Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-30-2025 
Maximiliano Romero v. Attorney General United States of America 
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Recommended Citation 
"Maximiliano Romero v. Attorney General United States of America" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 88. 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 23-2994 
_____________ 
 
MAXIMILIANO ROMERO, 
Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
_____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a 
Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Case No. A094-182-517) 
Immigration Judge: Yon K. Alberdi 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 2, 2024 
_____________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 30, 2025) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
 
 
 
 
 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
Maximiliano Romero petitions for review of a decision by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) finding him ineligible for deferral of removal under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We see no error in the BIA’s decision and will 
deny Romero’s petition. 
I. 
Romero, a native and citizen of El Salvador, has been removed from the United 
States several times for illegal reentry following an aggravated felony conviction. Most 
recently, in 2015, Romero was encountered by Border Patrol agents in Falfurrias, Texas 
after attempting to illegally reenter the country for at least the third time following his 
first removal in 1999. The Department of Homeland Security served Romero with a 
Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate his 1999 removal order. 
Romero conceded that he is ineligible for withholding of removal due to his 
aggravated felony conviction and instead sought deferral of removal under the CAT. 
Romero’s sole argument on appeal is that he will be tortured at the hands of the 
Salvadoran government if he is returned to El Salvador.1  
 
1 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3) and we have jurisdiction 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). “[W]here, as here, the BIA ‘affirmed and partially 
reiterated’ the IJ’s determinations, we review both decisions.” Blanco v. Att’y Gen., 967 
F.3d 304, 310 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 
2009)). We review factual findings for substantial evidence and legal determinations de 
novo. Saban-Cach v. Att’y Gen., 58 F.4th 716, 724 n.23 (3d Cir. 2023). Romero should 
have filed his petition with the Eleventh Circuit because the IJ who completed his 
proceedings was located in Orlando, Florida. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (“The petition for 
review shall be filed with the court of appeals for the judicial circuit in which the 
immigration judge completed the proceedings.”). But “section 1252(b)(2) is a 
3 
 
II. 
We have little difficulty concluding that the decisions of the IJ and BIA are 
supported by substantial evidence. The IJ concluded that Romero is unlikely to be 
detained if he has in fact “given up his criminal ways,” App. 65, and we see no error in 
this conclusion. And even if Romero is detained, it is unlikely that his detention would 
constitute torture. The BIA correctly observed that the “detention of former or suspected 
gang members itself does not constitute torture.” App. 5. And Romero concedes that even 
“deplorable prison conditions are not inherently torturous.” Opening Br. 26, 28; accord 
Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 652 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that “conditions of 
confinement, without more, do not constitute torture under the CAT”). Even if the 
conditions in Salvadoran prisons might be deplorable, Romero has not justified deferral 
of his removal under the CAT because he has not shown that the Salvadoran government 
will “intentionally inflict[]” any “severe physical or mental pain or suffering” upon 
him. Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 151 (3d Cir. 2005). 
In sum, we agree with the IJ, who explained that Romero’s application for deferral 
of removal depends on a hypothetical “chain of events” that we do “not believe would 
take place.” App. 64. 
 
non-jurisdictional venue provision,” Khouzam v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 235, 249 (3d Cir. 
2008), and the parties jointly ask us to retain venue as a prudential matter. As transfer to 
the Eleventh Circuit would further delay resolution of this long-running matter, we will 
retain venue. 
  
