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USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

Russell Tinsley v. Court of Common Pleas

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

Cody Simensky v. Experian Information Solutions Inc

Jackson, Marcella

High at Home: How the Continued Federal Prohibition of Cannabis In Federally Subsidized Housing Perpetuates the War on Drugs

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-2-2025 
Edin Madrid-Mancia v. Attorney General United States 
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"Edin Madrid-Mancia v. Attorney General United States" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 5. 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 21-2291 
_____________ 
 
EDIN DONELSY MADRID-MANCIA, 
       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a 
Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals  
(Agency Case No. A206-643-376)  
Immigration Judge: David Cheng 
_______________ 
 
On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States 
on June 24, 2024 
Submitted on Remand July 26, 2024 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and MATEY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  January 2, 2025) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
 
 
 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
This case returns to us for reconsideration in light of Campos-Chaves v. Garland, 
144 S. Ct. 1637 (2024), so we again address Edin Donelsy Madrid-Mancia’s petition for 
review of the denial of her motion to reopen proceedings and to rescind the Immigration 
Judge’s in absentia removal order.  Because the Board of Immigration Appeals erred in 
failing to weigh Madrid-Mancia’s evidence of non-receipt and was laboring at the time 
under the mistaken belief that Madrid-Mancia had failed in her obligations under 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B), we will grant the petition. 
I. BACKGROUND 
When we originally considered this case, we were presented with two preserved 
issues for review: (1) whether Madrid-Mancia failed to provide ICE with an address at 
which she may be contacted, excusing the Attorney General’s notice obligations in 
accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B), and if not, whether the Notice of Hearing 
that followed the defective Notice to Appear was sufficient under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(b)(5)(A); and (2) if the Notice of Hearing sufficed, whether Madrid-Mancia had 
rebutted the presumption that it was delivered to her.  See Madrid-Mancia v. Att’y Gen., 
72 F.4th 508, 514 n.6, 516 (3d Cir. 2023), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. 
Garland v. Madrid-Mancia, 144 S. Ct. 2677 (2024).   
At that time, we granted relief on the first ground, explaining that the BIA erred in 
holding that the requirement for notice was excused by Madrid-Mancia’s failure to 
provide “an address . . . at which [she] may be contacted” because designating her 
cousin’s home as her mailing address satisfied that obligation.  Id. at 520 (quoting 8 
3 
 
U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(i)).  We also explained that the mailing of a “Notice of Hearing” 
did not cure the defective NTA or satisfy 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A)’s notice 
requirements.  Id. at 516, 519–20.  As “[o]ur decision on the first issue [was] sufficient to 
resolve this petition,” we had no need to reach the second.  Id. at 514 n.6.   
On remand, that is no longer the case, as Campos-Chavez held that a subsequent 
Notice of Hearing, on its own, satisfies § 1229a(b)(5)(A) and can defeat recission under 
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).  See 144 S. Ct. at 1643, 1647–48.  Thus, we now reach Madrid-
Mancia’s second argument and consider whether the BIA erred in holding that she failed 
to rebut the presumption of delivery. 
II. DISCUSSION1 
In evaluating whether a respondent has rebutted the presumption of delivery via 
mail, the BIA must consider “all relevant evidence submitted,” Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. & 
N. Dec. 665, 674 (BIA 2008), including the respondent’s actions after learning of the 
order and her diligence in seeking to redress the situation, which the BIA has 
characterized as a “significant factor,” id. at 676.  Here, the BIA recognized that, because 
the Attorney General sent Madrid-Mancia’s notice by regular mail and not certified mail, 
the presumption of delivery was relatively weak.  A.R. 3 (citing Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. 
& N. Dec. at 665); see also Santana Gonzalez v. Att’y Gen., 506 F.3d 274, 279 (3d Cir. 
 
1 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), and we have jurisdiction under 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  We review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for 
substantial evidence.  Darby v. Att’y Gen., 1 F.4th 151, 159 (3d Cir. 2021).  We review 
the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.  Id. 
4 
 
