Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-27-2025 
USA v. Albert Clemons 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Albert Clemons" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 69. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/69 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 23-1879 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ALBERT CLEMONS, 
Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:16-cr-00076-002) 
District Judge: Honorable Nora Barry Fischer 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 21, 2025 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, McKEE, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 27, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Albert Clemons appeals the District Court’s judgment. Counsel for Clemons has 
filed a brief and moved for permission to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 
U.S. 738 (1967). We will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the judgment.  
I 
 In April 2016, Clemons was indicted in federal court for committing bank robbery, 
armed bank robbery, and firearms offenses in March 2016. Citing Clemons’s three prior 
Pennsylvania robbery convictions dating back to 1983, Count Five of the indictment 
charged Clemons as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 
ACCA mandates a minimum sentence of fifteen years if the defendant has three prior 
“violent felony” convictions “committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Clemons pleaded guilty to each count against him without any plea 
agreement. 
At sentencing, the District Court found that Clemons was a career offender under 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines with an advisory Guidelines range of 294 to 346 
months’ imprisonment. The Court granted Clemons a substantial downward variance, 
sentencing him to 180 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. He 
timely appealed.  
Clemons’s counsel has submitted an Anders brief, stating he found no 
nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. The Court notified Clemons that he could file a pro se 
brief in support of his appeal, but he did not do so. 
3 
II 
Anders requires us to determine whether defendant’s counsel “thoroughly 
examined the record in search of appealable issues” and “explain[ed] why the issues are 
frivolous.” United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). If so, we must 
confirm that nothing in the record “might arguably support the appeal.” Anders, 386 U.S. 
at 744. If no nonfrivolous issues exist, we will grant counsel’s Anders motion and dispose 
of the appeal. 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a) (2011). 
III 
The Anders brief in this case recognizes three potential issues based on Clemons’s 
open guilty pleas: (1) the District Court’s jurisdiction, (2) the validity of the pleas, and 
(3) the reasonableness and legality of the sentence. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 
563, 569 (1989). 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 32311 as Clemons was 
charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), § 924(c)(A)(i) and (ii), § 922(g)(1), 
and § 924(e)—all federal offenses. 
Clemons’s guilty pleas were valid. He entered knowing and voluntary pleas after a 
comprehensive colloquy with the Court. The sentencing judge confirmed Clemons’s 
competence, advised him of his constitutional rights and the potential consequences of 
waiving those rights, and ensured there was a factual basis for the plea.  The Court also 
confirmed that Clemons understood the charges, the penalties he faced, and the rights he 
 
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
4 
was waiving. The Court satisfied Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
the Constitution. Thus, there is no nonfrivolous basis to challenge his guilty pleas. 
Clemons’s sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable and lawfully 
imposed. The District Court complied with the process outlined in United States v. 
Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006), and met the requirements of Rule 32 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Clemons received and reviewed the Presentence 
Investigation Report and addenda. And the Court resolved Clemons’s objection to 
application of the ACCA in his favor, after addressing his objections. 
The Court then calculated Clemons’s advisory Guidelines range as 294 to 346 
months’ imprisonment based on his status as a career offender and provided counsel and 
Clemons the opportunity to address the Court. In imposing a substantial downward 
variance and sentencing Clemons to 180 months’ imprisonment, the District Court 
thoughtfully considered the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Court 
recognized the seriousness of the offenses and acknowledged Clemons’s age (over 70), 
harsh conditions he suffered in detention during the pandemic, his efforts in detention to 
improve himself, and his remorse. 
Although Clemons objected to his status as a career offender under the Guidelines, 
by the time counsel filed the Anders brief, this Court had issued its decision in United 
States v. Henderson, 80 F.4th 207 (3d Cir. 2023). That decision held that 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 3701(a)(1)(ii)—the same Pennsylvania robbery statute under which Clemons was 
thrice convicted—is a “crime of violence” as defined by USSG § 4B1.2(a) for the career 
offender guideline. See United States v. Henderson, 80 F.4th at 209. Clemons’s challenge 
5 
to his career offender status is no longer arguable on the merits, and there are no 
nonfrivolous issues regarding his sentence. 
* * * 
 Counsel’s Anders brief is adequate and there are no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. 
We will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the District Court’s judgment. 