4 
 
* * * * 
For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
 


English

Maximiliano Romero v. Attorney General United States of America

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

USA v. Souleymane  Diarra

Nedal Elfar v. Township of Holmdel

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-10-2025 
USA v. Sean Hagins 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Sean Hagins" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 192. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/192 
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BLD-092        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2854 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
SEAN L. HAGINS, 
          Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2:06-cr-00485-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Wendy Beetlestone 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on the Government’s Motion for Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 27, 2025 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 10, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Sean L. Hagins appeals the District Court’s orders denying his motion for 
compassionate release and motion for reconsideration.  The Government has filed a 
motion for summary affirmance.  For the reasons that follow, we grant the Government’s 
motion and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 In 2009, Hagins was sentenced to 360 months in prison after being convicted of 
firearm charges.  We affirmed his conviction and sentence on appeal and denied a 
certificate of appealability when Hagins sought to appeal the District Court’s denial of a 
motion filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
 In 2024, Hagins filed a motion for a reduction of his sentence pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).  The District Court denied the motion.  Hagins then filed a 
motion for reconsideration.  After the District Court denied the motion for 
reconsideration, Hagins filed a timely notice of appeal.  The Government has filed a 
motion seeking summary affirmance of the District Court’s orders. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because the Government 
states that it does not object to the untimeliness of the motion for reconsideration, the 
scope of the appeal includes the District Court’s July 10, 2024 order.  See Government of 
Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 327-29 (3d Cir. 2010).  We review a District 
Court’s order denying a motion for compassionate release for an abuse of discretion and 
will not disturb that decision unless the District Court committed a clear error of 
judgment.  See United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020).  We also 
review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion.  See United 
3 
 
States v. Kalb, 891 F.3d 455, 459 (3d Cir. 2018).  We may summarily affirm a District 
Court’s decision “on any basis supported by the record” if the appeal fails to present a 
substantial question.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam).   
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a District Court may reduce a sentence if, 
inter alia, extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.  In his motion, 
Hagin argued that he was entitled to compassionate release because changes in the law 
would entitle him to a shorter sentence if he were sentenced today.  He also pointed to his 
disciplinary record and productive activities in prison as proof of his rehabilitation.  The 
District Court concluded that the length of Hagins’s sentence and the changes in the law 
were not extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting compassionate release.  It also 
noted that rehabilitation, by itself, cannot establish extraordinary and compelling reasons 
for release.  See United States v. Stewart, 86 F.4th 532, 535-36 (3d Cir. 2023).  In his 
motion for reconsideration, Hagins argued that under U.S.S.G. § 1B.13(b)(5) & (6), he 
was eligible for a sentence reduction due to recent changes in the Sentencing Guidelines.1 
Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.13(c) provides that “[e]xcept as provided in 
subsection (b)(6), a change in the law (including an amendment to the Guidelines Manual 
that has not been made retroactive) shall not be considered for purposes of determining 
 
1 Pursuant to subsection (b)(5), “other reasons” similar to those described in subsections 
(1)-(4) can support a finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons.   
 
4 
 
whether an extraordinary and compelling reason exists under this policy statement.  
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.  Subsection (b)(6) explains that a change in the law (other than an 
amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be 
considered if the defendant received an unusually long sentence and the change in the law 
would create a “gross disparity” between the sentence received and the sentence likely to 
be imposed at the time of the motion. 
Hagins relies on Amendments 742, 826, and 828, which are “amendment[s] to the 
Guidelines Manual that [have] not been made retroactive.”  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1) 
& (d).2  Thus, pursuant to (b)(6), these changes in the law may not be considered.3  And 
we need not resolve whether the New Jersey statute expunging offenses related to 
 
2 Amendment 742 deleted the provision that added points to the criminal history for 
crimes committed within two years of release from prison.  These points are referred to as 
“recency points.”  United States v. Isaac, 655 F.3d 148, 158 (3d Cir. 2011).  Amendment 
826 limited the consideration of acquitted conduct.  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) (providing 
that “[r]elevant conduct does not include conduct for which the defendant was criminally 
charged and acquitted in federal court”).  Amendment 828 specified when an altered 
serial number on a firearm results in additional points.  See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B)(i) 
(directing that the offense level be increased by 4 levels if “any firearm had a serial 
number that was modified such that the original information is rendered illegible or 
unrecognizable to the unaided eye”). 
3 We recently held that, with respect to the changes in law to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), 
§ 1B1.13(b)(6) could not be considered in determining whether a defendant can show 
extraordinary and compelling reasons that make him eligible for a sentence reduction.  
See United States v. Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360 (3d Cir. 2024).  This was because 
Congress explicitly made the changes to § 924(c) not retroactive.  We explicitly limited 
our holding to the changes in § 924(c).  See id. at 377 n.23 (explaining that “[w]e are not 
suggesting that a change in law could never be considered in the compassionate release 
eligibility context”).  Here, we need not address whether § 1B1.3(b)(6) conflicts with any 
Congressional intent because the language of (b)(6) disqualifies the Amendments on 
which Hagins relies. 
5 
 
