Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-9-2025 
USA v. Marcus Ricketts 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Marcus Ricketts" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 278. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/278 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 24-1268 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MARCUS AKIEM RICKETTS, 
        Appellant 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 5:13-cr-00060-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on September 10, 2024 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, Chief Judge, ROTH and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April9, 2025) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
Marcus Akiem Ricketts appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his motion to 
vacate his sentence and conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  Ricketts contends that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel and his guilty plea was involuntary because his 
counsel solicited emotional pleas from family members and friends to coerce him to 
accept a plea deal.  Because we find that Ricketts’ counsel was not deficient and his plea 
was voluntary, we will affirm the District Court’s order.   
I. 
On September 5, 2013, a federal grand jury indicted Ricketts on four counts of 
armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) and four counts of using and carrying a 
firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).  Under the law at the 
time, Ricketts’ four § 924(c) charges alone required a mandatory minimum sentence of 
82 years.  Such a sentence would amount to life in prison for Ricketts, who was then 37 
years old.   
Before the court appointed attorney Maria Pedraza to his case, under different 
representation, Ricketts gave two damning admissions to authorities:  (1) that he robbed 
an M&T Bank on July 2, 2012, and (2) that he committed eleven armed bank robberies.  
The evidence against Ricketts was substantial.  Pedraza and the government engaged in 
3 
 
plea negotiations,  which resulted in the government’s final offer of 25 years.1  Ricketts 
found the government’s offer not only unreasonable but also “outrageous.”2   
A week before trial, Ricketts indicated at a status hearing that he intended to go to 
trial.  With Ricketts’ consent, Pedraza spoke to Ricketts’ mother and arranged for family 
members and friends to write emails to him.  While Pedraza characterized the request as a 
way to encourage and show support for Ricketts, Ricketts’ mother said the purpose of the 
emails was to “persuade him to take the deal.”3  Ricketts maintains that by the morning of 
the trial on June 3, 2014, he had not changed his mind.  Pedraza facilitated a private 
meeting between Ricketts and his mother that he described as “very emotional” and 
“upsetting.”4  After reading the emails and speaking to his mother, Ricketts decided to 
plead guilty.  During his plea colloquy, Ricketts swore under oath that he understood the 
plea agreement, no one forced or threatened him to sign it, and that he agreed to plead 
guilty “voluntarily and of [his] own free will.”5  Three months later, the District Court 
sentenced Ricketts to 300 months (25 years) and one day in prison.   
It was not until Ricketts took a legal course in prison that he began to question the 
voluntariness of his plea.  After the District Court granted Ricketts an extension, he filed 
a pro se motion under § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence based upon four 
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, including one that his plea was coerced.  
 
1 With good time credit, Ricketts could be released after serving about 21 years and four 
months of his sentence. 
2 JA 168a, 213a.  
3 JA 255a.  
4 JA 236a–37a. 
5 JA 92a–95a. 
4 
 
After holding an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied Ricketts’ motion but 
issued a certificate of appealability as to his coercion claim because the court was unable 
to find “any controlling authority factually similar to what occurred” in Ricketts’ case.6  
Ricketts appealed.7  
II. 
We “exercise plenary review of the district court’s legal conclusions and apply a 
clearly erroneous standard to the court’s factual findings.”8  As established in Strickland 
v. Washington, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a movant must 
show that:  (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient[,]” that is, “counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth 
Amendment”; and (2)  “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense” in such a way 
that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial . . . whose 
result is reliable.”9  When a defendant is represented by counsel and enters a plea on 
counsel’s advice, voluntariness is assessed by examining whether the advice “was within 
the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”10 
Given Ricketts’ prior admissions to law enforcement, the extensive evidence 
against him, and what amounted to a mandatory life sentence if he was convicted at trial, 
 
6 JA 2a, 19a–20a.  
7 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  We 
exercise jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).   
8 United States v. Travillion, 759 F.3d 281, 289 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Lambert v. 
Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 512 (3d Cir. 1997)).  
9 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
10 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 
759, 771 (1970)).  
5 
 
counsel’s efforts to encourage Ricketts to accept the plea deal were no doubt reasoned 
and within “the range of competence” expected of criminal defense attorneys.11  Nor was 
it improper or uncommon for counsel to implore the help of Ricketts’ family members.   
While we have yet to make an ineffective assistance of counsel determination on 
similar facts, the Second Circuit has rejected coercion claims where counsel sought the 
assistance of the defendant’s family members to urge him to accept a plea deal.12  In Lunz 
v. Henderson, the court held that “[a]dvice[,] even strong urging by those who have an 
accused’s welfare at heart, based on the strength of the State’s case and the weakness of 
the defense, does not constitute undue coercion.”13  Similarly, the First Circuit rejected a 
defendant’s claim that he was coerced into pleading guilty after an emotional 
conversation with his mother, noting that in a criminal prosecution, it is expected that 
“loved ones will advise, counsel, implore, beseech, and exhort defendants to take—or 
abjure—myriad courses of action”; that a defendant received input from family members 
before entering a plea “does not necessarily show coercion, duress, or involuntariness.”14   
The same applies here.  Ricketts concedes that his mother, family, and friends 
urged him to take the plea so that he could have a life outside of prison.  In doing so, they 
did not threaten him in any way.  This is strong persuasion, not coercion.  Confronted 
with the strength of the government’s case against her client, Pedraza acted appropriately 
 
11 See id. 
12 See Lunz v. Henderson, 533 F.2d 1322, 1327 (2d Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. 
Brown v. LaVallee, 424 F.2d 457, 460–61 (2d Cir. 1970).  
13 533 F.2d at 1327 (citations omitted).  
14 United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535, 1541 (1st Cir. 1989). 
6 
 
to encourage Ricketts to take the only course of action that would avoid a life sentence.  
As the District Court noted, “[a] lawyer does not deprive a client of autonomy by 
‘explaining why, in her view, conceding guilt would be the best option.’”15  We agree 
with the District Court that Ricketts’ plea was not coerced and will therefore affirm the 
order dismissing his § 2255 petition.  
 
