
neurologic findings,” with Dr. Lee’s advice being for Chung to “use warm compresses,” 
“do stretching exercises,” and “exercise.” A42. 
Based on the foregoing, the ALJ found Chung had limitations in lifting, carrying, 
and other areas, and that she could only “perform simple, routine tasks” and “make 
5 
 
simple work-related decisions.” A40. �ese limitations precluded Chung from performing 
her past work as a financial aid counselor. But the ALJ concluded Chung could perform 
other jobs such as “Photocopy Machine Operator” and “Laundry Sorter.” A48. �e ALJ 
therefore found Chung not disabled. 
After the Appeals Council denied review, Chung filed an action in the District 
Court, which upheld the ALJ’s decision. Chung then filed the present appeal. 
II.1 
A. Supportability and Consistency 
Chung disputes how the ALJ evaluated the persuasiveness of her doctors’ 
opinions. She urges the ALJ placed undue weight on the lack of exam findings in Dr. 
Richman’s records and overlooked other positive findings. See Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 
37, 41-42 (3d Cir. 1989) (declining to “interpret [a report’s] silence as affirmative 
evidence that the . . . physician considered [the claimant] to have no weight restrictions”). 
Chung also objects to the ALJ comparing Dr. Richman’s opinion to Dr. Lee’s records 
because Dr. Lee “does not treat [Chung’s] musculoskeletal conditions.” Appellant’s Br. 
31. 
 
1 �e District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We conduct a “plenary review” of the ALJ’s legal determinations while 
reviewing the ALJ’s factual findings for “substantial evidence.” Chandler v. Comm’r of 
Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial 
evidence consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (quoting 
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 
6 
 
Under the post-2017 regulation applicable to Chung’s claim, an ALJ “will not 
defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any 
medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [a 
claimant’s] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). �e “most important factors” in 
evaluating the persuasiveness are “supportability” and “consistency,” § 404.1520c(b)(2), 
which require the ALJ to examine “objective medical evidence” and “supporting 
explanations,” as well as “other medical sources and nonmedical sources.” 
§ 404.1520c(c)(1), (2). It was therefore appropriate for the ALJ to consider the lack of 
findings in Dr. Richman’s records. Rather than overlook positive exam findings, the ALJ 
discussed “positive Phalen’s and Tinel’s” (tests for carpal tunnel syndrome), “pain on 
palpation,” and “decreased range of motion,” among others. A46. And it was not 
unreasonable for the ALJ to observe that Dr. Lee’s records showed less severe symptoms. 
See Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 430 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Commissioner has an 
obligation to weigh medical evidence and make choices between conflicting accounts[.]” 
(citing Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1187 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
Chung next contends the ALJ disregarded the supportability and consistency 
factors for Dr. Yang and overlooked findings such as weakness, paresthesia, and 
tenderness in Dr. Yang’s “Medical Evaluation Report.” 27F. But an ALJ “need not 
reiterate the magic words ‘support’ and ‘consistent’ for each doctor,” so long as the ALJ 
“weave[s] supportability and consistency throughout [his] analysis of which doctors were 
persuasive.” Zaborowski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 115 F.4th 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2024). �e 
ALJ here concluded that Dr. Yang’s opinion was not supported after noting that Dr. Yang 
7 
 
did not refer Chung to pain management, did not “raise the possibility of surgery,” and 
“recommended long-term physical therapy, home exercises, and acupuncture.” A42. 
With respect to the psychologists, Chung urges the ALJ overlooked “findings such 
as an anxious, sad, and depressed affect with consistent mood, significant frustration 
related to her physical impairments, poor sleep, a pained appearance, and reduced 
appetite.” Appellant’s Br. 40. Chung also takes issue with the ALJ’s reference to GAF 
scores as unreliable. See 65 Fed. Reg. 50746, 50764-65 (Aug. 21, 2000) (clarifying that 
the Commissioner has not endorsed the use of GAF scores). 
We find no error. �e ALJ did not overlook abnormal findings cited by Dr. Burd 
and Dr. Cohen but discussed them extensively. �e ALJ described a mix of findings and 
concluded that Chung had significant mental limitations but not so much that she would 
be unable to perform any work. And the ALJ did not discount Dr. Burd’s and Dr. Cohen’s 
opinions “based on the naked fact that [they] [were] provided in a check-box form.” 
Colgan v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 353, 361 (2d Cir. 2022). Rather, the ALJ considered the 
form’s brevity in evaluating its persuasiveness. See Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 
1065 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting the reduced persuasiveness of checkbox forms). With respect 
to GAF scores, the ALJ did not mistake them for an ultimate determination of disability 
but instead looked at whether Dr. Burd’s own records, which included GAF scores, 
supported his opinion. See Miller v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 811 F.3d 825, 836 (6th Cir. 
2016) (taking a “case-by-case approach to the value of GAF scores”). 
We are also not persuaded by Chung’s argument that the ALJ misinterpreted Dr. 
Cohen’s terminology, an argument Chung did not make to the District Court. Chung’s 
8 
 