marijuana use, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:52-6.1, could be considered a “change in the law” 
or whether Hagins’s convictions for marijuana possession would be considered expunged 
if he were sentenced today.  See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j) & cmt. n.10; see, e.g., United States 
v. Bays, 589 F.3d 1035, 1037-40 (9th Cir. 2009) (examining whether a conviction had 
been expunged under § 4A1.2(j)); United States v. Townsend, 408 F.3d 1020, 1024-25 
(8th Cir. 2005) (same).  Assuming arguendo that the convictions would not be counted if 
Hagins were sentenced today, the high end of his sentencing range would be 327 months, 
compared to the 360-month sentence the District Court imposed (also at the high end of 
the sentencing range).  We doubt that this difference constitutes a “gross disparity,” but in 
any event, this type of claim must be pursued via § 2255.  See generally Johnson v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 295, 303-04 (2005); Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 
(3d Cir. 2002). 
Hagins also suggests that in Ward v. United States, 626 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2010), 
we held that a District Court’s failure to specify the sentence for each count can establish 
extraordinary and compelling reasons for release.  We did not so hold.  In Ward, the 
District Court had not specified a particular sentence for each count.  Thus, we could not 
determine whether the sentence was legal as to particular counts.  Id. at 184.  There was 
no discussion of extraordinary or compelling reasons in Ward as it addressed a direct 
appeal from a criminal judgment and not a motion for a reduction of sentence.  Rather, 
6 
 
we determined that Ward could raise the claim for the first time on appeal because the 
error affected his substantial rights and resulted in a manifest injustice.  Id.4   
Hagins also argues that the District Court denied his motion without applying the 
Supreme Court’s precedent in Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022).  The 
Court in Concepcion, however, did not address the issue here:  what qualifies as an 
“extraordinary and compelling” reason under the compassionate release statute.  See 
Stewart, 86 F.4th at 535 (explaining that “Stewart’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Concepcion is misplaced because the issue here is whether he, like the 
defendant in Andrews, is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)”); 
United States v. King, 40 F.4th 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2022) (observing that “Concepcion is 
irrelevant to the threshold question whether any given prisoner has established an 
‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason for release”). 
Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the 
appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 (2011).  As the District Court clearly did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Hagins’s motion for a sentence reduction, the appeal does not 
present a substantial question.  Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion for 
summary action and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. 
I.O.P. 10.6 (2018). 
 
4 We note that the remedy for such an error would be a limited remand for clarification of 
the sentence and not a sentence reduction or resentencing.  United States v. Jacobs, 21 
F.4th 106, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2021). 


USA v. Sean Hagins

Furst, Kaitlyn

The Doctor is (Not) In: Implications of Increased Medical Malpractice Litigation on Team Physicians in the National Football League

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-28-2025 
USA v. Omelyan Botsvynyuk 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Omelyan Botsvynyuk" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 239. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/239 
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ALD-110        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 24-3253 & 24-3305 
___________ 
 
