Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-11-2025 
Jules Ngambo v. New York State Department of Taxation and 
Finance 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Jules Ngambo v. New York State Department of Taxation and Finance" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 484. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/484 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
DLD-059        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2545 
___________ 
 
JULES NGAMBO, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE,  
A Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization; AMANDA HILLER;  
KELLY A. BURGOON; ESTHER FURMAN; DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON; 
MICHELLE I. SCHAUER; LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN;  
RACHEL F. TANGUAY; GERALD E. LOEHR 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-20887) 
District Judge: Honorable Jamel Semper 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Appellees’ Motions for Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 2, 2025 
Before:  RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 11, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Jules Ngambo appeals from the District Court’s order granting the 
Defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, judicial immunity, and failure to state a claim.  Three of those Defendants, 
now Appellees, filed motions for summary affirmance.1  Because we conclude the appeal 
presents no substantial question, we grant the motions for summary affirmance and will 
affirm the District Court’s judgment as to all Appellees.   
I. 
 Ngambo filed his 2023 complaint in the District of New Jersey against attorney 
Kelly A. Burgoon, New York Federal Judges Deborah Ann Livingston and Laura Taylor 
Swain, multiple New York State Judges, the New York State Department of Taxation and 
Finance (“NYSDTF”), and the NYSDTF Commissioner Amanda Hiller.  The action 
stems originally from several adverse judgments against Ngambo during matrimonial and 
child support proceedings in the New York state courts.  Ngambo brought a prior federal 
suit in the Southern District of New York alleging that Burgoon, who had represented his 
ex-wife, had conspired with the New York State Defendants to extort money from him 
during those New York state proceedings.  After losing that federal suit, Ngambo brought 
his current suit, adding the Federal Judges as defendants and alleging they had joined the 
conspiracy against him via their adverse rulings.  In his 2023 complaint, Ngambo alleged 
 
1  Even though not all Appellees filed a motion for summary affirmance, we advised all 
the parties that we would consider the possibility of summary action as to all Appellees.  
See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  We also extended to them an opportunity to respond, 
but we received no responses to our notice. 
 
3 
 
this purported conspiracy violated the Consumer Credit Protection Act’s (“CCPA”) 
restriction on garnishment, 15 U.S.C. § 1673, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“RICO”), among other statutes.    
All of the Defendants filed motions to dismiss.  The Magistrate Judge 
recommended that the District Court grant the motions to dismiss due to a lack of 
personal jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, and, alternatively, because 
Ngambo failed to state a claim.  The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report 
and recommendation in full and dismissed Ngambo’s complaint.  Ngambo timely 
appealed.  
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo dismissals 
based on a lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to 
state a claim.  See Chavez v. Dole Food Co., 836 F.3d 205, 223 n.90 (3d Cir. 2016); 
Geness v. Admin. Off. of Pa. Cts., 974 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2020); Bah v. United 
States, 91 F.4th 116, 119 (3d Cir. 2024).  We may affirm the District Court’s decision on 
any basis supported by the record and may summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present 
a substantial question.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6; Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 
246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
III. 
After a de novo review of the record, we agree that the District Court properly 
granted the Defendants’ motions to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. 
A. 
 
4 
 
The District Court properly dismissed the claims against Burgoon and the New 
York State Defendants in their individual capacities for lack of personal jurisdiction.  
Personal jurisdiction in the federal courts is generally governed by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4(k)(1).  See Fischer v. Fed. Express Corp., 42 F.4th 366, 382 (3d Cir. 2022).  
Federal courts are allowed to exercise personal jurisdiction when a defendant is properly 
served and “is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state 
where the district court is located.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A).  Since only state courts 
are courts of general jurisdiction, to exercise jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(1)(A), the 
federal court looks to the law of the state where it sits.  Fischer, 42 F.4th at 382-83.  Thus, 
“[a] federal court sitting in New Jersey has jurisdiction over parties to the extent provided 
under New Jersey state law.”  Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 
2004).  “New Jersey’s long-arm statute provides for jurisdiction co-extensive with the 
due process requirements of the United States Constitution.”  Id.   
“Where a federal court relies on such a state rule authorizing jurisdiction to the 
fullest extent permitted by the Constitution, Rule 4(k)(1)(A) incorporates the 
constitutional limits on jurisdiction imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Fischer¸ 42 
F.4th at 383 (citation omitted).  The Fourteenth Amendment limits personal jurisdiction 
to either general or specific jurisdiction.  Id.  General jurisdiction over individuals is 
proper where they are domiciled.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).  “By contrast, specific personal jurisdiction only reaches 
claims that arise out of or relate to the minimum contacts a plaintiff can demonstrate 
between the defendant and the forum state.”  Fischer, 42 F.4th at 383.  The plaintiff bears 
 
5 
 
the burden of establishing a court’s jurisdiction where defendants move to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction.  Smith, 384 F.3d at 97.  When a district court “does not hold 
an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss,” the plaintiff may satisfy this burden by 
establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.  Id. 
Here the District Court properly found that Ngambo did not establish a prima facie 
case of personal jurisdiction over Burgoon and the New York State Defendants in their 
individual capacities.  Ngambo failed to allege facts suggesting that any Defendant was 
domiciled in New Jersey.  He also failed to allege facts indicating that any Defendant had 
“minimum contacts” with New Jersey or that his suit arose from activities occurring in 
New Jersey.  Further, Burgoon filed an affidavit in the District Court showing that she is 
domiciled in Connecticut and her law practice is limited to New York.  Thus, Rule 
4(k)(1)(A) does not provide a basis for the District Court to exercise personal jurisdiction 
over Burgoon and the New York State Defendants. 
Federal courts may also exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants where 
authorized by federal law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C).  However, the CCPA does not 
provide federal courts with “a statutory mechanism through which to exercise personal 
jurisdiction” over defendants in suits alleging CCPA violations.  See Fischer, 42 F.4th at 
385.  As for Civil RICO claims, we have held that the RICO statute authorizes personal 
jurisdiction only when a plaintiff can establish that the District Court has personal 
jurisdiction over at least one defendant, and it is required by the “ends of justice.”  Laurel 
Gardens, LLC v. McKenna, 948 F.3d 105, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see 
also Fischer, 42 F.4th at 385.  As discussed above, Ngambo has failed to establish a 
 
6 
 
prima face case of personal jurisdiction over any Defendant in their individual capacities.  
Therefore, contrary to Ngambo’s assertions on appeal, the RICO statute also fails to 
authorize the District Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over any of the Defendants.   
Finally, federal courts may exercise personal jurisdiction for “a claim that arises 
under federal law . . . [when] the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s 
court of general jurisdiction” and it would be “consistent with the United States 
Constitution and laws.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).  Since Ngambo has not alleged facts 
demonstrating Defendants are not subject to New York’s courts of general jurisdiction, 
the District Court cannot utilize Rule 4(k)(2) to exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
Defendants.   
B.   
The District Court also properly found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
the claims pertaining to the New York State Defendants in their official capacities.  The 
Eleventh Amendment “make[s] states generally immune from suit by private parties in 
federal court [and] [t]his immunity extends to state agencies and departments.”  MCI 
Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl.-Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001) (cleaned up).  This 
immunity bars Ngambo’s complaint against the New York State Judges, the NYSDTF, 
and NYSDTF Commissioner Hiller in their official capacities.  There is an exception 
insofar as a plaintiff sues “individual state officers . . . in their individual capacities for 
prospective injunctive and declaratory relief to end continuing or ongoing violations of 
federal law.”  Id. at 506 (citation omitted).  Ngambo’s complaint sought injunctive relief 
 
7 
 
only against the NYSDTF,2 a state agency.  To the extent that Ngambo’s requested 
injunctive relief is extended to Commissioner Hiller as an individual party to the suit,3 the 
District Court, as noted above, lacks personal jurisdiction over Commissioner Hiller in 
her individual capacity. 
 