counsel provided Dr. Cohen a checkbox form that used severity terms resembling those 
from the Social Security Administration’s Program Operations Manual but with different 
definitions and the nonstandard term “moderate-to-marked.” U.S. Social Security 
Administration DI 34132.013, § F.2; 23F at R. 809. It was not unreasonable for the ALJ 
to categorize this last term as a “moderate” limitation. A45. 
B. Lay Opinions 
Chung posits the ALJ formed unsupported lay opinions from treatment records, 
diagnostic tests, and Chung’s daily activities. See Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (“[T]he ALJ improperly supplanted the opinions of [the claimant’s] treating 
and examining physicians with his personal observation and speculation.”). We disagree, 
and conclude the ALJ’s use of these materials was appropriate. 
An ALJ must consider “all the relevant evidence in [the] case record,” 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1545(a)(1), including “[o]bjective medical evidence,” § 404.1529(c)(2). “Objective 
medical evidence is evidence obtained from the application of medically acceptable 
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, such as evidence of reduced joint motion, 
muscle spasm, sensory deficit or motor disruption,” and is “a useful indicator to assist 
[the ALJ] in making reasonable conclusions about the intensity and persistence of [a 
claimant’s] symptoms and the effect those symptoms, such as pain, may have on [the 
claimant’s] ability to work.” Id. �e ALJ is also directed to look at the claimant’s “daily 
activities,” “medication,” other “treatment,” and other “measures . . . to relieve . . . pain.” 
§ 404.1529(c)(3). “�e ALJ—not treating or examining physicians or State agency 
9 
 
consultants—must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.” Chandler v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Chung’s contrary authority concerns the quantum of evidence necessary to 
overcome a treating doctor’s opinion under the pre-2017 “treating source” rule. See, e.g., 
Morales, 225 F.3d at 318 (“Although an ALJ may consider his own observations of the 
claimant . . . , they alone do not carry the day and override the medical opinion of a 
treating physician that is supported by the record.”); Frankenfield v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 
405, 408 (3d Cir. 1988) (“�e Secretary cannot reject [the treating sources’] medical 
determinations simply by having the administrative law judge make a different medical 
judgment.”); Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding the “mere[]” 
fact of conservative treatment not enough to overcome treating source’s opinion). Aside 
from the fact that the treating source rule did not apply to Chung’s post-2017 claim, the 
cited cases do not suggest that objective medical evidence should be ignored, only that 
“speculative inferences” drawn from it are insufficient. Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429. 
In particular with respect to Chung’s carpal tunnel syndrome, the ALJ reasonably 
looked to the 2018 EMG among other factors in concluding that Chung was not as 
severely limited in the use of her hands as either Dr. Richman or the state DDS doctors 
had opined. �e ALJ considered that the DDS doctors had not examined Chung 
personally and “offered little explanation as to what factors” supported their opinion. 
A44. Nor was the ALJ required to accept Dr. Richman’s supposition that the “mild” 
finding was based on a different threshold for what counts as “moderate.” A46. 
10 
 