15 JA 19a (quoting McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414, 423 (2018)).  


English

USA v. Marcus Ricketts

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-11-2025 
USA v. Leonard Gibbons 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Leonard Gibbons" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 286. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/286 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-3813 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
LEONARD GIBBONS, 
                      Appellant 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 2:16-cr-00037-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 15, 2024 
 
Before: RESTREPO, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 11, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not 
binding precedent. 
2 
 
 In 2015, appellant Leonard Gibbons robbed two banks, the second one at gunpoint.  
He was convicted of, inter alia, two counts of bank robbery, armed bank robbery, and 
possession by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).  Gibbons raises two issues on 
appeal.  First, he argues the failure to charge and prove the knowledge-of-felon-status 
element of his § 922(g)(1) offense—as later recognized by Rehaif v. United States, 588 
U.S. 225 (2019)—constituted reversible error.  Second, he asserts his convictions for both 
the greater and lesser-included offenses of bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 subjected 
him to multiple punishments for the same offense.  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm the judgment of conviction for the § 922(g) violation, and will vacate one of the 
judgments for bank robbery under § 2113(a). 
I.  
Between 1982 and 2010, Gibbons committed multiple felonies for which he was 
sentenced to—and served—more than one year in prison.  These included convictions for 
crimes such as armed bank robbery and aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy to commit 
bank robbery, resisting arrest and crack-cocaine possession, and drug trafficking.  In one 
instance, a few days after his 1993 arrest for drug trafficking, he committed a series of 
offenses in a Magistrate Judge’s courtroom where he obtained a firearm, held it to a 
constable’s head, escaped custody, and took a hostage before his arrest.  For these actions, 
he received six to fifteen years’ imprisonment for robbery and one to two years for escape.   
In 2015, Gibbons robbed two banks located in communities near Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania.  In July, he robbed the first bank by handing a note with the word “money” 
3 
 
on it to two tellers and demanded that they hand over cash within one minute.  Gibbons, 
who wore a disguise consisting of a black wig, black beard and cane, walked out of the 
bank with $7,828 in cash.  In November, he robbed a second bank by demanding money 
from two tellers at gunpoint.  Again wearing the black wig and beard, Gibbons left the 
bank with $3,971 in cash.  Gibbons was apprehended that same day after a high-speed car 
chase and his attempts to flee on foot.  A later search of his car revealed items from his 
disguise, approximately $2,400 in cash, and a 9mm pistol.  
The charges and convictions relevant to this appeal stem from the second bank 
robbery, committed in November 2015.  In March 2016, a federal grand jury returned a 
five-count indictment charging Gibbons with, among other offenses, bank robbery in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (Count Two); armed bank robbery in violation of § 
2113(d) (Count Three); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of §§ 
922(g)(1) and 924(e) (Count Four).  Specifically, Count Four charged that, at the time of 
the November 2015 robbery, Gibbons had already been convicted of seven crimes 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.   
During deliberations on the other counts, the jury answered interrogatories related 
to Count Four: whether he knowingly possessed a Hi-Point pistol, whether any such 
possession was in or affecting interstate commerce, and whether he brandished the firearm 
in a crime of violence.  The jury returned a guilty verdict on each of the other counts and 
answered the interrogatories affirmatively.  The District Court then charged the jury on the 
elements of a § 922(g) offense as they were understood at the time: (1) that the defendant 
had been convicted of a felony, (2) that after this conviction, the defendant knowingly 
4 
 
possessed a firearm, and (3) that the firearm was in or affected interstate or foreign 
commerce.  Gibbons entered an Old Chief stipulation, confirming the existence of a prior 
felony conviction.  See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997); The Court 
explained to the jurors that, because the interrogatories had been answered affirmatively, a 
guilty verdict under § 922(g) required only a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that 
“Gibbons was in fact convicted of a crime” punishable by imprisonment for more than one 
year and that “the conviction was prior to the possession of the weapon as charged in [the] 
indictment.”  Appx. 440–41.  The jury returned a guilty verdict on Count Four.  The District 
Court imposed a composite sentence of 22 years imprisonment followed by five years 
supervised release.  Relevant to this appeal are the two concurrent terms of 15 years’ 
imprisonment for Counts Two and Three, the greater and lesser-included offenses 
stemming from the November 2015 bank robbery.   
Gibbons filed a timely notice of appeal.  Since that filing, the United States Supreme 
Court clarified that a conviction under § 922(g) requires the government to prove “both 
that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the 
relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif v. United States, 
588 U.S. 225, 237 (2019) (emphasis added).  The indictment and the District Court’s 
instructions to the jury did not include this new knowledge-of-felon-status requirement for 
the § 922(g) offense. 
 