English

USA v. Albert Clemons

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-28-2025 
USA v. Damone Oakley 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Damone Oakley" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 74. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/74 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
   
 
No. 23-3101 
   
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DAMONE D. OAKLEY, a/k/a Alex Logan, a/k/a Officer Alex Logan, a/k/a Officer 
Victor Creed, a/k/a Officer Stan Valentine, a/k/a Dee Dimes, 
 
    Appellant. 
          
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 3:21-cr-00179-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
      
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 24, 2025 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, AMBRO, and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed January 28, 2025) 
 
   
 
OPINION* 
   
 
 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Defendant-appellant Damone Oakley pled guilty to mail and wire fraud.  A federal 
criminal statute provides for enhanced penalties for certain defendants, like Oakley, 
whose scams target people over age 55 and victimize 10 or more people in that age range.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 2326.  Oakley’s plea agreement stipulated that § 2326 would allow the 
District Court to impose a sentence of up to 10 additional years for his mail- and wire-
fraud offenses.  He also waived his appellate rights in that agreement.  The District Court 
imposed a 192-month sentence: 96 months for the fraud counts and an additional 96 
months under § 2326.  Oakley appeals that sentence.  We affirm based on the valid 
waiver of his appellate rights in the plea agreement. 
I. 
 We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with this case, so we note 
only the facts needed for our analysis.  In July 2023, Oakley pled guilty to two counts of 
mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and two counts of wire fraud, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1343.  The plea agreement contained a comprehensive waiver of his 
appellate rights: 
The defendant is aware that Title 28, United States Code, § 1291 affords a 
defendant the right to appeal a judgment of conviction and sentence; and that 
Title 18, United States Code, § 3742(a) affords a defendant the right to appeal 
the sentence imposed.  Acknowledging all of this, the defendant knowingly 
waives the right to appeal the conviction and sentence.  This waiver includes 
any and all possible grounds for appeal, whether constitutional or non-
constitutional[.] 
 
App. 56–57 (Plea Agreement ¶ 32).  The agreement also explained that  
 
3 
 
because [Oakley’s] offenses constitute telemarketing or email marketing, as 
defined in Title 18, United States Code, § 2325, . . . pursuant to Title 18, 
United States Code, § 2326, the Court may impose an additional term of 
imprisonment of up to ten years because the offenses targeted persons over 
the age of 55 and victimized ten or more persons over the age of 55. 
 
App. 52 (Plea Agreement ¶ 26).  As noted, the District Court imposed 96 months for the 
fraud counts, the top of the Guideline range, and an additional 96 months under § 2326.   
II. 
A motions panel of our Court denied without explanation the Government’s 
motion for summary affirmance based on the appellate waiver in the plea agreement.  
Oakley mistakenly argues that we are bound by the motions panel’s order declining to 
take summary action. That order said nothing about the merits of the motion. See I.O.P. 
10.6 (providing that we “may take summary action . . . if it clearly appears that no 
substantial question is presented or that subsequent precedent or a change in 
circumstances warrants such action” (emphasis added)); see also Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & 
Pistol Clubs Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J., 974 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[A] decision of a 
motions panel declining to affirm is not the same as a determination that there is a 
substantial question left in the case.  It often means nothing more than that the 
presentation made by motion has left that particular motions panel wondering whether 
there is a substantial question.”), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds sub 
nom. Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Bruck, 142 S. Ct. 2894 (2022). 
We enforce a valid waiver if: “(1) the issues raised fall within the scope of the 
appellate waiver; and (2) [the defendant] knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the 
appellate waiver; unless (3) enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.”  
 
4 
 
United States v. Erwin, 765 F.3d 219, 225 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
To the extent Oakley makes an argument under the first factor, he seems to 
contend that § 2326 is not covered by the waiver provision because it does not explicitly 
reference the statute.1  But the comprehensive waiver “includes any and all possible 
grounds for appeal,” App. 56–57 (Plea Agreement ¶ 32), so this argument is unavailing. 
As for the second factor, Oakley acknowledges that the District Court complied 
with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 during the plea hearing.  But he still 
contends that the waiver was not knowing because he did not know how the District 
Court would apply § 2326.  This contention is unpersuasive because the plea agreement 
specifically discusses the possibility of “an additional term of imprisonment of up to ten 
years” under § 2326.  App. 52 (Plea Agreement ¶ 26).  Moreover, the prosecutor 
explained at the plea hearing that § 2326 “would allow the Court to impose up to an 
additional 10-year sentence,” App. 67, and upon being asked by the District Court, 
Oakley said that he understood the prosecutor.  Additionally, the District Court confirmed 
that Oakley “knowingly waiv[ed] [his] right to appeal” both his conviction and sentence.  
App. 68. 
For the third factor, only “unusual circumstance[s]” give rise to a miscarriage of 
justice, United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001), and we consider 
 
