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2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-21-2025 
USA v. Deshaun Curtis Jones 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Deshaun Curtis Jones" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 154. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/154 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT  
 
_______________________ 
 
No. 24-1558 
_______________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
                     
v. 
 
DESHAUN CURTIS JONES, 
Appellant 
                 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
District Court No. 2:21-cr-00017-001 
District Judge:  The Honorable William S. Stickman, IV 
__________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
 January 24, 2025  
 
Before: HARDIMAN, AMBRO, and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: February 21, 2025) 
 
__________________________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________________________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge 
I.  
 
 While driving, Deshaun Jones was stopped by police for a suspected window tint 
violation. After a subsequent dog sniff indicated the presence of narcotics, officers 
searched the vehicle and seized drugs and a firearm. Jones moved to suppress the fruits of 
the search, which the District Court denied. He entered a conditional plea of guilty to 
possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 
841(b)(1)(C), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Jones now challenges the District Court’s denial 
of his suppression motion. For the following reasons, we will affirm.  
II. 
At the suppression hearing, Detective Shane Rebel testified that he was sitting in a 
police car on the side of State Route 30 with his high-beams on when he observed a BMW 
with heavily tinted windows pass by. According to Detective Rebel, the tint was such that 
it prevented the detective from seeing the vehicle’s occupants. Detective Rebel followed 
the BMW, which did not immediately pull over, activated his emergency lights, and 
initiated a traffic stop. He testified during the suppression hearing that Jones was the driver, 
and that after he knocked on the vehicle’s passenger window it was lowered. Detective 
Rebel said he was immediately met with the odor of raw marijuana.  
 Detective Rebel asked Jones for his license, registration, and proof of insurance. 
Jones handed him a Pennsylvania identification card, rather than a valid driver’s license. 
The passenger, who identified herself as Keyoka Akins, began to retrieve the vehicle 
 
3 
 
registration from the glove box. While waiting for the requested documents, Detective 
Rebel noticed that Jones was unusually nervous. After Akins closed the glove box, 
Detective Rebel saw packaging paper he recognized as a “brick wrapper” for heroin 
between Akins’s feet on the floor of the vehicle. The item resembled packaging he had 
seen just weeks before while investigating a case involving a fatal overdose. While 
Detective Rebel spoke with Jones at the rear of the vehicle, police dispatch advised the 
detective that Jones’s license was both “expired” and “suspended.” SA87.  
In the meantime, Detective Rebel’s supervisor, Sergeant Justin Wardman, arrived 
on scene with his K-9 partner. Sergeant Wardman had heard Detective Rebel advise 
dispatch that he was not certain the driver intended to pull over. Sergeant Wardman also 
noted that he saw Detective Rebel pursuing Jones’s vehicle, and that he observed that the 
vehicle’s windows were “pretty much blacked out.” SA 48.   
Detective Rebel returned to the passenger-side window and asked Akins if there 
was marijuana in the vehicle. She replied there was not, and Jones agreed. When Jones 
refused to consent to a search of the vehicle, Sergeant Wardman conducted a dog sniff 
around the vehicle. The K-9 alerted, after which Detective Rebel handcuffed Jones and 
Akins. At that point, Akins provided verbal and written consent to search the vehicle. 
Detective Rebel found a partially opened bag, wrapped in a garbage bag, located in the 
back seat. It contained 342 grams of marijuana. He also found what he believed to be 
heroin, cocaine, and a firearm in the vehicle. Jones admitted to Officer Rebel that the 
contraband belonged to him, not Akins.  
 
4 
 
 Facing federal drug and firearms charges, Jones moved to suppress the contraband 
seized from the vehicle. The District Court denied Jones’s motion, concluding that the 
traffic stop was valid and that Detective Rebel had reasonable suspicion to extend the 
traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff. Jones timely appealed. His plea agreement preserved his 
right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.  
III.1 
 We review the District Court’s factual findings underlying its denial of a 
suppression motion for clear error, and we exercise plenary review of the District Court’s 
legal conclusions. United States v. Kramer, 75 F.4th 339, 342 (3d Cir. 2023). “Because the 
District Court denied the suppression motion, we view the facts in the light most favorable 
to the Government.” Id.   
Jones argues that Detective Rebel stopped him illegally and then unreasonably 
extended the stop. He further claims that the District Court erred in crediting Detective 
Rebel’s testimony that he was unable to see through the vehicle’s windows and that he 
smelled raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle. We disagree. 
 The Fourth Amendment protects the public from “unreasonable searches and 
seizures[,]” including traffic stops. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 653 (1979). The Supreme Court has explained that “an officer may, consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231; we have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
5 
 
U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). To meet this “generally 
undemanding” reasonable suspicion standard, an officer must point to specific, articulable 
facts that reasonably support a suspicion “that an individual has violated the traffic laws.” 
United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 397 (2006). “[A]ny technical violation of a 
traffic code legitimizes a stop[.]” United States v. Mosely, 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)). 
  We agree with the District Court that Detective Rebel reasonably suspected a 
violation of 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4524(e)(1). That provision prohibits “any sun screening 
device or other material which does not permit a person to see or view the inside of the 
vehicle[.]” The District Court noted both Detective Rebel’s testimony that he was unable 
to see the vehicle’s occupants when Jones drove by and Sergeant Wardman’s observation 
that the vehicle’s windows were “‘pretty much blacked out[.]’” A30 (quoting Tr. 7 
(SA48)). In addition to this testimony, the District Court stated that the dash cam videos of 
the two law enforcement officers “captured the blacked-out state of the front passenger 
window” and that even in the photographs of the vehicle taken in a “well-lit police garage, 
it was nearly impossible to see through” the vehicle’s windows. A31.    
We conclude that the District Court did not err by crediting Detective Rebel’s 
testimony. And we will not disturb the District Court’s determination that Detective 
Rebel’s initiation of the traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Delfin-
Colina, 464 F.3d at 396; United States v. Harrell, 268 F.3d 141, 148–49 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 We further conclude that Detective Rebel did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop. 
A lawful traffic stop can be unreasonably extended in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
 