5 
 
II. 1 
A. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) Offense (Count Four) 
Because Gibbons did not preserve his claim of legal error, we review for plain 
error.  United States v. Adams, 36 F.4th 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2022).  A defendant “must meet 
‘three threshold requirements’: (1) there was an error; (2) that error was plain; and (3) it 
affected his ‘substantial rights.’” Id.  (quoting Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 507 
(2021)).  To satisfy the “substantial rights” prong, a defendant must show that “there is ‘a 
reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have 
been different.’”  Greer, 593 U.S. at 504 (quoting Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 
U.S. 129, 134–35 (2018)).  This prong also requires Gibbons to show that “if the District 
Court had correctly advised him of the [mens rea] element of the offense, there is a 
‘reasonable probability’ that he would not have pled guilty.”  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004)).  Even if these three requirements have been 
met, we will grant relief “only if ‘the error had a serious effect on the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of the judicial proceedings.’”  Adams, 36 F.4th at 152 (quoting Greer, 
593 U.S. at 504).  
Here, we agree with Gibbons that Rehaif errors occurred during the district court 
proceedings and that those errors were plain.  However, Gibbons cannot meet the third 
prong of plain error review; that is, there is not a reasonable probability that this error 
affected his substantial rights.  The Supreme Court in Greer clarified that a court “may 
 
1 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
6 
 
consider the entire record—not just the record from the particular proceeding where the 
error occurred” in evaluating a Rehaif objection on plain-error review.  593 U.S. at 511.  A 
felon “faces an uphill climb in trying to satisfy the substantial-rights [i.e., third] prong of 
the plain-error test” because the fact of a felony conviction is itself persuasive evidence of 
mens rea.  Id. at 508; see also id. at 509 (“[A]bsent a reason to conclude otherwise, a jury 
will usually find that a defendant knew he was a felon based on the fact that he was a 
felon.”).  Likewise, our Court has clarified that “Greer, in effect, created a presumption 
that the ‘knowledge-of-status’ element is satisfied whenever [an 18 U.S.C.] § 922(g)(1) 
defendant is, in fact, a felon.”  Adams, 36 F.4th at 152.  To overcome that presumption, a 
defendant “must make a ‘sufficient argument . . . that he would have presented evidence at 
trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon.’”  Id. (quoting Greer, 593 U.S. at 514). 
Gibbons has not overcome the presumption. He had been convicted of multiple 
felonies—many of them for violent offenses—prior to the instant felon-in-possession 
offense. When looking at the entire record, Gibbons’ prior convictions are substantial and 
persuasive evidence that he knew he was a felon when he used the pistol to commit the 
November 2015 robbery.  In Adams, this Court rejected the argument that a defendant with 
four prior felonies—who had not served more than a full year in prison—was ignorant of 
his felon status. See Adams, 36 F.4th at 152–53.  By the time of trial, Gibbons had served 
multiple prison terms of more than a year, making it implausible that he was unaware of 
his status.  Moreover, although Greer was decided after Gibbons’ trial, the argument that 
he did not know he was a felon was available to him.  His failure to raise and corroborate 
this argument, especially in his post-Greer filings, further undermines any claim of 
7 
 
ignorance regarding his status.  Thus, we cannot say there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.   
B.   18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) Offense (Count Two)  
Gibbons correctly notes that bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) 
(Count Two) is a lesser-included offense of armed bank robbery in violation of § 2113(d) 
(Count Three).  As this Court has stated: 
The federal bank robbery statute makes each aspect of a bank robbery a 
separate offense.  Therefore, bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), is a lesser 
included offense of armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d).  Because each 
count charged a crime defined by the statute, the District Court erred by 
imposing separate sentences for each—even though it ordered the terms of 
imprisonment to be served concurrently. 
 
United States v. Cesare, 581 F.3d 206, 207 (3d Cir. 2009).   
Thus, imposing “two separate special assessments . . . constitute[s] impermissible 
double punishments and, as such, offend[s] double jeopardy.”  Id. at 208 (remanding the 
case with instructions to vacate the lesser-included conviction); see also United States v. 
Beckett, 208 F.3d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he District Court erred by sentencing him 
concurrently on both the charge of armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), and on 
the lesser included offense of robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).”).  
 Here, the District Court sentenced Gibbons to concurrent sentences of fifteen years 
at Counts Two and Three, and imposed a special assessment of $100 at each count.  We 
agree with Gibbons and the government that this constitutes a constitutional error.  
Consistent with our precedent in Cesare, we will vacate the conviction and sentence of the 
lesser-included offense at Count Two and otherwise affirm the judgment.  
8 
 
III.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment of conviction for Count Two 
and remand for re-sentencing as to that count.  We will affirm the judgment of conviction 
for the remaining counts.   


