Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-15-2025 
James Quisenberry v. Jon Ridge 
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Recommended Citation 
"James Quisenberry v. Jon Ridge" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 46. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/46 
This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT  
_____________ 
No. 24-1017 
_____________ 
 
JAMES CARLO QUISENBERRY 
      Appellant 
 
v.  
 
JON T. RIDGE, Washington County Chief Probation and Parole Officer; KATHERINE 
B. EMERY 
____________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:20-cv-01824) 
District Judge:  Honorable J. Nicholas Ranjan 
____________ 
Argued:  September 11, 2024 
___________ 
Before:  CHAGARES, Chief Judge, ROTH and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 15, 2025) 
 
Wayne A. Ely [ARGUED] 
59 Andrea Drive 
Richboro, PA 18954 
 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
Sarah E. Cobbs [ARGUED] 
Walsh Barnes 
2100 Corporate Drive, Suite 300 
Wexford, PA 15090 
 
Counsel for Appellee 
2 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Chief Judge. 
  On August 10, 2019, Jon T. Ridge, the Chief Adult Probation and Parole Officer 
for Washington County, Pennsylvania, directed local police to arrest James Carlo 
Quisenberry on the authority of an arrest warrant that had been signed by a judge several 
months earlier.  Quisenberry filed suit against Ridge and the judge who signed the 
warrant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the issuance of the pre-signed warrant 
violated the Fourth Amendment.  The District Court granted summary judgment to Ridge 
on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity, and Quisenberry appealed.  Because we agree 
that Ridge is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity with respect to claims arising from the 
issuance of the warrant, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.       
I.   
We write for the benefit of the parties and so recite only the facts pertinent to our 
decision.  In 2017 or 2018, after the murder of two domestic violence victims, Judge 
Katherine Emery, then the President Judge of the Washington County Court of Common 
Pleas, devised a procedure for the prompt arrest, in an “emergency . . . situation,” of 
persons on pretrial release charged with domestic violence.  Appendix (“App.”) 134.  
Those subject to the emergency process were called “Tier 3” offenders.  As part of the 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
3 
emergency arrest procedure, Judge Emery signed arrest warrants specific to each offender 
“in the Tier 3 level, only to be used if needed.”  App. 135.  Once signed, the warrants 
were placed in a “probation office special file in a special drawer that only would be 
accessed if [a] problem had arisen.”  App. 134.   
On March 18, 2019, a detective in the Cecil Township Police Department filed a 
criminal complaint against Quisenberry alleging that he had used anonymous phone calls 
to stalk, harass, and threaten his former romantic partner, Judge Valarie Costanzo of the 
Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Pennsylvania.  The Affidavit of Probable 
Cause supporting the criminal complaint alleged, inter alia, that Quisenberry had “left a 
message threatening to cut out [Judge Costanzo’s] tongue and kill her.”  App. 211.   
Because Quisenberry’s alleged offenses involved a judge of Washington County, his case 
was assigned to Judge Gerald Solomon, a senior judge visiting from Fayette County.      
Quisenberry was released on bond.  As a condition of release, he agreed not to 
enter certain designated “exclusion zones.”  One “exclusion zone” consisted of the area 
within a two-mile radius of Judge Costanzo’s house.  To ensure compliance, Quisenberry 
was required to wear an electronic monitoring device called the “Buddi Clip.”  The Buddi 
Clip was designed to alert Judge Costanzo if Quisenberry entered the exclusion zone 
around her house.   
On August 10, 2019, Judge Costanzo was alerted that Quisenberry had entered the 
exclusion zone around her house.  Judge Costanzo then notified Ridge of the breach.  
Ridge, in turn, obtained confirmation from a subordinate that Quisenberry had breached 
the exclusion zone.  At the time Ridge learned of the breach, he “was in the middle of 
4 
DJ’ing a wedding” at which Judge Emery happened to be a guest.  App. 184.  After 
learning from Ridge that Quisenberry had breached an exclusion zone, Judge Emery 
directed Ridge to call Judge Solomon.   
Ridge and Karen Lebar, the Assistant Chief of the probation office and also a 
guest at the wedding, called Judge Solomon and informed him that Quisenberry had 
breached an exclusion zone.  Judge Solomon initially “advised [Ridge] to see if he could 
make contact with a judge” in Washington County “to get a bench warrant signed . . . .”  
App. 222.  But, as Judge Solomon recalled during his deposition, either Ridge or Lebar 
“informed [him] that there were already bench warrants signed by the presiding judge 
and that [it] was their practice and procedure in Washington County to have these forms 
available for such circumstances as we now face.”  App. 222.  After learning of the pre-
signed warrant procedure, Judge Solomon told Ridge, “if that’s your practice in 
Washington County and you have a bench warrant, then you should act upon it.”  App. 
227.  
Ridge thereafter directed a subordinate to fax the pre-signed warrant for 
Quisenberry’s arrest to the Peters Township Police Department.  Multiple officers of the 
Peters Township Police Department executed the warrant on the evening of August 10, 
2019.   
Quisenberry filed suit against Ridge and Judge Emery in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  The District Court granted Judge 
Emery’s motion to dismiss on the basis of judicial immunity.  Ridge later filed a post-
discovery motion for summary judgment, which the District Court granted on the basis of 
5 
quasi-judicial immunity.  Quisenberry timely filed a notice of appeal.              
II.  
The District Court had jurisdiction of the suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  This Court 
has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review a grant of summary 
judgment de novo, using the same standard as the District Court.”  Hayes v. N.J. Dep’t of 
Hum. Servs., 108 F.4th 219, 221 (3d Cir. 2024).  “Summary judgment is appropriate only 
‘if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving party], there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  
Id. (quoting Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 580 (3d Cir. 2003)) 
(alteration in Hayes).  “A fact is material if its resolution might affect the outcome of the 
suit under the governing law.”  Mall Chevrolet, Inc. v. Gen. Motors LLC, 99 F.4th 622, 
631 (3d Cir. 2024) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  “And a dispute is 
genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party.”  Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  In deciding 
whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact, we must credit the evidence of the 
nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.  Peifer v. Bd. of Prob. and 
Parole, 106 F.4th 270, 275 (3d Cir. 2024).    
III.  
It is well established that judges enjoy absolute immunity with respect to claims 
arising from their official acts.  See Russell v. Richardson, 905 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 
2018).  As our Court has explained, “[t]he adjudicative function that judges perform 
requires that they be immune from suit for damages, for if judges were personally liable 
6 
for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but 
vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions 
likely to provoke such suits.”  Trinh v. Fineman, 9 F.4th 235, 238 (3d Cir. 2021) (cleaned 
up).   
We have recognized that “[t]he fair administration of justice depends not only 
judges,” but also on those who assist them.  Russell, 905 F.3d at 247.  As a result, “so-
called ‘quasi-judicial’ immunity has been extended over time to protect a range of [quasi-
]judicial actors, including . . . those who serve as arms of the court, fulfilling a quasi-
judicial role at the court’s request . . . .”  Id. (citations omitted and cleaned up).  In 
Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1969), this Court extended absolute 
immunity to a prothonotary who refused to file a defendant’s appeal papers, “because his 
refusal was ‘at the direction of the court,’ and ‘any public official acting pursuant to court 
directive is . . . immune from suit.’”  Russell, 905 F.3d at 248 (quoting Lockhart, 411 
F.2d at 460).  In Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1975), we “granted immunity 
to an investigator for the public defender for ‘act[ing] under orders of the . . . court’ to 
help extradite the plaintiff for prosecution . . . .”  Russell, 905 F.3d at 248–49 (quoting 
Waits, 516 F.2d at 205) (alteration in Russell).  And in Russell, we made clear that an 
official enjoys immunity with respect to claims arising from “actions actually authorized 
by court order.”  905 F.3d at 248.   
Quisenberry himself acknowledges that “[q]uasi-judicial immunity applies when a 
defendant ‘act[s] pursuant to a court directive.’”  See Reply. Br. 3 (quoting Stankowski v. 
Farley, 251 F. App’x 743, 746 (3d Cir. 2007)).  Nevertheless, Quisenberry insists that the 
7 
record evidences a genuine dispute as to whether Judge Solomon authorized Ridge to 
issue the arrest warrant.     
We are not persuaded.  At his deposition, Ridge testified that “Judge Solomon said 
to have Mr. Quisenberry picked up.”  App. 164.  Judge Solomon’s own statements 
regarding his conversation with Ridge corroborate Ridge’s account.  During his 
deposition, Judge Solomon testified that he told Ridge, “if [it’s] your practice in 
Washington County [to use pre-signed warrants] and you have a bench warrant, then you 
should act upon it.”  App. 227. A statement made by Judge Solomon during 
Quisenberry’s bond revocation hearing on August 15, 2019, is to the same effect:   
I was told that there was a presigned warrant by Judge Emery.  The 
question to me was, “Should it be issued?”  I said, “Did he violate the 
terms?”  They said that he did, so I directed that the warrant be issued.   
 