1 The briefing could alternatively be read to argue, under the second factor, that the 
waiver was not knowing with respect to § 2326.  That argument fails for the reasons 
discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
5 
 
“[t]he clarity of the error, its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it concerns a fact issue, a 
sentencing guideline, or a statutory maximum), the impact of the error on the defendant, 
the impact of correcting the error on the government, and the extent to which the 
defendant acquiesced in the result.”  Id. at 563 (quoting United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 
14, 26 (1st Cir. 2001)). 
Oakley uses Tenth Circuit precedent to argue that the enhanced penalties from 
§ 2326 are at least partly incorporated into the Sentencing Guidelines.  See United States 
v. Smith, 133 F.3d 737, 749–50 (10th Cir. 1997) (“To the extent the [§ 2326] upward 
departure is based on the number of victims, it is not supported by an aspect of the 
offense sufficiently distinct from that supporting the multiple victim enhancement.”).  
But this is an issue on which the Third Circuit has not spoken.  Even assuming for the 
sake of argument that the District Court double-counted the penalties and therefore erred, 
one out-of-circuit case does not persuasively establish the clarity or gravity of the error 
under Khattak.  Furthermore, by stipulating in the plea agreement that “pursuant to Title 
18, United States Code, § 2326, the Court may impose an additional term of 
imprisonment of up to ten years,” Oakley acquiesced in the result.  App. 52 (Plea 
Agreement ¶ 26). 
Oakley next contends that the District Court erred by concluding that § 2326 
“require[s] a mandatory consecutive Guidelines sentence, effectively doubling Mr. 
Oakley’s Guidelines range.”  Oakley Opening Br. 25 (emphasis in original).  The 
Government agrees that § 2326 does not require a doubling of the Guidelines sentence, 
but correctly points out that the District Court did not interpret the statute that way.  It 
 
6 
 
stated that it is “required to consider and implement the provisions of [§] 2326,” App. 
134, and that the statute requires “an additional enhancement” to the sentence “to run in 
addition to any term of imprisonment imposed for the underlying offense,” App. 136.  
But nowhere did the Court conclude that the statute mandates a particular length for the 
consecutive sentence.  Indeed, in his reply brief, Oakley contends merely that “the 
District Court may have interpreted § 2326(2) as requiring a mandatory consecutive 
Guidelines range sentence.”  Oakley Reply Br. 12 (emphasis added).  If it is ambiguous 
whether the error occurred at all, he fails to establish that the purported error was clear or 
grave.  In short, we find no unusual circumstances giving rise to a miscarriage of justice 
relating to his § 2326 contentions. 
The rest of the issues Oakley raises—(1) whether the District Court sufficiently 
explained how it arrived at the sentence; (2) whether the sentencing record was 
sufficiently developed; and (3) whether the sentence was substantively unreasonable—
are more ordinary sentencing objections.  They are “the very sort of claim[s]” that 
appellate waivers are meant to prevent, United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 931 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and thus present no unusual 
circumstances giving rise to a miscarriage of justice. 
     * * * * 
For these reasons, we enforce the appellate waiver in Oakley’s plea agreement and 
affirm the District Court’s judgment. 