USA v. Leonard Gibbons

Charles Adler v. Gruma Corporation

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-2-2025 
David Richardson v. USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"David Richardson v. USA" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 352. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/352 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
BLD-085        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2808 
___________ 
 
DAVID D. RICHARDSON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-02015) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joel H. Slomsky 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 13, 2025 
Before:  SHWARTZ, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 2, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 David D. Richardson, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order granting the 
United States’ motion to dismiss a civil action that he brought pursuant to the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (FTCA).  For the reasons discussed below, we will summarily affirm. 
 On January 20, 2023, Richardson was admitted to the United States Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center in Philadelphia.  As part of his treatment, 
Richardson agreed that his opioid “addiction had to be tapered down.”  The next day, Dr. 
Hilary Bollman visited Richardson in his hospital room and told him that if he “did not 
accept the help that [she] was offering, [she] would discharge [him] to the streets and let 
[him] fend for himself.”  At the time, Richardson was “wheel-chair-bound and 
homeless.”  He claimed that the doctor’s comment caused him “’shock,’ ‘anxiety,’ 
‘depression,’ ‘loss of sleep,’ ‘nightmares,’ [and] ‘tightening of the muscles in [his] neck, 
bac[k], and stomach.’”  Those symptoms “were continuous and lasted for several days 
per episode at the thought of [the doctor] carrying out [her] statement.”  Richardson filed 
an administrative tort claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs, which was denied. 
 Thereafter, Richardson filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which he amended four times, raising claims of medical 
malpractice and negligent infliction of emotional distress.1  The United States filed a 
 
1 He also suggested that he was denied due process in connection with the adjudication of 
his administrative tort claim.  We note, however, that constitutional tort claims are not 
cognizable under the FTCA.  See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1994). 
3 
 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(5), and 
12(b)(6).  The District Court granted that motion, holding that Richardson failed state a 
claim under either theory of liability and concluding that amendment would be futile.2  
Richardson timely appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1291, and exercise plenary review 
over the order granting the motion to dismiss.  See Black v. Montgomery County, 835 
F.3d 358, 364 (3d Cir. 2016).  To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true,” to show that its claims are facially plausible.  Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.  
See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 Sovereign immunity generally protects the federal government from civil liability.  
See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).  But the FTCA waives 
the United States’ sovereign immunity for claims arising out of negligent or wrongful 
acts of its employees when the employees are acting within the scope of their duties.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).  This waiver applies to claims involving VA health care 
 
2 The District Court declined to dismiss Richardson’s claims against the United States 
under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but it properly dismissed his 
claims against Dr. Bollman because the “Government is the only proper defendant in a 
case brought under the FTCA.”  CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 138 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2008).  The District Court also properly denied all of Richardson’s pending motions as 
moot.  See Coronavirus Rep. v. Apple, Inc., 85 F.4th 948, 958 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Because 
the district court properly dismissed with prejudice all of the claims against Apple, it 
correctly denied the remaining pending motions as moot.”). 
4 
 
employees’ conduct in providing care or treatment.  See 38 U.S.C. § 7316(a)(1); Ingram 
v. Faruque, 728 F.3d 1239, 1245 (10th Cir. 2013) (stating that § 7316 “applies the 
remedy available against the United States under the FTCA to damages arising from the 
provision of medical services by health care employees of the VA” (cleaned up)).  A 
claim brought under the FTCA is governed by “the law of the place where the act or 
omission occurred.”  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); see also Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 
220 F.3d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 2000).  
 Richardson sought to bring medical malpractice and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claims.  To state a prima facie cause of action for both claims, he had 
to demonstrate the elements of negligence.  See Quinby v. Plumsteadville Fam. Prac. 
Inc., 907 A.2d 1061, 1070-71 (Pa. 2006) (stating that “medical malpractice is a form of 
negligence”) (citations omitted); Toney v. Chester Cnty. Hosp., 961 A.2d 192, 198 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2008) (stating that “under [a negligent infliction of emotional distress] theory 
of recovery, a plaintiff must establish the elements of a negligence claim”).  Those 
elements are: the existence of a legal duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages.  
See Martin v. Evans, 711 A.2d 458, 461 (Pa. 1998).  
We conclude that Richardson failed to demonstrate that Dr. Bollman breached a 
duty of care when she notified him that he would be discharged if he did not adhere to 
medical advice, including that he taper off opioids.  “The determination of whether a duty 
exists in a particular case involves the weighing of several discrete factors which include: 
5 
 
(1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the social utility of the actor’s conduct; (3) 
the nature of the risk imposed and foreseeability of the harm incurred; (4) the 
consequences of imposing a duty upon the actor; and (5) the overall public interest in the 
proposed solution.”  Althaus ex rel. Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 1166, 1169 (Pa. 2000).  
“The determination whether to impose affirmative common-law duties as a predicate to 
civil liability is a matter of law[.]”  Seebold v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 57 A.3d 1232, 
1243 (Pa. 2012). 
The relationship between Dr. Bollman and Richardson weighs in favor of 
imposing a duty of care.  See Toogood v. Owen J. Rogal, D.D.S., P.C., 824 A.2d 1140, 
1150 (Pa. 2003) (“A physician owes his patient a duty to employ that degree of 
knowledge, skill, and care ordinarily possessed by members of the medical profession.”).  
But, as the District Court accurately explained, the remaining factors weigh against 
imposing such a duty.  With respect to social utility, informing a patient that he will be 
discharged if he refuses recommended medical care potentially frees up space in the 
hospital and permits the doctor to focus on patients who are willing to accept help.  The 
third factor – the nature of the risk imposed and the foreseeability of the harm incurred – 
weighs against recognition of a legal duty in the circumstances presented here.  While Dr. 
Bollman’s warning about discharge might have foreseeably caused the anxiety, 
depression and other effects alleged by Richardson, this foreseeability does not weigh in 
favor of finding a special duty given that such effects are an ordinary outcome of 
6 
 