App. 602. 
Quisenberry seizes on some of Judge Solomon’s other deposition testimony as 
evidence of a genuine dispute.  In particular, Quisenberry observes that when Judge 
Solomon was asked, “So you did not give them [Ridge] permission to arrest Mr. 
Quisenberry?”, he responded:  “I did not.  It was not my warrant.”  App. 225; see also 
App. 222 (when asked, “So you did not issue a warrant yourself obviously; right?”, 
stating, “I did not.”).  Quisenberry also notes that Judge Solomon denied “mak[ing] any 
determination of probable cause” during his phone call with Ridge.  App. 225.  And, 
citing Judge Solomon’s testimony that he “advised [Ridge] to . . . make contact with a 
judge over there to get a bench warrant signed,” Quisenberry argues that Judge 
Solomon’s only instruction to Ridge was that he should obtain a warrant from another 
8 
judge.  App. 222.     
 In context, however, these statements fail to establish that there is a genuine 
dispute of material fact.  First, Judge Solomon’s statement that he “did not give [Ridge] 
permission to arrest” Quisenberry amounts to a denial that Judge Solomon signed the 
warrant—not a denial that Judge Solomon directed Ridge to act according to a warrant 
signed by another judge.  Indeed, immediately after responding affirmatively to counsel’s 
question, “So you did not give them [Ridge] permission to arrest Mr. Quisenberry?”, 
Judge Solomon said by way of clarification:  “It was not my warrant.”  App. 225.  So, 
although Judge Solomon made clear that he did not sign the warrant, he did not contradict 
his testimony elsewhere that he directed Ridge to “act upon” on the warrant signed by 
Judge Emery. 
 Second, Judge Solomon’s denial that he made any finding of probable cause is not 
inconsistent with his testimony that he instructed Ridge to “act upon” a pre-existing 
warrant.  Judge Solomon’s denial that he made a finding of probable cause at most 
establishes that, although he directed Ridge to “act upon” a pre-existing warrant, he did 
so without making a determination of probable cause.  But the relevant question in 
assessing Ridge’s entitlement to quasi-judicial immunity is whether Ridge acted 
according to a judicial directive—not whether that directive was proper as a matter of 
law.        
 Third, Judge Solomon’s statement that he advised Ridge to obtain a bench warrant 
must be understood in light of Judge Solomon’s subsequent testimony that he was 
“informed [by Ridge] that there were already bench warrants signed by the presiding 
9 
judge and that [it] was their practice and procedure in Washington County to have these 
forms available for such circumstances as we now face.”  App. 222.  Indeed, Judge 
Solomon testified that, once informed of the availability of the pre-signed warrants, he 
told Ridge:  “[I]f that’s your practice in Washington County and you have a bench 
warrant, then you should act upon it.”  App. 227.  No reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that Judge Solomon’s telling Ridge to obtain a bench warrant from another 
judge was the last word in their conversation.   
 In sum, we conclude that there is no genuine dispute that Ridge issued the warrant 
for Quisenberry’s arrest according to Judge Solomon’s directive.  Ridge is therefore 
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity with respect to claims arising from the issuance of the 
warrant.          
IV.  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Ridge.     