6 
 
if an officer prolongs the stop “‘beyond the time reasonably required’” to complete its 
traffic-related mission in order to investigate other crimes. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 
U.S. 348, 350, 355–57 (2015) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). Our 
analysis proceeds in two steps. We must first determine if and when the stop was 
extended—i.e., the “Rodriguez moment[.]” United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). If we conclude the stop was extended, we then 
assess whether the facts available to the officer “at that time were sufficient to establish 
reasonable suspicion[.]” Id. If the officer has reasonable suspicion of other criminal 
wrongdoing before “engag[ing] in any unrelated investigation[,]” “there is no Fourth 
Amendment violation.” United States v. Garner, 961 F.3d 264, 271 (3d Cir. 2020).  
 Here, the earliest plausible “Rodriguez moment” occurred when Detective Rebel 
asked Akins if there was marijuana in the vehicle. Before that inquiry, however, Detective 
Rebel had sufficient reasonable suspicion of separate criminal activity when he smelled 
raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle immediately after the vehicle’s window was 
lowered.2 See United States v. Ramos, 443 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2006). Moreover, as the 
District Court noted, in response to Officer Rebel’s request for driver’s license, registration, 
and proof of insurance, Jones did not produce a valid driver’s license, but only a 
Pennsylvania identification card. The Court also noted Officer Rebel’s belief that Jones 
 
2 We reject Jones’s assertion that the District Court clearly erred in crediting Detective 
Rebel’s testimony that he was able to smell the 342 grams of marijuana in the bag on the 
back seat from the passenger window. The District Court specifically noted Detective 
Rebel’s testimony that he recognized the odor because he had smelled it thousands of times 
both as a youth and in the course of his duties conducting narcotics investigations. See 
United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
7 
 
was very nervous. And there is the fact that Officer Rebel observed what he knew to be 
packaging paper for heroin in the vehicle, prompting reasonable suspicion of a violation of 
Pennsylvania’s drug paraphernalia statute. See 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(32). These 
observations provided reasonable suspicion not just for Detective Rebel’s marijuana-
related questions, but also for the subsequent dog sniff. See Green, 897 F.3d at 186–87.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   


English

USA v. Deshaun Curtis Jones

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-24-2025 
Jose Sanchez Torres v. Attorney General United States of America 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Jose Sanchez Torres v. Attorney General United States of America" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 159. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/159 
This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-2216 
____________ 
 
JOSE DITER SANCHEZ TORRES, 
                                       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an 
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A079-038-526) 
Immigration Judge:  Richard Bailey 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 21, 2025 
____________ 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, Chief Judge, BIBAS and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: February 24, 2025) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
CHAGARES, Chief Judge.  
Jose Diter Sanchez Torres petitions for review of the decision by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his due process claim and upholding the 
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of withholding of removal and protection under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the 
petition for review in part for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and deny it in 
remaining part. 
I.1 
Sanchez Torres is a native and citizen of El Salvador who has been in the United 
States since 2001 and was issued a Notice to Appear in 2023.  Before the IJ, he conceded 
removability and sought asylum, withholding of removal, CAT protection, and 
cancellation of removal.  The IJ denied relief and Torres timely appealed to the BIA.   
Before the BIA, Sanchez Torres argued that the IJ violated his right to due process 
by expressing an intent to deny his asylum and withholding of removal applications 
before the close of testimony.  The BIA concluded that the record did not support 
Torres’s due process claim because the IJ made clear that his findings were not final and 
he permitted counsel to provide additional argument addressing the issues, and because 
Sanchez Torres failed to establish prejudice.  Sanchez Torres also contested the IJ’s 
denial of asylum and withholding of removal.  The BIA upheld both decisions.  The BIA 
determined that Torres’s asylum application was untimely by more than twenty years and 
 
1 We write for the parties and therefore recite only those facts pertinent to our decision. 
3 
 
Sanchez Torres did not establish an exception to the filing deadline.  The BIA upheld the 
denial of withholding of removal because Sanchez Torres did not challenge several of the 
IJ’s dispositive conclusions, including that he did not show past harm rising to the level 
of persecution, a nexus between any harm he experienced and his membership in a 
particular social group (“PSG”), or a clear probability of future persecution.  Finally, the 
BIA observed that Sanchez Torres waived any challenge to the IJ’s denial of CAT 
protection by failing to contest the IJ’s denial of that form of relief, and it affirmed the 
denial of cancellation of removal on the grounds that Sanchez Torres did not establish 
that his removal would cause an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his adult 
United States citizen daughter.  This timely petition for review followed. 2 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1).  Sanchez Torres claims that the BIA improperly denied his due process 
claim and erred in upholding the IJ’s denial of withholding of removal and CAT 
protection.  We consider each claim in turn. 
A. 
In the immigration context, due process entitles a petitioner to a full and fair 
hearing and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence.  Romanishyn v. Att’y Gen., 
455 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 2006).  To prevail, the petitioner must demonstrate that he 
 
2 Sanchez Torres has not presented any arguments in his petition for review concerning 
the denial of asylum or cancellation of removal.  Because those aspects of the BIA’s 
decision are not before us, we will not discuss them in this opinion. 
4 
 
suffered substantial prejudice as a result of the due process violation.  Bonhometre v. 
Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 448 (3d Cir. 2005).  We review the BIA’s denial of a due 
process claim de novo.  Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 153–54 (3d Cir. 2007). 
Sanchez Torres claims that he was denied due process because the IJ commented 
on the merits before the proceeding concluded.3  Specifically, after Sanchez Torres 
completed his witness presentations in support of his applications for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and CAT protection, but before he began presenting his 
cancellation of removal claim, the IJ informed counsel for both sides of “where the 
court’s at in terms of the various elements.”  App. 189.  The IJ then explained why he 
was “likely” to deny asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection based on the 
evidence that Sanchez Torres had presented.  Id.   
Sanchez Torres received due process before the IJ.  Contrary to his argument, the 
IJ’s comments reflecting a tentative ruling on his asylum and withholding of removal 
 