receiving such a diagnosis and hearing the attendant consequences in failing to remedy 
it.  Toney v. Chester Cnty. Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 94 (Pa. 2011) (per curiam).  The final two 
factors – the consequences of imposing a duty and the overall public interest in the 
proposed solution – also counsel against imposing a duty.  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has cogently explained that “doctors inevitably but necessarily inflict emotional 
pain on their patients when they disclose distressing news about the patient’s health.  
Obviously, however, physicians should not be liable for the emotional distress when they 
are obligated to share distressing news.”  Id. at 92–93.  We recognize that Dr. Bollman’s 
suggestion that Richardson would be discharged to the “streets,” where he would have to 
“fend for himself,” while harsh, likely was intended to encourage Richardson to accept 
treatment.  Thus, those stray comments do not meaningfully contribute to a 
demonstration that Dr. Bollman breached a duty of care to Richardson.        
In sum, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Richardson’s 
fourth amended complaint for failure to state a claim.  Moreover, the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in concluding that granting further leave to amend would be 
futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 2002).  The 
District Court accurately explained that it had previously afforded Richardson 
opportunities to amend and that his fourth amended complaint was “nearly identical” to 
his first complaint.  Cf. Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Assoc., 903 F.3d 100, 113 
(3d Cir. 2018) (concluding that amendment would be futile where the plaintiff-appellant 
7 
 
“had already amended her complaint once and did not move to amend again or suggest 
what she might add”).   
For the foregoing reasons, this appeal does not present a substantial question. 
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.3  3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
3 Richardson’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied. 


David Richardson v. USA

Libby Hilsenrath v. School District of the Chathams

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-2-2025 
USA v. Tyler Goodnight 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Tyler Goodnight" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 356. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/356 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
No. 23-1882 
_______________ 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
TYLER GOODNIGHT,  
Appellant 
_______________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:21-cr-00143-001) 
Chief District Judge: Hon. Mark R. Hornak 
_______________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on May 1, 2025 
Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
(Filed: May 2, 2025) 
 
_______________ 
OPINION* 
_______________ 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 
precedent. 
2 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge.  
Tyler Goodnight was a gang member. He was forbidden to have a gun because he had 
three prior convictions: one for possessing an unlicensed, stolen gun in 2016; one for pos-
sessing an unlicensed gun with an altered manufacturer number around the same time in 
2016; and one for possessing heroin with intent to deliver it in 2018. Yet in 2020, police 
saw him with a gun. Knowing his history, they stopped him and found a loaded gun in his 
waistband. He pleaded guilty (without a plea agreement) to possessing a gun as a felon in 
violation of § 922(g)(1). He served his prison sentence and was let out on three years’ super-
vised release.  
Goodnight argues that permanently disarming him violates the Second Amendment—
but he makes this argument for the first time on appeal. He acknowledges, as he must, that 
we review only for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–32 (1993). 
Yet he wrongly claims that he can clear plain error’s high bar. An error is plain only if it is 
“clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute” under existing law. United 
States v. Dorsey, 105 F.4th 526, 529 (3d Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Goodnight cannot cite any caselaw that makes any potential error here plain.  
First, he contends that United States v. Rahimi made it clear that only temporary dis-
armament is constitutional under the Second Amendment. 602 U.S. 680 (2024). But 
Rahimi did not reach so far. It considered only the question before it: whether temporarily 
disarming someone who poses “a credible threat to the physical safety of others” was con-
sistent with our history and tradition of gun regulations. Id. at 700. It left for another day 
broader questions about “the full scope of the Second Amendment,” as Goodnight himself 
3 
admits. Id. at 702. And it expressly reserved the question whether “the Second Amendment 
prohibits the enactment of laws banning the possession of guns by categories of persons 
thought by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse,” such as 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1). Id. at 698.  
Coming up short with Rahimi, Goodnight is left to contend that our decision in Range 
v. Attorney General (Range II) clarifies that his disarmament is plainly unconstitutional. 
124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024) (en banc). Not so. In Range II, we considered whether dis-
arming someone with a thirty-year-old conviction for food-stamp fraud violated the Second 
Amendment. Id. at 222–23. Our Court held that the felon-in-possession statute could not 
apply to him. Id. at 222. We emphasized that our decision was a “narrow one,” based on 
Range’s individual circumstances and the lack of any sign that “Range poses a physical 
danger to others.” Id. at 232. And consistent with the as-applied nature of Range’s chal-
lenge, we expressly declined to “preview how this Court would decide future Second 
Amendment challenges” on different facts. Id. at 232 n.13.  
Range II does not help Goodnight because it concerned only an as-applied challenge, 
and Goodnight cannot show that it is obvious that he is similarly situated to Range. That 
conclusion follows directly from Dorsey. 105 F.4th at 530. There, we applied our decision 
in Range v. Attorney General (Range I), 69 F.4th 96, 103 (3d Cir. 2023), to a plain-error 
challenge like Goodnight’s. Dorsey, 105 F.4th at 532. And we held that the challenge failed 
because the defendant could not show that it was obvious “beyond dispute that he [was] 
similarly situated to Range for Second Amendment purposes.” Id. at 530. That logic applies 
4 
all the same to our decision in Range II, which reaffirmed our holding in Range I. Range 
II, 124 F.4th at 232.  
That logic also dooms Goodnight’s case. For starters, Goodnight’s prior convictions are 
meaningfully different from Range’s 30-year-old food-stamp-fraud conviction. Goodnight 
has three very recent convictions, including one for heroin dealing and two for violating 
gun laws. And it is hardly obvious under our caselaw that such convictions are not them-
selves enough evidence of dangerousness to justify disarmament. Indeed, we have explained 
that drug trafficking is the kind of conviction that could justify disarmament because drug 
dealing risks violence. See Pitsilides v. Barr, 128 F.4th 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2025) (quoting 
Folajtar v. Att’y Gen., 980 F.3d 897, 922 (3d Cir. 2020) (Bibas, J., dissenting)). Plus, the 
specific facts behind Goodnight’s prior convictions suggest that he is dangerous. For instance, 
when the cops caught him with the unlicensed gun with an altered serial number, he fled 
and tossed the gun into a bush. He then forced his way into a neighboring home, where he 
tried to bribe the woman inside to stay quiet. So it is hardly self-evident that disarming 
Goodnight, given his prior convictions and background, even permanently, is unconstitu-
tional under Range II.   
To be clear, we do not foreclose the possibility that someone who is “like Range” both 
in his conduct and the nature and remoteness of his offense could show plain error on an 
as-applied challenge under Range. Range II, 124 F.4th at 232; see Dorsey, 105 F.4th at 
530. But as-applied challenges under the Second Amendment are necessarily individual-
ized inquiries. Pitsilides, 128 F.4th at 213. That is because “[a]s an original matter, the 
Second Amendment’s touchstone is dangerousness.” Id. at 210–11 (alteration in original) 
5 
(quoting Folajtar, 980 F.3d at 924 (Bibas, J., dissenting)). Many factors may help show 
dangerousness, including the nature of the predicate offense and other aspects of a person’s 
background. Id. at 210–12; see also United States v. Moore, 111 F.4th 266, 273 (3d Cir. 
2024) (looking to “facts beyond the predicate offenses” in evaluating an as-applied chal-
lenge under the Second Amendment). Thus, we must look closely at the particular facts of 
a person’s conviction when he brings an as-applied challenge under the Second Amend-
ment.  
Goodnight’s case is not the kind of Second Amendment challenge that is plain under 
our existing caselaw. It is hardly obvious that the Second Amendment bars permanently 
disarming someone with recent firearms and drug-dealing convictions like Goodnight’s. 
So his as-applied challenge fails. For the same reason, Goodnight’s facial challenge must 
necessarily fail too. He cannot establish that it is plain under existing caselaw that there is 
“no set of circumstances” under which § 922(g)(1) would be valid. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 693 
(quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). We will thus affirm.  