English

James Quisenberry v. Jon Ridge

Isaac Carranza-Cortez v. Attorney General United States of America

Krishna Geda v. Director United States Citizenship and Immigration

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-24-2025 
USA v. Guibbonz Marcellus 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Guibbonz Marcellus" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 63. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/63 
This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1748 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
                                       
v. 
 
GUIBBONZ MARCELLUS, 
Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 1:20-cr-00199-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 16, 2025 
____________ 
 
Before:  PHIPPS, FREEMAN, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 24, 2025) 
____________ 
 
OPINION1 
____________ 
 
 
 
1 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
CHUNG, Circuit Judge. 
During Appellant’s trial, he objected to the admission of certain evidence.  He 
argues that the District Court applied the wrong standard under Federal Rule of Evidence 
403 when it overruled his objection, and, in any event, failed to adequately explain its 
Rule 403 analysis.  Because we disagree, we will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND2 
 
Guibbonz Marcellus ran a tax return preparation business.  To increase his clients’ 
refund amounts, he regularly included false numbers on the returns he prepared.  This led 
to him being charged with 23 counts of aiding or assisting the preparation of a false or 
fraudulent tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2).  At trial, Marcellus argued that 
he did not know the information was false and merely relied on information provided by 
his customers.  To rebut this defense, the Government sought to introduce Marcellus’s 
own fraudulent tax returns from 2013, 2014, and 2015 to show knowledge and absence of 
mistake.  Marcellus objected under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).  The District Court 
overruled the objection and admitted the evidence.  After trial, Marcellus was convicted 
on all counts and timely appealed.  
II. DISCUSSION3 
 
 
2 Because we write for the parties, we recite only facts pertinent to our decision. 
3  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review decisions to admit evidence for abuse of discretion, 
and such discretion is construed especially broadly in the context of Rule 403.  However, 
to the extent the District Court’s admission of evidence was based on an interpretation of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, the standard of review is plenary.”  United States v. 
Scarfo, 41 F.4th 136, 178 n.35 (3d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 
3 
As part of its Rule 404(b) analysis, the District Court must weigh the probative 
value of proffered evidence against any danger of unfair prejudice it may pose.  Fed. R. 
Evid. 403; United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 277 (3d Cir. 2014).  The only issue 
on appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion when it conducted this 
weighing.   
After analyzing the prejudice and probative value, the District Court concluded, “I 
don’t think the prejudice substantially outweighs the relevance.  So I will overrule the 
objection.”  App. 33.  Marcellus argues that the District Court applied the wrong standard 
because the relevant question is if the prejudice outweighs the relevance, not if the 
prejudice substantially outweighs the relevance.  We disagree.  The text of Rule 403 
plainly states that evidence may be excluded when “its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of … unfair prejudice ….”  Fed. R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added); 
see also Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687 (1988) (“Rule 403 allows the 
trial judge to exclude relevant evidence if, among other things, its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  While we have at times stated that Rule 403 requires courts to consider 
whether the “probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect,” United 
States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1992); see Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 277, we 
made clear that such references were mere shorthand for the standard set forth in Rule 
403 itself, see Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 277 (“[T]he court must evaluate pursuant to Rule 
403 whether the evidence is sufficiently probative ….” (emphasis added)); Sampson, 980 
 
4 
F.2d at 886 (“[I]ts probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect under Rule 403 
….” (emphasis added)). 
Marcellus also argues that, even if it applied the correct standard, the District 
Court procedurally erred by failing to adequately articulate its Rule 403 analysis.  
Marcellus Br. 9–10; see also United States v. Finley, 726 F.3d 483, 491 (3d Cir. 2013).  
This argument fails.  The District Court explained that the tax returns were probative of 
Marcellus’s knowledge and lack of mistake, analyzed and rejected Marcellus’s arguments 
to the contrary, acknowledged the possibility of undue prejudice, and ultimately 
concluded that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by 
any undue prejudice.  This was an adequate explanation and “sufficient to satisfy the 
procedural requirements of Rule 403.”  Id.4 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
4 The Government also argues that if there was any error, it was harmless.  Because 
we hold that no error was committed, we need not reach this issue. 