3 Sanchez Torres also claims that:  (1) the proceeding before the IJ was “disjointed” due 
to initial confusion about the proper Immigration Court in which to hold the hearings; (2) 
Sanchez Torres was detained in Pennsylvania although he had previously been living in 
Maryland; and (3) the detention facility in which he was housed “is known to be a place 
where detainees are at risk of harm.”  Sanchez Torres Br. 11–12.  Although he could have 
done so, Sanchez Torres did not present these claims to the BIA; he thus failed to 
administratively exhaust them.  See Bonhometre, 414 F.3d at 448 (concluding that a 
failure to present a due process claims that could have been argued before the BIA 
prohibits our review).  Even if we could excuse his failure to present these claims to the 
BIA in the first instance, we are unpersuaded that the circumstances of which Sanchez 
Torres complains impinged on his right to due process.  Sanchez Torres offers no 
persuasive argument as to why venue concerns or conditions at the detention facility 
interfered with his ability to present his case or obtain a full and fair hearing.  Notably, 
Sanchez Torres was represented by counsel throughout the proceeding, and it was 
Sanchez Torres’s counsel who chose venue in New Jersey.   
5 
 
claims do not reasonably demonstrate bias or prejudgment, particularly given that 
Sanchez Torres had completed his presentation of evidence on those claims.  
Additionally, Sanchez Torres did not suffer substantial prejudice as a result of the 
comments because he cannot demonstrate that he was eligible for any form of relief.  See 
Bonhometre, 414 F.3d at 448 (observing that a due process claim cannot succeed if the 
petitioner cannot demonstrate eligibility for relief).  The BIA therefore properly denied 
his due process claim. 
B.  
Sanchez Torres next claims that the BIA erred in upholding the IJ’s denial of 
withholding of removal and CAT protection.  He argues that “[t]o demand that a person 
requesting refugee status in the United States or protection under Article 3 of the 
Convention Against Torture provide evidence that he has personally been targeted by the 
criminal gangs and/or the government of El Salvador violates the immigration laws of the 
United States, as well as international law.”  Torres Br. 18. 
We have doubts about the merit of Sanchez Torres’s view that he was not required 
to show that he was personally targeted for torture or persecution.  See Hernandez 
Garmendia v. Att’y Gen., 28 F.4th 476, 484 (3d Cir. 2022) (“The specter of torture must 
be supported by specific evidence that the individual applicant is more likely than not to 
be singled out.”); Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 346 (3d Cir. 2008) (“‘[A] 
petitioner must show he or she would be individually singled out for persecution or 
demonstrate that there is a pattern or practice in his or her country of nationality . . . of 
persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of’ a 
6 
 
protected ground.” (quoting Sukwantputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 637 (3d Cir. 
2006)).  We cannot resolve our doubts, however, because Sanchez Torres did not 
administratively exhaust these claims before the BIA.4  We therefore do not reach their 
merits.  See Bonhometre, 414 F.3d at 447 (“As a general rule, an alien must exhaust all 
administrative remedies available to him as of right before the BIA as a prerequisite to 
raising a claim before us.” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)) (emphasis omitted).   
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the petition for review in part for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and we will deny it in remaining part. 
 
4 Sanchez Torres did not appeal the IJ’s denial of the CAT claim to the BIA.  Although 
Sanchez Torres did appeal the IJ’s denial of withholding of removal, he did not claim to 
the BIA that the IJ erred by requiring him to establish that he would be personally 
targeted for persecution.  To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, his arguments 
concerning both of these claims should have been presented to the BIA in the first 
instance. 


Jose Sanchez Torres v. Attorney General United States of America

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-24-2025 
Magno Guerrero-Guerrero v. Attorney General United States of 
America 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Magno Guerrero-Guerrero v. Attorney General United States of America" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 160. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/160 
This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-2012 
____________ 
 
MAGNO JOSELITO GUERRERO-GUERRERO; SONIA ESPERANZA TAPIA-
CUESTA; JOFFRE ALEXANDER GUERRERO-TAPIA, 
         Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a 
Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
A220-604-710, A220-971-478, A220-971-479 
Immigration Judge: Steve Mannion 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 21, 2025 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, Chief Judge, BIBAS, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  February 24, 2025) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
2 
Petitioner Magno Guerrero-Guerrero, his wife, and their son left Ecuador and 
applied for asylum and withholding of removal in the United States. The Immigration 
Judge denied relief and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied their appeal and 
subsequent motion for reconsideration.1 Guerrero-Guerrero appeals the denial of the 
reconsideration motion. He argues that the BIA abused its discretion by requiring rigid 
adherence to the procedural requirements for an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 
and by refusing to reconsider its determination that the Ecuadorian government was not 
unwilling or unable to protect him. We will deny the petition because the ineffective-
assistance claim fails on the merits and the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied reconsideration of the Ecuadorian government’s willingness or ability to protect 
Guerrero-Guerrero and his family.  
We review an order by the BIA denying a motion to reconsider for an abuse of 
discretion2 and the underlying ineffective-assistance claim de novo.3 The BIA abuses its 
discretion “when it acts in a manner that is ‘arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to the law.’”4 
“[D]enying a motion for reconsideration predicated on either new evidence or legal 
 
1 An order by the BIA denying a motion to reconsider constitutes a final order. 
Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir. 2012). We have jurisdiction under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252 (judicial review of orders of removal). The petitions have been 
consolidated. We refer to the family collectively as “Guerrero-Guerrero.” 
2 Alexander-Mendoza v. Att’y Gen., 55 F.4th 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2022). 
3 We review an ineffective-assistance claim de novo because it is a procedural due 
process claim. See Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 153–54 (3d Cir. 2007). 
4 Castro, 671 F.3d at 365 (quoting Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 
2004)). 
 
 
3 
arguments that could have been raised earlier” is not an abuse of discretion.5 Neither is 
“declining to revise . . . prior factual findings” where the record does not compel a 
contrary conclusion.6 
Guerrero-Guerrero’s first argument relates to his ineffective-assistance claim. A 
petitioner advancing such a claim must comply with the requirements laid out in In re 
Lozada:7 (1) “provide an affidavit attesting to the relevant facts” of the agreement with 
former counsel; (2) “inform former counsel of the allegations and allow” counsel an 
opportunity to respond; and (3) where “prior counsel’s handling of the case involved a 
violation of ethical or legal responsibilities,” either file a bar complaint or explain the 
failure to do so.8 However, failure to file a bar complaint or provide an explanation “does 
not necessarily sink” a claim as long as the policy concerns on which the third prong is 
based—such as policing the conduct of the immigration bar, preventing collusion 
between counsel and their clients, and highlighting expected standards of conduct—have 
been served.9 Guerrero-Guerrero argues that, although he neither filed a bar complaint 
nor provided a reasonable excuse for failing to do so, the policy goals underlying the 
third requirement were satisfied. The Government disputes this and claims that this 
 
5 Alexander-Mendoza, 55 F.4th at 210. 
6 Id. 
7 In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988). 
8 Rranci v. Att’y Gen., 540 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Lozada, 19 I. & 
N. Dec. at 639). 
9 Id. at 174. 
 