USA v. Tyler Goodnight

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-8-2025 
USA v. Various Parcels of Real Property 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Various Parcels of Real Property" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 381. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/381 
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ALD-116       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 24-2371, 24-2372 & 25-1315 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
VARIOUS PARCELS OF REAL PROPERTY 
                          
*Jelani C. Solomon, Appellant in C.A. No. 24-2371                                                                     
*(Pursuant to Rule 12(a), Fed. R. App. P.) 
__________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
VARIOUS VEHICLES TITLED IN  
THE NAME OF JELANI SOLOMON 
 
*Jelani Solomon, Appellant in C.A. No. 24-2372                                                                     
*(Pursuant to Rule 12(a), Fed. R. App. P.) 
__________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JELANI C. SOLOMON, 
                                                                              Appellant in C.A. No. 25-1315 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 2:06-cv-00024 & 2:05-cv-01498 and 
D.C. Crim. Action No. 2:05-cr-00385-001 ) 
2 
 
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted in C.A. Nos. 24-2371 & 24-2372 for Possible Dismissal 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, and 
Submitted in C.A. No. 25-1315 for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 3, 2025 
Before:  BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 8, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jelani Solomon is a federal prisoner serving a life sentence for drug trafficking and 
murder.  His conduct also resulted in three long-concluded forfeiture actions—a 2005 
civil forfeiture action in which he forfeited parcels of real property (W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 
2:05-cv-01498), a 2006 civil forfeiture action in which he forfeited automobiles (W.D. 
Pa. Civ. No. 2:06-cv-00024), and an administrative forfeiture action in which he forfeited 
a Rolex watch, a diamond bracelet, and $6,480 in currency.  See United States v. 
Solomon, 533 F. App’x 77, 78 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).   
Solomon has filed many repetitive and otherwise frivolous challenges to his 
conviction and related matters over the years.  Those challenges ultimately led the 
District Court to enter at least three orders directing its Clerk to reject any further filings 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
3 
 
that were not preauthorized by the court.  (W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2:05-cv-01498, ECF No. 
31; W.D. Pa. Crim. No. 2:05-cr-00385-001, ECF Nos. 912 & 946.)  Solomon did not 
appeal those orders.  See United States v. Solomon, No. 22-2969, 2023 WL 1775662, at 
*1 (3d Cir. Feb. 6, 2023) (per curiam) (so noting as to the orders in the criminal case).   
Solomon’s challenges—both before and after those orders—have included at least 
three belated challenges to the civil forfeitures, see Solomon, 533 F. App’x at 79-80, and 
at least four belated challenges to the administrative forfeiture, see Solomon, 2023 WL 
1775662, at *1.  Solomon has argued, inter alia, that the District Court should reopen the 
these proceedings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) and order return of his property under 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) because he lacked adequate notice of these proceedings.  See, e.g., 
Solomon, 533 F. App’x at 79.  But as we explained over ten years ago, that argument and 
Solomon’s others “easily could have been pursued in his prior attempts to challenge the 
forfeitures” and he thus “has not shown extraordinary circumstances for reopening either 
the civil in rem judgment[s] or the administrative proceedings.”  Id. at 80. 
 At issue here is a motion that Solomon filed for authorization to file another 
motion under Rules 60(b) and 41(g) seeking return of the same property.  Solomon filed 
that motion in his two civil forfeiture cases and in his underlying criminal case.  By 
single order entered in all three cases, the District Court denied the motion because 
Solomon did not raise grounds for relief.  Solomon appeals.1 
 