�e same applies to Chung’s daily activities. �e ALJ’s decision does not reflect a 
misimpression that household activities were equivalent to what Chung could do “in an 
8-hour workday, 40 hours a week.” Appellant’s Br. 36. Rather, the ALJ weighed them in 
evaluating whether Chung was as severely limited as her doctors had opined. See 
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 555 (3d Cir. 2005) (looking to a claimant’s daily 
activities in evaluating limitations). �e ALJ acknowledged that Chung had significant 
limitations but reasonably concluded she could still “perform simple, routine tasks” and 
“make simple work-related decisions.” A40. 
Similarly, the ALJ did not form a speculative lay opinion about Chung’s response 
to treatment. �e ALJ observed the contrast between Dr. Richman’s opinion of complete 
disability and the comparatively “conservative” treatment she had recommended. See 
A46; Pierce v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 769, 773 (8th Cir. 2022) (looking to the nature of 
treatment among other factors in evaluating disability). 
With respect to the ALJ’s reference to Chung using only over-the-counter pain 
medication, we are not persuaded the ALJ needed to explore other reasons why Chung 
might forego more aggressive treatment. See Newell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 
541, 547 (3d Cir. 2003) (cautioning ALJs against drawing unexplained inferences from a 
“failure to seek or pursue regular medical treatment”). �e ALJ simply observed the 
tension between Dr. Richman’s opinion that Chung’s pain was disabling and her 
observation that it was “managed with over-the-counter pain medication.” A42. 
11 
 
C.  Support for Residual Functional Capacity 
Finally, Chung argues that since the ALJ discounted the persuasiveness of all 
medical opinion evidence, he lacked a basis for rendering a decision on Chung’s residual 
functional capacity. We disagree. 
An ALJ determines functional capacity from “all of a claimant’s credibly 
established limitations.” Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554 (emphasis in original). When an 
alleged limitation is “supported by medical evidence, but is opposed by other evidence in 
the record,” the ALJ may choose to discredit it. Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 615 (3d 
Cir. 2014). Here, while the ALJ found that the opinion of the state DDS doctors had 
“reduced” persuasiveness, he accepted many of the same limitations, other than as to 
Chung’s use of her hands. A43-44. For the reasons discussed previously, the ALJ did not 
err in finding other limitations not credibly established. 
III. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 


Susan Chung v. Commissioner Social Security

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-11-2025 
USA v. Luis Algarin-Torres 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Luis Algarin-Torres" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 285. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/285 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1589 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
LUIS ALGARIN-TORRES, 
Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:18-cr-00180-002) 
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 10, 2025 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 11, 2025)  
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Luis Algarin-Torres appeals his judgment of conviction for firearm-related 
offenses following a jury trial. We will affirm. 
I 
Police arrested Algarin-Torres for trafficking drugs. In a concealed compartment 
in his home, they found cash, crack cocaine, and a Glock handgun. 
A grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Algarin-Torres with 
more than a dozen drug trafficking and firearms-related offenses. He pleaded guilty to all 
charges except for: (1) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (c)(1)(B)(ii); and (2) possession of a firearm 
by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 922(g)(1). 
At trial, a former cellmate testified that Algarin-Torres told him that he owned a 
gun with a switch that made the firearm fully automatic, that the person who sold it to 
him had installed the switch, and that he had personally tested the modified gun. A 
federal agent testified that the switch installed on the Glock visibly altered its size and 
appearance. Another agent testified that the firearm was fitted with a 33-round capacity 
magazine, more than three times the size of the standard magazine. And a confidential 
source for the Government testified that she saw Algarin-Torres access the hidden 
compartment where the gun was found. 
The jury convicted Algarin-Torres on both charges and found in a special verdict 
form that the Glock had been modified to make it capable of firing as a machine gun, 
which made Algarin-Torres subject to a 30-year mandatory minimum term of 
 
3 
 
incarceration. See § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii). Algarin-Torres moved for judgment of acquittal for 
his § 924(c) conviction, which the District Court denied. The District Court imposed a 
total term of 622 months’ imprisonment followed by 6 years’ supervised release. Algarin-
Torres timely appealed. 
II1 
Algarin-Torres argues that his conviction under § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) should be 
vacated because the District Court failed to instruct the jury that knowledge is an element 
of the offense. To challenge jury instructions for the first time after a verdict was returned 
“is classic sandbagging of the trial judge.” United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 661 (3d 
Cir. 2011). Because Algarin-Torres’s objection was untimely, we review his argument 
now under the very deferential plain error standard. Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 
507 (2021). We perceive no plain error for two reasons.  
First, the alleged error is not “clear or obvious.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 
129, 135 (2009). We have not decided whether § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) contains an implicit 
mens rea requirement. Nor has the Supreme Court. United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 
218, 222 (2010) (reserving the question). And our sister courts that have addressed the 
question have reached divergent results. Compare United States v. Haile, 685 F.3d 1211, 
1218 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), and United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500, 516 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (en banc), with United States v. Pérez-Greaux, 83 F.4th 1, 13 (1st Cir. 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction to 
review the final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
4 
 