2007).  But the BIA erred in two respects when considering whether that weak 
presumption was rebutted. 
First, neither the BIA’s opinion, nor the IJ’s opinion on which it relied, evaluated 
the full range of Madrid-Mancia’s evidence of non-receipt, even though the BIA’s own 
precedent required it do so.  See Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 674.  And as we 
explained in Santana Gonzalez, “submission of an affidavit by an alien claiming non-
receipt” with “circumstantial evidence corroborating the alien’s claims of non-receipt” is 
“ordinarily [] sufficient to raise a factual issue requiring an evidentiary hearing before the 
IJ.”  506 F.3d at 280.  There, we concluded that the evidence—petitioner’s affidavit 
asserting non-receipt; her lack of “motive to avoid the scheduled hearing” and how “[s]he 
had little to gain by failing to appear”; her incentive to appear given the prospect of 
statutory relief from removal; her attempt “to acquaint the DHS with her change of 
address”; her voluntary appearance in subsequent proceedings; and her “affirmative 
action to have her counsel inquire” and move to reopen—sufficed for us to “remand to 
the BIA, with directions to reopen the in absentia order of removal.”  Id. at 280–81.  
Madrid-Mancia has presented similar evidence of non-receipt.  Like Santana 
Gonzalez, she submitted her own affidavit.  And as attested in that document, she 
provided ICE with her then-current address at 307 Ashmore Avenue when she was 
presented the original NTA in April 2014; she went to the Mt. Laurel ICE office within 
one month of moving to a new address to update her address and was told she was not in 
their system; between 2014 and October 2019, she checked for mail every three days at 
the 307 Ashmore house and did not receive any mailing from the Immigration Court; 
5 
 
when she received an ICE letter sent to the 307 Ashmore house in October 2019 
requesting her appearance on November 4, 2019, she voluntarily presented herself and 
learned for the first time that an in absentia removal order had been issued in August 
2017; she promptly retained counsel who moved to reopen the case in February 2020; 
and when the IJ denied relief, she promptly appealed to the BIA.   
Also like Santana Gonzalez, Madrid-Mancia had little to gain and much to lose in 
failing to appear, particularly given her intent to petition for relief; she too attempted to 
update her residential address with ICE, only to be told it was not possible; and she too 
voluntarily appeared and promptly sought to redress the situation.  Within weeks, she 
retained counsel, who took affirmative action to inquire after her case files in January 
2020, and, in February 2020, moved to reopen proceedings.  Substantially similar 
evidence persuaded us to vacate and remand in Santana Gonzalez.  Id. at 281; see also 
Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 674, 676 (holding that “respondent’s actions upon 
learning of the in absentia order” is a relevant factor, and that “obtaining counsel and 
requesting reopening” is “significant”).  Here, where the BIA and IJ declined even to 
acknowledge Madrid-Mancia’s evidence of due diligence, we will take the same course.  
Our second concern with the BIA’s opinion is that when it concluded Madrid-
Mancia had not rebutted the presumption of delivery, it was laboring under a 
misapprehension of the law concerning the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B).  
Specifically, the BIA expressed the view that Madrid-Mancia had failed to comply with 
§ 1229a(b)(5)(B) by “mov[ing] to a new address and never submitt[ing] a change of 
address” form.  A.R. 4.  It also asserted that she was “on actual notice . . . of the 
6 
 
obligation to keep the Immigration Court informed of any changes of address, and of the 
consequences for failure to do so,” and explained its refusal to disturb the in absentia 
removal as one of “[t]he consequences for failing to follow the address notification 
requirements [that] are outlined in section 240(b)(5)(B) of the Act.”  Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(b)(5)(B)).   
This was legal error.  As we explained in our prior opinion, § 1229a(b)(5)(B) does 
not require that a current residential address be on file, as the BIA’s analysis assumed.  
Madrid-Mancia, 72 F.4th at 520; see also Renaut v. Lynch, 791 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 
2015).  Rather, it requires provision of “an address . . . at which the alien may be 
contacted respecting proceedings.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(i).  And “‘[a]n address’ 
where the alien ‘may be contacted’ means just that: a place where a person can be 
contacted. The alien’s current residential address. Or her cousin’s. Or a PO box. So long 
as that address exists, it is sufficient.”  Madrid-Mancia, 72 F.4th at 520.  Madrid-Mancia 
provided such an address, so to the extent that the BIA may have declined reopening 
based on the belief that she did not, it was mistaken. 
III. CONCLUSION2 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant Madrid-Mancia’s petition for review and 
remand to the BIA for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
2 Judge Matey would deny the petition because he reads the record to contain insufficient 
corroboration of Madrid Mancia’s affidavit to direct reopening of the proceedings, or the 
lesser remedy of an evidentiary hearing. Nor is the BIA’s misinterpretation of 
§ 1229a(b)(5)(B) significant because it was not central to the agency’s decision. 