UNIED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
OMELYAN BOTSVYNYUK, 
   Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2:10-cr-00159-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 27, 2025 
Before:  BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 28, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Omelyan Botsvynyuk appeals from District Court orders denying his 
motions for compassionate release and reduction of his federal criminal sentence. The 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
Government has moved for summary affirmance in both appeals. Because the appeals 
present no substantial questions, see 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6, we grant the 
Government’s motions and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgments on each 
order. 
I 
 In 2011, a jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania convicted Botsvynyuk of 
conspiracy to commit racketeering and interference with interstate commerce by threats 
of violence for his involvement in an extensive human trafficking ring which involved 
bringing Ukrainian nationals to the United States. He received a sentence of life 
imprisonment plus 20 years to be served consecutively. Botsvynyuk’s direct appeal and § 
2255 motion proved unsuccessful. 
On November 8, 2024, Botsvynyuk first filed a motion for compassionate release, 
which alleged that a combination of factors created “extraordinary and compelling 
reasons” to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); namely, his 
unusually long sentence, rehabilitative efforts, and his health. On November 15, 2024, the 
District Court denied Botsvynyuk’s motion for compassionate release. The District Court 
determined that Botsvynyuk’s reasons were not extraordinary nor compelling to warrant 
granting the compassionate release motion. Botsvynyuk timely appealed that denial. 
Subsequently, on November 25, 2024, Botsvynyuk filed a motion to reduce his 
sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), relying on Amendment 826 to the 
Sentencing Guidelines, which became effective on November 1, 2024. On November 29, 
2024, the District Court denied that motion because Amendment 826 does not apply 
 
3 
 
retroactively. Botsvynyuk timely appealed that denial. The two appeals have been 
consolidated for our analysis.   
II 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s 
denials of Botsvynyuk’s motions for abuse of discretion and will not disturb its decisions 
“unless there is a definite and firm conviction that [the District Court] committed a clear 
error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weight of the relevant factors.” 
United Stats v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted); see also United States v. Thompson, 825 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 
2016). We may summarily affirm the District Court’s decisions if the appeals fail to 
present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6; see also 
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  
III 
A. Motion for compassionate release 
A District Court has discretion to “reduce [a federal inmate’s] term of 
imprisonment” if it finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a 
reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Before granting such a motion, the District 
Court must consider the sentencing factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “to the extent 
they are applicable.” See 18 U.S.C. § 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Those factors include, 
among other things, “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); the need for the sentence “to 
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
 
4 
 
punishment for the offense,” “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” and “to 
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” and “to provide the defendant 
with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner.” Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D).  
On appeal, Botsvynyuk asserts that the District Court denied his motion without 
explanation. He relies on Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022), which he 
claims requires the District Court to enumerate the reasons one-by-one and explain the 
reasons for the denial of his motion. Nevertheless, Concepcion stated that a District Court 
is not required to articulate more than a brief statement of reasons reflecting its 
consideration of the parties’ non-frivolous arguments. It need not make a point-by-point 
rebuttal of the parties’ arguments. See id. at 501, 502. 
Here, the District Court met the standard and did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied Botsvynyuk’s motion for compassionate release. Botsvynyuk relied on a recent 
Sentencing Guidelines Amendment, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6), which states that unusually 
long sentences can be considered in a compassionate release motion if a change in the 
law makes the sentence disproportional to what a court would impose today. But 
Botsvynyuk did not identify a relevant change in the law.1 
 
1 Based on this analysis, we need not consider whether the District Court erred in also 
relying on our decision in United States v. Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360, 377, n.23 (3d Cir. 
2024) (limiting its holding to the First Step Act’s changes to 18 U.S.C. 924(c), but stating 
that it might apply to other compassionate release motions).  
 
 
5 
 
Next, with respect to analyzing the Section 3553(a) factors, the District Court 
expressly noted the nature of the offense which this Court analyzed extensively in 
Botsvynyuk’s direct appeal. See United States v. Botsvynyuk, 552 F. App’x 178, 181-82 
(3d Cir. 2014) (not precedential) (describing the nature of the human trafficking ring 
Botsvynyuk ran with his brothers). As to Botsvynyuk’s rehabilitative efforts and medical 
conditions2, the District Court’s order also indicated that it considered them as well. See 
also 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (“Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an 
extraordinary and compelling reason). Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the compassionate release motion.  
B. Motion to reduce sentence 
Section 3582(c)(2) of Title 18 of the United States Code authorizes a District 
Court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if the defendant was sentenced “based on a 
sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the [United States] Sentencing 
Commission,” but only “if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy 
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” The relevant policy statement in 
U.S.S.G. § 1B.1.10(b)(1) permits a reduction only on the basis of amendments that are 
made retroactive in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d). See, e.g., Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 
817, 821 (2010).  
 