USA v. Guibbonz Marcellus

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-24-2025 
Abdul Jaludi v. Citigroup 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Abdul Jaludi v. Citigroup" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 65. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/65 
This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________ 
 
No. 24-1358 
__________ 
 
ABDUL A. JALUDI, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITIGROUP, and company or one or more of  
its direct or indirect subsidiaries 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-02076) 
District Judge:  Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 6, 2024 
Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 24, 2025) 
 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
Abdul Jaludi, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the District Court denying his 
motion for post-judgment relief in his action against his former employer.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
Jaludi filed a lawsuit against Citigroup raising claims under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (“RICO”), and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.  Jaludi alleged that Citgroup fired him 
in retaliation for his reporting improprieties in its internal complaint monitoring system.  
The District Court granted Citicorp’s motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the 
action.  On appeal, we affirmed the judgment as to the RICO claim but held that the 
District Court had erred in compelling arbitration of the Sarbanes-Oxley claim.  Jaludi v. 
Citigroup, 933 F.3d 246, 251, 257 (3d Cir. 2019).  On remand, the District Court granted 
Citigroup’s motion to dismiss the Sarbanes-Oxley claim.  We affirmed.  Jaludi v. 
Citigroup & Co., 57 F.4th 148, 150 (3d Cir. 2023). 
Seven months later, Jaludi filed a motion to return his RICO claim to the District 
Court.  He argued that Citigroup had waived its right to arbitration by not initiating 
arbitration proceedings within 30 days of our decision in 2023.  The District Court 
adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation to deny relief.  It construed 
Jaludi’s filing as a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and ruled 
that the motion was untimely and without merit.   
3 
 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District 
Court’s denial of relief under Rule 60(b) for abuse of discretion.  Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 
113, 118 (3d Cir. 2014). 
Jaludi asserts on appeal that the District Court failed to decide his appeal of a 
Magistrate Judge’s order striking his motion for summary judgment on the merits of his 
claims.  He seeks a ruling on that motion.  Jaludi filed a summary judgment motion after 
Citigroup moved to compel arbitration.  In 2016, the Magistrate Judge struck the filing 
without prejudice as premature.  The District Court overruled Jaludi’s objection to that 
order when it granted Citigroup’s motion to compel arbitration and dismissed his action.1  
When the case was remanded in 2019 to adjudicate Jaludi’s Sarbanes-Oxley claim, he 
renewed his objection.  Jaludi contends his filings in this regard were not addressed. 
Jaludi’s argument is not properly before us.  Our jurisdiction is limited to the 
review of the denial of his motion for post-judgment relief.  Jaludi’s sole argument was 
that the District Court should adjudicate his RICO claim because Citigroup had waived 
arbitration.  He did not contend that the District Court failed to address his objection to 
(or appeal of) the Magistrate Judge’s order.  We thus do not consider this argument.  See 
Garza v. Citigroup Inc., 881 F.3d 277, 284 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that arguments not 
presented to the District Court may not be raised on appeal). 
 
1 Jaludi also appealed the Magistrate Judge’s order to this Court, and we dismissed his 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  See C.A. No. 16-3167, 10/5/16 Order. 
4 
 
Jaludi also challenges the District Court’s denial of his Rule 60(b) motion on the 
merits.  The District Court rejected Jaludi’s contention that Citigroup had waived 
arbitration.  It stated that he was required to pursue his RICO claim in arbitration and that 
he never sent Citigroup a written demand for arbitration, which would have triggered 
Citigroup’s obligations under their agreement.  Jaludi argues that, under Pennsylvania 
law, he demanded arbitration through the filing of his lawsuit.  He also contends that 
Citigroup misled the courts by failing to submit the parties’ most current arbitration 
agreement. 
Jaludi, however, also did not raise these arguments in his post-judgment motion.  
And even if they were properly before us, he does not challenge the District Court’s 
ruling that his motion was untimely under Rule 60(c)(1).  This was an independent basis 
for denying relief, and “[t]he failure to challenge an independent basis for a district 
court’s decision is fatal to an appeal.”  LabMD Inc. v. Boback, 47 F.4th 164, 191 (3d Cir. 
2022). 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.2 
 
 
2 Jaludi’s motion to reject Citigroup’s brief and supplemental appendix is denied. 


Abdul Jaludi v. Citigroup

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-28-2025 
USA v. Devon Brinkley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Devon Brinkley" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 71. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/71 
This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
ALD-066                NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2113 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DEVON BRINKLEY, 
         Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-09-cr-00060-004) 
District Judge: Honorable Kai N. Scott 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
on January 16, 2025 
 
Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 28, 2025) 
____________________________________  
2 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Devon Brinkley, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s 
order denying his second motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). The 
Government has filed a motion for summary affirmance. We grant the Government’s mo-
tion. 
 In 2008, Brinkley and his co-conspirators conducted a series of armed robberies. After 
two federal trials resulted in hung juries, Brinkley’s third trial resulted in his conviction on 
all charges, including five counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and five firearm 
counts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Due to the mandatory consecutive § 924(c) sen-
tences, Brinkley was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 107 years. We affirmed the 
conviction and sentence. See United States v. Brinkley, 524 F. App’x 817, 818 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
In 2021, Brinkley filed his first motion for compassionate release, which was based 
primarily on a change to the statutory penalties for consecutive § 924(c) convictions, his 
young age at the time of the offense, his rehabilitation, and a comparison with the sentences 
of his co-defendants. The District Court determined that the disparity between Brinkley’s 
sentence and the sentence he would receive under current law was an extraordinary and 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
3 
 