English

Edin Madrid-Mancia v. Attorney General United States

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-7-2025 
USA v. Juan Jarmon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Juan Jarmon" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 12. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/12 
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the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2681 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JUAN JARMON, also known as J, also known as Yizzo, 
         Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2:17-cr-00072-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
on December 19, 2024 
 
 
Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 7, 2025) 
____________________________________  
2 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
In 2019, the District Court sentenced Juan Jarmon to 360 months in prison after a jury 
found him guilty of a host of drug-related offenses. That sentence was at the bottom of his 
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range—a range that was based on a total offense level of 
40 and a criminal-history category of VI. 
In August 2024, Jarmon submitted a pro se letter to the District Court, asking that the 
letter be construed “as a motion if I’m eligible for relief [under Guidelines Amendment 
821],” and seeking appointment of counsel if he was indeed eligible. Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 
710. Later that month, the District Court denied this letter-motion. The District Court ex-
plained that Jarmon was not eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) 
because Amendment 821 had no effect on his sentence, and that counsel appointment was 
not warranted. Jarmon then filed this appeal,1 and the Government has since timely moved 
to summarily affirm. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo 
the District Court’s determination that Jarmon was not eligible for a sentence reduction. 
See United States v. Rivera-Cruz, 904 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 2018). And we review the 
District Court’s denial of his request for counsel for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United 
States v. Meeks, 971 F.3d 830, 833–34 (8th Cir. 2020); United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 
789, 795 n.4 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); cf. Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (noting that a district court has “broad discretion” to appoint counsel for an 
indigent litigant under 28 U.S.C. § 1915). 
3 
 
The Government’s motion is granted. Amendment 821, which took effect on November 
1, 2023, United States v. Stimpson, 113 F.4th 350, 354 n.5 (3d Cir. 2024), “applies retro-
actively and alters how so-called ‘status points’ are used to calculate a defendant’s criminal 
history category,” United States v. Bonds, 121 F.4th 1129, 1130 (7th Cir. 2024) (per cu-
riam). But as the District Court explained, Jarmon’s criminal-history category of VI was 
based not on status points, but rather on his designation as a career offender under the 
Guidelines. Accordingly, Jarmon is not eligible for a sentence reduction, and appointment 
of counsel in the District Court was not warranted. Because this appeal does not present a 
substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. 
I.O.P. 10.6.2 
 
2 Jarmon’s motion for appointment of counsel on appeal is denied, as is his “Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgement [sic].” 


USA v. Juan Jarmon

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-14-2025 
Michael Vela v. Kelly Christopher 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Michael Vela v. Kelly Christopher" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 37. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/37 
This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
1 
 
BLD-058        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2756 
___________ 
 
MICHAEL J. VELA, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KELLY CHRISTOPHER;  
CAPTAIN MOSER, Shift Commander, C.O. 4;  
C. J. MCKEOWN, Hearing Examiner;  
KELLEY, C.O.1; SGT. HYDE; CO1 GILBERT; SGT. FISHER 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-01043) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 2, 2025 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 14, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Michael Vela, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s 
order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss his complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment, with one modification. 
I. 
Vela is currently incarcerated at SCI Waymart. His complaint1 alleges injuries 
arising from various events, starting with an incident in his cell where a CO, “completely 
unprovoked,” pepper sprayed him “less than 5 inches from [his] face.” Complaint at 13. 
That CO then filed “frivolous” misconduct charges against Vela, in which she lied about 
why she used the pepper spray, “claiming that [he] stood up off his bunk and came 
rapidly towards her.” Id. Vela was immediately sent to the restricted housing unit (RHU), 
where he was strip searched and denied access to a shower to wash off the pepper spray. 
At the misconduct hearing held two days later, during which Vela was not allowed to call 
witnesses or present evidence, he was found guilty of threatening an employee with 
bodily harm and refusing to obey an order and punished with 60 days of disciplinary 
custody status and the loss of his job. Vela immediately appealed and two days later, the 
 
1 Because this case was adjudicated at the motion-to-dismiss stage, we accept the 
allegations in Vela’s complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to him. 
See Mator v. Wesco Distrib., Inc., 102 F.4th 172, 178 (3d Cir. 2024). We may “consider 
documents integral to or explicitly relied upon in [that pleading].” Id. (quotation marks 
omitted). We also construe Vela’s filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 
94 (2007) (per curiam). 
3 
 
charges were expunged. He also alleges other later incidents of abuse from two other 
COs. 
Vela challenges these actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming retaliation, 
unreasonable search and seizure, violations of his privacy, cruel and unusual punishment, 
and discrimination. He explains that he has not filed any grievances related to these 
incidents because “staff abuse is not covered by the grievance system.” Complaint at 6. 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that his claims are 
barred for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, and in the alternative, that he 
failed to state a claim.  Vela moved for appointment of counsel, which the District Court 
denied without prejudice as premature.  The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, 
reasoning that Vela’s failure to exhaust was “fatal to his claims,” ECF No. 20 at 11, and 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  This timely appeal followed.2  
 
II. 
 “Under the PLRA, prisoners who seek to challenge their conditions of 
confinement must exhaust all available administrative remedies.” Prater v. Dep't of Corr., 
76 F.4th 184, 203 (3d Cir. 2023) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). Failure to exhaust is an 
affirmative defense, Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing 
 
2 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise 
plenary review over a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to [Rule] 
12(b)(6),” Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021), and may summarily 
affirm if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 
F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
4 
 