USA v. Damone  Oakley

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-28-2025 
USA v. Joseph Abbinanti 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Joseph Abbinanti" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 75. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/75 
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the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 23-2755 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JOSEPH ABBINANTI, 
                                Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:17-cr-00234-001) 
U.S. District Judge:  Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 27, 2025 
______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and PORTER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 28, 2025) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Joseph Abbinanti appeals the sentence imposed for violating the conditions of his 
supervised release.  Because the sentence was substantively reasonable, we will affirm. 
I 
Abbinanti pled guilty to bank robbery and was sentenced to sixty months’ 
imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised release.1  Approximately six months 
after he commenced his supervised release, Abbinanti (1) left a court-ordered drug 
treatment facility where he had showed “signs of relapse,” App. 31, (2) was fired from 
his job for poor performance, and (3) failed to respond to his probation officer’s repeated 
attempts to contact him.  Based on these facts, the probation officer petitioned the District 
Court to revoke Abbinanti’s supervised release.  The petition was later withdrawn 
without prejudice to enable Abbinanti to come into compliance with his release 
conditions.   
Thereafter, Abbinanti (1) was fired from another job for failing to report to work, 
(2) was discharged from a substance abuse program for not attending appointments, (3) 
failed to schedule a required mental health assessment, (4) missed an appointment with 
his probation officer, and (5) was unreachable when the officer tried to contact him.   
Abbinanti also was terminated from a third job due to “poor attendance and disruptive 
 
1 Abbinanti’s supervised release included conditions such as (1) working full-time 
unless his probation officer excused him from doing so, (2) participating in a drug testing 
program and a mental health assessment, (3) reporting to his probation officer, (4) 
following his probation officer’s instructions, (5) living in an approved place, and (6) not 
committing another crime.   
3 
 
outbursts.”  App. 34.  Based on this conduct and the conduct alleged in the first petition, 
the probation officer petitioned the District Court to revoke Abbinanti’s supervised 
release.   
 A few months later, Abbinanti pled guilty to state charges for resisting arrest, 
reckless endangerment, and simple assault on his then-girlfriend.  The probation officer 
filed a supplemental petition detailing Abbinanti’s crimes, noting he posed “a risk to 
public safety.”  App. 48.   
The District Court thereafter held a revocation hearing.  During the hearing, 
Abbinanti admitted to the Grade B violation for committing crimes while on supervised 
release and the Grade C violations arising from his failure to comply with the release 
conditions requiring him to (1) work full-time, (2) participate in drug testing and a mental 
health assessment, (3) report to his probation officer, (4) follow his probation officer’s 
instructions, and (5) live at an approved location.2  Based on his Grade B violation and 
criminal history category of V, the Court calculated the Sentencing Guidelines range as 
18 to 24 months.3   
Abbinanti requested a downward variance to accommodate his need for mental 
health and substance abuse treatment.  Abbinanti testified that the probation-approved 
 
2 Grade A violations include conduct constituting felony crimes of violence, drug, 
or firearm offenses, Grade B violations include conduct constituting other felony 
offenses, and Grade C violations include violations of any other condition of supervision.  
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1)-(3).   
3 Where, as here, “there is more than one violation of the conditions of 
supervision,” “the grade of the violation is determined by the violation having the most 
serious grade.”  U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(b).  The District Court accordingly considered 
Abbinanti’s Grade B violation in calculating the Sentencing Guidelines range.   
4 
 
treatment program required him to report during work hours and that he sought 
alternative programs.  The District Court declined to grant the variance, explaining in part 
that even if the probation-approved program might have conflicted with his ability to 
work, he may not “decide for [himself] that [he was] not going to go to it” or “go to some 
program that better fit[] [his] schedule.”  App. 79.   
The Court then considered the nature and circumstances of Abbinanti’s offense, 
his history and characteristics, as well as the need for deterrence and to protect the public, 
and sentenced him to eighteen months’ imprisonment, followed by eighteen months’ 
supervised release.  The Court recommended that Abbinanti participate in substance 
abuse and mental health treatment programs while in prison and required him to 
participate in similar programs upon release.   
Abbinanti appeals.   
II4 
Abbinanti challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, asserting that 
it does not adequately account for his need for mental health and substance abuse 
treatment.  Two considerations guide our review.  First, we “presume that a sentence 
within the advisory Guidelines is reasonable.”  United States v. Handerhan, 739 F.3d 114, 
124 (3d Cir. 2014).  Second, a sentence is substantively unreasonable if “no reasonable 
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 
 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We review a 
sentence’s substantive reasonableness for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Azcona-
Polanco, 865 F.3d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2017).  
5 
 