2  His complaint specifically sought to “[e]njoin[] the [NYSDTF] from taking any sum 
for unpaid child support.”   
 
3  See MCI Telecomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 506-08, 513-15 (holding that the Eleventh 
Amendment did not bar an action for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against 
Commissioners of the Public Utility Commission who were individual parties to the suit 
where the other requirements are met). 
 
 
8 
 
 
C.   
 Finally, the District Court properly found that the Federal and State Judges were 
entitled to judicial immunity.  “A judicial officer in the performance of [their] duties has 
absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.”  Azubuko v. 
Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).  “A judge will not be deprived of 
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess 
of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear 
absence of all jurisdiction.”  Id. (cleaned up).  Ngambo’s allegations all relate to actions 
taken by the Federal and State Judges in their capacities as judges.  See id.  And contrary 
to his assertions on appeal, Ngambo has not set forth facts showing any of the judges 
acted “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”  Id. 
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the motions for summary action, and we will 
affirm the District Court’s judgment as to all Appellees.4  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4(a).   
 
 
 
4  Although the Magistrate Judge recommended that Ngambo’s complaint be dismissed 
against all Defendants on jurisdictional grounds, the Magistrate Judge also concluded that 
Ngambo’s complaint failed to state a claim under the CCPA and RICO statutes.  We do 
not review these conclusions because we find the District Court correctly dismissed the 
case for lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and judicial 
immunity. 


English

Jules Ngambo v. New York State Department of Taxation and Finance

Chapin, Margo

Lost Without a Cause: The Sixth Circuit’s But-For Standard for False Claims Act Violations Harms Healthcare Fraud Enforcement

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-4-2025 
Omar Folk v. Warden McKean FCI 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Omar Folk v. Warden McKean FCI" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 99. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/99 
This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
CLD-060        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2567 
___________ 
 
OMAR SIERRE FOLK, 
                             Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN MCKEAN FCI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3:23-cv-00071) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert D. Mariani  
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 8, 2025 
 
Before:  KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 4, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Omar Sierre Folk appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion filed 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s order. 
 In 2012, Folk was found guilty by a federal jury of drug and firearms offenses.  
The District Court sentenced Folk to 264 months in prison.  We affirmed his conviction 
and sentence on direct appeal, United States v. Folk, 577 F. App’x 106 (3d Cir. 2014), 
and his petition for certiorari was denied, 577 U.S. 867 (2015).  In 2016, the Federal 
Public Defender filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion on Folk’s behalf.  Folk eventually 
proceeded pro se and was permitted to amend the § 2255 motion.  The District Court 
denied the § 2255 motion in 2018.  After granting a certificate of appealability and 
appointing counsel, we affirmed that denial.  United States v. Folk, 954 F.3d 597, 600 
(3d Cir. 2020).  Since then Folk has filed numerous unsuccessful challenges to his 
conviction. 
 In 2023, Folk filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  He 
argued that he was actually innocent of the two counts of using a firearm during a drug 
trafficking crime and the one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm.  In August 
2023, the District Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, explaining that a 
defendant may not file a § 2241 petition to avoid the requirements for bringing a second 
or successive § 2255 motion.  See Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 477–78 (2023) 
(stating that “[b]ecause § 2255 is the ordinary vehicle for a collateral attack on a federal 
sentence, the straightforward negative inference from § 2255(h) is that a second or 
successive collateral attack on a federal sentence is not authorized unless one of those 
3 
 
two conditions is satisfied”).  The District Court concluded that Folk did not establish any 
“unusual circumstances” that made it “impossible or impracticable to seek relief in the 
sentencing court” such that challenging his conviction with a § 2241 petition would be 
permitted.  Folk v. Sage, No. 3:23-CV-71, 2023 WL 5211631, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 
2023) (quoting Jones, 599 U.S. at 478). 
 In August 2024, Folk filed his motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1).  He argued that 
he had established unusual circumstances and described the procedural history of his 
§ 2255 proceedings.  He appeared to argue, as he has in the past, that he should have been 
allowed to bring additional § 2255 claims in his first § 2255 motion.  Thus, he seemed to 
contend, he should not be subject to § 2255’s limitations on second or successive § 2255 
motions. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s legal conclusions.  Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2013).  
Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the appeal.  
See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4.  We may summarily affirm a District Court’s decision “on any 
basis supported by the record” if the appeal fails to present a substantial question.  
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 On appeal, Folk argues that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1) because the 
District Court committed a mistake of law and that he does meet the unusual 
circumstances to file a § 2241 petition challenging his conviction.  The Supreme Court 
has held that a District Court’s legal error falls within the meaning of “mistake” under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), and a motion asserting such a legal error is subject to the one-
4 
 
year limitations period set forth in Rule 60(c)(1).  See Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 
528, 539 (2022).  Folk repeats his arguments that, based on events which happened 
during his first § 2255 proceedings, he is entitled to file additional § 2255 claims without 
meeting the requirements of § 2255 for second or successive § 2255 motions.  To the 
extent that Folk seeks to challenge actions taken by the District Court in resolving his 
first § 2255 motion in 2018, the Rule 60(b)(1) motion is untimely.  To the extent that he 
challenges the District Court’s dismissal of his recent § 2241 petition, his Rule 60(b)(1) 
motion is without merit as Folk has not shown that the District Court committed any legal 
error when it dismissed the petition.  Folk did not show any unusual circumstances which 
would allow him to challenge his conviction with a § 2241 petition. 
For the above reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See 
3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  Folk’s “Motion for Briefing Schedule” is denied. 
 


Omar Folk v. Warden McKean FCI

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-5-2025 
USA v. Tanya Stanger 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Tanya Stanger" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 109. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/109 
This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
Nos. 23-2814 and 23-2817 
_____________ 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
TANYA JAYNENE STANGER, 
Appellant in 23-2814 
 
BRYCE RICHARD STANGER, 
Appellant in 23-2817 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 4:21-cr-00264-001 through 002) 
District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 16, 2024 
 
Before: RESTREPO, PHIPPS, and McKEE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: February 5, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 
precedent. 
2 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
 Appellants Tanya Stanger and Bryce Stanger were convicted of conspiracy to distribute 
and possession with intent to distribute controlled substances—500 grams and more of a mixture 
and substance containing methamphetamine, and 400 grams and more of a mixture and substance 
containing fentanyl—in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.1 The District Court denied their joint motion 
to suppress, and following their entry of conditional guilty pleas, sentenced both in accordance 
with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The Stangers now appeal, arguing that the District Court 
erred by denying their suppression motion because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to 
extend the traffic stop. Alternatively, they argue that the District Court erred in denying their 
requests for a downward sentencing variance. We disagree and will therefore affirm the judgments 
of conviction and sentence imposed by the District Court.  
I.  
A.  
On August 25, 2021, Pennsylvania State Police Corporal Mark Conrad observed a Kia 
traveling 79 miles per hour on Interstate 80 with a posted speed limit of 70 miles per hour. 
Before stopping the vehicle, Cpl. Conrad made several observations: the car had heavily tinted 
windows; the car was clean with no personalization; the car’s registration plate had a plastic 
cover on it, making it difficult to read; the car had a recent registration from San Ysidro, 
California, which borders Tijuana, Mexico; and the car had abruptly slowed to well-below the 
70 mile-per-hour speed limit. Cpl. Conrad testified that, based on his training, each of these 
 