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007)), and can be invoked at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage 
if the deficiency is apparent on the face of the complaint. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 215. In 
the context of a prisoner’s claim of abuse by a staff member, the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections’ policy ADM 804 provides “the exclusive means of 
exhaustion.” Prater, 76 F.4th at 204. A prisoner’s failure to “follow the full administrative 
review process under ADM 804” means they have “necessarily failed to properly exhaust 
their claims under the PLRA.” Id.  
 We agree with the District Court’s determination that Vela has failed to exhaust 
his claims because he has not filed any grievances under ADM 804.3 Vela attempts to 
excuse this failure by asserting that “staff abuse is not covered by the grievance system.” 
Complaint at 6. This is incorrect, as we have held that the grievance procedures laid out 
in ADM 804 are the exclusive means of exhaustion for prisoners alleging abuse by staff. 
See Prater, 76 F.4th at 204. Because this failure to exhaust was apparent on the face of 
Vela’s complaint, it was appropriate for the District Court to dismiss it on that basis 
under Rule 12(b)(6). See Jones, 549 U.S. at 215.4   
 
3 Vela mentions vaguely that he “is litigating” a PREA complaint against one of the 
defendants. Complaint at 17. Though ADM 804 does not apply in that context, see Prater, 
76 F.4th at 204 (citing ADM 804 § 1A(2)), exhaustion must be complete prior to filing 
suit, see, e.g., Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir. 2002), and Vela’s 
language indicates that his PREA complaint has not yet been resolved. 
4 Vela’s notice of appeal also encompasses the District Court’s order denying his motion 
for appointment of counsel. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(4). We review such a denial for 
abuse of discretion, see Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 457 (3d Cir. 1997), and 
perceive no error in the District Court’s decision. See generally Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 
147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993).   
5 
 
Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. However, 
we will modify the dismissal to be without prejudice. See Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 
F.3d 69, 81 n.16 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that we “allow[] complaints filed prematurely 
to be dismissed without prejudice and then refiled when the administrative remedies [are] 
exhausted”). 


Michael Vela v. Kelly Christopher

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-15-2025 
USA v. Ernest Dyer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Ernest Dyer" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 44. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/44 
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inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
BLD-061        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2921 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ERNEST KYLE DYER, 
    Appellant 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 1:17-cr-00226-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph F. Saporito, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 8, 2025 
Before:  SHWARTZ, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 15, 2025) 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________ 
PER CURIAM 
Ernest Dyer appeals pro se from the District Court’s order denying his motion for 
a reduction of his federal sentence. The Government has filed a timely motion for 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
summary affirmance, and Dyer has filed a motion to appoint appellate counsel. We deny 
Dyer’s motion, grant the Government’s motion, and will summarily affirm the District 
Court’s judgment. 
Dyer entered a conditional guilty plea in the Middle District of Pennsylvania to 
one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1). In 2021, the District Court sentenced Dyer to 110 months’ incarceration 
followed by three years of supervised release, which was within the recommended range 
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG). This Court affirmed Dyer’s 
conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See United States v. Dyer, 54 F.4th 155 (3d Cir. 
2022).  
Dyer then moved to reduce his sentence based on four different grounds: (1) a 
motion for “zero-point criminal amendments/retroactive” based on Part A of Amendment 
821 to the USSG; (2) a motion for “start date of federal detainer”; (3) a motion for 
“double jeopardy law”; and (4) a motion for “First Step Act.” See ECF No. 249 (altered 
to remove capitalization). The District Court construed Dyer’s filing as a sentence 
reduction motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) and denied it because all four grounds were 
meritless.  Dyer timely appealed.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See United States v. Thompson, 825 
F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2016); United States v. Brow, 62 F.4th 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2023). 
We generally review the District Court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for sentence 
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) for abuse of discretion, but if that decision rests 
solely on a question of law, our review is de novo. See Thompson, 825 F.3d at 203; 
3 
 
Brow, 62 F.4th at 118. We may summarily affirm the District Court’s order if an appeal 
presents no substantial question for our review. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; IOP 10.6.  
  First, the District Court appropriately interpreted Dyer’s motion for “zero-point 
criminal amendments/retroactive” as a motion filed pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). Section 
3582(c)(2) authorizes a district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if the defendant 
was sentenced “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the 
[United States] Sentencing Commission,” but only if “the reduction is consistent with 
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” For that reason, a 
district court proceeding under § 3582(c)(2) must first “follow the Commission’s 
instructions in [applicable policy statement] §1B1.10 to determine the prisoner’s 
eligibility for a sentence modification and the extent of the reduction authorized.” See 
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 821 (2010). According to Policy Statement § 
1B1.10, a sentence reduction “is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)” unless (1) 
a “covered amendment” listed at § 1B1.10(d) applies to the defendant, and (2) the 
amendment has the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range. See 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2). Here, Dyer moved to reduce his sentence according to Part A of 
Amendment 821 to the USSG, which reduced the number of “status points” imposed in 
calculating a defendant’s criminal history category from 2 points to 1 point. The District 
Court correctly determined that applying Amendment 821 would not alter Dyer’s 
sentencing range. See ECF No. 256 at 5-6 (explaining that a reduction of Dyer’s criminal 
history points from 18 to 17 points would still fall in Category VI). Therefore, a 
sentencing reduction was unauthorized under § 3582(c)(2).  
4 
 