compelling reason for granting the motion,1 and, after weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
factors, reduced Brinkley’s total term of imprisonment to 240 months. 
 In January 2024, Brinkley filed a second motion for compassionate release based on 
essentially the same grounds as his first motion. The District Court denied the motion. This 
appeal ensued. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See United States v. Muhammud, 701 
F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2012). We review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s ulti-
mate decision to grant or deny a motion for compassionate release and will not disturb the 
decision unless the District Court committed a clear error of judgment. See United States 
v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2021). We may take summary action on any basis 
supported by the record if the appeal presents no substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
Here, the extraordinary and compelling reasons that Brinkley presented in support of a 
reduction under § 3582(c)(1) are essentially the same as those he previously raised in his 
first motion. Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s ultimate deter-
mination that the sentence reduction it had previously provided was appropriate and that 
there was no basis in the second motion to provide a further reduction.2 
 
1 The Government elected not to appeal this decision. See C.A. Doc. No. 14 at 6–7 (dis-
cussing this Court’s determinations, in United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 261 (3d 
Cir. 2021), and in United States v. Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360, 376 (3d Cir. 2024), that the 
change in § 924(c) cannot be a basis for compassionate release). 
 
2 We note that Brinkley’s filings on appeal generally do not address his asserted bases for 
compassionate relief under § 3582(c)(1). Instead, he primarily raises challenges to his con-
viction and sentence, including a claim under United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), 
4 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
which must be raised in a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In the District Court 
proceedings, Brinkley was informed that he must file an application under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244 with this Court if he wishes to file a second or successive § 2255 motion raising a 
Taylor claim. We similarly direct Brinkley to file a § 2244 application with this Court if he 
wishes to pursue such relief. 


USA v. Devon Brinkley

USDC for the District Court of the Virgin Island

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-28-2025 
Christine Thompson v. Over the Line VI LLC 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
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"Christine Thompson v. Over the Line VI LLC" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 73. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/73 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 23-3110
_______________
CHRISTINE THOMPSON,
Appellant
v.
OVER THE LINE VI, LLC; JORDAN MAUPIN
_______________
On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands
(D.C. No. 3:21-cv-00070)
District Judge: Honorable Robert A. Molloy
_______________
Argued: December 9, 2024
Before:  CHAGARES, Chief Judge, MONTGOMERY-REEVES and FISHER, Circuit
Judges
(Filed: January 28, 2025)
_______________
Joel H. Holt, Esq. [Argued]
Law Office of Joel H. Holt, Esq., P.C.
2132 Company Street
Christiansted, VI 00820
Counsel for Appellant
Matthew J. Duensing, Esq.  [Argued]
Joseph Sauerwein, Esq.
Duensing & Casner
9800 Buccaneer Mall, Bldg. 2, Suite 9
2
P.O. Box 6785
St. Thomas, VI 00804
Counsel for Appellees
_______________
OPINION*
_______________
CHAGARES, Chief Judge
In this appeal, plaintiff–appellant Christine Thompson challenges the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant–appellees Over the Line VI, 
LLC (“OTL”) and Jordan Maupin on negligence claims arising out of injuries allegedly 
suffered during a boating excursion off the coast of the U.S. Virgin Islands. For the
reasons set out below, we will reverse. 
I.1
A.
On June 13, 2021, Thompson joined five family members and friends (the
“passengers”) for a recreational boating and snorkel excursion in the waters of Saint 
Thomas and Saint John.  Choosing from several boat companies in the area, the group 
booked the charter with OTL, which supplied them with a powerboat captained by 
Maupin. Maupin met the passengers at a dock prior to boarding the vessel and handed 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not
constitute binding precedent.
1 We write primarily for the parties, and so we recite only the facts necessary to decide the
case.
3 
them a clipboard holding a form contract purporting to release OTL and its agents from 
all liability for any injuries sustained during the excursion (the “Release”).  
The Release was a single-page document with two sides.  One side (the “front 
page”) was titled “GENERAL RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS,” written in bold text at the 
top of the page.  Appendix (“App.”) 359.  The front page provided, in part, “Releasor . . . 
hereby releases, waives and forever discharges any and all claims that Releasors 
may have or ever had or will have against [OTL and its agents],” and that “Releasors 
hereby assume full responsibility for the risk of bodily injury . . . whether caused by 
the negligence of the Releasees or otherwise.”  Id. (boldface emphasis in original).  The 
other side of the Release (the “back page”) was titled “GENERAL RELEASE OF ALL 
CLAIMS (CONTINUED),” again written in bold text at the top of the page.  App. 360.  
The remainder of the back page contained twelve rows of blank lines split into three parts 
labeled:  “Signature,” “Print name,” and “Address.”  Id. 
No one disputes that all passengers, including Thompson, signed the Release, but 
the record contains conflicting evidence about how the document was presented and 
represented to the passengers at the time they signed.  Maupin testified that he handed the 
Release to the passengers with the front page up.  The passengers, however, testified that 
they were only given a page containing “blank lines” because Maupin handed them the 
back page of the Release and the clipboard’s clip covered the “GENERAL RELEASE 
OF CLAIMS (CONTINUED)” language at the top.  App. 354–55, 373–74, 398–400, 
419, 422, 425.  They further testified that Maupin never described the document as a 
4 
release or a waiver and, instead, only asked them to provide their “contact information.”  
App. 340–41, 358, 400, 419, 422, 425.  
Shortly after leaving the dock, the vessel crashed against a wave that dislodged 
Thompson from her seat.  Upon landing, Thompson was visibly injured, and Maupin 
changed course to deliver her to a dock for medical care.  
B. 
 Thompson filed a complaint in the District Court of the Virgin Islands asserting 
claims of negligence and gross negligence against OTL and Maupin.  OTL and Maupin 
moved for summary judgment, and the District Court granted the motion in part, 
concluding that the Release precluded Thompson’s negligence claims.  Over Thompson’s 
objections, the District Court held that the Release was enforceable as a matter of law 
because she had sufficient time to review the document and, notwithstanding disputes 
about how the Release was presented, there was “no gen[uine] issue [of] material fact in 
dispute that [she] had the opportunity to remove the clip covering the second page.”  
App. 6–7.  Thompson’s gross negligence claim was tried to a jury, which rendered a 
verdict in favor of OTL and Maupin.  Thompson timely appealed, and she now asks this 
Court to reverse the District Court’s summary judgment ruling.2  
 