1 Any reference to “Appx” refers to the appendix filed by Tanya Stanger in Case No. 23-
2814, which Mr. Stanger joins in and adopts pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(i).  
3 
 
factors led him to suspect that the occupants of the vehicle, Tanya and Bryce Stanger, may be 
involved in criminal activity, particularly drug trafficking.  
 Cpl. Conrad then conducted a traffic stop, lasting around fifty-two minutes. Cpl. Conrad 
first questioned Ms. Stanger, who said they had left California and were on their way to New 
York to see a concert, but the concert had been cancelled and they did not have a hotel 
reservation. Cpl. Conrad also noted that Ms. Stanger appeared nervous and fidgety during the 
questioning. After running a standard criminal record check, Cpl. Conrad learned that Ms. 
Stanger had a history of drug offenses spanning a decade. Cpl. Conrad testified that it was at this 
point—approximately thirteen and a half minutes into the traffic stop—that he had reasonable 
suspicion that the Stangers were trafficking narcotics.  
 When Cpl. Conrad questioned Mr. Stanger separately, Mr. Stanger told him they were 
traveling to Hazleton, Pennsylvania, to pick up his grandmother. Cpl. Conrad testified that it 
was significant for Mr. Stanger to mention Hazleton because that area has become a hub for 
narcotics distribution. After running a criminal record check on Mr. Stanger, Cpl. Conrad 
learned that his record included multiple felony drug arrests.  
 Cpl. Conrad asked the Stangers if he could search the vehicle, and Mr. Stanger refused. 
Once backup arrived, Cpl. Conrad deployed a drug-detecting canine, who alerted to the presence 
of illegal narcotics in the car. After informing the Stangers that he would have to detain them 
and impound their vehicle while he waited for a search warrant, the Stangers consented to the 
vehicle search, occurring about fifty-two minutes into the traffic stop. The search yielded over 
eleven kilograms of 97% pure methamphetamine, and police later found over one kilogram of 
fentanyl during a subsequent search of the car. The Stangers were arrested.  
4 
 
B.  
The Stangers filed a joint motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic 
stop, arguing that the traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged in terms of length and scope. The 
District Court denied the motion and found that the stop was lawful because Cpl. Conrad had 
reasonable suspicion to extend the Stangers’ detention. The District Court credited Cpl. 
Conrad’s observations, which formed the basis for reasonable suspicion.  
C.  
The Stangers both entered conditional guilty pleas for conspiracy to distribute and 
possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. At Ms. Stanger’s sentencing, she 
requested a downward variance, noting her Guidelines range was based on pure 
methamphetamine and not a mixture containing methamphetamine. She argued that there is no 
longer a justification for sentencing individuals due to a higher purity of methamphetamine 
because most methamphetamine seized today is of high purity. The District Court disagreed, 
finding that “pure methamphetamine obviously increases the risk of an overdose and presents a 
greater risk to the public.” Appx295. It reasoned that “the Sentencing Guidelines appropriately 
[ac]count for the increased risk of harm that arose as a result of the very pure methamphetamine 
that . . . Ms. Stanger[] was transporting.” Appx295–96. After considering the § 3553(a) factors 
and other mitigating factors, the District Court imposed a sentence in the middle of the 
Guidelines range. 
Mr. Stanger’s sentencing hearing occurred the following day and proceeded similarly. 
The Court rejected his request for a downward variance for the same reasons given in Ms. 
Stangers’ hearing. The Stangers’ timely appealed.  
5 
 
II.2  
A.  
When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we exercise plenary review over a 
district court’s reasonable suspicion determination but review the factual findings for clear error. 
United States v. Stewart, 92 F.4th 461, 466 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing United States v. Garner, 961 
F.3d 264, 269 (3d Cir. 2020)). When the district court denies the motion, we review the facts in 
the light most favorable to the government. Id.  
During a lawful traffic stop, an officer’s mission includes determining “whether to issue a 
traffic ticket” and making “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.” Rodriguez v. United 
States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 
405, 408 (2005)). This can include checking for outstanding warrants and inspecting the vehicle’s 
registration and insurance. Garner, 961 F.3d at 271. The Fourth Amendment also permits “an 
officer to conduct unrelated investigations that do not lengthen a roadside detention.” Id. at 269. 
If the officer decides to take additional steps beyond the original purpose of the traffic stop, the 
officer must have already developed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Rodriguez, 575 
U.S. at 355; see also Garner, 961 F.3d at 270 (finding the officer must have “an objectively 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that illegal activity had occurred or was occurring”). 
Reasonable suspicion does not require proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, 
but it does require more than a mere hunch. Garner, 961 F.3d at 271.  
 
2 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
We have jurisdiction over the District Court’s judgments of conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and the accompanying sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 
6 
 
Our inquiry is two-fold.  First, we must determine the Rodriguez moment, or “the moment 
when the stop was measurably extended.” Stewart, 92 F.4th at 467. Second, we assess “whether 
the facts available to the officer up to that moment established reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity.” Id. The extension and subsequent seizure are lawful if reasonable suspicion existed at 
that time. Id.  
We agree with the District Court that everything that occurred before the Rodriguez 
moment was within the scope of a normal traffic stop, and after that point, was supported by 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Cpl. Conrad’s initial questioning of Ms. Stanger 
qualified as an “ordinary inquir[y]” related to the stop. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355. It was not until 
after their conversation—approximately thirteen and a half minutes into the stop—that the stop 
was arguably extended.  
But by that point, Cpl. Conrad had already observed sufficient indicia that the Stangers 
could be involved in drug trafficking. We determine the existence of reasonable suspicion based 
on the totality of circumstances. Garner, 961 F.3d at 271. While “[i]t is possible for factors, 
although insufficient individually, to add up to reasonable suspicion . . . [,] we think it impossible 
for a combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless 
there are concrete reasons for such an interpretation.” Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 496 (3d 
Cir. 1995). Under that standard, several indicators—such as the car’s tinted windows and covered 
license plate, that it was a salvage recently registered to an area bordering Mexico and the 
insurance was for a different car, as well as the Stangers’ questionable travel plans—create the 
7 
 
basis for the officer’s reasonable suspicion.3  Thus, we affirm the District Court’s judgments of 
conviction and sentence.  
B.  
The Stangers alternatively appeal their sentences, arguing that the District Court abused 
its discretion by denying their requests for a downward variance. We disagree.   
We review a sentence’s procedural and substantive reasonableness for abuse of discretion. 
United States v. Jumper, 74 F.4th 107, 111 (3d Cir. 2023) (citing United States v. Tomko, 562 
F.3d 558, 567–68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)). Our review proceeds in two stages. Tomko, 562 F.3d 
at 567. First, we review the district court’s decision for procedural error, which could include 
“failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as 
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly 
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Negroni, 
638 F.3d 434, 443 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). If there 
is no procedural error, we then look to the substantive reasonableness of the decision, focusing on 
the totality of the circumstances. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. Reasonableness depends on “whether 
 
3 We note that several of the facts the Government cites in support of reasonable 
suspicion are wholly innocent, including that the Stangers were driving to New York City 
in a generic car that lacked personalization. Because “[t]here are limits . . . to how far 
police training and experience can go towards finding latent criminality in innocent 
acts,” Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2003),” these factors alone or in 
combination add nothing to the reasonable suspicion calculation without more than 
appears on this record.”  To hold otherwise, could potentially subject millions of innocent 
travelers to New York City to extended traffic stops. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 
441 (1980) (holding no reasonable suspicion where “circumstances describe a very large 
category of presumably innocent travelers.”).  Judge Phipps does not join this footnote. 
8 
 
the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. at 568 (quoting United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(en banc)).  
The District Court fulfilled its requirements with respect to procedural reasonableness. It 
imposed middle of the Guidelines sentences, considered motions for downward departures and 
requests for variances based on the purity of the methamphetamine, and addressed all relevant 
§355(a) factors. The Stangers did not dispute the 97% purity level of the methamphetamine they 
transported, and the District Court therefore committed no procedural error in calculating their 
Guideline ranges based on that level under Section 2D1.1.(c). We decline to reach any policy-
based argument regarding sentencing disparities for mixed versus pure methamphetamine. Thus, 
the sentences were procedurally reasonable.  
The sentences were also substantively reasonable. A sentencing court abuses its discretion 
only if “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular 
defendant for the reasons the [sentencing] court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  “As long as 
a sentence falls within the broad range of possible sentences that can be considered reasonable in 
light of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, we must affirm.”  United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 
218 (3d Cir. 2008).  The District Court thoroughly considered the seriousness of the offenses and 
the “increased risk of harm that arose as a result of the very pure methamphetamine” that the 
Stangers transported. Appx295–96. Thus, the District Court acted within its discretion. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgments of conviction and sentence entered 
by the District Court. 