Second, Dyer’s “start date of federal detainer” argument briefly mentioned the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, possibly asserted that his federal 
charges should have “had precedence” over his state misdemeanor charges, and listed 
dates related to his incarceration. See ECF No. 249 at 2. Dyer’s point is unclear. If he 
intended to challenge the Bureau of Prisons’s (BOP’s) calculation of his sentence, then he 
should seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the appropriate district court. See Woodall 
v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Jiminian v. 
Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2001) (“A motion pursuant to § 2241 generally 
challenges the execution of a federal prisoner’s sentence, including such matters as . . . 
computation of a prisoner’s sentence by prison officials”). However, Dyer’s filing was 
too vague for any jurist to construe any part of it as a viable § 2241 petition, so the 
District Court did not err by rejecting his federal detainer issue as meritless. 
Third, Dyer moved to reduce his sentence on double jeopardy grounds. The 
motion did not explain why his sentence violated principles of double jeopardy, but it 
cites several state court dockets. We see no error in the District Court’s reasoning that his 
federal conviction did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  
Finally, Dyer’s motion “for First Step Act” listed several features of the First Step 
Act of 2018, but it did not specify why any part of the First Step Act applied to his 
sentence. Generally, § 3582(c)(1)(B) authorizes a district court to resentence a defendant 
who was convicted of a “covered offense” under the First Step Act. See Brow, 62 F.4th at 
119-20 (further noting that “covered offenses” are narrowly limited to those that were 
5 
 
altered by sections 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010).  But Dyer’s offense is not a 
covered offense, so he is not entitled to resentencing under the First Step Act.  
Consequently, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 


USA v. Ernest Dyer

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-17-2025 
Craig Anderson v. Attorney General United States 
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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
___________ 
 
No. 21-2820 
___________ 
 
CRAIG OKEIDA ANDERSON, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A206 755 570) 
Immigration Judge:  Robert Lewandowski 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 23, 2022 
 
 
Before:  McKEE,* SHWARTZ, and MATEY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 17, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION** 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* Judge McKee assumed senior status on October 21, 2022.  
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
 Craig Anderson, proceeding pro se, petitions for review of a Final Administrative 
Order of Removal (“FARO”) and a decision denying his application for withholding of 
removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
 Anderson is a 43-year-old native and citizen of Jamaica.  He entered the United 
States as a non-immigrant visitor in 1996 at approximately the age of 15.  In 2015, 
Anderson was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  He was sentenced to 84 months in prison.   
In 2019, the Department of Homeland Security began expedited removal 
proceedings and issued a FARO.  It found Anderson removable for having been 
convicted of an aggravated felony.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii) (defining “aggravated felony” to include a § 922(g)(1) offense).  
DHS rejected Anderson’s claim that he was born in the United States and was thus a 
United States citizen.  The Assistant Field Office Director found that Anderson was born 
in Jamaica and noted that he had not derived citizenship through the naturalization of his 
father.   
 Anderson asserted a fear of returning to Jamaica based on his bisexual orientation.  
An asylum officer concluded that he had established a reasonable possibility of harm and 
referred his case to an Immigration Judge for “withholding-only” proceedings.  See 8 
C.F.R. § 208.31(e).  Anderson was represented by counsel in these proceedings.  The IJ 
ruled that he was ineligible for withholding of removal and denied his application for 
deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  On August 31, 
3 
 
2021, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the IJ’s decision without an opinion.   
Anderson timely petitioned for review. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).1  Where the BIA affirms 
the IJ’s decision without opinion, we review the IJ’s decision.  Borrome v. Att’y Gen., 
687 F.3d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2012).  Because Anderson was found removable as an 
aggravated felon, our review is limited to constitutional and legal questions, although we 
may review factual challenges to a CAT order.  Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 576 
(2020).  We review legal determinations de novo and factual findings for substantial 
evidence.  See Herrera-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 952 F.3d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 2020).  Under the 
substantial evidence standard, we will not disturb a finding of fact unless the record 
compels a contrary conclusion.  See Nasrallah, 590 U.S. at 584. 
Anderson challenges the denial of deferral of removal under the CAT.2  Anderson 
testified that he is bisexual.  He described his past relationships with men and women and 
stated that people perceived him as homosexual.  Anderson fears returning to Jamaica 
because the country does not accept the LGBT community.  He believes he might be 
 