 
4 
argument was “a new legal theory” that was improperly raised in a motion to reconsider 
as it could have previously been raised before the BIA.10  
However, the dispositive issue here is not Guerrero-Guerrero’s compliance with 
the Lozada requirements, but the fact that his ineffective-assistance claim fails on the 
merits. “Under Lozada, to prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, an alien must 
demonstrate not only that counsel’s assistance was ineffective, but also that he was 
prejudiced by counsel’s poor performance.”11 We agree with the BIA that Guerrero-
Guerrero’s ineffective-assistance claim does not establish “a reasonable likelihood that 
the outcome of the case would have been different but for the alleged ineffective 
assistance of former counsel.”12 In both its denial of the motion to reconsider and its 
denial of his initial appeal, the BIA held that Guerrero-Guerrero’s ineffective-assistance 
claim failed on the merits because he “[did] not dispute that the police responded” to the 
burglary and “that he did not seek assistance from the authorities when he was threatened 
or when his wife was . . . assaulted and robbed.”13 Although Guerrero-Guerrero argues 
that the BIA ignores facts “essential . . . to demonstrate his case was otherwise winnable 
but for the actions of prior counsel,” he merely reiterates the same facts that the BIA 
considered twice before.14 Because Guerrero-Guerrero failed to establish that his 
 
10 Gov’t Br. 19.   
11 Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 107 (3d Cir. 2005). 
12 JA 211.  
13 JA 211; see also JA 226. 
14 Petitioner’s Br. 13.  
 
 
5 
previous counsel erred as to the “dispositive issue of government’s ability or willingness 
to protect,” there is not a reasonable likelihood that his case would have had a different 
result.15  
Guerrero-Guerrero also argues the BIA abused its discretion by refusing to 
reconsider the finding that the Ecuadorian government was neither unwilling nor unable 
to assist him. To qualify for asylum, a petitioner must demonstrate that the government 
either “condoned the [persecution] or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to 
protect” the victims.16 Guerrero-Guerrero argues that this is a disjunctive test, requiring 
that he prove either an inability or an unwillingness. Guerrero-Guerrero also claims that 
in making this determination the BIA disregarded four distinct interactions he had with 
the police and proper consideration would have yielded a different result.  
We are not convinced. First, Guerrero-Guerrero’s argument that he need only 
prove unwillingness or inability is inappropriate for a motion to reconsider, as this legal 
argument was previously available to him.17 Second, the BIA did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the motion to reconsider because the facts in the record do not compel a 
contrary conclusion.18 Guerrero-Guerrero tries to “fill the evidentiary gap” by arguing 
 
15 JA 211. 
16 Galeas Figueroa v. Att’y Gen., 998 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2021) (citation 
omitted). 
17 Alexander-Mendoza, 55 F.4th at 210. 
18 See id.  
 
 
6 
that he had further interactions with the police that did not result in any assistance.19 
However, Guerrero-Guerrero “admit[s]” that his statements are “somewhat confusing” 
concerning the timeframes of his assaults, interactions with the police, and the police’s 
failure to assist.20 What is clear is that the police responded to his call for help after the 
burglary—though they were unable to locate and arrest a perpetrator—and that Guerrero-
Guerrero did not make another report against his wife’s attacker. After responding to 
Guerrero-Guerrero’s report of the burglary, the police also engaged with his 
neighborhood safety association efforts. The record does not suggest that the Ecuadorian 
government failed to respond or did so inadequately, nor that it will fail to do so in the 
future. As the evidence does not compel a conclusion contrary to the BIA’s decision and 
it is improper to reargue previous arguments or raise previously available ones, the BIA 
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider.  
For the reasons set forth above, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
19 Petitioner’s Br. 12 (quoting Doe v. Att’y Gen., 956 F.3d 135, 146 (3d Cir. 
2020)). 
20 Petitioner’s Br. 14.  


Magno Guerrero-Guerrero v. Attorney General United States of America

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-25-2025 
Shanicqua Bryant v. Pottstown School District 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Shanicqua Bryant v. Pottstown School District" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 162. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/162 
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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2376 
__________ 
 
SHANICQUA BRYANT, 
                                            Appellant    
 
v. 
 
POTTSTOWN SCHOOL DISTRICT 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-00699) 
District Judge:  Honorable Wendy Beetlestone 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 18, 2025 
 
Before:  RESTREPO, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 25, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 Appellant Shanicqua Bryant appeals the District Court’s dismissal of her 
complaint and the denial of her motion for reconsideration.  We will affirm the judgments 
as modified.   
This case arises from a dispute between Bryant and Appellee Pottstown School 
District (“Pottstown”) regarding her son’s education.  In 2023, Bryant filed a Special 
Education Due Process Complaint under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(“IDEA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act alleging that Pottstown wrongfully 
altered her son’s Individualized Education Plan.  Bryant requested a special education 
due process hearing, but Pottstown maintained that her claim was barred by a settlement 
agreement between Pottstown and Bryant. 
The settlement agreement provided that, in exchange for compensation, Bryant, on 
behalf of herself and her son, waived all past, present, or future educational claims 
through the end of the 2024-2025 school year.  Pottstown also agreed to fund Bryant’s 
son’s attendance at a private school, and Bryant agreed that she would not seek in-person 
education placement in Pottstown.  After Pottstown moved to dismiss the complaint 
pursuant to the settlement agreement, Bryant disputed the validity of the agreement, 
asserting it was made under duress, and that she was challenging the agreement in state 
court. 
The Hearing Officer dismissed the complaint without prejudice, determining that a 
valid settlement agreement existed between the parties, and until such agreement was 
held invalid, the Officer could not adjudicate the case. 
3 
Bryant filed a complaint in the District Court, in which she challenged the Hearing 
Officer’s dismissal of her complaint, and she additionally alleged that Pottstown violated 
the IDEA and “Section 1983 for Discrimination and Deprivation of Rights” by 
prohibiting her son from attending classes at or enrolling in Pottstown.1  She stated that 
she was still challenging the settlement agreement’s validity in the Montgomery County 
Court of Common Pleas.  Bryant sought reversal of the Hearing Officer’s decision, 
injunctive relief ordering her son’s attendance at Pottstown High School, and “monetary 
damages for violation of Section 1983 Discrimination and Deprivation of Rights.”  
Pottstown moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  Bryant requested a time extension to respond to the motion, but 
the Court did not grant it, and it dismissed the complaint with prejudice. 
 Bryant appealed and moved for reconsideration.  The District Court denied the 
reconsideration motion.  It concluded that dismissal of the complaint was proper because 
the IDEA precluded the Section 1983 claim, the settlement agreement barred Bryant’s 
first IDEA claim, and Bryant failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before 
bringing the second IDEA claim.  As for Bryant’s challenge to the settlement 
agreement’s validity, the Court determined that Bryant failed to meet her burden to prove 
the agreement’s invalidity because she made only conclusory allegations that she entered 
into the agreement under duress.   
 