USA v. Tanya Stanger

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-7-2025 
USA v. Mohamad Shnewer 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Mohamad Shnewer" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 113. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/113 
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ALD-071                NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-3085 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MOHAMAD IBRAHIM SHNEWER, 
         Appellant 
___________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1:07-cr-00459-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Christine P. O’Hearn 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
on January 23, 2025 
 
Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 7, 2025) 
____________________________________  
2 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Appellant Mohamad Shnewer appeals the District Court’s order denying his second 
motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Shnewer has also moved for 
appointment of counsel. The Government has moved for summary affirmance of the Dis-
trict Court’s order.1 After a review of the record, we conclude the appeal presents no sub-
stantial question. We therefore grant the Government’s motion and will summarily affirm 
the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
 In 2008, Shnewer was convicted by a federal jury of conspiracy to murder members of 
the United States military, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1117. The official victim and terror-
ism sentencing enhancements, U.S.S.G. §§ 3A1.2(b) and 3A1.4, were applied to increase 
his offense level to 51 and his criminal history category to VI, which resulted in a Federal 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1  Our Clerk dismissed Shnewer’s appeal on January 2, 2025, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 
42(b) because of a prior motion from Shnewer that sought to withdraw his appeal. Shnewer 
filed a motion to reopen the appeal on January 7, 2025, explaining that he had moved to 
withdraw his appeal because he had mistakenly believed, until receiving the government’s 
motion, that we had already denied his motion for counsel. Because the motion to reopen 
was timely filed and Shnewer provided good cause to reopen the appeal, we grant 
Shnewer’s motion to reopen and consider the pending motions. See Third Circuit L.A.R. 
Misc. 107.2. 
 
3 
 
Sentencing Guidelines range of life imprisonment. Shnewer was sentenced to life impris-
onment in April 2009 on the conspiracy charge.2  
 In 2022, Shnewer filed his first motion for compassionate release. The District Court 
denied both Shnewer’s motion and his subsequent motion for reconsideration. We sum-
marily affirmed the District Court’s judgment. In February 2024, Shnewer filed his second 
motion for compassionate release. The District Court denied his motion in October 2024. 
Shnewer timely filed an appeal. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.3 We review the District Court’s order 
denying the motion for compassionate release for an abuse of discretion and will not disturb 
that decision unless the District Court committed a clear error of judgment. See United 
States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020). We may summarily affirm the Dis-
trict Court’s order if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See Murray v. 
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
Because we conclude the appeal presents no substantial question, we grant the Govern-
ment’s motion and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
2  Shnewer was also convicted of attempted possession of firearms in furtherance of a crime 
of violence for which he was sentenced to a 360-month concurrent prison term. On direct 
appeal, we vacated this conviction and sentence, while affirming his conspiracy conviction, 
see United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 356 (3d Cir. 2011), and the District Court’s judg-
ment was amended to only reflect Shnewer’s life sentence for conspiracy. 
3  After filing his notice of appeal, Shnewer filed a motion for reconsideration with the 
District Court, which was denied. Our jurisdiction does not reach that denial because 
Shnewer appealed prior to the District Court disposing of his motion for reconsideration 
and he did not file an amended notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).   
4 
 
III. 
 A district court may modify a federal inmate’s term of imprisonment if it finds that 
extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a modification. See § 3582(c)(1). Even if an 
inmate is eligible for a sentence modification under § 3582(c)(1), a district court may deny 
that motion for modification upon determining that it would be inconsistent with the factors 
set forth in § 3553(a). See Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 330–31 (denying motion for sentence 
modification considering, among other factors, the time remaining on the defendant’s sen-
tence and the seriousness of the defendant’s crimes). 
 In his motion, Shnewer argued that his “cumulative mitigating circumstances” satisfied 
the extraordinary and compelling reasons as described in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). Shnewer 
also asserted that Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013), had changed the law 
and would have required that the terrorism enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines 
be sent to the jury during deliberations as an “element that increased his sentence.” ECF 
559 at 25-27. The District Court found that Shnewer’s circumstances did not amount to a 
showing of extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting compassionate release, 
and that, even if he had, the § 3553(a) factors still counseled against release. 
We discern no clear error in the District Court’s rejection of Shnewer’s arguments 
and specifically its determination that no change in law has occurred based on Alleyne. 
Alleyne held that facts increasing the statutory minimum sentence for a crime must be sent 
to the jury. 570 U.S. at 103. However, Alleyne and its predecessor, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), do not apply to facts that affect the Sentencing Guidelines. See 
United States v. Gonzalez, 905 F.3d 165, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. Smith, 
5 
 
751 F.3d 107, 117 (3d Cir. 2014). Therefore, Alleyne does not apply to Shnewer’s claims 
regarding the terrorism enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. We further discern 
no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors, specifically 
its determination that the nature and circumstances of Shnewer’s crime and the need for 
the sentence imposed to provide both just punishment to Shnewer and to protect the public 
still weighed against an early release. 
As Shnewer’s appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment. In light of our disposition, we deny his motion for appointment 
of counsel. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 


USA v. Mohamad Shnewer

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-7-2025 
Danielle Johnson v. Lycoming County Children and Youth 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Danielle Johnson v. Lycoming County Children and Youth" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 114. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/114 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-1246 
__________ 
 
DANIELLE JOHNSON, 
                                 Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LYCOMING COUNTY CHILDREN AND YOUTH; RYAN TIRA, Judge; 
ANGELA LOVECCHIO; TARA LONGENBERGER, Supervisor; 
HEIDI PORTER, Case Worker; MATTHEW WOOD, Clinical Director; 
MATTHEW SALVATORI, Administrator; MARK LONGENBERGER, Support 
Services Director 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-01159) 
District Judge:  Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 6, 2025 
Before:  RESTREPO, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 7, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Danielle Johnson appeals the District Court’s order dismissing her complaint.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
 Johnson filed a civil rights complaint alleging that Appellees, employees of 
Lycoming County Children and Youth Services, violated her rights when they removed 
her children from her home.  A Magistrate Judge recommended that her federal claims be 
dismissed on the grounds that Johnson had failed to state a claim, a judicial defendant had 
immunity, the District Court should abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), 
and that some allegations did not satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)’s requirement of a short 
and plain statement.  The Magistrate Judge recommended that the District Court decline 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Johnson’s state law claims.  The District Court 
adopted the Report and Recommendation and dismissed the complaint.  Johnson filed a 
timely notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 
 In her brief, Johnson argues that the Appellees made false allegations of abuse and 
neglect which caused Judge Tira to approve the removal of her children from her home.  
She asserts that the Appellees made their decisions concerning the children with malice 
 