2 Botsvynyuk stated in his brief filed in this Court that he suffers from pulmonary 
fibrosis. However, as noted by the Government, the medical records attached to his brief 
do not list this as one of his current conditions.  
 
6 
 
Botsvynyuk relied on Amendment 826 in his motion to reduce his sentence, which 
provides that “[r]elevant conduct does not include conduct for which the defendant was 
criminally charged and acquitted in federal court.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c). On appeal, 
Botsvynyuk argues that the District Court should have ignored the explicit limitation on 
the retroactive effective of Amendment 826 because “many jurists have noted” the use of 
acquitted conduct to increase a defendant’s guidelines range is unfair. However, 
Botsvynyuk has not even shown that his sentence was enhanced by acquitted conduct. 
We note that although he was initially charged with an additional Count III, that count 
was withdrawn by the Government during trial. See Botsvynyuk, 552 F. App’x at 180 
n.2.  
Botsvynyuk also argues that the omission of Amendment 826 from the list of 
amendments that apply retroactively in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d) is discriminatory and has 
no rational basis. Thus, according to him, it constitutes an equal protection violation. 
However, Botsvynyuk provides no support for his argument. Again, any possible equal 
protection argument is undermined by his failure to show in the first instance that his 
sentence was enhanced by any acquitted conduct.   
IV 
 As the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying both motions, we will 
affirm.  
 


USA v. Omelyan Botsvynyuk

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-3-2025 
Gerald Bush v. Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Gerald Bush v. Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 263. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/263 
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1 
 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-3070 
__________ 
 
GERALD BUSH, 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PHILADELPHIA REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; CHRISTI M. JACKSON; 
ROBERT LABRUM 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-05659) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joshua D. Wolson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 24, 2025 
Before:  SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed April 3, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Gerald Bush appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion for leave to file 
a complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
In state and federal court, Bush has repeatedly and unsuccessfully litigated the 
issue of whether he had an ownership interest in a property.  In 2020, we affirmed the 
District Court’s dismissal of his complaint.  Bush v. Philadelphia Redevelopment Auth., 
822 F. App’x 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam).  Bush continued to file complaints, 
and, by order entered October 17, 2023, we affirmed an order entered in a separate 
District Court action that enjoined Bush from filing any civil actions regarding his 
alleged ownership of the property.  See C.A. No. 23-2381. 
 In October 2024, Bush filed a complaint which the District Court treated as a 
motion for leave to file.  He argued that the injunction and the dismissal of his complaint 
should be vacated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) based on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 588 U.S 180 (2019), a decision issued two months 
before the August 2019 dismissal of his complaint.1  The District Court denied the 
motion, having determined that Bush did not state that the claims were new and did not 
explain how Knick would provide him a basis to pursue his claims.  Bush filed a timely 
notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 On appeal, Bush argues that his claims should be allowed to proceed based on 
Rule 60(b)(6).  We review the denial of a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) for an 
 
1 In Knick, the Supreme Court held that a property owner may bring a Fifth Amendment 
takings claim in federal court without first seeking compensation in state court.  Knick, 
588 U.S. at 185.  In affirming the dismissal of Bush’s complaint, we determined that his 
claims were barred by res judicata because Bush could have raised his claims in a state 
court action he had filed.  Bush, 822 F. App’x at 134-35.  The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Knick does not undermine our analysis.  See Tejas Motel, L.L.C. v. City of Mesquite 
ex rel. Bd. of Adjustment, 63 F.4th 323, 334 (5th Cir. 2023). 
 
