Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-5-2025 
Sean Burke v. Edward Bachert 
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Recommended Citation 
"Sean Burke v. Edward Bachert" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 359. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/359 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________________ 
 
No. 24-2237 
________________ 
 
SEAN PATRICK BURKE; EQUINOX ADVANTAGE REAL ESTATE I, INC.; 
STELLA CADENTE INVESTMENTS, LLC; EQUINOX PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT, INC., 
                                                 Appellants 
 
v. 
 
CHIEF EDWARD BACHERT; OFFICER RICHARD PENN; 
CHARLES F. ZURICK, III; OFFICER STEVEN FRITZINGER; 
OFFICER MATTHEW DEVERS; OFFICER JOSE VAZQUEZ; 
OFFICER ERIC TOSAD; OFFICER RICHARD KRASLEY; 
BOROUGH MANAGER ERIC GRATZ; BASE ENGINEERING, INC.; 
CINDY WITMAN; TIMOTHY CAMPION; GARREN KNOLL; BARRY COHEN; 
JOHN DOES 1-10 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 5:23-cv-01959) 
District Judge: Honorable John M. Gallagher 
________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on April 15, 2025 
 
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 5, 2025) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Appellee police officers twice switched off 
Appellants’ LED yard sign, purportedly fearful it would distract motorists.1  Appellants 
sued, contending, inter alia, that officers conspired with Appellant Burke’s neighbor, 
Appellee Zurick, to violate Appellants’ Fourth Amendment rights.  The District Court 
dismissed Appellants’ claims at summary judgment, holding qualified immunity applied 
as it was not clearly established whether the community caretaking exception to the 
warrant requirement allows police to switch off distracting signs on private property.  Our 
review is de novo.  Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1289 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Appellants do not challenge the substance of the court’s immunity analysis.  
Rather, relying solely on an expert report evaluating their sign’s maximum intensity in 
footcandles of light, they contend it was “impossible” their sign was “dangerously bright” 
in the first place.  Reply Br. 1.  But the report does not address distraction risk, as distinct 
from light output, and Appellants concede the sign was malfunctioning.  The report is, at 
best, “a scintilla of evidence” in Appellants’ favor, which “is insufficient to avoid 
summary judgment.”  Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1295.  Accordingly, because there is no genuine 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C §§ 1331 and 1367, and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 
 
3 
 
dispute of fact that the sign was potentially distracting to motorists, and Appellants do not 
challenge the court’s underlying immunity analysis, we will affirm the order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Appellees. 


English

Sean Burke v. Edward Bachert

US Bank NA v. B R Penn Realty Owner LP

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-16-2025 
Ariana World Wide Shipping LLC v. Ariana Worldwide USA Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Ariana World Wide Shipping LLC v. Ariana Worldwide USA Inc" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 414. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/414 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 24-1441 
_____________ 
 
ARIANA WORLD WIDE SHIPPING LLC, 
Appellant 
v. 
 
ARIANA WORLDWIDE USA, INC.  
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey  
(D.C. No. 2:20-cv-14655) 
District Judge: Honorable Madeline C. Arleo 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 3, 2024 
_____________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and McKEE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 16, 2025) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
 
 
 
 
 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
Ariana World Wide Shipping LLC (Ariana Dubai) exports used cars to Dubai 
from the United States. Ariana Dubai sued Ariana Worldwide USA, Inc. (Ariana NJ) 
alleging Ariana NJ never delivered 119 promised vehicles between 2019 and 2020, and 
seeking alleged lost profits, resulting from a consequent decline in its business. Before 
trial, the District Court granted Ariana NJ’s motion to exclude certain evidence and 
entered judgment as a matter of law for Ariana NJ on Ariana Dubai’s breach of fiduciary 
duty and tortious interference claims. After a full trial, the jury reached a verdict against 
Ariana Dubai for unjust enrichment and a verdict for Ariana Dubai on its claims of 
conversion and bailment. We will affirm those decisions.1  
I. 
 First, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of 
proffered lay witness Amin Ullah Haji Saidi Jun Ullah, head of Ariana Dubai’s 
accounting department, because his testimony would not have been “helpful to 
. . . determining a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 701(b). Lay opinions on lost profits may be 
admitted when “the witness ha[s] adequate personal knowledge in light of his in-depth 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s evidentiary rulings 
for abuse of discretion, Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 211 
(3d Cir. 2009), and review de novo the order of judgment as a matter of law, Norman v. 
Elkin, 860 F.3d 111, 122 n.13 (3d Cir. 2017). Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate 
when, “if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving 
it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from 
which a jury reasonably could find liability.” Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 227 F.3d 78, 88 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 
F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
3 
 