1 The parties were initially asked to address whether the Court had jurisdiction over the 
appeal as the notice of appeal appeared to have been untimely filed.  However, because 
the District Court’s five-page order contained its reasoning, it did not qualify as a 
separate judgment, and the judgment was not considered entered until 150 days after 
entry of the order.  See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 454 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2006), 
as amended (Aug. 30, 2006) (noting that to qualify as a separate judgment, District Court 
order must, inter alia, substantially omit the District Court’s reasoning); Fed. R. Civ. P. 
58 (providing that if judgment is not set out in a separate document, judgment is entered 
when 150 days have run from entry on the docket).  Thus, the notice of appeal was timely 
filed, and we will not dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
3 
 
and negligence.  Appellees, however, are entitled to immunity from Johnson’s claims.  
See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–57 (1978) (judges not civilly liable for 
judicial acts); Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cnty., 108 F.3d 486, 488–89 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (holding that “child welfare workers and attorneys who prosecute dependency 
proceedings on behalf of the state are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for all of 
their actions in preparing for and prosecuting such dependency proceedings”). 
Johnson also challenges the District Court’s refusal to grant her a default judgment 
against the Appellees.  We review the District Court’s refusal for an abuse of discretion.  
See Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000).  Appellees filed a 
motion for an extension of time to file a responsive pleading, and the Magistrate Judge 
granted the motion and informed the parties that no responsive pleading was required 
until the court conducted its preliminary review of the complaint.  See ECF #12.  Thus, 
there was no default by Appellees.  Moreover, even if there had been a default, Johnson 
has not shown any prejudice from the District Court’s refusal, and the Appellees had a 
litigable, and, in fact, meritorious defense.  See Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 164 (discussing 
factors to consider in reviewing refusal to enter default judgment).  The District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in refusing to enter a default judgment against the Appellees.  
 In her reply brief, Johnson appears to suggest that the Appellees are guilty of 
crimes and requests that Judge Tira be charged with treason.  There is, however, no 
private federal right to require the government to initiate criminal proceedings.  See 
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). 
4 
 
 For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  Johnson’s 
motion titled “reconsider request for default judgment,” as supplemented, is denied. 
 


Danielle Johnson v. Lycoming County Children and Youth

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-12-2025 
USA v. Mehdi Nikparvar-Fard 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Mehdi Nikparvar-Fard" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 127. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/127 
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inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
   NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 23-3270 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MEHDI NIKPARVAR-FARD,  
a/k/a MEHDI ARMANI, 
              Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:18-cr-00101-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 13, 2025 
____________ 
 
Before:  PHIPPS, FREEMAN, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: February 12, 2025) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. 
A federal grand jury indicted a medical doctor who owned and operated four 
Philadelphia-area urgent care facilities on five counts related to the illegal distribution of 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
opioids.  In return for a lower sentencing range, the doctor pleaded guilty to one of the 
counts: conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance.  One of the doctor’s employees, a 
physician assistant, was also indicted on four of those five counts, including conspiracy.  
Unlike the doctor, the physician assistant did not plead guilty; instead, he went to trial and 
was not convicted of any of the charges against him.  After his alleged co-conspirator’s 
trial ended without a conviction, the doctor changed his mind about his prior guilty plea, 
and he twice moved to withdraw it.  The District Court denied those motions and imposed 
a prison sentence within the range specified in the plea agreement.  The doctor now appeals 
the denial of his second withdrawal-of-plea motion.  On abuse-of-discretion review, we 
will affirm that ruling.   
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Between January 2014 and August 2017, Dr. Mehdi Nikparvar-Fard owned and 
operated eight urgent care facilities, four of which were in the Philadelphia area.  Each 
facility was identified by the prefix ‘AUC,’ an abbreviation for ‘Advanced Urgent Care,’ 
followed by a location, such as ‘AUC – City Avenue’ or ‘AUC – Montgomeryville.’  After 
a federal investigation of several of his urgent care facilities, a grand jury indicted 
Nikparvar-Fard on March 14, 2018, for one count of conspiracy to unlawfully distribute 
oxycodone.  He was then taken into custody, where he remained for over 42 months before 
being released in July 2022 on a $100,000 cash bond.  
On January 9, 2019, while Nikparvar-Fard was detained, a grand jury returned a 
superseding indictment.  It charged him with five counts related to the illegal distribution 
of opioids: four counts of maintaining drug-involved premises – one count for each of 
AUC’s Philadelphia-area locations, see 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) – and one count of 
conspiracy to unlawfully distribute oxycodone, see id. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); id. § 846.  
 
3 
 
That superseding indictment also charged twelve employees of AUC facilities – seven 
physicians, four physician assistants, and the office manager – with between one and four 
counts of maintaining a drug-involved premises.  One of the physician assistants, Mitchell 
White, was charged with three counts of maintaining a drug-involved premises, see 
21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1), as well as the conspiracy count, see id. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); id. 
§ 846.   
As the case proceeded, the Government dismissed charges against six of the 
defendants, and five defendants pleaded guilty to the charges against them.  Even still, up 
until three days before the scheduled trial date of January 9, 2023, two defendants – 
Nikparvar-Fard and White – had not been dismissed and had not pleaded guilty.   
On January 6, 2023, however, Nikparvar-Fard came to court to plead guilty to the 
conspiracy charge.  He had previously entered into a plea agreement with the Government 
under which the Government agreed to dismiss the remaining four charges.  In addition, 
the sentencing range in the plea agreement – 43 to 108 months’ imprisonment – was less 
than the applicable range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines of 121 to 151 
months.  See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual ch. 5 pt. A (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2023) 
(setting forth a 121 to 151 month sentence for a total offense level of 31 and criminal 
history category of II).  The parties further agreed to present the plea agreement pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) so that if the District Court accepted the 
plea, it would be bound by that reduced sentencing range.   
The District Court accepted that plea and the reduced sentencing range that came 
with it.  Before it did so, the District Court made several inquiries to ensure that a factual 
basis existed for Nikparvar-Fard’s guilty plea, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3) (“Before 
entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for 
 
4 
 
the plea.”), and that the plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, see Bradshaw v. 
Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005) (“A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, 
and is valid only if done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, ‘with sufficient 
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’” (quoting Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970))).  With respect to the factual basis for Nikparvar-
Fard’s guilty plea, the Government explained that the conspiracy charge was based on his 
practice, at various times between May 2014 and July 2015, of giving a pre-signed 
prescription pad to another physician who did not have a license to write prescriptions and 
that such a practice was “outside the usual course of professional practice and not for a 
legitimate medical purpose.”  Change-of-Plea Hr’g Tr. 41:22–23 (App. 163).  Nikparvar-
Fard fully admitted those facts.  Through a series of questions, which Nikparvar-Fard 
answered under oath, the District Court ensured that he was not making a haphazard or 
half-hearted admission: it confirmed that he had sufficient time and opportunity to discuss 
his case with counsel, that he was satisfied with their representation and advice, and that 
no one had made “any threats or any promises or assurances to [him] of any kind other than 
what is set forth in the Plea Agreement” to induce his plea.  Id. at 31:23–32:1 (App. 152–
53).  
The next week, the lone remaining defendant, White, proceeded to trial on the four 
counts against him.  The trial ended with a mistrial on the conspiracy-to-distribute charge 
and acquittals on the three counts of maintaining a drug-involved premises.   
Two days later, Nikparvar-Fard filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  
Contrary to his testimony during the plea colloquy, Nikparvar-Fard asserted that his 
counsel had threatened him: if he did not either plead guilty or satisfy counsel’s demand 
for an additional payment of $190,000 for trial, then his counsel would stop representing 
 