2 Thompson does not challenge the jury verdict on her gross negligence claim. 
 
5 
II.3 
We apply substantive federal admiralty law to claims within our admiralty 
jurisdiction.  Gibbs ex rel. Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 126, 131 (3d Cir. 
2002); see also East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 
(1986) (“With admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty 
law.”).  A claim falls within our admiralty jurisdiction where it satisfies “conditions of 
both location and of connection with maritime activity.”  Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great 
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995); see also Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. 
Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 253 (1972)) (“If the wrong occurred on navigable waters, the 
action is within admiralty jurisdiction . . . .”).  Those conditions are further broken down 
into a three-part test that requires courts to consider whether (1) the incident “occurred on 
navigable water” or involved an “injury on land [that] was caused by a vessel on 
navigable water”; (2) the general features of the incident show that it “has a potentially 
disrupting impact on maritime commerce”; and (3) “the general character of the activity 
giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime 
activity.”  Gibbs, 314 F.3d at 131–32 (quoting Jerome B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 534)). 
The events giving rise to the boating incident in this case satisfy the three-part test 
for admiralty jurisdiction.  The alleged torts occurred onboard a vessel that was traveling 
on navigable waters off the coast of Saint Thomas.  The alleged torts also involved injury 
 
3 Setting aside a dispute in the District Court as to whether diversity jurisdiction applied 
to Thompson’s action, the District Court certainly possessed admiralty jurisdiction.  
28 U.S.C. § 1331(1).  This Court has jurisdiction over Thompson’s appeal under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1294(3).  
6 
to a passenger during a paid excursion, which is a type of incident that has the potential to 
disrupt maritime commerce by, for example, “causing a commercial vessel to divert from 
its course.”  Hargus v. Ferocious & Impetuous, LLC, 840 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2016).  
Further, the type of water activity involved — a recreational shore excursion involving 
transportation over water — has a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.  
See Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc., 409 U.S. at 255–56 (describing “traditional maritime 
activities” as those “involving navigation or commerce on navigable waters”).  As such, 
admiralty jurisdiction is proper, and federal maritime common law applies.4 
The Court “review[s] the District Court’s order granting summary judgment de 
novo,” evaluating the record “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  In re 
Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 881 F.3d 262, 267–68 (3d Cir. 2018).  
III. 
It is a well-established rule of admiralty contract law “that exculpatory clauses, 
whether fully exonerating a party from its own negligence or not, ‘must be clearly and 
unequivocally expressed.’”  Sander v. Alexander Richardson Invs., 334 F.3d 712, 715 
(8th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases).  Exculpatory clauses may “not be inflicted by a 
monopoly[] or a party with excessive bargaining power” either.  Piché v. Stockdale 
Holdings, LLC, 51 V.I. 657, 667 (D.V.I. 2009) (citing Broadley v. Mashpee Neck 
 