experience with the business’s contracts, operating costs, and competition.” Donlin v. 
Philips Lighting N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 81 (3d Cir. 2009). But an “opinion based on 
false assumptions is unhelpful in aiding the jury in its search for the truth, and is likely to 
mislead and confuse.” Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1175 (3d Cir. 
1993) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 Ullah testified that Ariana Dubai had suffered $1.19 million in lost profits, a figure 
he derived from the decline in shipping volume from forty-two customers whose vehicles 
Ariana NJ converted or refused to release to Ariana Dubai. But Ullah failed to give 
precise answers to basic questions about Ariana Dubai’s business, including how many 
customers the company had in 2020. He offered no comparative analysis of the decline in 
shipping volume between the forty-two customers affected by Ariana NJ’s actions and 
the unaffected customers to see whether the decline stemmed from those acts. And he 
lacked evidentiary support for many of his claims, making them unfounded speculation. 
In all, the District Court did not err in concluding this testimony, riddled with false and 
unsupported assumptions, would confuse the jury. See Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 1175.  
 Second, the District Court did not err in excluding Ariana Dubai’s business loss 
report comparing the number of shipping containers loaded in 2019 and 2020, because 
Ariana Dubai never provided Ariana NJ with the data underlying the calculations and 
“[t]he proponent must make the underlying originals or duplicates available for 
examination or copying.” Fed. R. Evid. 1006(b). Additionally, when “calculations [go] 
beyond the data they summarize[] and include[] several assumptions, inferences, and 
projections” then “the proposed evidence is . . . subject to the rules governing opinion 
4 
 
testimony.” Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 484 F.3d 644, 650 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, the 
calculations of lost profits were based on a lay witness’s assumptions about the causes of 
the decline in shipping volume, so they were not a summary to “prove the content of 
voluminous admissible writings.” Fed. R. Evid. 1006(a). Instead, this evidence was 
opinion testimony in the guise of a summary and was properly excluded.2 
 Third, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding pre-suit letters 
between counsel for Ariana Dubai and Ariana NJ. “Under the Federal Rules, relevant 
evidence is generally admissible, and irrelevant evidence is not.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 
F.3d 93, 114 (3d Cir. 2019). Evidence is relevant if it “has any tendency to make a fact 
more or less probable” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. 
Evid. 401. The letters contained demands from Ariana Dubai’s counsel about disputed 
vehicles and Ariana NJ’s response. Rather than admitting the letters, the District Court 
entered a stipulation stating that Ariana Dubai made a demand that Ariana NJ refused. 
That was enough to convey the factual importance of the letters, without also admitting 
the underlying documents containing irrelevant legal arguments and conclusions. And 
 
2 Even if Ullah’s testimony and Ariana Dubai’s business loss report were 
admissible, they were insufficient to support damages for lost profits. See Lightning 
Lube, 4 F.3d at 1176–78. New Jersey law requires that a plaintiff seeking lost profits 
must prove damages with “reasonable certainty.” Id. at 1176.  
But the evidence here provides no such certainty. As the District Court observed, 
“the witness was not even able to explain . . . his own business.” App. 565. Indeed, Ullah 
undertook no comparative analysis nor explained how broader market trends affected his 
estimate of lost profits. Thus, the District Court correctly found that “the witness 
. . . demonstrated” that his testimony “was speculative,” would “not be reasonably 
valuable,” and “would not establish damages with any kind of reasonable certainty.” 
App. 571; see also Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 1177.  
5 
 
even if they were relevant, they would be excludable because their probative value was 
“substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice [and] confusing the issues.” 
Fed. R. Evid. 403.  
Fourth, the District Court properly dismissed Ariana Dubai’s tortious interference 
claim. New Jersey law requires that a plaintiff establish “damages resulting from the 
defendant’s interference.” Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 1167; see also Printing-Mart 
Morristown v. Sharp. Elec. Corp., 563 A.2d 31, 37 (N.J. 1989) (per curiam). Because 
Ariana Dubai only produced speculative and inadmissible evidence of lost profits, it 
could not make a prima facie showing of damages. 
 Finally, Ariana Dubai argues that the District Court erred in entering judgment as a 
matter of law on its breach of fiduciary duty claim. Under New Jersey law, “[t]he essence 
of a fiduciary relationship is that one party places trust and confidence in another who is in 
a dominant or superior position.” F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 703–04 (N.J. 1997). 
The party in a superior or dominant position “is under a duty to act for or give advice for 
the benefit of another on matters within the scope of their relationship.” Id. at 704. Here, 
Ariana Dubai conceded it held the dominant position. The District Court’s judgment was 
proper. 
*  *  * 
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  