5 
 
him.  After the filing of that motion, Nikparvar-Fard’s counsel moved to withdraw from 
representing him.  The District Court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw from 
representation, denied without prejudice Nikparvar-Fard’s motion to withdraw the guilty 
plea, and appointed new counsel.   
Through his appointed counsel, Nikparvar-Fard again moved to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  There, he argued that he was under duress when he pleaded guilty due to his prior 
counsel’s pre-trial fee demand.  In addition, he claimed that his prior counsel provided 
ineffective assistance because they were critical of his desire to prove that he did not act 
with criminal intent when he gave the unlicensed doctor pre-signed pads to write 
prescriptions for opioids.  Cf. generally Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. 450, 454 (2022) 
(holding that a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841 for dispensing controlled substances not 
as authorized requires a knowing or intentional mental state).  
To resolve Nikparvar-Fard’s renewed motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the 
District Court held an evidentiary hearing.  Only Nikparvar-Fard testified, and he did not 
persuade the District Court.  As the District Court explained, his statements contradicted 
his prior testimony, and he did not explain or otherwise justify the contradiction.   
After his motion was denied and he was sentenced to a 107-month prison term, 
Nikparvar-Fard invoked this Court’s appellate jurisdiction through a timely notice of 
appeal.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
DISCUSSION 
By rule, there must be “a fair and just reason” for the withdrawal of a guilty plea 
before sentencing.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B); see also United States v. Rivera, 62 F.4th 
778, 788 (3d Cir. 2023); United States v. James, 928 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2019).  Three 
factors have been used to determine whether a plea withdrawal request meets that standard: 
 
6 
 
(i) an assertion of innocence by the defendant; (ii) the strength of the rationale for the 
requested plea withdrawal; and (iii) prejudice to the Government resulting from the 
withdrawal.  See United States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 2005); United States 
v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1986).  When the first two factors do not support 
withdrawal, there is no need to consider whether the Government would be prejudiced by 
the plea withdrawal.  See United States v. Harris, 44 F.3d 1206, 1210 (3d Cir. 1995). 
A. Assertion of Innocence 
Nikparvar-Fard attempts to meet the innocence prong by arguing that he did not 
have the requisite criminal intent to enter a drug conspiracy.  See United States v. Williams, 
974 F.3d 320, 367–68 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining that it is sufficient for purposes of 
21 U.S.C. § 846 that “knowing or intentional distribution or possession occurred”).  
Specifically, he contends that he had a reasonable belief that allowing an unlicensed doctor 
to fill out opioid prescriptions on a pre-signed pad was consistent with the practice of 
interval dispensing.  The problem is that Nikparvar-Fard admitted during the plea colloquy 
that those pre-signed prescription pads served no legitimate medical purpose.  And without 
additional evidence to support his innocence, it was not an abuse of discretion to reject his 
later profession of innocence that contradicts his prior sworn statements.  See United States 
v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 253 (3d Cir. 2003).  Thus, Nikparvar-Fard has not carried his burden 
with respect to this factor.  
B. Strength of Rationale for Withdrawal 
Nikparvar-Fard provides two reasons for withdrawing his plea.  Neither is 
persuasive. 
First, he blames his guilty plea on bad advice from his counsel.  See generally 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (setting forth the two elements of a 
 
7 
 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: deficient performance and resulting prejudice).  
He claims that when he proposed introducing several medical treatises to demonstrate his 
non-culpable mental state with respect to the use of pre-signed prescription pads, his 
counsel opined that “much” of that evidence would be inadmissible.  Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 35:9–
10 (App. 800).  It is hard to see how that assessment constitutes deficient performance 
“under prevailing professional norms.”  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) 
(quoting Strickland, 539 U.S. at 688).  Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the 
District Court to conclude that Nikparvar-Fard failed to demonstrate that counsel’s advice 
was unreasonable.  See id.   
The other rationale for withdrawal that Nikparvar-Fard develops is the threat-from-
counsel claim.  He argues that he was forced to plead guilty because, three days before 
trial, his counsel demanded payment of $190,000.  But by its own terms, the email 
exchange between the two of them concerned a payment dispute: counsel stated that 
Nikparvar-Fard agreed to payment in full before trial and that the balance was $190,000, 
and Nikparvar-Fard refused to immediately pay the outstanding balance.  As part of that 
correspondence, counsel mentioned the possibility of filing a motion to withdraw from 
representing Nikparvar-Fard, but even that email made clear that “it [would] be up to the 
court” to decide whether to grant the motion.  E-mail from Frank DeSimone to Mehdi 
Nikparvar-Fard (Jan. 5, 2023, 6:26 p.m.) (App. 242).  That statement is not a threat, but 
even if it were, Nikparvar-Fard did not perceive it as such because in response to a direct 
question by the District Court, he denied receiving any threats that induced him to plead 
guilty.  Under these circumstances, therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in rejecting the presence of a threat from counsel as a basis for allowing Nikparvar-Fard to 
withdraw his prior guilty plea. 
 
8 
 
CONCLUSION 
Because the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Nikparvar-
Fard did not satisfy either of the first two factors for a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
we will affirm its judgment without considering the third factor, prejudice to the 
Government.   


USA v. Mehdi Nikparvar-Fard

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-13-2025 
Quimera Holding Group SAC v. Kennedy Funding Financial LLC 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Quimera Holding Group SAC v. Kennedy Funding Financial LLC" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 129. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/129 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
No. 24-1041 
______________ 
QUIMERA HOLDING GROUP SAC 
 
v. 
 
KENNEDY FUNDING FINANCIAL LLC;  
KEVIN WOLFER; GREGG WOLFER 
 
KENNEDY FUNDING FINANCIAL, LLC., 
Appellant 
______________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey  
(D.C. Civil No. 2:20-cv-17764) 
District Judge:  Honorable Madeline C. Arleo 
______________ 
  
Argued November 13, 2024 
 
Before: RESTREPO, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: February 13, 2025) 
 
Craig S. Hilliard [ARGUED] 
Stark & Stark 
100 American Metro Boulevard 
Hamilton, NJ 08619 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
Ahmed A. Massoud [ARGUED] 
Massoud & Pashkoff 
950 Third Avenue, Suite 901 
New York, NY 10022 
Counsel for Appellee 
 
2 
 
______________ 
OPINION 
______________ 
MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Kennedy Funding Financial LLC (“Kennedy”) executed an agreement 
to issue Appellee Quimera Holding Group SAC (“Quimera”) a loan in the amount of 
55% the value of certain collateral.  But the agreement failed to identify the collateral.  
No loan ever issued, and Quimera sued Kennedy for breach of contract. 
Following cross motions for summary judgment, the District Court granted 
summary judgment for Quimera and denied Kennedy’s subsequent motion for 
reconsideration.  The District Court found that Quimera retained the right under the 
agreement to identify the collateral for the loan and held that Kennedy breached by 
failing to oblige Quimera’s preference.  We disagree.  Applying New Jersey law, we find 
a genuine dispute of material fact as to what collateral the parties agreed to use for the 
loan.  We therefore vacate the District Court’s orders and remand for further proceedings. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On November 1, 2017, Kennedy and Quimera met (the “November 1 Meeting”) 
and executed a loan agreement (the “Loan Commitment”).  Kennedy agreed to issue 
Quimera a loan for 55% the appraised as-is market value of collateral, with a minimum 
loan of $3,000,000 and a maximum loan of $50,000,000.  The Loan Commitment 
 