1 We will presume, as the District Court did, that Bryant raised claims solely on her own 
behalf, see Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 529 
(2007), and not on behalf of her son, see Osei-Afriyie by Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of 
Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991). 
4 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s legal conclusions.  Munir v. Pottsville Area Sch. Dist., 723 F.3d 423, 
430 (3d Cir. 2013).  The District Court must afford due weight to the Hearing Officer’s 
factual findings, and we review the District Court’s factual findings for clear error.  Id.  
We review the District Court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration for abuse of 
discretion.  Gibson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 994 F.3d 182, 186 (3d Cir. 2021). 
 Bryant challenges the District Court’s determinations regarding the settlement 
agreement and the exhaustion of administrative remedies.  She also takes issue with the 
District Court’s with-prejudice dismissal and that the District Court did not grant her 
additional time to respond to Pottstown’s motion to dismiss.  We will address each issue 
in turn.  
 First, Bryant argues that the settlement agreement did not bar her complaint 
because the settlement agreement’s waiver excluded intentional tort claims and actions 
arising under criminal law.  But Bryant brought neither type of claim.  She filed an 
administrative grievance asserting that Pottstown altered her son’s Individualized 
Education Plan in violation of the IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act.  See 22 Pa. Code 
§ 14.162; see also J.M. v. Summit City Bd. of Educ., 39 F.4th 126, 138 (3d Cir. 2022).  In 
the settlement agreement, Bryant waived past, present, and future litigation claims about 
her son’s education, and the agreement is presumed valid until proven otherwise.  See 
 
2 We liberally construe Bryant’s status report filed in this Court as a timely filed amended 
notice of appeal, and thus we have jurisdiction to review the denial of the reconsideration 
motion.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 3.4; see also Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). 
5 
Lewis v. Lewis, 234 A.3d 706, 714 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020); see also Am. Eagle Outfitters 
v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581-86 (3d Cir. 2009) (applying state contract law to 
determine an agreement’s validity).   
 Second, Bryant challenges the District Court’s determination that she needed to 
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing the second IDEA claim in the District 
Court.  A party aggrieved by a hearing officer’s decision may bring a civil action in the 
District Court.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).  But the civil action must relate only to “the 
complaint presented” before the hearing officer.  Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).  “In the normal 
case, exhausting the IDEA's administrative process is required in order for the statute to 
grant subject matter jurisdiction to the district court.”  Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. 
Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).  Here, although Bryant filed an 
administrative grievance to challenge the implementation of her son’s Individualized 
Education Plan, she did not do the same to challenge Pottstown’s denial of her son’s 
placement at Pottstown High School.  She brought this claim before the District Court in 
the first instance.  Thus, her claim concerning her son’s placement at Pottstown High 
School did not relate to “the complaint presented” before the Hearing Officer.  
 Bryant correctly points out that a plaintiff must administratively exhaust her 
non-IDEA claims only if the suit seeks relief for the denial of a free appropriate public 
education.  Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 168 (2017).  She is also correct 
that the administrative exhaustion requirement applies only to suits brought under other 
federal laws that seek relief also available under the IDEA.  Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. 
Schs., 598 U.S. 142, 146-48 (2023).  But Bryant asserted a claim against Pottstown under 
6 
the IDEA itself—she alleged that Pottstown violated the IDEA by not allowing her child 
to attend classes in the District, and she requested that the Court order her son’s 
placement at Pottstown High School.  See Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 273 (“It is plain that 
[the claim] falls within the ambit of § 1415(i) and requires exhaustion: Appellants claim 
that the IDEA has been violated, they allege educational harms, and the IDEA’s statutory 
scheme is able to provide an appropriate remedy.”).3  
 Bryant also appears to raise another recognized exception to the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies requirement, which allows parents to “bypass the administrative 
process where exhaustion would be futile or inadequate.”  Komninos by Komninos v. 
Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Honig v. 
Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988)).  She points out that the Hearing Officer had already 
declined to consider her other IDEA claim due to the settlement agreement, so it would 
have been futile to bring another claim administratively.  But even if the District Court 
had excused Bryant’s failure to bring the claim before the Hearing Officer, the settlement 
agreement still would have barred Bryant from bringing the IDEA claim before the 
District Court.  And as the District Court properly determined, Bryant did not meet her 
burden to allege sufficiently that the settlement agreement was void, nor has Bryant 
 
3 We need not address whether Bryant needed to exhaust her Section 1983 discrimination 
claim for damages because the District Court determined that Section 1983 is not 
available to remedy IDEA violations, and Bryant does not challenge this conclusion on 
appeal.  See A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791, 803 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Congress 
did not intend § 1983 to be available to remedy violations of the IDEA.”); see also United 
States v. Albertson, 645 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2011) (“It is standard practice that an 
appellant must state all issues raised on appeal in the opening brief.”).  
 
7 
provided a judgment from the pending state court case declaring that the agreement is 
void.4  See Lewis, 234 A.3d at 714.    
 Accordingly, the District Court did not err by dismissing Bryant’s complaint.  Nor 
did it abuse its discretion by declining to grant Bryant’s time-extension motion and by 
denying Bryant’s motion for reconsideration.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1); U.S. Bank Tr. 
Nat’l Ass’n as Tr. of Tiki Series IV Tr. v. Walden, 124 F.4th 314, 320 (5th Cir. 2024); 
see also Gibson, 994 F.3d at 190.  But here, the District Court’s dismissal order specifies 
that the dismissal of the complaint is with prejudice.  We modify the District Court’s 
order to dismiss Bryant’s IDEA claims without prejudice in case her challenge to the 
validity of the settlement agreement proves successful.  We will affirm the order as 
modified. 
 