4 Federal admiralty law consists of an “amalgam of traditional common-law rules, 
modifications of those rules, and newly created rules,” which may be supplemented by 
state law “when maritime law is silent or where a local matter is at issue.”  Floyd v. Lykes 
Bros. S.S. Co., 844 F.2d 1044, 1046–47 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Sosebee v. Rath, 893 F.2d 
54, 56 (3d Cir. 1990) (“There is a strong interest in maintaining uniformity in maritime 
law.”). 
7 
Marina, Inc., 471 F.3d 272, 274 (1st Cir. 2006)).  The Release in this case meets both 
requirements.  There is no dispute that the Release contains express, unambiguous 
language releasing OTL and its agents from “any and all claims” and even provides for 
an assumption of risk for injuries “caused by [OTL’s] negligence.”  App. 359.  There is 
also no dispute that OTL offered purely recreational services and was not a monopoly, 
thus the Release cannot reasonably be characterized as a contract of adhesion.   
 Yet Thompson does not challenge the language of the Release and focuses instead 
on how the Release was presented, arguing that a reasonable factfinder could conclude 
that Thompson had no “reason to suspect [she] w[as] being asked to do anything other 
than provide the charterer with [her] name and contact information.”  Thompson Br. 22.  
Thompson’s argument is, in substance, “a claim of excusable ignorance of the contents of 
the writing signed,” Connors v. Fawn Mining Corp., 30 F.3d 483, 492 (3d Cir. 1994), 
also known as “fraud in the execution” or “fraud in the factum,” Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 163 & cmt. a.  This defense to contract formation applies when an offeror 
“procures a party’s signature to an instrument without [the signatory’s] knowledge of its 
true nature or contents,” rendering the manifestation of assent invalid and the contract 
void.  Langley v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., 484 U.S. 86, 93 (1987); accord MZM Constr. Co. 
v. N.J. Bldg. Laborers Statewide Benefit Funds, 974 F.3d 386, 404 (3d Cir. 2020).  The 
offeror need not act with “an affirmative intent to defraud,” but the objective 
circumstances must nonetheless establish that the signatory’s ignorance was reasonable.  
MZM Constr. Co., 974 F.3d at 404–05. 
 Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to Thompson without 
8 
“weigh[ing] the evidence or mak[ing] credibility determinations,” Pichler v. UNITE, 
542 F.3d 380, 386 (3d Cir. 2008), we cannot agree with the District Court that the 
Release is enforceable as a matter of law.  A reasonable factfinder could find that Maupin 
handed the passengers a clipboard showing only the back page of the Release, obscured 
the sole liability-waiver language with the clip, and left visible only a series of blank lines 
to write signatures, names, and addresses.  A reasonable factfinder could further conclude 
that when Maupin “asked that [Thompson] put [her] contact information on the clip 
board” and said nothing else about the document, Thompson reasonably believed that 
“[t]here was nothing to read” on this “blank piece of paper.”5  App. 340–41, 356, 373, 
400.  Under that reading of the record, the Release is unenforceable and thus summary 
judgment was improper.  Just as “one who signs a promissory note reasonably believing 
he only gave his autograph is not liable on the note,” Operating Eng’rs Pension Tr. v. 
Gilliam, 737 F.2d 1501, 1504 (9th Cir. 1984), one who signs a liability waiver reasonably 
believing that she only completed a sign-in sheet is not deprived of her day in court.6 
 
5 The threshold for “reasonable” ignorance depends in part on the intent of the party seeking 
to avoid the contract.  “[L]ess care will ordinarily be expected of [a signatory] if he did not 
intend to assume a legal obligation at all than if he intended to assume a legal obligation, 
although one of a different nature.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 163 cmt. b; see 
also Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 136 (4th Cir. 1967) (“[T]he 
average reasonable man would not be expected to exercise that caution which he would if 
he knew that he was signing what purported to be a legal document.”). 
 
6 A Virgin Islands court declined to enforce a liability waiver for similar reasons in near 
identical circumstances.  See generally Leach v. Cruise Ship Excursions, Inc., No. ST-16-
CV-506, 2019 WL 3814399 (V.I. Super. Aug. 12, 2019).  In Leach, the “release form 
comprised two sides of a clip board,” the back page had a release-related title that the 
plaintiffs “did not recall seeing,” and the rest of the back page had lines for names and 
signatures, which the court concluded “might suggest to some that the form was a sign-in 
9 
 OTL and Maupin’s counterarguments are unpersuasive.  OTL and Maupin are 
correct that, without more, Thompson’s “alleged failure to read the document [would] not 
create a genuine issue of material fact as to the enforceability of the [R]elease,” OTL Br. 
13, because “[a]cceptance is measured not by the parties’ subjective intent, but rather by 
their outward expressions of assent,” Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 
222 (3d Cir. 2008).  But even a clear “outward expression[] of assent” may be ineffective 
when, as here, there is evidence that the offeror “misrepresented the contents of the 
agreement” or “tried to hide” key provisions therein.  See id. at 221, 223.  The case law 
invoked by OTL and Maupin is not to the contrary.  See, e.g., Delponte v. Coral World 
V.I., Inc., 48 V.I. 386, 387–88 (D.V.I. 2006), aff’d, 233 F. App’x 178 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(liability waiver upheld where plaintiff “concede[d] that he [signed] with an intent to be 
bound”); Nicole Morgan v. Water Toy Shop, Inc., No. 16-cv-2540, 2018 WL 1725550, at 
*10 (D.P.R. Mar. 30, 2018) (liability waiver upheld where “there [was] no evidence . . . 
that [plaintiffs] [signed] by mistake, thinking they were signing something else”).  
 In sum, we conclude that the District Court erred by resolving Thompson’s 
negligence claims at summary judgment based on the Release.  While we do not deem 
the Release unenforceable as a matter of law, we hold that there are genuine disputes of 
material fact as to the Release’s enforceability that should have been left to the factfinder. 
 
sheet.”  Id. at *7.  Because it was “quite possible that a person signing the form might not 
have been alerted to the fact that waiver and release clauses appeared on the reverse side 
of the clip board,” the court held that the Release was unenforceable.  Id. 
10 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment in favor of OTL and Maupin and remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 


Christine Thompson v. Over the Line VI LLC

Zodiac Pool Systems LLC v. US Department of Energy

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-30-2025 
David Aquino v. Attorney General United States of America 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"David Aquino v. Attorney General United States of America" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 83. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/83 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 24-1996 
_____________ 
 
                   DAVID CANAHUI AQUINO; MAYRA ISABEL ACETUN IXCOPAL;  
L. S. C. A.; D. E. C. A., 
         Petitioners                  
 v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A220-933-831; A220-933-832; A220-933-833; A220-933-834) 
Immigration Judge: Nicole Lane 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on 
January 21, 2025 
 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, McKEE, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 30, 2025) 
 