the reasons the district court provided.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (en banc).    
Both considerations show that Abbinanti’s sentence was substantively reasonable.  
First, Abbinanti received a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range, and nothing in 
the record causes us to question that his sentence is presumptively reasonable.  See 
Handerhan, 739 F.3d at 124.  Abbinanti violated various release conditions, including 
failing to (1) remain employed, (2) participate in drug testing and mental health 
programs, and (3) respond to his probation officer.  He also committed other crimes while 
on release.  In explaining Abbinanti’s sentence, the District Court noted his “many, many 
violations,” expressed concern about his behavior, explained that his criminal history 
category of V was “high,” and stated that there was a need to deter Abbinanti and protect 
the public from future crimes.  App. 80.   
Second, for the same reasons, we cannot say that no reasonable sentencing court 
would have imposed the sentence here.  See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  Abbinanti’s 
sentence appropriately (1) sanctioned him for breaching the District Court’s trust when he 
violated various release conditions and (2) accounted for his criminal history and criminal 
conduct while on release.  See United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(holding that courts imposing sentences for supervised release violations may consider a 
defendant’s breach of trust, and to a limited degree, the seriousness of his underlying 
violations and criminal history).   
 Moreover, contrary to Abbinanti’s claims, the District Court adequately addressed 
his need for mental health and substance abuse treatment.  The Court acknowledged 
6 
 
Abbinanti’s concern that his treatment obligations might have conflicted with his ability 
to work, but as the Court explained, that did not mean he could simply choose not to 
receive treatment or pick a program better suited to his schedule.  The Court also 
recognized his treatment needs by (1) recommending that he participate in substance 
abuse and mental health treatment while in prison and (2) requiring similar treatment 
upon release.  Even if the District Court did not give Abbinanti’s concerns the weight he 
believes they deserve, that “does not render [his] sentence unreasonable.”  United States 
v. Simmons, 69 F.4th 91, 96 (3d Cir. 2023) (alteration in original).   
For these reasons, Abbinanti’s sentence was substantively reasonable.   
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 


USA v. Joseph Abbinanti

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

Secretary United States Department of Labor v. Nursing Home Care Management Inc.

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-7-2025 
Carl Rodgers v. Pennsylvania State Police 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Carl Rodgers v. Pennsylvania State Police" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 187. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/187 
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Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 24-1759 
 
CARL E. RODGERS, 
                           Appellant 
                                       
v. 
 
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE; JEFFREY STINE; 
DEAN SHIPE; SCOTT DENISCH; SEAN MOYER; 
MARK MAGYAR; JOHN DOES 
 
(M.D. Pa. No. 1:20-cv-02115) 
 
Before: PHIPPS, FREEMAN, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
_________________________________ORDER________________________________ 
Due to typographical errors in the opinion, as further outlined below, an amended 
opinion will be issued to correct said errors.  At footnote 5, the text “Camiolo governs our 
analysis and it forecloses Rodgers’ argument” has been added to the end of the footnote 
as it was inadvertently omitted in the published opinion.  “Rodgers’s” at the end of page 4 
of the opinion has been changed to “Rogers’”.  No other amendments were made.  The 
Clerk is directed to file the amended opinion.  As these changes do not affect the 
judgment, the judgment will remain as filed. 
 
        By the Court, 
 
        s/ Cindy K. Chung   
        Circuit Judge 
 
Dated: March 7, 2025 
Tmm/cc: Christopher E. Fisher, Esq.  
                 Joseph G. Muzic Jr., Esq.  
                 Michael J. Scarinci, Esq 
 


Carl Rodgers v. Pennsylvania State Police

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-7-2025 
USA v. Darron Thomas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Darron Thomas" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 191. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/191 
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Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
        NON PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 22-1386 
_____________ 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
 
v. 
 
DARRON THOMAS 
Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
D.C. No. 2:1-cr-00416-001 
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 12, 2024 
 