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
3 
 
required Quimera—within three days of receiving a loan offer—to accept the offer, reject 
the offer, or initiate a third-party appraisal of the collateral.  The Loan Commitment 
defined collateral “as described in ‘Schedule C.’”  App. 114.  But although the parties 
discussed a complete list of Quimera’s properties at the November 1 Meeting, Schedule 
C did not identify any properties. 
Also at the November 1 Meeting, Quimera requested that Kennedy select 
properties to use as collateral for the loan from the list of Quimera’s properties.  Kennedy 
then asked Quimera to identify the properties it wished to use as collateral.  Quimera 
emailed its preferred collateral list on November 12 (the “November 12 List”), 
identifying eight properties. 
On December 7, Kennedy sent Quimera a list of nine properties—five of which 
were on Quimera’s November 12 List—to serve as collateral.  On December 27, Quimera 
paid $85,000 to Kennedy to appraise those nine properties.  On January 23, 2018, 
Kennedy offered Quimera a loan for $32,600,000 (the “January 23 Loan Offer”) based on 
the nine properties appraised. 
On January 29, Quimera responded to the offer.  Following a back-and-forth, 
Quimera asked Kennedy to remove five properties from the January 23 Loan Offer.  
Kennedy agreed and offered a loan for $23,000,000 based on the remaining collateral, but 
that figure fell below 55% of the value of the collateral. 
Discussions faltered; Kennedy and Quimera parted ways without closing a loan; 
and Kennedy refused to return fees paid by Quimera under the Loan Commitment. 
4 
 
In 2020, Quimera sued Kennedy in the District Court and alleged, among other 
things, that Kennedy breached the Loan Commitment.1  After discovery, both parties 
moved for summary judgment, each arguing that the other caused the Loan Commitment 
to falter. 
The District Court held that Quimera’s request for the removal of collateral 
complied with the Loan Commitment and that Kennedy’s below-value offer in response 
operated as a breach.  The District Court entered judgment for Quimera.  Kennedy moved 
for reconsideration, which the District Court denied.  Kennedy appealed. 
II. DISCUSSION2 
Our review of an order on summary judgment “is plenary, meaning we review 
anew the District Court’s summary judgment decisions, applying the same standard it 
must apply.”  Ellis v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 11 F.4th 221, 229 (3d Cir. 2021).3  
 
1  Quimera also included causes of action for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, unjust 
enrichment, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a violation of the 
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.  Quimera brought each cause of action against 
Kennedy.  But it also named Kennedy’s principals, Gregg Wolfer and Kevin Wolfer (the 
“Wolfers”), as Defendants to the fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act claims.   
2  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
3  Quimera argues that Kennedy forfeited any argument that genuine disputes of material 
fact preclude summary judgment by instead cross-moving for summary judgment.  Not 
so.  A “losing party” to a cross motion for summary judgment does not “waive[] judicial 
consideration and determination [of] whether genuine issues of material fact exist.”  
Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 1968).  And because we vacate 
the underlying order on summary judgment based on the record before the District Court, 
 
5 
 
Quimera “as the moving party must show ‘that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  Id. at 229–30 (alteration 
in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).4  Moreover, “we must view the facts in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party.”  Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 647 
(3d Cir. 2002) (citing Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 105 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
No one disputes that New Jersey law applies.  Under New Jersey law, extrinsic 
evidence “is always admissible in aid of the interpretation of an integrated 
agreement . . . even when the contract on its face is free from ambiguity.”  Atl. N. Airlines 
v. Schwimmer, 96 A.2d 652, 656 (N.J. 1953).  Thus, “[w]e consider all of the relevant 
evidence that will assist in determining the intent and meaning of the contract[,]” and 
“the words of the contract alone will not always control.”  Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. 
Assocs., 901 A.2d 341, 346, 347 (N.J. 2006).  
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Kennedy and in light of the fact 
that Schedule C to the Loan Commitment fails to specify collateral, a reasonable jury 
could find based on all the relevant evidence that the parties agreed to use the nine 
properties appraised for Kennedy’s January 23 Loan Offer as collateral.  A reasonable 
jury could reach this conclusion by relying on: (1) Quimera’s initial request that Kennedy 
 
“[w]e need not reach a decision on the motion for reconsideration as it is moot.”  United 
States ex rel. Ascolese v. Shoemaker Constr. Co., 55 F.4th 188, 197 (3d Cir. 2022). 
4  Kennedy appeals only the District Court’s order granting Quimera’s motion for 
summary judgment, not the District Court’s order denying Kennedy’s motion for 
summary judgment. 
6 
 
select properties for collateral; (2) Quimera’s payment of appraisal fees for the nine 
properties Kennedy selected; and (3) Quimera’s failure to object to the inclusion of the 
identified properties until after the appraisal, offer, and three-day response period.  If a 
jury reached this conclusion, Kennedy could defeat Quimera’s breach-of-contract claim 
because the jury would find that Kennedy fulfilled its obligation under the Loan 
Commitment to offer a loan for 55% the value of appraised collateral.5 
True, “[t]he construction and effect of a written instrument is a matter of law to be 
determined by the court and not by the jury; but when such construction depends upon 
extrinsic facts, as to which there is a dispute, a jury question is presented.”  Spinelli v. 
Golda, 77 A.2d 233, 239 (N.J. 1950) (quoting Downs v. N.J. Fid. & Plate Glass Ins. Co. 
of Newark, 103 A. 205, 206 (N.J. 1918)).  Because what collateral the parties agreed to 
use under the Loan Commitment presents a genuine dispute of material fact on which the 
ultimate breach analysis turns, we will vacate the District Court’s order on summary 
judgment and remand for further proceedings.6 
 
5  We recognize that there is evidence to support Quimera’s view, but that is why 
summary judgment is inappropriate.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
250 (1986) (explaining that summary judgment “is the threshold inquiry of determining 
whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine 
factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may 
reasonably be resolved in favor of either party”). 
6  Quimera withdrew its unjust-enrichment claim following Kennedy’s motion for 
summary judgment.  And Quimera agreed to dismiss the remaining claims against 
Kennedy and the Wolfers if the District Court granted judgment in its favor on the 
breach-of-contract claim against Kennedy.  Because the District Court did so, it 
dismissed Quimera’s remaining claims.  Kennedy does not dispute that Quimera’s 
dismissed claims—including fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of the covenant 
 
7 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s orders granting Quimera’s 
motion for summary judgment and denying Kennedy’s motion for reconsideration; and 
we will remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
of good faith and fair dealing, and a violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act—
may be revived upon remand to the District Court. 


Quimera Holding Group SAC v. Kennedy Funding Financial LLC

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-20-2025 
Edith Farina v. Bank of New York 
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Recommended Citation 
"Edith Farina v. Bank of New York" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 145. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/145 
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the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
DLD-070        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-1550 
___________ 
 
EDITH FARINA; EMILIO FARINA, 
                                               Appellants 
 
v. 
 
THE BANK OF NEW YORK, as trustee for the CHL Mortgage Pass-Through 
Trust 2007-8; RESIDENTIAL CREDIT SOLUTIONS, INC.; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC; BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON; 
DOES 1-10, inclusive 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-03395) 
District Judge:  Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 23, 2025 
Before:  RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 20, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Edith and Emilio Farina appeal the District Court’s order denying their motion for 
reconsideration as moot.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s order. 
The procedural history and factual background of the case are well known to the 
parties, set forth in the District Court’s memorandum opinions, and need not be discussed 
at length.  Briefly, Appellee Bank of New York (BONY) filed a foreclosure action 
against the Farinas in state court.  The Farinas then filed a complaint in the District Court 
against Appellees.  The District Court dismissed the complaint, but, on appeal, we 
remanded the matter for further proceedings.  Farina v. Bank of N.Y. as Tr. for CHL 
Mortg. Pass-Through Tr. 2007-8, No. 15-3679, 2021 WL 4439250, at *3 (3d Cir. Sept. 
28, 2021).  On remand, the District Court again dismissed the complaint.  The Farinas 
appealed, and we affirmed the District Court’s judgment.  Farina v. Bank of N.Y. as Tr. 
for CHL Mortg. Pass-Through Tr. 2007-8, No. 22-3383, 2023 WL 6290749, at *1 (3d 
Cir. Sept. 27, 2023). 
Shortly after filing the second appeal, the Farinas filed a motion in the District 
Court requesting that the District Judge recuse himself.  The District Court concluded that 
it lacked jurisdiction over the motion while the matter was before us on appeal and 
denied the motion.  It also determined that the Farinas’ arguments for recusal were 
insufficient.  The Farinas filed a timely motion for reconsideration.  After we affirmed the 
District Court’s dismissal of the Farina’s complaint, the District Court closed the case and 
denied the motion for reconsideration as moot.  The Farinas filed a timely notice of 
3 
 