2023). With this level of uncertainty and disagreement, any error could not have been 
plain. See United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 387 n.11 (3d Cir. 2014). 
Second, the alleged error could not have affected Algarin-Torres’s substantial 
rights. See Greer, 593 U.S. at 508. Like Greer, Algarin-Torres cannot show a “reasonable 
probability” that he would have been acquitted if the District Court had instructed the 
jury on the mens rea element. Id. (cleaned up). The evidence showed that the gun was 
visibly altered to fire automatically. And Algarin-Torres (1) was familiar with the 
firearm, (2) knew it had been altered, (3) knew who had modified it, (4) had personally 
tested the modified firearm, and (5) had accessed the hidden compartment where the gun 
was stored. On this record, there is no “reasonable probability that, but for [any] error, the 
outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 
585 U.S. 129, 134–35 (2018) (cleaned up). 
* * * 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm Algarin-Torres’s judgment of conviction. 


USA v. Luis Algarin-Torres

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-14-2025 
USA v. Tarek Bouanane 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Tarek Bouanane" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 288. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/288 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 24-1133 & No. 24-1144 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
  
v. 
 
TAREK BOUANANE 
Appellant in 24-1133 
 
& 
 
RODERICK FEURTADO 
Appellant in 24-1144 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Nos. 2:21-cr-00476-001, 2:21-cr-00476-002) 
District Judge: Honorable J. Nicholas Ranjan 
________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on April 9, 2025 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 14, 2025) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
 
I 
Appellants Tarek Bouanane and Roderick Feurtado were members of a criminal 
wire fraud conspiracy that scammed elderly Pittsburgh residents out of hundreds of 
thousands of dollars. The group’s method—a so-called “grandparent scam”—worked like 
this. First, the group’s leaders would identify targets, typically elderly citizens with close 
relationships with their adult grandchildren. One scammer would call the target, 
pretending to be their grandchild. The “grandchild” would explain that he was in legal 
trouble—often, the story was that he was involved in a serious car accident with a 
pregnant woman and was now facing criminal charges. Another scammer would then 
come on the line posing as the grandchild’s lawyer. The “lawyer” would explain that the 
grandparent could help by posting a cash bond, freeing their loved one from jail. And, by 
happy coincidence, the “lawyer” had a bail bondsman in the area that could personally 
pick up the cash. But, the “lawyer” cautioned, the judge in the case had imposed a strict 
gag order, so the grandparent could not speak about the situation to anyone. 
Bouanane was one of the “bail bondsmen.” Once a target was on the hook, 
Bouanane would scope out the area, park around the corner, ring the doorbell, collect as 
much cash as he could from the victim, then make his escape—sometimes at a dead run. 
Feurtado recruited and managed Bouanane and other “bail bondsmen.” He would 
direct the “bondsmen” to their targets, collect the take from successful “runs,” then 
convert the cash to digital currency and transmit it back to the conspiracy leaders. 
 
3 
Bouanane kept eight percent of what he personally picked up, plus expenses; 
Feurtado kept three percent of the combined take from all successful “runs.” The group 
collected over $250,000 from victims, with Bouanane personally responsible for about 
$140,000 of the total. 
Both men were indicted on counts of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. Both men went to trial and were found guilty by a jury of 
their peers. The District Court sentenced Bouanane to 46 months’ imprisonment—the top 
of his calculated Guideline range—and Feurtado to 120 months’ imprisonment—a sua 
sponte upward variance of 23 months above his calculated Guideline range. 
Bouanane and Feurtado appealed their sentences. Both men challenge the District 
Court’s application of certain sentencing factors in calculating their Guideline ranges, and 
Feurtado separately challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. 
II1 
A. Guideline Provisions 
Both Bouanane and Feurtado challenge the District Court’s application of a two-
level upward “vulnerable victim” adjustment. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1). Bouanane also 
challenges the Court’s refusal to apply a downward adjustment for minor or minimal 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
 