1 The District Court denied the motions by order entered in each case on June 26, 2024.  
In Solomon’s criminal case, the court later received a reply brief that Solomon mailed 
before the court entered its June 26 order.  Thus, the court reviewed Solomon’s reply 
brief and then entered a further order in each case on July 15, 2024, providing that its 
4 
 
We will affirm.  The only thing new that Solomon raised was the decision in 
Culley v. Marshall, 601 U.S. 377 (2024).  In that case, the Court explained that, “[a]fter a 
State seizes and seeks civil forfeiture of personal property, due process requires a timely 
forfeiture hearing but does not require a separate preliminary hearing.”  Id. at 386.  
Solomon apparently relied on Culley for its recognition that due process requires a timely 
post-seizure forfeiture hearing.  But Culley did not newly recognize that right and instead 
relied on authority establishing it decades before.  See id. at 386-87 (discussing United 
States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242 (1986), and United States v. $8,850 in U.S. 
Currency, 461 U.S. 555 (1983)).  Thus, as with Solomon’s previous challenges, any 
challenge based on the lack of a forfeiture hearing “easily could have been pursued in his 
prior attempts to challenge the forfeitures.”  Solomon, 533 F. App’x at 80.   
Cully does not otherwise provide a basis for relief.  The actual holding of Cully is 
that, although due process requires a timely post-seizure forfeiture hearing, it does not 
also require a preliminary hearing before that forfeiture hearing.  See Culley, 601 U.S. at 
380-81, 393.  That holding does not undermine the validity of the forfeitures at issue here 
and thus does not provide any basis to reopen these forfeiture proceedings.  See, e.g., 
Norris v. Brooks, 794 F.3d 401, 405 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining that “a change in the law 
doesn’t even begin to support a Rule 60(b) motion unless the change is actually relevant 
to the movant’s position”). 
 
denial of authorization remained in effect.  Solomon mailed his notice of appeal for each 
case before the court entered its July 15 order, and he specified that he was appealing 
from the initial June 26 order.  He has not appealed from the July 15 order. 
5 
 
 Finally, Solomon has filed a letter pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) in two of these 
appeals noting that, in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), the 
Supreme Court overruled Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  But Solomon does not explain why he believes that ruling is 
relevant to any issue on appeal, and it is not. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgments of the District Court.  Solomon’s 
requests for a briefing schedule or summary reversal are denied.  To the extent that his 
filings can be construed to request any other relief, such relief is denied as well. 


USA v. Various Parcels of Real Property

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-12-2025 
In Re: Caleb McGillvary 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: Caleb McGillvary" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 390. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/390 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
ALD-140        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 25-1753 
___________ 
 
IN RE: CALEB McGILLVARY, 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
(Related to Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-01497) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
May 1, 2025 
 
Before:  BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 12, 2025) 
_________ 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In February 2025, Petitioner Caleb McGillvary filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  He sought a declaratory judgment 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 that he qualifies for protection from removal under 8 
U.S.C. § 1359 and an injunction preventing the defendants from removing him from the 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
United States.  The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.   
 McGillvary then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court.  He explains 
that the District Court Clerk erroneously characterized his complaint as a habeas petition 
and asks us to compel the District Court to correct the docket entry to reflect the true 
nature of the cause of action. 
 We will deny the petition.  Although McGillvary is correct that the Clerk 
mistakenly described an exhibit to his complaint as an exhibit to his habeas petition, see 
ECF No. 2, this was merely a clerical error; the error does not affect the nature of the 
filing.  Indeed, the District Court specifically recognized that McGillvary’s filing was not 
a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Therefore, this case does not present the type 
of “extraordinary circumstances” in which the drastic remedy of mandamus is warranted.  
In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).  
 


In Re: Caleb McGillvary

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-13-2025 
USA v. Eric Hayes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Eric Hayes" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 396. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/396 
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BLD-132        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 25-1043 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ERIC HAYES a/k/a International Ross a/k/a Ross, 
    Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1:05-cr-00443-009) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 24, 2025 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 13, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Eric Hayes appeals pro se from the District Court’s denial of his motion for 
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The Government has filed a 
motion for summary affirmance. We will grant the motion. 
 In 2007, following a federal jury trial, Hayes was convicted of conspiracy to 
commit various sex trafficking offenses. The following year he was sentenced to 420 
months in prison. We later affirmed his conviction and sentence. He subsequently filed a 
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The District Court denied the petition and we later 
denied his request for a certificate of appealability.  
 In 2024, Hayes filed a pro se motion for compassionate release and reduction of 
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The District Court appointed counsel, who 
then filed a supporting brief. The motion requests a reduction in Hayes’ sentence due to 
“(1) his unusually long sentence resulting in sentencing disparity because of the changes 
in the law; (2) his exigent family circumstances; (3) his post sentencing rehabilitation; 
and (4) the harsh conditions he has endured because of the COVID-19 pandemic.” ECF 
No. 2411 at 5. The District Court denied the motion, reasoning that Hayes failed to 
establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release and, even if he 
had, the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) counseled against granting the 
motion. Hayes timely appealed, and the Government has moved for summary affirmance. 
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of 
discretion a district court’s order denying a motion for compassionate release, including 
3 
 