1 Anderson seeks review of the FARO and the denial of deferral of removal.  The FARO 
became final for purposes of judicial review when his application for withholding of 
removal was decided.  See Inestroza-Tosta v. Att’y Gen., 105 F.4th 499, 513 (3d Cir. 
2024) (involving reinstated removal order). 
2 To the extent Anderson contends that he is entitled to withholding of removal because 
he would be persecuted on account of his sexual orientation, the IJ found that he was 
ineligible for this form of relief.  Anderson has not challenged this ruling and we thus do 
not consider whether he met the standard for such relief. 
4 
 
killed there.  He stated that he has no family in Jamaica, that he does not speak the same 
language as Jamaicans, and that he expects to live on the street. 
 In ruling that Anderson had not satisfied his burden of proof, the IJ explained that 
he had not suffered past torture in Jamaica and that he had not identified any specific 
threat of harm.  The IJ noted that, while same-sex sexual conduct is prohibited by 
Jamaican law, the government only prosecutes cases of sexual assault and child 
molestation.  The IJ recognized that the country reports showed discrimination and some 
violence against LGBT persons in Jamaica, however the reports did not show that the 
government was unwilling or unable to protect LGBT persons.  The IJ thus found the risk 
of harm to Anderson “too generalized and hypothetical.”  IJ Decision at 18.  The IJ stated 
that the risk was “not zero,” but that Anderson did not establish a clear probability or 
likelihood of future torture in Jamaica.  Id. at 21. 
To obtain relief under the CAT, an applicant must show that it is “more likely than 
not” that he would be tortured if removed.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).  An IJ must make a 
factual finding as to what is likely to happen to the applicant if removed and decide 
whether that amounts to the legal definition of torture.  Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 
509, 516 (3d Cir. 2017).  The latter determination involves assessing whether public 
officials will acquiesce to harm by a non-state actor.  Id. 
The IJ did not explicitly apply the framework in Myrie; however, his decision 
reflects that he found that Anderson might be harmed, but that Anderson did not show 
that such harm is likely.  Anderson argues that violence against LGBT individuals in 
5 
 
Jamaica is widespread and that the IJ downplayed the criminalization of same-sex sexual 
conduct.  He also contends that the lack of a specific threat does not undermine his claim 
because he has not been in Jamaica since he was 15 years old. 
The record reflects that Jamaican officials do not prosecute consensual same-sex 
conduct between men.  A.R. at 372.  While the country reports show incidents of 
violence against LGBT individuals, the reports do not compel a conclusion that 
Anderson, in particular, is likely to be harmed.  See Bernard v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 1042, 
1048 (7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (holding general reports of violence against LGBT 
individuals and Jamaica’s criminal laws did not meet burden of proof for CAT relief).  To 
the extent Anderson relies on a 2014 Human Rights Watch Report suggesting a high risk 
of violence, as the IJ recognized, the report is outdated.  The IJ thoughtfully considered 
the country reports.  Substantial evidence supports his decision.3 
Anderson also contends that his due process rights were violated because he was 
denied the opportunity to apply for adjustment of status.  DHS pursued expedited 
removal proceedings under § 238 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1228, which precludes discretionary relief.  Anderson filed a motion to be placed in 
removal proceedings under § 240 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, so that he could apply for 
adjustment of status with a waiver.  His father had filed a Form I-130 petition on his 
 
3 To the extent the IJ suggested that relief was not due because Anderson has been able to 
conceal his bisexuality, Bernard rejected the premise that a claim fails when a person can 
hide his identity.  Bernard, 881 F.3d at 1049.  As in that case, the IJ here did not rely 
solely on this reasoning and any error does not warrant relief. 
6 
 
behalf, which was approved.  An IJ denied the request, noting a lack of authority to 
change the proceedings.4 
Anderson’s due process argument lacks merit.  As Anderson’s lawyer conceded,  
§ 1228(b)(1) allows the Attorney General to pursue the removal of non-permanent 
residents for an aggravated felony conviction under either section.  See Avila v. Att’y 
Gen., 826 F.3d 662, 670 (3d Cir. 2016) (recognizing the government’s discretion); 
Flores-Ledezma v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 375, 381-82 (5th Cir. 2005) (rejecting equal 
protection challenge to such discretion).  More significantly, there was no due process 
violation because a noncitizen has no protectible liberty interest in being considered for 
discretionary relief.  United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92, 104-06 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 Anderson also argues that he derived citizenship through the naturalization of his 
father.5  A child who was born outside of the United States to noncitizen parents can 
become a citizen upon the naturalization of a parent if certain statutory conditions are 
met.  Morgan v. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 226, 230-31 (3d Cir. 2005).  The applicable statute 
here is former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a).6  DHS found that Anderson did not derive citizenship 
 