3 
 
abuse of discretion.  Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2014).  A Supreme Court 
decision issued before the judgment at issue does not constitute the extraordinary 
circumstances needed to receive relief from judgment based on Rule 60(b)(6).  Id. at 122 
(explaining that litigant seeking relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) must demonstrate 
extraordinary circumstances).  And, to the extent that Bush’s motion was based on an 
alleged mistake of law by the District Court under Rule 60(b)(1), the motion filed in 
October 2024 was untimely with respect to both the dismissal of the complaint in August 
2019 and the entry of the injunction in July 2023.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (providing 
that a motion pursuant to subsection (b)(1) must be made no more than a year after entry 
of judgment); Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 533-34 (2022) (holding that a 
District Court’s legal error falls within the meaning of “mistake” under Rule 60(b)(1)). 
Bush also argues that the motion should be treated as one requesting 
reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) because Knick represents a change in 
the law.  We review the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment for 
an abuse of discretion.  See Max’s Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 
1999).  In a motion to alter or amend the judgment, a party must show “(1) an intervening 
change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct 
clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.”  Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 
(3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  As noted earlier, the Supreme Court’s decision in Knick was 
issued before the judgment in this case.  Moreover, the holding in Knick does not 
undermine the judgment or the filing injunction.  Thus, Bush has not shown an 
intervening change in the controlling law or a clear error of law. 
 
4 
 
Bush also suggests that the District Court could have reconsidered its order under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).  That rule provides that a district court may revise a nonfinal order 
at any time before a final judgment is entered.  Rule 54(b) is not applicable here as the 
order dismissing the complaint was final.  
For the reasons above, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Bush’s motion.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s decision.  Bush’s 
motions are denied. 
 


Gerald Bush v. Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-17-2025 
Matthew Jones v. Delaware State Police 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Matthew Jones v. Delaware State Police" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 208. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/208 
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BLD-090        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2992 
___________ 
 
MATTHEW JONES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DELAWARE STATE POLICE; U.S. MARSHAL’S OFFICE;  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE; THE CLERK’S OFFICE; 
JUDGES OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT; WILMINGTON POLICE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D. Del. Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-01379) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 27, 2025 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 17, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant and frequent pro se litigant Matthew Jones appeals from the District 
Court’s order sua sponte dismissing his civil action without leave to amend.  We will 
summarily affirm the opinion of the District Court.  
 In December 2023, Jones, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated a 
civil action against various defendants asserting negligence and violations of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Federal Tort Claims Act, Delaware 
tort law, and various federal criminal statutes.  Jones alleged, inter alia, that between 
1998 and 2001, he was repeatedly sexually assaulted and tortured by unnamed law 
enforcement officers and others across multiple states, including Delaware.  He alleged 
that he suffered physical harm, including internal bleeding, broken bones, and repeated 
death.  Jones claimed that he was resurrected from the dead each time through the 
conversion of a 250-year-old tree and its surrounding plants into medicine.  He sought 
damages in the amount of $250 million. 
 The District Court, screening Jones’ filings pursuant to 28 U.SC. § 1915(e)(2)(B), 
dismissed the action as frivolous, concluding that Jones’ factual allegations were 
fantastical or delusional.  Noting that Jones had been filing complaints alleging sexual 
assault by police officers and others since at least 2017, the District Court determined that 
amendment would be futile and dismissed the action with prejudice.  It also denied Jones’ 
motion for default judgment.  Jones appeals.   
 
3 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review of the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint under § 1915(e), see Dooley v. Wetzel, 
957 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 2020), and may summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present 
a substantial question, see 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
This appeal fails to present a substantial question.  District Courts are required to 
dismiss in forma pauperis complaints that are frivolous.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  In determining whether complaints are frivolous, District Courts can 
and should reject factual allegations that are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional,” and 
that “rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.”  Denton v. Hernandez, 
504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328 (1989)).   
We agree with the District Court’s determination that Jones’ claims, and the relief 
sought, were based on a fantastic and delusional factual scenario, and that the action was 
frivolous within the meaning of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  Moreover, while generally a plaintiff 
should be granted leave to cure the deficiencies of a complaint subject to dismissal, we 
agree with the District Court’s determination that such allowance would have been futile 
in this case.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
For the above reasons, we will summarily affirm the decision of the District Court.   