Ariana World Wide Shipping LLC v. Ariana Worldwide USA Inc

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-29-2025 
James Biear v. Attorney General United States of America 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"James Biear v. Attorney General United States of America" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 436. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/436 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-3093 
__________ 
 
JAMES S. BIEAR, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-01488) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 27, 2025 
Before:  HARDIMAN, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed May 29, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
James S. Biear appeals pro se from orders entered in an action brought pursuant to 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, denying his motion to reopen 
and his motion for reconsideration of that denial.  We will affirm.     
 Because the parties are familiar with the background of this case, we will revisit 
the facts only as they are relevant to our analysis.  Biear filed an action in the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, challenging responses to his 
FOIA requests for records pertaining to himself.1  Ultimately, the District Court issued 
separate decisions that, among other things, required the Department of Justice’s 
Criminal Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to provide Biear with 
certain previously withheld material.  See Biear v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 684 F. 
Supp. 3d 296, 313, 316 (M.D. Pa. 2023); Biear v. United States Dep’t of Justice., 2023 
WL 4868443, at *8-11 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2023).  We affirmed the decision pertaining to 
the FBI.2  See Biear v. Att’y Gen., 2024 WL 837039, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb. 28, 2024) (not 
precedential).   
Shortly thereafter, Biear filed a letter-motion in the District Court, asking it to 
reopen the case to determine if the defendants “completed [their] FOIA obligation 
 
1 Biear sought records related to his prosecution in federal court for money laundering, 
wire fraud, and related offenses.  Biear v. Warden Fort Dix FCI, 679 F. App’x 93 (3d Cir. 
2017.)  “According to the superseding indictment, Biear worked as a driver and personal 
assistant for Kenward Elmslie, the heir to the Pulitzer fortune.  From May 2005 through 
September 2007, Biear carried out a scheme to defraud Elmslie of his artwork, money, 
and other valuable property.”  Id. at 93 n.1. 
 
2 Biear did not appeal the District Court’s decision regarding the Criminal Division’s 
response.   
 
 
3 
 
pursuant to the Court’s most recent order(s).”  The Criminal Division and the FBI 
responded, arguing that the case should remain closed.  Biear filed a reply brief.  The 
District Court denied relief, stating that the “record is clear that [Biear] was provided 
with all documents required by Court Order” and that Biear “present[ed] no cognizable 
basis to reopen this case.”  Biear timely filed a motion for reconsideration which the 
District Court denied.  Biear timely appealed.3   
We conclude that the District Court properly rejected the arguments that Biear 
made in his letter-motion and reply brief.  In response to the District Court’s 2023 
decision, the Criminal Division released with redactions ten documents that previously 
had been withheld in full.  Biear “disagreed” with that response.  It is clear from the 
redacted documents themselves and from the Vaughn index4 filed in the District Court 
that the withheld information consisted only of the names of government employees and 
individuals in unrelated Criminal Division cases involving Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaties.  Redaction of that information was proper.  See Davin, 60 F.3d at 1060 (stating 
that “in the usual circumstance, an individual’s privacy interest in not having his or her 
identity revealed in the context of a criminal or national security investigation overrides 
 
3 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because Biear’s appeal from the 
denial of his timely post-judgment motion “brings up the underlying judgment for 
review,” we will review both the District Court’s order denying reopening and the order 
denying Biear’s motion for reconsideration.  See McAlister v. Sentry Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 
550, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
4 A Vaughn index “correlate[es] each withheld document, or a portion thereof, with a 
specific exemption and relevant part of an agency’s justification for nondisclosure.”  
Davin v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 60 F.3d 1043, 1047 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing 
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). 
 