appeal, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Ohntrup v. Firearms Ctr., 
Inc., 802 F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 1986).   
Appellee RCS has moved for summary affirmance of the District Court’s order, 
and Appellees BONY and MERS concur with RCS’s motion.  Edith Farina has filed a 
suggestion of bankruptcy and requests that the appeal be stayed pending the bankruptcy 
proceedings.   
 Bankruptcy Stay 
 Edith Farina argues that this appeal falls within the protection of the automatic 
stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  That provision, however, provides that a 
bankruptcy petition will operate as a stay of actions against the debtor or the property of 
the bankruptcy estate.  The matter before us does not involve an action against Edith 
Farina or the property of her bankruptcy estate.  The underlying complaint was filed by 
the Farinas and not against them or their property.  Assoc. of St. Croix Condo. Owners v. 
St. Croix Hotel Corp., 682 F.2d 446, 448 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that “Section 362 by its 
terms only stays proceedings against the debtor. The statute does not address actions 
brought by the debtor which would inure to the benefit of the bankruptcy estate”).  The 
request to stay the appeal is denied. 
 Appellee RCS’s Motion for Summary Action 
 In its motion for summary affirmance, Appellee argues, inter alia, that the District 
Court did not err in denying the motion for reconsideration as moot.  The Farinas spend 
much of their brief discussing the allegations of their recusal motion and seeking to 
relitigate their prior unsuccessful appeal of the District Court’s dismissal of their 
4 
 
complaint.1  They do not challenge the District Court’s denial of the motion to recuse for 
lack of jurisdiction.  When they briefly mention the denial of the motion for 
reconsideration as moot towards the end of their brief, they simply argue that the recusal 
issue was not moot because they plan to file a motion to vacate.  No such motion, 
however, was pending at the time the District Court denied the motion for 
reconsideration.2  As the District Court proceedings were finished, the District Court did 
not err in denying the motion for reconsideration as moot.  See Chafin v. Chafin, 568 
U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (explaining that a matter is moot when the court cannot grant the 
litigant any effectual relief).  In any event, we agree with the District Court that the 
Farinas’ allegations were insufficient to require recusal. 
Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the 
appeal.  See Third Circuit LAR 27.4.  For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by 
the District Court, we grant Appellee RCS’s motion for summary action and will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See Third Circuit I.O.P. 10.6.  Appellee 
RCS’s request that we deem the motion for summary action as unopposed is denied as 
moot.  Appellant’s motion for judicial notice is denied. 
 
1 The Farinas filed the motion to recuse a few weeks after filing the second appeal.  
Instead of raising the issue of the District Judge’s alleged conflicts during that appeal, the 
Farinas explicitly stated that they did not seek to litigate that issue.  See Brief at 20 n.3 in 
C.A. No. 22-3383 (stating that “[w]e are not attempting to litigate it here, we simply 
mention it so the court can take Judicial Notice of that fact”).  The Farinas’ post-
judgment motion to recuse is not an appropriate vehicle for relitigating the District 
Court’s dismissal of their complaint. 
 
2 We warn the Farinas that repetitive and vexatious litigation may result in financial 
sanctions and filing limitations. 


Edith Farina v. Bank of New York

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-21-2025 
Robert Browning v. John Young 
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Recommended Citation 
"Robert Browning v. John Young" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 150. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/150 
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the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2562 
__________ 
 
ROBERT BROWNING, 
     Appellant 
      
v. 
 
JOHN YOUNG, Judge 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-06883) 
District Judge:  Honorable Madeline C. Arleo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 26, 2024 
Before:  KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed February 21, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
2 
Appellant Robert Browning, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his civil 
action against New Jersey Superior Court Judge John Young.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
In 2011, Browning bit off the tip of his neighbor’s nose during an altercation.  He 
subsequently pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in the third degree and was sentenced 
to three years of probation.  The neighbor later brought a successful civil suit against 
Browning for damages.  Despite being found liable for damages, Browning asserted that 
“[e]vidence of [his] innocence was found during the civil matter.”  3d Cir. ECF No. 8 at 
3.  In 2016, Browning filed a post-conviction relief (“PCR”) petition in the New Jersey 
Superior Court, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial.  Judge Young 
denied the petition, and the denial was affirmed on direct appeal.   
After failing to successfully challenge his conviction in state court, Browning 
turned to the federal courts, filing three previous civil actions, including one prior action 
against Judge Young.1  As with those prior actions, in this fourth attempt Browning again 
seeks to have his guilty plea vacated and a trial held.  He asserts that Judge Young denied 
him his “right to trial without addressing the evidence [he] put before him.”  D.Ct. ECF 
No. 1 at 4.   
 
1 See Browning v. Supreme Court of NJ Stuart Rabner, Civ. No. 19-12212 (D.N.J. May 
6, 2019); Browning v. Grant, Civ. No. 20-01587 (D.N.J. Feb. 13, 2020), aff’d 828 F. 
App’x 822 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam); Browning v. Young, Civ. No. 21-14578 (Dec. 15, 
2021), aff’d C.A. No. 21-3341, 2022 WL 866287 (3d Cir. Mar. 23, 2022) (per curiam).   
 
 
3 
Judge Young moved to dismiss Browning’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Concluding that Browning’s claim for injunctive relief was 
barred by judicial immunity, the District Court granted the motion and dismissed the 
complaint with prejudice.  Browning filed a timely notice of appeal.   
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise de novo review 
over the District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss.  See Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of 
Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2018).  We may affirm on any basis supported by the 
record.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
As stated above, Browning again seeks to vacate his state-court conviction.  
However, as this Court has twice previously noted, any request that a federal court 
overturn Browning’s state-court conviction must be brought in a habeas corpus petition, 
not a § 1983 action.  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); cf. Bronowicz 
v. Allegheny Cnty., 804 F.3d 338, 345 n.12 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that plaintiff “who had 
no recourse under the habeas statute was nevertheless subject to Heck’s favorable 
termination rule”); see also Browning v. Grant, 828 F. App’x at 823; Browning v. Young, 
2022 WL 866287 at *1.  
Further, as the District Court properly concluded, Browning’s action is barred by 
judicial immunity.  In an “action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission 
taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”  42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
As the District Court noted, Browning did not allege that a declaratory decree was 
 
 
4 
violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable.2  Finally, the fact that Browning sued 
Judge Young in his individual capacity is not enough to circumvent judicial immunity as 
the relief sought “does not address the actions of Judge Young other than those taken in 
his judicial capacity.”  D.Ct. ECF No. 15 at 2. 
Accordingly, the complaint was properly dismissed, and we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.3    
 
2 Browning raises such an assertion for the first time on appeal, alleging that he sued the 
State of New Jersey for a declaration of his right to a trial in his criminal case, and that 
“[a]n order was issued by the Superior Court of New Jersey denying me a declaration.”  
3d Cir. ECF No. 8 at 3.  However, as this Court previously noted in affirming the 
dismissal of his prior action against Judge Young, the assertion that his request for 
declaratory relief failed “falls short of showing that the exception to the general bar on 
injunctive relief applies.”  Browning v. Young, 2022 WL 866287 at *1 (citing Azubuko 
v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)). 
 
3 Appellee’s motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix is granted. 


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