4 
participants, § 3B1.2, and a two-level decrease for certain defendants with zero criminal 
history points, § 4C1.1. 
We review the District Court’s legal interpretations of the Sentencing Guidelines 
de novo and its application of the Guidelines for clear error. United States v. Adeolu, 836 
F.3d 330, 332 (3d Cir. 2016). 
1. Vulnerable Victim 
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1) allows for a two-level upward adjustment if a known 
victim of the offense was a “vulnerable victim.” The provision applies where: 
“(1) the victim was particularly susceptible or vulnerable to the criminal 
conduct; (2) the defendant knew or should have known of this susceptibility 
or vulnerability; and (3) this vulnerability or susceptibility facilitated the 
defendant’s crime in some manner; that is, there was a nexus between the 
victim’s vulnerability and the crime’s ultimate success.” 
Adeolu, 836 F.3d at 333 (quoting United States v. Zats, 298 F.3d 182, 186 (3d Cir. 
2002)). “What matters is not whether [the defendant] wanted to exploit vulnerable 
victims, but whether he knew or should have known that he was doing so.” Zats, 298 
F.3d at 189. 
“Victims can be vulnerable for the reasons listed in the application note—age, 
physical or mental condition—or simply because one is ‘otherwise particularly 
susceptible to the criminal conduct.’ ” Id. at 187–88 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 cmt. n.2). 
The inquiry is fact-heavy and context-dependent; the focus is “the individual victims’ 
ability to avoid the crime rather than their vulnerability relative to other potential victims 
 
5 
of the same crime.” Id. at 188 (quoting United States v. McCall, 174 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 
1998)). 
Appellants argue that the District Court improperly applied this adjustment based 
merely on the fact that the victims were elderly, and that such a categorical approach falls 
short of the necessary finding of individual susceptibility. Bouanane argues that, though 
elderly, many of the victims were “sophisticated, intelligent people,” “strong willed [and] 
competent individuals.” Bouanane Op. Br. 14. Feurtado argues that the record does not 
reflect that he knew or had any reason to know of any specific characteristics of the 
victims that would render them particularly susceptible to the fraud, as Feurtado, unlike 
Bouanane, never interacted directly with any victims. 
The District Court explained its reasoning in a pair of “Tentative Findings & 
Rulings” documents. After citing the three-prong test from Adeolu, the Court noted that 
while “not all elderly victims are more susceptible to fraud,” specific victims “can be 
particularly vulnerable and susceptible to fraud due to their age.” Bouanane App. 414–15; 
Feurtado App. 894–95 (citing United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1426 (3d Cir. 
1992)). The Court found that the victims here were particularly vulnerable, not just 
because of their age, but “because they were grandparents and the conspirators preyed on 
this knowledge, in part, by posing as the victims’ grandchildren.” Bouanane App. 415. 
The Court then found, “based on . . . credible trial testimony,” that the Appellants knew 
or should have known that their victims were vulnerable in this way. Bouanane App. 415; 
Feurtado App. 895. Indeed, the very nature of the scheme—as both men knew—revolved 
around identifying and exploiting those relational vulnerabilities. See United States v. 
 
6 
Astorri, 923 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 1991) (affirming application of vulnerable victim 
adjustment where defendant preyed on the close relationship between his girlfriend and 
her parents to further a fraud scheme). 
The District Court applied the appropriate legal standard and committed no clear 
error in doing so. We will affirm its application of the “vulnerable victim” adjustment to 
both Appellants. 
2. Minor or Minimal Participant 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 allows for offense level downward adjustments based on a 
defendant’s mitigating role in the offense: two levels for minor participants, four levels 
for minimal participants, and three levels for participation falling somewhere in between.  
Factors for gauging participation include: “(1) the defendant’s awareness of the nature 
and scope of the criminal enterprise; (2) the nature of the defendant’s relationship to the 
other participants; and (3) the importance of the defendant’s actions to the success of the 
venture.” United States v. Womack, 55 F.4th 219, 244 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting United 
States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 819 (3d Cir. 2001)). We allow district courts “broad 
discretion” in applying this adjustment, and “their rulings are left largely undisturbed by 
the courts of appeal.” Id. (quoting United States v. Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d 236, 238 (3d 
Cir. 1998)). 
Bouanane argued for this adjustment at sentencing, and the District Court 
explained its reasoning on the issue in detail. The Court found that Bouanane (1) 
communicated with other members of the conspiracy enough to understand the “critical 
components of the scope and structure” of the scheme; (2) did not have a role in planning 
 