Matthew Jones v. Delaware State Police

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-17-2025 
Kevin Lewis v. Carmen Diaz-Petti 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Kevin Lewis v. Carmen Diaz-Petti" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 211. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/211 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 24-1110 
_______________ 
 
 
KEVIN LEWIS, 
                   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CARMEN DIAZ-PETTI, in her official capacity as Director of DCP&P/Assistant 
Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Children and Families (DCF); 
CHRISTINE NORBUT BEYER, in her official capacity as the Commissioner of DCF; 
RICHARD J. NOCELLA, Presiding Judge, New Jersey Superior Court, Family Division, 
Burlington County, in his official capacity; EDWARD W. HOFFMAN, Judge, New 
Jersey Superior Court, Family Division, Burlington County, in his official capacity; 
MARK P. TARANTINO, Judge, New Jersey Superior Court, Family Division, 
Burlington County, in his official capacity; GERARD BRELAND, Judge, New Jersey 
Superior Court, Family Division, Burlington County, in his official capacity; JAMES 
FERRELLI, Judge, New Jersey Superior Court, Family Division, Burlington County, in 
his official capacity; HON. GLENN GRANT, J.A.D, in his official capacity; DAVID 
TANG, in his official capacity; LAURALIE LEWIS, in her individual capacity 
  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 1:22-cv-03242) 
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 14, 2025 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 17, 2025) 
 
2 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Kevin Lewis appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint.  
Because we conclude that Lewis lacked standing from the outset, we will vacate the 
District Court’s judgment and remand with instruction to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.1 
Lewis brought this § 1983 action against a bevy of state officials in their official 
capacities for alleged constitutional violations stemming from a 2016 child-welfare 
investigation and orders temporarily limiting contact with his three children and his ex-
wife for alleged abuse of process in the same investigation and child custody 
proceedings.  The District Court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss because Lewis 
brought his claims after the two-year statute of limitations had lapsed and his claims were 
barred by sovereign and judicial immunity.  The Court also declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over Lewis’s remaining state law claim against his ex-wife. 
But the District Court lacked jurisdiction to reach those issues because Lewis does 
not have standing.  We evaluate standing on a claim-by-claim basis, so “when a plaintiff 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The District Court putatively had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  Our 
jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We have an independent obligation to 
examine our and the District Court’s jurisdiction and “assure ourselves of . . . [Lewis]’s 
Article III standing.”  George v. Rushmore Serv. Ctr., LLC, 114 F.4th 226, 233 (3d Cir. 
2024). 
3 
 
seeks prospective (forward-looking) relief in the form of an injunction or a declaratory 
judgment, [he] must show that [he is] ‘likely to suffer future injury.’”  Yaw v. Del. River 
Basin Comm’n, 49 F.4th 302, 318 (3d Cir. 2022) (emphases in original) (quoting McNair 
v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 223 (3d Cir. 2012)).  A future injury must be 
“imminent” or “certainly impending,” not “merely ‘possible,’” to give a plaintiff 
standing.  Id. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)).  
Here, Lewis seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief, even though he concedes 
Appellees Diaz-Petti’s and Beyer’s alleged unconstitutional conduct, at its latest, ended 
in 2019.  As for the remaining state Appellees, Lewis’s allegations all refer to past 
conduct.2  Such past injuries are neither ongoing nor imminent and do not establish 
standing to seek prospective relief.  Thus, the District Court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to dismiss Lewis’s claims on the merits.  And because the District Court 
never possessed original jurisdiction, it had “no discretion to decline supplemental 
jurisdiction here because there [was] no supplemental jurisdiction at all.”  Royal Canin 
U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 33–34 (2025).   
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand with 
instruction to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
2 Counsel for Lewis contends that Lewis has standing because he “has a pending case 
before the state Family Court.”  Appellant’s Suppl. Letter Br. 5.  But none of the 
Appellees is presiding over those proceedings, see Dkt. No. 58, and counsel 
misrepresented that fact to this Court. 