4 Another IJ stated at a later hearing that she believed the Government should have placed 
Anderson in § 240 proceedings.  The Government looked at the issue and, at the next 
hearing, said that it would not change the proceedings.  Anderson’s counsel conceded 
that the Government had a choice, although she believed that the Government should 
have initiated § 240 proceedings.   
5 We may review legal questions related to nationality claims.  Espichan v. Att’y Gen., 
945 F.3d 794, 797 (3d Cir. 2019). 
6 Section 1432(a) was replaced by 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a), but the law in effect at the time of 
the events giving rise to the citizenship claim – the child’s birth, entry into the United 
States, and the parent’s naturalization – applies.  Morgan, 432 F.3d at 230 & n.1.  Here, 
7 
 
because he was not admitted as a lawful permanent resident before his eighteenth 
birthday.   
Anderson argues that lawful permanent resident status is not necessary under the 
statute, which requires, among other things, that the “child is residing in the United States 
pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence at the time of the naturalization 
of the parent . . . , or thereafter begins to reside permanently in the United States while 
under the age of eighteen years.”  8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(5) (repealed) (emphasis added).  
Anderson’s father’s naturalization was in 1994, when Anderson was 12 years old and 
living in Jamaica.  Anderson contends that he satisfies the second clause because he 
began to reside here permanently while under the age of 18. 
Courts of appeals are divided on whether the second clause in § 1432(a)(5) 
requires lawful permanent resident status.  Compare Cheneau v. Garland, 997 F.3d 916, 
917-18 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (holding that such status is not required); Nwozuzu v. 
Holder, 726 F.3d 323, 333 (2d Cir. 2013) (same), with United States v. Forey-Quintero, 
626 F.3d 1323, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that such status is required).  While we 
stated in Morgan, 432 F.3d at 230, that the child must be residing in the United States as 
a lawful permanent resident, the proper construction of the statute was not before us. 
 We need not decide this issue here because, even if the second clause does not 
require lawful permanent resident status, Anderson has not shown that he began to reside 
 
these events occurred before 2001, when § 1431(a) became effective. 
8 
 
here permanently while under the age of 18.  See Sharma v. Garland, 67 F.4th 1, 4 (1st 
Cir. 2023) (holding same).  As Anderson states, courts have required a noncitizen to 
show an “objective official manifestation of the child’s permanent residence.”  Cheneau, 
997 F.3d at 925 (citation omitted).  The noncitizens in Cheneau and Nwozuzu had 
applied to adjust their status before they were 18 years old.  Anderson contends that his 
actual residence in the United States since he was 15 is an objective official manifestation 
of his permanent residence.  But his long-time residence does not establish that he began 
to reside permanently while he was under the age of 18.  See Nwozuzu, 726 F.3d at 329 
(noting that subjective intent to reside permanently is insufficient).   
To the extent Anderson’s father’s filing of the Form I-130 constitutes an objective 
official manifestation, Anderson did not know the filing date.  The Form I-130 appears to 
have been approved in 2002, when Anderson was 21 years old.  A.R. at 529, 534.  In 
addition, while Anderson states that his father did not receive notice of the approval, he 
does not state that he or his father took any steps to ascertain the status so that he could 
apply to adjust his status.  See Sharma, 67 F.4th at 4 (holding intent to reside permanently 
was not shown where petitioner abandoned the adjustment-of-status process).  Anderson 
has not shown that he satisfied § 1432(a)(5).  See Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 256 
(3d Cir. 2005) (noting applicant’s burden of proof of eligibility for citizenship). 
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.  


Craig Anderson v. Attorney General United States

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-21-2025 
Maria Vera-Valle v. Attorney General United States of America 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Maria Vera-Valle v. Attorney General United States of America" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 57. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/57 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2405 
___________ 
 
MARIA VERA-VALLE; O. C.-V., 
         Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of  
the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A220-920-487, A220-920-488) 
Immigration Judge: Dennis J. Ryan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on January 14, 2025 
 
Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 21, 2025) 
____________________________________  
2 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Maria Vera-Valle and her minor son, O. C.-V., proceeding pro se, have filed a petition 
for review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). 
We will deny the petition. 
I. 
 Vera-Valle and her son are citizens of Ecuador who arrived in the United States in 
December 2021. The Department of Homeland Security served them with Notices to Ap-
pear, charging them as removable for being present in the United States without having 
been admitted or paroled. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). They conceded the charges and 
applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against 
Torture (“CAT”). 
 At the merits hearing, Vera-Valle testified that she and her son are from the rural town 
of Zumbi, Ecuador. On May 8, 2021, Vera-Valle intervened to stop Marcelo “Pecueca” 
Olmedo, a member of the local Los Podridos gang, from attacking another woman. On 
May 11, 2021, when Vera-Valle was walking home from work with her son, Pecueca at-
tacked and injured her with a knife. She received treatment for her wounds, but she did not 
go to the police to seek protection, and she did not suffer any further harm from Pecueca. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
3 
 