4 Even if we assume that the Hearing Officer had authority to void the agreement, Bryant 
raised only bare legal conclusions that the agreement is void and was entered under 
duress.  Nor did Bryant explain why the agreement is void in her civil action before the 
District Court; she merely mentioned that she was disputing the agreement in the 
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas.  At most, Bryant stated in a preliminary 
injunction motion that she signed the agreement under duress while experiencing a 
mental breakdown.   


Shanicqua Bryant v. Pottstown School District

Richard Laird v. Secretary PA Dept Corrections

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-26-2025 
Kenneth Taggart v. PHH Mortgage Corp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Kenneth Taggart v. PHH Mortgage Corp" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 169. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/169 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
Nos. 23-2826 & 23-2986 
____________ 
 
In re: KENNETH J. TAGGART, Debtor 
 
 
KENNETH J. TAGGART,  
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PHH MORTGAGE CORP; 
TIAA BANK, a/k/a TIAA Bank Home Lending f/k/a or a/k/a 
Everbank 
 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civil Nos. 2:22-cv-00302 & 2:22-cv-00309) 
District Judge: Honorable John M. Younge 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on January 14, 2025 
 
Before: PHIPPS, FREEMAN, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 26, 2025) 
 
 
2 
_______________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________
 
FREEMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
While Kenneth J. Taggart’s Chapter 11 proceedings were ongoing, the Bankruptcy 
Court heard Taggart’s adversary proceeding against PHH Mortgage Corporation 
(“PHH”) and TIAA Bank (“TIAA”) (together, “the Companies”).  The Bankruptcy Court 
declined to remand the adversary proceeding to the state court, and it dismissed Taggart’s 
complaint for failure to state a claim.  The District Court affirmed both orders. 
In Appeal No. 23-2826, Taggart seeks review of the Bankruptcy Court’s order 
denying his motion to remand.  We will dismiss that appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
In Appeal No. 23-2986, Taggart seeks review of the Bankruptcy Court’s order 
dismissing his complaint in the adversarial proceeding.  We will affirm that order insofar 
as it dismisses Taggart’s claims against PHH.  However, Taggart’s claims against TIAA 
are non-core proceedings, so the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss them.  
Only the District Court had jurisdiction to enter a final order on the claims against TIAA.  
Thus, we will remand those claims to the District Court so it can treat the Bankruptcy 
Court’s decision as to TIAA as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
3 
I 
In 2021, Taggart filed a complaint in Pennsylvania state court challenging the 
Companies’ mortgage lien on his property.  Two months later, he filed a Chapter 11 
petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  
He listed the Companies as secured creditors because of the lien but noted his dispute of 
each company’s claim on his property.  PHH filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy 
action, but TIAA did not. 
The Companies removed Taggart’s state court action to the Bankruptcy Court.  
They asserted that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction on two bases: because Taggart’s 
claims against the Companies were core proceedings arising in Taggart’s bankruptcy 
case, and because of diversity of citizenship.  The matter was docketed as an adversary 
proceeding connected to the bankruptcy action. 
Taggart moved to remand the adversary proceeding to state court, arguing that the 
removal was untimely.  While his remand motion was pending, he also filed an amended 
complaint.  The Bankruptcy Court denied Taggart’s motion to remand and entered an 
order purporting to dismiss his amended complaint against both Companies for failure to 
state a claim. 
Taggart timely appealed to the District Court, which affirmed the Bankruptcy 
Court’s order denying the motion to remand.  The District Court also entered an order 
purporting to affirm the Bankruptcy Court’s order dismissing the amended complaint.  
After the District Court declined to reconsider those orders, Taggart timely appealed to 
us, and we consolidated the appeals for disposition.  
 
4 
II 
We lack jurisdiction to consider Taggart’s appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s 
decision not to remand his adversary proceeding to state court (Appeal No. 23-2826).1  
“[T]he bankruptcy removal statute . . . bars a court of appeals’ review of decisions to 
remand or not to remand made on the basis of ‘any equitable ground.’”  In re Seven 
Fields Dev. Corp., 505 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b)).  
Here, the Bankruptcy Court considered Taggart’s argument that the removal was 
untimely, rejected that argument, and declined to remand.  That was a decision made on 
the basis of an equitable ground.  Id. at 246.  Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review 
it. 
III 
In Appeal No. 23-2986, the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) to hear an appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal and remand 
orders.2  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to hear 
an appeal of the District Court’s order entered under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). 
In reviewing bankruptcy court decisions on appeal, we “stand in the shoes” of the 
district court and apply the same standard of review.  In re Glob. Indus. Techs., Inc., 645 
F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting In re Krystal Cadillac Oldsmobile GMC 
 
1 We always have jurisdiction to consider our own jurisdiction.  See United States v. Ruiz, 
536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002).   
2 As we will discuss below, the Bankruptcy Court did not enter a final order on Taggart’s 
claims against PHH because it lacked jurisdiction to do so. 
 
5 
Truck, Inc., 142 F.3d 631, 635 (3d Cir. 1998)).  We give plenary review to a bankruptcy 
court’s legal determinations.  In re Imerys Talc Am., Inc., 38 F.4th 361, 370 (3d Cir. 
2022).  Legal determinations include rulings on motions to dismiss, In re Hertz Corp., 
120 F.4th 1181, 1191 (3d Cir. 2024), whether proceedings are core or non-core, Seven 
Fields, 505 F.3d at 253, and whether to exercise mandatory abstention under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1334(c)(2), In re Exide Techs., 544 F.3d 196, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). 
A 
Taggart argues that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction to enter a final 
judgment in the adversary proceeding against the Companies because the claims were 
non-core.  He is partially correct.  The claims against PHH were core proceedings, but the 
claims against TIAA were not. 
Absent the consent of the parties, a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to enter final 
judgments only in core proceedings.  Halper v. Halper, 164 F.3d 830, 836 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1)).   In non-core proceedings, a bankruptcy court’s 
“adjudicatory power is limited to hearing the dispute and submitting ‘proposed findings 
of fact[] and conclusions of law to the district court.’”  Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(c)(1)). 
 To determine whether a claim is a core proceeding, a court first looks to the 
“illustrative list of proceedings” found in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).  In re Winstar 
Commc’ns, Inc., 554 F.3d 382, 405 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Halper, 164 F.3d at 836).  If 
the claim at issue fits within one of the items on that list, the claim is core if it (1) 
 