4 
 
the public benefit”). 
Biear also claimed that the FBI continued to redact the name of Kenward Elmslie, 
see note 1, supra, who had died during the FOIA litigation.  A deceased individual has 
diminished personal privacy interests.  See Davis v. DOJ, 460 F.3d 92, 97-98 (D.C. Cir. 
2007).  Here, after reviewing the documents in camera, the District Court carefully 
described the references to Elmslie that needed to be disclosed, but noted that “in many 
cases, his name and information must remain redacted because their disclosure would 
invade the privacy of another individual.”  See Biear, 2023 WL 4868443, at *8-11 & 
n.10.  Biear’s letter-motion and reply brief did not identify any specific instances where 
the FBI masked Elmslie’s name in violation of the District Court’s directives.  Thus, the 
District Court properly rejected his challenge to the redaction of Elmslie’s name in the 
documents reprocessed by the FBI.5 
The District Court also correctly denied Biear’s request that it “investigat[e]” the 
“extraordinary delay” between the issuance of its opinion in July 2023 and the FBI’s 
disclosure of the reprocessed records in March 2024.  But the District Court had not 
provided a deadline for the FBI to reprocess the records, and Biear offered no basis for 
his assertion that the FBI acted “mischievously.”  Biear’s letter-motion and reply brief 
also raised issues related to documents produced by the Executive Office for United 
 
5 To the extent that Biear complains that the FBI is withholding exculpatory evidence, we 
note that the “FOIA is neither a substitute for criminal discovery nor an appropriate 
means to vindicate discovery abuses.”  Williams & Connolly v. SEC, 662 F.3d 1240, 
1245 (D.C. Cir. 2011).    
 
 
5 
 
States Attorneys (EOUSA), to the ‘legality’ of how the FBI obtained the documents, and 
to the fairness of the criminal case against him.  But because these challenges are 
unrelated to enforcement of the judgments in the underlying FOIA action, the District 
Court properly rejected them.  Cf. Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 354, 358 (1996) 
(stating that “we have cautioned against the exercise of jurisdiction over proceedings that 
are ‘entirely new and original,’ ... or where ‘the relief [sought is] of a different kind or on 
a different principle’ than that of the prior decree” (citations omitted)).  Finally, to the 
extent that Biear challenges the denial of his motion for reconsideration, we discern no 
abuse of discretion, as that motion failed to allege “(1) an intervening change in the 
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available . . .; or (3) the 
need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.”  Max’s 
Seafood Café, 176 F.3d at 677.   
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 


James Biear v. Attorney General United States of America

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-29-2025 
USA v. Todd Stydinger 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Todd Stydinger" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 437. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/437 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 23-3019 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
TODD FRANKLIN STYDINGER, 
Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 1:21-cr-00341-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Christopher C. Conner 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 14, 2025 
_____________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 29, 2025) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
Todd Franklin Stydinger pleaded guilty to receiving child pornography in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), admitting to possessing 198 pictures and seventy-
three videos documenting sexual abuse of children. Stydinger argues the District Court 
incorrectly included the frames contained in his seventy-three videos as “images” under 
United States Sentencing Guideline § 2G2.2(b)(7).1 He is incorrect.  
The District Court applied the reasoning we would adopt in United States v. 
Haggerty, that “[o]rdinary usage makes plain that an ‘image’ is a fixed visual 
representation,” which “is synonymous with ‘frame’ in the video context.” 107 F.4th 175, 
184–85 (3d Cir. 2024). And the District Court reasonably relied on evidence that just 
three of Stydinger’s seventy-three videos contained 1,680 frames of children suffering 
sexual abuse. So there is no error in the District Court’s judgment to apply the 
enhancement in § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D), and we will affirm. 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We exercise plenary review 
over an interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, United States v. Nasir, 17 F.4th 459, 
468 (3d Cir. 2021) (en banc), and review for clear error a “district court’s application of 
the Guidelines to a specific set of facts,” United States v. Caraballo, 88 F.4th 239, 243 
(3d Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2012)). 