7 
or organizing; (3) exercised some decision-making authority in performing his part of the 
scam; (4) played a critical role in the overall operation of the scheme; and (5) received a 
percentage cut of the take, rather than a flat fee. Bouanane App. 440–42. These findings 
led the Court to conclude that Bouanane was “the average participant[]” in the scheme—
not a mere courier as he suggested—which did not warrant a downward adjustment for 
his role.2 Id. 
On appeal, Bouanane quibbles with the District Court’s reading of the facts. For 
example, as to his understanding of the scheme, Bouanane alleges that he “was in the 
dark as to most details of the operation.” Bouanane Op. Br. 12. While the District Court 
found that Bouanane exercised some decision-making authority, Bouanane argues that it 
was “very little” and that he “did not influence the exercise of decision-making 
authority.” Id. Bouanane thus argues that a minimal role adjustment of four levels would 
have been appropriate. Whatever merit there may be to Bouanane’s proposed read of the 
record, the District Court did not clearly err in its understanding of the facts and its 
decision not to apply either adjustment. We will therefore leave its judgment undisturbed 
and affirm. 
3. Zero-Point Offender 
U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 allows for a two-level downward adjustment for certain 
offenders with zero criminal history points. To be eligible, a defendant must meet an 
enumerated list of criteria. Relevant here, the defendant must not have “receive[d] an 
 
2 By contrast, Feurtado received a three-level upward adjustment for his managing role in 
the conspiracy. 
 
8 
adjustment under § 3A1.1 (Hate Crime Motivation or Vulnerable Victim).” 
§ 4C1.1(a)(9). Consistent with our ruling above upholding the application of the 
vulnerable victim provision, we will affirm the District Court’s decision not to apply the 
Zero-Point Offender adjustment to Bouanane. 
B. Substantive Reasonableness 
We review the substantive reasonableness of a District Court’s judgment of 
sentence for abuse of discretion, and we will overturn only if “no reasonable sentencing 
court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons 
the district court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en 
banc). 
After resolving objections, the District Court calculated Feurtado’s Guideline 
range at 78 to 97 months’ imprisonment. The government recommended a sentence at the 
top of the range. But after considering the factors dictated by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the 
Court concluded that this was one of the “rare cases” where the guideline range did not 
reflect an appropriate sentence. Feurtado App. 942. The Court specifically highlighted (1) 
the seriousness of the crime, including its impact on the victims and Feurtado’s managing 
role; (2) specific deterrence, given Feurtado’s extensive (though non-criminal) history of 
engaging in “schemes or scams or hustles or pyramid schemes”; and (3) general 
deterrence. Id. at 938–43. Accordingly, the Court varied upward, imposing a sentence of 
120 months’ imprisonment. 
Feurtado argues that many of the District Court’s concerns were adequately 
addressed in the Guidelines, and thereby accounted for in the Guideline range. He also 
 
9 
urges us to weigh certain factors differently than did the District Court: though serious, 
his crime “did not involve any weapons, drugs, or violence”; as a foreign national, he 
may face removal after serving his sentence; he is of “relatively advanced age . . . and has 
significant health problems”; he had a criminal history score of zero; and the “vast bulk 
of the [defrauded] funds . . . were recovered by law enforcement.” Feurtado Op. Br. 15–
16. 
But even if we would have weighed the evidence differently, we cannot say that 
“no reasonable sentencing court” would have reached the same conclusion as did the 
District Court here. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. The District Court conducted a careful 
review of the record and demonstrated “rational and meaningful consideration” of the 
§ 3553(a) factors. Id. (quoting United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(en banc)). The Court acted well within its discretion in varying upward after its review 
led it to conclude that this was the “rare case[]” where a Guideline range sentence was 
not sufficient to further the purposes of sentencing. Feurtado App. 942. See also United 
States v. Seibert, 971 F.3d 396, 402 (3d Cir. 2020) (“ ‘[A] district court’s failure to give 
mitigating factors the weight a defendant contends they deserve’ does not make a 
sentence substantively unreasonable.” (quoting United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 
546 (3d Cir. 2007))). Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion. 
* * * 
 
10 
III 
 For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the District Court’s sentencing 
determinations and judgments as to both Bouanane and Feurtado. 


Villanova University

Not a member yet