6 
“invokes a substantive right provided by title 11,” or (2) “is a proceeding, that by its 
nature, could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case.”  Id. (quoting Halper, 164 
F.3d at 836). 
In his complaint against the Companies, Taggart brings state-law claims for breach 
of contract, quiet title, and violations of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”).  All of these claims challenge the validity of the 
lien on property that is part of the bankruptcy estate.  Therefore, the claims against both 
Companies fit within at least one of the items on § 157(b)(2)’s illustrative list: 
“determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens.”  28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(K). 
Turning to the next step of our inquiry, our precedent establishes that Taggart’s 
claims against PHH are core proceedings.  As noted above, PHH filed a proof of claim in 
Taggart’s bankruptcy action.  And “it is axiomatic that filing a proof of claim triggers the 
claims allowance process under 11 U.S.C. § 501 et seq., which, by its very nature, is a 
‘core’ proceeding that can arise only in a title 11 case.”  Exide Techs, 544 F.3d at 214 
(citations omitted); see Winstar, 554 F.3d at 405 (core proceeding is one that “could arise 
only in the context of a bankruptcy case.”). 
By contrast, TIAA did not file a proof of claim.  Because Taggart disputed TIAA’s 
claim against his property, TIAA was obligated to file a proof of claim to be considered a 
creditor in the bankruptcy action.  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3003(c)(2).  Absent that proof of 
claim, Taggart’s claims against TIAA do not implicate the claims-allowance process.  See 
11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) (courts shall only consider payment to creditor of a disputed claim 
when creditor timely files proof of claim).  Nor is there anything else about the nature of 
 
7 
the claims against TIAA that puts the claims exclusively within the province of a 
bankruptcy case.  Winstar, 554 F.3d at 405.  The claims also do not invoke a substantive 
right provided by title 11, insofar as they arise under state law and not under the 
Bankruptcy Code.  Therefore, Taggart’s claims against TIAA are non-core.  See Halper, 
164 F.3d at 836. 
 Because Taggart’s claims against TIAA are non-core, the Bankruptcy Court 
lacked jurisdiction to dismiss them.  Thus, we will vacate the District Court’s order 
insofar as it purports to affirm the dismissal of the claims against TIAA, and we will 
remand those claims to the District Court.  Upon remand, the District Court shall treat the 
Bankruptcy Court’s discussion of TIAA’s motion to dismiss as proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law subject to the District Court’s de novo review.3,4  
 
3 Although we use the statutory phrase “proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law,” 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1), the Bankruptcy Court addressed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, so 
it had no occasion to propose any findings of fact. 
4 Taggart argues that the Bankruptcy Court needed to abstain from ruling on the claims 
against the Companies.  He is incorrect.  The mandatory abstention provision of 28 
U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) applies only to non-core proceedings.  Exide Techs, 544 F.3d at 206.  
As discussed above, only the claims against TIAA are non-core.  And mandatory 
abstention is warranted only if, inter alia, federal courts would not have jurisdiction over 
a non-core proceeding absent its relation to a bankruptcy case.  Id. at 218 n.14.  Here, 
Taggart and TIAA are citizens of different states, and the amount in controversy exceeds 
$75,000.00.  Therefore, diversity of citizenship provides an independent basis for federal 
jurisdiction, so there are no grounds for mandatory abstention. 
 Additionally, we lack jurisdiction to review the Bankruptcy Court’s decision on 
permissive abstention.  28 U.S.C. § 1334(d). 
 
8 
B 
The Bankruptcy Court properly dismissed Taggart’s claims against PHH.  To 
survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint 
must allege facts sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also In re Energy Future Holdings 
Corp., 990 F.3d 728, 736 n.1 (3d Cir. 2021) (noting that Bankruptcy Rule 7012, which 
governs adversary proceedings, incorporates Rule 12(b)(6)).  A claim is facially plausible 
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).  “Threadbare recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”  
Id. 
Taggart’s allegations fall well short of this standard.  To state a breach-of-contract 
claim under Pennsylvania law, he needed to allege facts plausibly supporting three 
elements: “(1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms; (2) a breach of the 
contract; and (3) resultant damages.”  Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 
2020) (quoting Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. v. L. Firm of Malone 
Middleman, P.C., 137 A.3d 1247, 1258 (Pa. 2016)) (cleaned up).  But he alleged that no 
valid contract exists between him and PHH.  This is fatal to his breach-of-contract claim.  
To the extent that he alleged in the alternative that he does have a contract with PHH, he 
did not identify the essential terms of the contract or how PHH breached those terms. 
 
9 
Similarly, Taggart’s allegations do not plausibly support a UTPCPL claim against 
PHH.  A plaintiff seeking relief under the UTPCPL must plead (among other elements) 
that he suffered an “ascertainable loss of money or property” as a result of the 
defendant’s unlawful conduct.  Gregg v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 245 A.3d 637, 646 (Pa. 
2021) (quoting 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-9.2(a)).  But Taggart alleged no loss of money or 
property other than litigation costs and attorney fees.  As we previously informed him, 
those do not constitute an “ascertainable loss” under Pennsylvania law.  See Taggart v. 
New Century Fin. Servs. Inc., No. 22-3429, 2024 WL 1672256, at *2 (3d Cir. Apr. 18, 
2024); Grimes v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Phila., LLC, 105 A.3d 1188, 1193–94 (Pa. 2014). 
Finally, Taggart’s claims for quiet title and for declaratory relief against PHH fail 
because he did not allege that he holds title to the property that is superior to PHH’s 
disputed interest in the property that he scheduled in his bankruptcy petition.5  See 
Woodhouse Hunting Club, Inc. v. Hoyt, 183 A.3d 453, 458 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018). 
*  * * 
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss Appeal No. 23-2826 for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction.  In Appeal No. 23-2986, we will affirm the Bankruptcy Court’s 
dismissal of the Amended Complaint with respect to PHH, and we will vacate the District 
Court’s order with respect to the claims against TIAA and remand those claims to the 
District Court so it can enter a final order. 
 
5 Taggart also argues that he was denied due process because the Bankruptcy Court did 
not hold an evidentiary hearing on his Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  That argument is baseless.  
See In re Tribune Media Co., 902 F.3d 384, 397 (3d Cir. 2018). 


Kenneth Taggart v. PHH Mortgage Corp

David Palmer v. Britton Industries Inc.