Before: RESTREPO, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and AMBRO Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 7, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
 Appellant Darron Thomas was convicted of assaulting, resisting, and impeding a federal 
officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1).  Thomas now appeals his conviction, arguing that 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not 
binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
the District Court’s jury instructions precluded the jury from considering his theory of self-
defense.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the conviction and sentence imposed by the 
District Court.1   
I. 
 On September 28, 2021, Darron Thomas visited the office of the Clerk of Courts for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in the James Byrne U.S. Federal Courthouse.  While there, 
Thomas became increasingly belligerent, and court security officers and a deputy marshal 
repeatedly told him to leave.  Thomas eventually left the Clerk’s office and headed to the 
courthouse lobby.  He continued to shout and create a disturbance.  At this point, deputy marshals 
called for backup from uniformed officers of the Federal Protective Service (“FPS”). 
 FPS Inspector Devin Wagerman and FPS Police Officer Anthony Clemente arrived at the 
scene in full police uniforms, after another officer had directed them to “follow the screams.”  
Appx. 1046.  They spoke with Thomas in hopes that he would leave the premises, but he refused 
and continued to yell.  After Wagerman told Thomas “his time [was] up,” Thomas threw his hands 
in the air, and Wagerman stepped towards him.  Appx. 1048.  At this point, Thomas abruptly 
lowered his left arm and shoved Wagerman in the chest.  Thomas continued to resist several 
deputies and officers as they attempted to detain him.  Finally, after a brief struggle, Thomas was 
taken into custody.  The entire encounter—including Thomas’s physical contact with 
Wagerman—was captured on video surveillance.  
 
1 Because we affirm based on the jury instruction issue, we need not address the arguments 
in Thomas’s pro se briefs, as his counsel has not moved to file supplemental briefs raising 
those claims.  See United States v. Turner, 677 F.3d 570, 579 (3d Cir. 2012).   
 
3 
 
 At trial, Thomas claimed he acted out of self-defense, arguing that Wagerman made sexual 
advances towards him when detaining him.  Specifically, Thomas testified that Wagerman’s 
position behind him reminded him of how he approaches his “special someone” when he is trying 
to “send [a] signal” that he is in a sexual mood.  Appx. 1255.  Thomas told the jury he could “feel 
[Wagerman’s] erect penis” and shoved him because he was “never going to wait for [Wagerman] 
to stick his tongue in [his] ear.”  Id.  This alleged interaction between Thomas and Wagerman 
occurred over the course of about three seconds.  See Appx. Vol. V at 0:08:02–0:08:05.  
The District Court denied both Thomas’s proposed jury instructions as well his objections 
to the Court’s standard jury instructions and delivered its charge.  In its instructions, the District 
Court defined the claim of self-defense as follows:  
The burden of proof is upon the Government to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the Defendant did not act in self-defense.  If the Defendant knew 
of the official identity or purpose of Federal Protective Service Inspector 
Wagerman, then the Defendant has no valid claim of self-defense.  A person 
has no right to resist arrest . . . if the person is aware [of] the official identity 
and purpose of the arresting officer.  If on the other hand, you find that the 
Defendant had no knowledge of the official identity or purpose of the Federal 
Protective Service Inspector Wagerman and that he reasonably believed he 
was the subject of the hostile, imminent or sexual attack against his person 
by Federal Protective Service Wagerman, then he was entitled to use 
reasonable force to defend himself.  
 
Appx. 1372–73.  Thomas made no further objections to the self-defense instruction.  After 
receiving these instructions, the jury returned a guilty verdict. 
II.2 
 
2 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. We have jurisdiction over the District Court’s judgment of conviction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  
 
4 
 
 We exercise plenary review when determining whether the jury instructions stated the 
proper legal standard and consider the failure to give a particular instruction or wording for abuse 
of discretion.  United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 74 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. 
Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 642 (3d Cir. 2006)).  We assess “whether, viewed in light of the evidence, 
the charge as a whole fairly and adequately submit[ted] the issues in the case to the jury.”  United 
States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted).  “[W]e consider the 
totality of the instructions and not a particular sentence or paragraph in isolation.”  Jimenez, 513 
F.3d at 74–75 (quotation omitted). 
Thomas challenges the District Court’s self-defense instruction, particularly the language 
instructing the jury to assess whether he “knew of the official identity or purpose of” Officer 
Wagerman.  Appellant Br. 18.  Thomas argues that it instructed the jury that if Thomas knew 
Wagerman was an officer, regardless of whether he knew if Wagerman was acting with an official 
purpose, it automatically precluded self defense.  We disagree.  As our standard of review requires, 
we must look at the jury instructions as a whole.  The following sentence of the instruction clarifies 
that “[a] person has no right to resist arrest, even if it turns out that the arrest was unlawful, if the 
person is aware [of] the official identity and purpose of the arresting officer.” Appx. 1372–73 
(emphasis added). Taken together—and not as “particular sentence[s] or paragraph[s] in 
isolation”—these instructions provided the jury with a complete framework to evaluate Thomas’s 
theory of self-defense.  Jimenez, 513 F.3d at 74–75 (quoting Leahy, 445 F.3d at 642).   
Furthermore, the latter portion of the self-defense instruction directed the jury to consider 
whether Thomas “reasonably believed he was the subject of a hostile, imminent or sexual attack.” 
Appx. 1372–73.  By returning a guilty verdict, the jury necessarily rejected as unreasonable 
 