USA v. Todd Stydinger

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-3-2025 
USA v. Joseph Cammarata 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Joseph Cammarata" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 444. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/444 
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Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 23-2110 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
JOSEPH CAMMARATA, 
        Appellant 
 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2:21-cr-00427-001) 
 
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING 
 
Present:  RESTREPO, McKEE, and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant and the response filed by the 
Appellee in the above-entitled case having been submitted to the judges who participated 
in the decision of this Court, it is hereby 
  O R D E R E D that the petition for panel rehearing is granted limited to the 
restitution issue.  The opinion and judgment issued on February 24, 2025 are vacated. 
The parties are directed to file supplement letter briefs regarding the restitution 
issue not to exceed five (5) pages single spaced.  Appellant’s supplemental brief shall be 
filed and served within 10 days from the date of this order and Appellee’s supplemental 
brief shall be filed within seven (7) days from the date that Appellant’s supplement brief 
is filed.  Hard copies of the supplemental briefs are not required.   
In light of the action taken by the original panel, the en banc court declines to take 
action on the request for rehearing en banc. 
      BY THE COURT, 
      s/D. Brooks Smith 
      Circuit Judge 
 
Date: June 3, 2025 
Amr/cc: All counsel of record  


USA v. Joseph Cammarata

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-4-2025 
USA v. Jonathan Vega 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Jonathan Vega" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 451. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/451 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 24-2067 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JONATHAN GREGORY VEGA, 
a/k/a Jay, 
a/k/a Thug, 
                Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3:22-cr-00008-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 6, 2025 
 
Before: MATEY, FREEMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 4, 2025) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
 
 
 
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
 2 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
Defendant Jonathan Vega pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 
forty grams or more of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). He 
appeals his 144-month sentence, arguing that his criminal history did not justify his 
career-offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. We see no error in the District 
Court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines.1  
A defendant is considered a career offender, and subject to the corresponding 
enhancement, if: 1) he “was at least eighteen years old at the time [he] committed the 
instant offense of conviction”; 2) “the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is 
either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense”; and 3) he “has at least two 
prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.”2 
§ 4B1.1(a). Section 4B1.2(c) clarifies that a defendant’s charged conduct must have 
followed two felony convictions “counted separately” under § 4A1.1. Prior convictions 
“always are counted separately if . . . [the] offenses . . . were separated by an intervening 
arrest.” § 4A1.2(a)(2); see § 4B1.2(c). “If there is no intervening arrest, prior sentences 
are counted separately unless” the offense conduct was “in the same charging instrument” 
or “the sentences were imposed on the same day.” Id. 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Whether a conviction is a predicate to 
apply the career-offender enhancement “is a question of law subject to plenary review.” 
United States v. Womack, 55 F.4th 219, 236 (3d Cir. 2022). 
2 The parties do not dispute that Vega satisfies the first element, as he was over the 
age of eighteen at the time of the instant offense. Nor does Vega offer any reason to 
doubt that his 2014 and 2019 convictions were controlled substance offenses as defined 
in § 4B1.2(b).  
 
 
 3 
The presentence investigation report identified two drug convictions that justified 
application of the career-offender enhancement. First, in 2014, Vega tried to sell 500 
packets of heroin to a confidential informant. He was arrested in the act and released on 
bond. Two weeks later, police found Vega with 230 more packets of heroin. Each 
incident resulted in a conviction for possession with intent to deliver heroin. The 
guidelines required the District Court to count these convictions separately because of the 
intervening arrest. Id.; § 4B1.2(c).3 Vega argues these convictions comprised a single 
offense, a “conspiracy that never ceased.” Opening Br. 9. But he was not convicted of 
conspiracy, and the guidelines always separately count convictions when an arrest 
intervenes. § 4A1.2(a)(2).4 Accordingly, Vega’s 2014 convictions constitute two separate 
controlled substance convictions for the purposes of § 4B1.1(a), and application of the 
career-offender enhancement was proper.  
So we will affirm.  
 
3 Vega cites three cases that apply language struck from the guidelines’ 
commentary over seventeen years ago. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 709 (effective 
Nov. 1, 2007); United States v. Mora-Zapata, 94 F. App’x 63, 65–66 (3d Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Martin, 749 F.3d 87, 93 n.7 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Withers, 267 
F. Supp. 2d 836, 838 (S.D. Ohio 2003). The District Court properly applied the 
guidelines in effect at Vega’s sentencing. See United States v. Lewis, 58 F.4th 764, 772 
(3d Cir. 2023). 
4 Vega points to § 1B1.3’s “related conduct” test and the Armed Career Criminal 
Act’s “on occasions different” standard, but those inquiries are rooted in text absent from 
the career-offender enhancement. § 4A1.2(a)(2).  