_____________________ 
 
OPINION 
______________________ 
 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.  
 2 
Petitioners David Canahui Aquino, Mayra Isabel Acetun Ixcopal, and their two 
children seek review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying their 
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against 
Torture.1 We will deny the petition for review.2   
I.3 
 
1  Petitioners have waived any challenge to their denial of relief under the CAT by 
failing to raise the claim on appeal. See Ying Chen v. Att’y Gen., 676 F.3d 112, 117 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (“[B]ecause petitioners do not challenge the denial of CAT relief in their brief 
before this Court, we deem that issue waived and do not address it.”). Additionally, they 
have failed to exhaust their withholding of removal and procedural due process claims by 
failing to raise these issues to the BIA. See Inestroza-Tosta v. Att’y Gen., 105 F.4th 499, 
520 (3d Cir. 2024) (recognizing that, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), a petitioner must 
exhaust all administrative remedies for each issue raised and declining to reach a claim 
that the petitioner failed to exhaust).  
While “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not always required when the 
petitioner advances a due process claim,” exhaustion is required when a “due process 
claim amounts to a procedural error correctable through the administrative process.” 
Sewak v. I.N.S., 900 F.2d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 1990). In Bonhometre v. Gonzales, the 
petitioner raised a claim of procedural error that he had not presented to the BIA. 414 
F.3d 442, 447 (3d Cir. 2005). “[T]hough argued in the language of procedural due 
process, [it was] essentially [a] claim that the IJ failed in its duty to completely develop 
th[e] case.” Id. at 448. We held that the exhaustion requirement applied because the BIA 
was “eminently capable of addressing” the claim. Id. As in Bonhometre, the exhaustion 
requirement applies to Petitioners’ claim that the IJ committed a procedural error by 
failing to develop the record of the case because it is an issue that could have been 
addressed by the BIA. 
2 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s order under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  
3 If the BIA “‘affirmed and partially reiterated’ the IJ’s determinations, we review both 
decisions.” Blanco v. Att’y Gen., 967 F.3d 304, 310 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Sandie v. 
Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009)). “If the BIA relied on only some of the 
grounds given for denying relief, we review only those grounds.” Id. “In reviewing 
decisions of the BIA, this Court applies a deferential standard of review.” Chavarria v. 
Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006). While we review legal determinations de 
novo, Blanco, 967 F.3d at 310, “factual findings are subject to substantial-evidence 
review and may not be set aside ‘unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled 
to conclude to the contrary,’” Galeas Figueroa v. Att’y Gen., 998 F.3d 77, 91 (3d Cir. 
2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). 
 3 
 To obtain asylum, an applicant bears the burden of establishing that s/he is a 
“refugee,” which is defined, in pertinent part, as any person “who is unable or unwilling 
to return to” his/her country of nationality “because of persecution or a well-founded fear 
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.”4 Petitioners are citizens of Guatemala who seek asylum 
based on membership in a particular social group. “To be legally cognizable, a proposed 
social group must be (1) composed of members who share a common, immutable 
characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in 
question.”5 We agree with the BIA that Petitioners’ proposed social groups are not legally 
cognizable. 
 Petitioners’ first proposed social group, “Guatemalans who were threatened by 
gang members and refused to give protection money,”6 is impermissibly defined by the 
alleged persecution. “[U]nder the statute a ‘particular social group’ must exist 
independently of the persecution suffered by the applicant for asylum.”7 For past 
persecution, “the persecution must have been ‘on account of’ a protected ground. INA § 
101(a)(42)(A). Therefore, the ‘particular social group’ must have existed before the 
persecution began.”8 The proffered social group is not legally cognizable because it did 
not exist before the persecution began. 
 
4 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
5 Radiowala v. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 577, 583 (3d Cir. 2019). 
6 Opening Br. 16. 
7 Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003). 
8 Id. 
 4 
 Petitioners’ other proposed social group, “Guatemalans who are economically 
stable,”9 is not defined with particularity. To meet the particularity requirement, a 
proposed group must “have ‘discrete and ... definable boundaries’ that are not 
‘amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.’”10 It cannot “be ‘too vague and all 
encompassing’ to set discernible parameters.”11 Economic stability is too vague and 
subjective of a characteristic to define a group with particularity. The proffered social 
group is not legally cognizable because it does not have definable boundaries. Therefore, 
the BIA properly affirmed the IJ’s denial of Petitioners’ asylum claim.12 
II. 
For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
9 Opening Br. 20. 
10 S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 552 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 
26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239 (BIA 2014)). 
11 Id. (quoting Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 2005)); see also Ucelo-
Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[C]lass status does not establish a 
social group with sufficient particularity.”); In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 
76 (BIA 2007) (rejecting “wealthy Guatemalans” as a particular social group because 
“[t]he characteristic of wealth or affluence is simply too subjective, inchoate, and variable 
to provide the sole basis for membership in a particular social group”). 
12 Even if Petitioners had exhausted their withholding of removal claim, the outcome 
would still be the same because “an [applicant] who fails to qualify for asylum is 
necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal.” Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 
663 F.3d 582, 591 (3d Cir. 2011). 


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James Quisenberry v. Jon Ridge

Isaac Carranza-Cortez v. Attorney General United States of America

Krishna Geda v. Director United States Citizenship and Immigration

USA v. Guibbonz Marcellus

Abdul Jaludi v. Citigroup

USA v. Devon Brinkley

Christine Thompson v. Over the Line VI LLC

Zodiac Pool Systems LLC v. US Department of Energy

David Aquino v. Attorney General United States of America

USA v. Kenneth Graham

40,620

41,076