5 
 
Thomas’s claim that he believed he was being sexually assaulted—a claim that strained credulity 
in light of the evidence.  The interaction occurred in a federal courthouse with multiple uniformed 
officers present, and the timeline for when the alleged attack occurred lasted only three seconds.  
Thomas’s assertion that he interpreted Wagerman’s attempt to detain him as a sexual advance, 
complete with claims about feeling an “erect penis” and fears about Wagerman “stick[ing] his 
tongue in [his] ear,” was patently unreasonable to the jury in this context.  Appx. 1255.  The 
security footage captured the entire encounter, allowing the jury to evaluate the objective 
reasonableness of Thomas’s purported belief.  Thus, when looking at the instructions as a whole, 
the instructions fairly submitted the self-defense claim to the jury. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence 
imposed by the District Court. 
 


USA v. Darron Thomas

Nelson, Caroline G.

Invasive Species from Sea to Shining Sea: An Exploration of Different Government Responses to Invasive Species in the United States

Hofgesang, Sarah M.

Pedagogy of the Polluted: Environmental Justice for School Communities

USA v. Antwaine Thomas

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-31-2025 
Matthew Jones v. Syed Shah 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Matthew Jones v. Syed Shah" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 245. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/245 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 24-1949 & 24-1950 (cons.) 
___________ 
 
MATTHEW JONES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DR. SYED SHAH 
 
 
& 
 
 
MATTHEW JONES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DR. FOUAD EL CHIDIAK 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 1:23-cv-00925; 1:23-cv-00998) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jennifer L. Hall 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 5, 2025 
Before:  RESTREPO, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 31, 2025) 
___________ 
 
2 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Matthew Jones appeals from the District Court’s judgments in 
favor of the defendants in these civil actions that raise claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 
state tort law.  We will affirm. 
 In August and September 2023, Jones filed near-identical complaints in the 
District Court.  He alleged that the defendants, two doctors employed by Dover 
Behavioral Health, misdiagnosed him with schizophrenia and prescribed him damaging 
medication.  Jones primarily alleged that these actions violated his Second, Fourth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  The District Court screened the complaints 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and dismissed them with prejudice as frivolous.  Jones filed 
timely notices of appeal, and the appeals have been consolidated for all purposes. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s dismissals.  See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373–74 (3d Cir. 
2020).  “To be frivolous, a claim must rely on an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory’ or 
a ‘clearly baseless’ or ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual scenario.”  Mitchell v. Horn, 318 
F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
3 
 
(1989)).  We may affirm a District Court’s order on any basis supported by the record.  
See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
We agree with the District Court’s dismissals of the complaints.  As we have 
previously explained in ruling on similar appeals filed by Jones, he has failed to 
sufficiently allege that the defendants are state actors subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, he has failed to allege grounds for diversity jurisdiction over his state law claims, 
and he has not identified any other potential basis for federal jurisdiction over his claims.  
See Jones v. Mirza, 685 F. App’x 90, 92 (3d Cir. 2017) (non-precedential opinion).1 
Accordingly, we will affirm. 
 
1 The Clerk directed Jones to address in his merits brief whether the District Court erred 
when it did not give him an opportunity to amend his complaints to include allegations 
that might support a claim that the defendants acted under color of state law here.  See 
generally Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002); see also 
Benn v. Universal Health Sys., Inc., 371 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 2004); Rawson v. 
Recovery Innovations, Inc., 975 F.3d 742, 757 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 69 
(2021).  Jones has forfeited this issue by failing to develop it in his brief.  See In re 
Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016). 


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USA v. Albert Clemons

USA v. Damone Oakley