USA v. Jonathan Vega

USA v. Corey Hamlet

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-9-2025 
Aden Rusfeldt v. Cristian Morar 
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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-2133 
____________ 
 
ADEN RUSFELDT, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
OFFICER CRISTIAN MORAR; CITY OF READING 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 5:23-cv-01523) 
District Judge: Honorable John M. Gallagher 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 6, 2025 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, BIBAS, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 9, 2025)  
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Aden Rusfeldt appeals a summary judgment for the City of Reading and one of its 
police officers, Cristian Morar. We will affirm. 
I 
A pastor, Rusfeldt staged a demonstration outside Reading Senior High School. 
He preached while his wife videotaped. Using a megaphone, Rusfeldt told students, 
among other things, “it’s time for you to give your life to Jesus Christ,” “Jesus Christ has 
a plan for your life,” “some of you are suicidal, you need God,” “some of you are 
depressed, you need God,” and “some of you are whores, you need God.” ECF No. 18 
(Video) at 0:00–0:34. He called one student a “little slut.” Id. at 0:31–43. The crowd 
grew agitated. Some threw objects and water, made crude gestures, and moved toward 
Rusfeldt. 
School resource officers called for backup, and Officer Morar arrived at the scene. 
App 386. As Morar attempted to disperse the crowd, Rusfeldt told one student, “go to 
hell, lesbo dyke.” Video at 5:31–33. Morar warned Rusfeldt that he would be arrested if 
he continued to rile up the students and asked him to move down the street. But Rusfeldt 
didn’t move, so Morar arrested him for disorderly conduct. He was detained for less than 
an hour and released without charges. 
Rusfeldt sued Morar, the Reading School District, and the City of Reading, and an 
unnamed officer, claiming constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and false 
imprisonment under state law. The District Court dismissed most of Rusfeldt’s claims 
without prejudice. But four claims survived: the First and Fourth Amendment claims 
 
3 
 
against Morar and the false imprisonment claims against Morar and the City. 
Nearly five months after the deadline, Rusfeldt moved for leave to file an amended 
complaint. The District Court denied the motion. Morar and the City moved for summary 
judgment on the four remaining claims, which the District Court granted. Rusfeldt timely 
appealed.  
II1 
Rusfeldt argues that summary judgment was improper, that the District Court 
abused its discretion by denying his motion for leave to amend, and that he is entitled to 
attorney’s fees. We disagree. 
First, Rusfeldt’s claims fail as a matter of law. Even if Rusfeldt’s speech were 
protected, Morar is entitled to qualified immunity. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223, 236 (2009). A reasonable officer could have believed that some of Rusfeldt’s speech 
was unprotected under Gilles v. Davis, which deemed similar epithets to be “fighting 
words.” 427 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2005). Rusfeldt counters that Snyder v. Phelps, 562 
U.S. 443 (2011), abrogated Gilles. But Snyder was not a fighting-words case, as the 
Supreme Court acknowledged. 562 U.S. at 451 n.3. So Rusfeldt cannot show that the 
arrest violated his constitutional rights under clearly established law. See George v. 
Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 572 (3d Cir. 2013).  
Rusfeldt’s false imprisonment claims also fail. Given Gilles, it was reasonable for 
Officer Morar to believe Rusfeldt was engaging in disorderly conduct. See Renk v. City of 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a). We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
4 
 
Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994). Because Rusfeldt’s arrest was based on 
probable cause, his detention was not unlawful. Id. 
Rusfeldt contends that the District Court relied on inadmissible hearsay in granting 
summary judgment. But even if that were true, Morar would still be entitled to qualified 
immunity. And Rusfeldt’s arrest would still be justified by the undisputed facts and 
circumstances. See Renk, 641 A.2d at 293. So any error was harmless. See Goodman v. 
Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 667 (3d Cir. 2002). 
Second, the District Court acted well within its discretion when it denied 
Rusfeldt’s motion for leave to amend. Gay v. Petsock, 917 F.2d 768, 772 (3d Cir. 1990). 
Rusfeldt waited five months after the deadline to file the motion and offered no plausible 
reason for that undue delay. See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 116 
(3d Cir. 2003). And granting the motion would have prejudiced Morar and the City, who 
were required to file dispositive motions the next day. See id. 
Third, Rusfeldt is not entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) 
because he is not a “prevailing party.” Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 759–60 (1987). 
* * * 
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 


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