its determination that the sentencing factors under § 3553(a) do not weigh in favor of 
granting compassionate release. United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 
2020). “[W]e will not disturb the District Court’s decision unless there is a definite and 
firm conviction that [it] committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached 
upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Id. (cleaned up). We may summarily affirm a 
district court’s decision if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6; Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(per curiam).   
The compassionate-release provision states that a district court may reduce a 
defendant’s term of imprisonment if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such 
a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Before granting compassionate release, a 
district court must consider “the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent 
that they are applicable.” Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Those factors include the nature and 
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the 
need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the 
law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public from 
future crimes by the defendant. See id. § 3553(a). Compassionate release is discretionary, 
not mandatory. Therefore, even if a defendant is eligible, a district court may deny 
compassionate release upon determining that a sentence reduction would be inconsistent 
with the § 3553(a) factors. See Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 330.  
4 
 
We discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s conclusion that the 
§ 3553(a) factors weighed against a grant of compassionate release.1  In doing so, the 
District Court appropriately considered that Hayes’ sentence was “based on his 
leadership role in an extensive criminal network that employed threats and extreme 
violence to force vulnerable young victims to prostitute themselves for the benefit of 
Hayes and his partners.” ECF No. 2418 at 3. It further determined that Hayes’ sentence 
“is necessary to protect the public, promote respect for the law, and provide appropriate 
punishment.” Id. 
Hayes argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it failed to consider 
his low risk of recidivism and the significant evidence of his rehabilitation during his 18 
years of incarceration. But the District Court did consider his rehabilitative efforts, albeit 
more explicitly as part of its analysis regarding Hayes’ proffered “extraordinary and 
compelling reasons.” And even considering both points, we do not have “a definite and 
firm conviction that [the District Court] committed a clear error of judgment in the 
conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 
330 (citation omitted).  
Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we grant the 
Government’s motion and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
1 Based on this conclusion, we need not decide whether Hayes demonstrated 
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” for his release. 


USA v. Eric Hayes

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-20-2025 
Richard Silverberg v. DuPont De Nemours Inc 
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"Richard Silverberg v. DuPont De Nemours Inc" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 422. 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1774 
____________ 
 
RICHARD J. SILVERBERG,  
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DUPONT DE NEMOURS INC; DOW INC; CORTEVA INC; INTERNATIONAL 
FLAVORS & FRAGRANCES; AVANTOR INC; LIBERTY MUTUAL GROUP INC; 
VANGUARD GROUP INC; WILLIAM PENN FOUNDATION; CITY OF 
PHILADELPHIA; BALLARD SPAHR LLP; GELLERT SCALI BUSENKELL & 
BROWN LLC; EDWARD BREEN; ANDREW LIVERIS; RAJIV GUPTA; 
ANDREAS FIBIG; DAVID H. LONG; TIMOTHY BUCKLEY; JANET HAAS, MD; 
JAMES KENNEY; MARCEL S. PRATT, ESQUIRE; DIANA CORTES; MARISSA 
O’CONNELL, ESQUIRE; BRIAN R. CULLIN, ESQUIRE; GARY F. SEITZ, 
ESQUIRE; JOHN DOE NOS. 1-15 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:23-cv-01868) 
District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1775 
____________ 
 
RICHARD J. SILVERBERG,  
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DUPONT DE NEMOURS INC; DOW INC; CORTEVA INC; INTERNATIONAL 
FLAVORS & FRAGRANCES; AVANTOR INC; LIBERTY MUTUAL GROUP INC; 
VANGUARD GROUP INC; WILLIAM PENN FOUNDATION; CITY OF 
PHILADELPHIA; BALLARD SPAHR LLP; GELLERT SCALI BUSENKELL & 
 
 
BROWN LLC; OFFICE DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL EDWARD BREEN; ANDREW 
LIVERIS; RAJIV GUPTA; ANDREAS FIBIG; DAVID H. LONG; TIMOTHY 
BUCKLEY; JANET HAAS, MD; JAMES KENNEY; MARCEL S. PRATT, 
ESQUIRE; DIANA CORTES; MARISSA O’CONNELL, ESQUIRE; BRIAN R. 
CULLIN, ESQUIRE; GARY F. SEITZ, ESQUIRE; THOMAS J. FARRELL, ESQ., 
ESQUIRE; RICHARD HERNANDEZ, ESQUIRE; JOSHUA ROBERTS; DANIEL 
ANDERS; JOHN DOE NOS. 1-5 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:24-cv-00924) 
District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick 
____________ 
 
Before: MATEY, FREEMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
_______________ 
 
JUDGMENT ORDER 
_______________
 
Having considered the parties’ arguments about whether these appeals have been 
rendered moot, it is hereby ORDERED that these appeals are DISMISSED as moot.1  
Costs shall not be taxed. 
 
By the Court, 
 
 
       s/Arianna J. Freeman 
       Circuit Judge 
 
 
  
 
1 Appellant’s Amended Motions for Summary Action, Sanctions, and Attorney Discipline 
are denied.  All other motions in these appeals are denied as moot. 
 
 
ATTEST: 
 
 
s/ Patricia S. Dodszuweit 
Clerk 
 
Dated: May 20, 2025 
cc: All Counsel of Record   


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