Kevin Lewis v. Carmen Diaz-Petti

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-24-2025 
Stephen Lambert v. Ross Casteel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Stephen Lambert v. Ross Casteel" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 230. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/230 
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DLD-092        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2946 
___________ 
 
STEPHEN LAMBERT, 
            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ROSS CASTEEL, York City Police Officer, Badge #103 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-01220) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 27, 2025 
 
Before: RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 24, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
 Stephen Lambert appeals the District Court’s order granting Appellee’s motion to 
dismiss his amended complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm 
the District Court’s order. 
 The procedural history of this matter and the allegations of Lambert’s complaints 
are well-known to the parties, set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation, and need not be discussed at length.  Briefly, in 2022, Lambert filed a 
complaint against Appellee Officer Ross Casteel and the York City Police Department.  
He alleged that in 2019, Officer Casteel refused to let Lambert file a report for a sexual 
assault.  He asserted that he was given a rectal examination in an emergency room and 
the exam was performed by someone Lambert “believed to be FBI.”  He asked for 
damages and for criminal charges to be brought against the parties involved.  The 
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.  A Magistrate Judge, sitting by 
consent, granted the motion and dismissed some claims with prejudice as time-barred, 
dismissed the claims against the York City Police Department with prejudice, and gave 
Lambert the opportunity to file an amended complaint.   
Lambert filed an amended complaint against Officer Casteel.  This time, he added 
allegations that, at the direction of the FBI, a doctor injured Lambert during eye surgery 
in June 2022.  He also asserted that the FBI interfered with his seeing a nerve specialist.  
Appellee Officer Casteel moved to dismiss the complaint.  A Magistrate Judge 
 
3 
 
recommended that the motion be granted.1  The District Court adopted the Report and 
Recommendation and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice.  Lambert filed a 
timely notice of appeal. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise de novo review 
over the District Court’s order granting the motion to dismiss.  See Simko v. United 
States Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 203-04 (3d Cir. 2021).  We accept the facts alleged in 
the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in Lambert’s favor.  Id. at 204.  
Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the appeal.  
See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4.  We may summarily affirm a District Court’s decision “on any 
basis supported by the record” if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. Murray 
v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
The District Court did not err in determining that Lambert’s allegations against 
Officer Casteel do not state a claim for relief.  Lambert alleges that Officer Casteel made 
him more vulnerable to harm by failing to accept Lambert’s complaint.  There is, 
however, no affirmative obligation on the state to protect its citizens.  Bright v. 
Westmoreland Cty, 443 F.3d 276, 280 (3d Cir. 2006).  Likewise, Lambert has not alleged 
a claim of state-created danger because he has not alleged that Casteel affirmatively used 
 
1 Initially, another Magistrate Judge granted the motion to dismiss, and Lambert 
appealed.  We dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the parties had not 
consented to proceed before the other Magistrate Judge. 
 
4 
 
his authority in a way that created a danger to Lambert.  See Sauers v. Borough of 
Nesquehoning, 905 F.3d 711, 717 (3d Cir. 2018) (describing elements for a state-created 
danger claim).2  Moreover, there is no federal right to require the government to initiate 
criminal proceedings. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). 
For the above reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See 
3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  Lambert’s motion for the appointment of counsel is denied. 
 
 
2 Further, since Lambert failed to show a constitutional “violation in the first place, there 
can be no derivative municipal claim.”  Mulholland v. Gov’t Cnty. of Berks, Pa., 706 
F.3d 227, 238 n.15 (3d Cir. 2013). 


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Maximiliano Romero v. Attorney General United States of America

USA v. Souleymane Diarra