Vera-Valle briefly relocated to her parents’ house in Zumbi before she decided to flee Ec-
uador with her son. Since Vera-Valle left, Pecueca has visited her parents’ house to ask 
about her, and he has sent her threatening Facebook messages. 
 The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied the applications for relief, concluding that Vera-
Valle failed to demonstrate eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under 
the CAT. The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision. Vera-Valle and her son filed a 
timely petition for review. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review the agency’s legal 
determinations de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. See Herrera-Reyes 
v. Att’y Gen., 952 F.3d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 2020). Under the substantial-evidence standard, 
factual findings “are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 
conclude to the contrary.” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020) (cleaned up). 
III. 
 To succeed on an asylum claim, a petitioner must show that she suffered past persecu-
tion or has a well-founded fear of future persecution “on account of” a protected ground 
such as “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). The protected ground “must be an essential or principal 
reason for the persecution.” Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 685 (3d Cir. 
2015); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Because the standard for withholding of re-
moval is higher than that for asylum, an application that does not establish asylum 
4 
 
eligibility necessarily fails to make the required showing for withholding of removal. 
Blanco v. Att’y Gen., 967 F.3d 304, 310 (3d Cir. 2020). 
 Here, we agree with the agency’s conclusion that Vera-Valle failed to establish eligi-
bility for asylum or withholding of removal because there is no nexus between any pro-
tected ground and the harm that she suffered or fears. To the extent that Vera-Valle at-
tempted to articulate any protected ground in the agency proceedings, she claimed mem-
bership in the particular social group of “victims of gang violence in Ecuador.” A.R. at 5. 
Like the IJ, we “sympathize[] that she was the victim of a crime having assisted an innocent 
individual,” A.R. at 49, but we conclude that this incident alone is not enough to establish 
her membership in a cognizable group. See Manuel-Soto v. Att’y Gen., 121 F.4th 468, 471 
(3d Cir. 2024) (concluding that “victims of extortion by gang members” was not cognizable 
because “a particular social group must exist independently of the persecution suffered by 
the applicant”) (cleaned up); see also Inestroza-Tosta v. Att’y Gen., 105 F.4th 499, 518 (3d 
Cir. 2024) (concluding that the particular social group of “gang violence recipients” was 
“defined by the harm posed to its members, so it is not cognizable”). 
Moreover, even if Vera-Valle could establish membership in a cognizable particular 
social group,1 substantial evidence supports the agency’s alternative conclusion that her 
membership in such a group was not an essential or principal reason for her persecution. 
 
1 In her reply brief, Vera-Valle argues that she is part of the particular social group of 
“Women who resist the authority of gangs in rural Ecuador.” Pet’rs’ Reply Br. at 2. We do 
not consider this argument because it was not raised in her opening brief. See In re Wettach, 
811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that any issue that an appellant fails to develop 
in an opening brief is forfeited). 
 
5 
 
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Pecueca has been motivated by 
the fact that Vera-Valle disrupted his prior criminal attack against another woman. See 
A.R. at 151, 160; see also Gonzalez-Posadas, 781 F.3d at 685 (“Conflicts of a personal 
nature and isolated criminal acts do not constitute persecution on account of a protected 
characteristic.”). 
Substantial evidence also supports another independent basis that the agency pro-
vided for denying asylum and withholding of removal: Vera-Valle failed to show that the 
Ecuadorian government was unwilling or unable to protect her from the harm that she suf-
fered and fears from a private actor. See Manuel-Soto, 121 F.4th at 472 (concluding that 
petitioners failed to show that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to pro-
tect them where they never reported the relevant conduct to the police and where the coun-
try-conditions report “shows that the Guatemalan government takes [violence against 
women] seriously”). Here, Vera-Valle never reported the incident with Pecueca to the po-
lice, and to the extent that she expressed fear about going to the police, substantial evidence 
supports the agency’s conclusion, based on the country-conditions report, that the Ecuado-
rian government would be willing to protect her because it takes gang violence and vio-
lence against women seriously. See A.R. at 181, 198.2 
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
2 It appears that Vera-Valle has forfeited any argument related to her claim for relief under 
the CAT because none was raised in her briefing. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d at 115. In 
any event, for essentially the same reasons discussed above, substantial evidence supports 
the agency’s denial of CAT relief based on its conclusion that the Ecuadorian government 
would not acquiesce in any harm amounting to torture. See Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 
509, 516 (3d Cir. 2017). 


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