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-2-2025 
Maria Disen v. Bayview Loan Servicing LLC 
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"Maria Disen v. Bayview Loan Servicing LLC" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 2. 
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1 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-1885 
__________ 
 
MARIA J. DISEN, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:21-cv-00521) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 2, 2025 
 
Before:  RESTREPO, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 2, 2025) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
PER CURIAM 
 Maria Disen (“Appellant”)1 appeals pro se from the District Court’s decision 
dismissing her complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm that judgment. 
I. 
 In 2019, Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (“Bayview”),2 filed a mortgage-
foreclosure action against Appellant in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas, 
relating to real property located in Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania.  That court ultimately 
granted summary judgment in Bayview’s favor, and Appellant’s efforts to attack that 
judgment on appeal were unsuccessful.   
Thereafter, in 2021, Appellant filed a pro se complaint against Bayview in the 
District Court.  The complaint, which was not a model of clarity, appeared to take issue 
with the state-courts’ rulings, raise issues that were (or could have been) presented in the 
state-court proceedings, and accuse Bayview of violating the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and Appellant’s due-process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
 Bayview moved to dismiss Appellant’s complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6).  Appellant opposed that motion, and she also filed a one-page “New Matter.”  
Thereafter, a United States Magistrate Judge issued a report recommending that the 
 
1 Disen refers to herself using several different surnames.  To avoid any confusion, we 
refer to her as “Appellant.” 
 
2 Bayview is now known as Community Loan Servicing, LLC. 
 
3 
District Court grant Bayview’s motion.  In support of that recommendation, the 
Magistrate Judge stated, inter alia, that Appellant’s claims were barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine and res judicata, that her FDCPA claim was time-barred, and that her 
Fourteenth Amendment claim failed because Bayview is not a state actor.   
 Appellant objected to the Magistrate Judge’s report.  In April 2024, the District 
Court overruled those objections, adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report, granted 
Bayview’s motion, and directed the District Court Clerk to close the case.  This timely 
appeal followed.3   
II. 
 We see no reason to vacate the District Court’s decision.  To the extent that 
Appellant’s complaint can be construed as (a) alleging injuries caused by the state-court 
rulings in the mortgage-foreclosure action, and (b) seeking the District Court’s review 
and rejection of those rulings, we agree with the District Court that this part of her 
complaint is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See Vuyanich v. Smithton 
Borough, 5 F.4th 379, 385 (3d Cir. 2021).  To the extent that the complaint sought to 
raise claims that were, or could have been, raised in the state-court proceedings, we agree 
with the District Court that those claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  See 
Duhaney v. Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010).  And for the reasons set forth 
 
3 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s decision.  See In re Schering Plough Corp. 
Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012).    
 
4 
in the Magistrate Judge’s report, which the District Court adopted, we agree with the 
District Court’s dismissal of Appellant’s FDCPA and Fourteenth Amendment claims. 
 We have considered the various arguments raised in Appellant’s brief and 
conclude that none warrants relief here.4  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 
 
4 The District Court’s decision did not address the merits of Appellant’s “New Matter.”  
But even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that this was error, there would 
be no need for us to disturb that decision, for we see nothing in Appellant’s New Matter 
that would have survived dismissal.  See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (“On the hearing of 
any appeal . . ., the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without 
regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”).  To 
the extent that Appellant alleges that the District Court proceedings were biased, we see 
no evidence of any bias.  See generally Arrowpoint Cap. Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset 
Mgmt., LLC, 793 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining that “adverse rulings . . . are 
not in themselves proof of prejudice or bias”). 


Maria Disen v. Bayview Loan Servicing LLC

USDC for the District Court of the Virgin Island

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-10-2025 
USA v. Trevor Stephen 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Trevor Stephen" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 26. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/26 
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inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
No. 24-1654 
______________ 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
TREVOR STEPHEN, 
 Appellant 
______________ 
On Appeal from the District Court  
of the Virgin Islands 
(D.C. No. 3:21-cr-00027-002) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert A. Molloy 
______________ 
Argued on December 9, 2024 
 
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge; MONTGOMERY-REEVES and FISHER, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: January 10, 2025) 
 
Matthew A. Campbell [ARGUED] 
Office of the Federal Public Defender 
1336 Beltjen Road  
Suite 202, Tunick Building 
St. Thomas, VI 00802 
Counsel for the Appellant  
 
Delia L. Smith  
Adam Sleeper [ARGUED] 
Office of the United States Attorney 
5500 Veterans Drive  
United States Courthouse, Suite 260  
St. Thomas, VI 00802 
Counsel for the Appellee  
 
2 
______________ 
OPINION∗ 
______________ 
MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge. 
Trevor Stephen appeals his conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841 for possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine.  On appeal, Stephen argues that the District Court erred by 
denying his motions for acquittal and a new trial because the Government did not adduce 
sufficient evidence at trial for a jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  For 
the reasons discussed below, these arguments fail, and we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.  
I. BACKGROUND 
In 2022, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Stephen with 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine.1  During Stephen’s jury trial, the Government called several law 
enforcement witnesses who testified to the following facts.   
Around 10:00pm on the night of November 29, 2021, a tactical flight officer in a 
surveillance plane, using video surveillance equipment,2 witnessed a small boat 
“traveling at a high rate of speed towards St. Thomas” without any lights.  App. 309.  The 
 
∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The superseding indictment included aider and abettor liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2 for 
the possession with intent to distribute cocaine charge.   
2 The surveillance plane did not have audio surveillance capabilities.   
3 
boat entered a bay near the east end of St. Thomas and approached the shore where a 
pickup truck was backed up to the shoreline.  Three people met the boat in the water and 
quickly offloaded seven bags from the boat into the truck.  The flight officer relayed this 
“very suspicious activity” to agents on the ground, “so that they [could] come and make 
contact with the truck and the individuals to further investigate.”  App. 314.  Meanwhile, 
the truck began driving away and the surveillance plane followed overhead, continuing to 
report the truck’s location to agents on the ground.  The truck stopped at a residence, and 
the three people in the truck moved the bags from the bed of the truck to the backseat of 
the cab.  At one point, the driver of the truck went into the residence while the other two 
people continued moving the bags.  All three people got back in the truck and drove to a 
second residence.  The person in the passenger seat then departed, and the person in the 
backseat moved to the front passenger seat.   
Soon thereafter, ground agents pulled up behind the truck and activated their lights 
and sirens to initiate a traffic stop.  The truck fled and drove “erratically at a high rate of 
speed.”  App. 326.  The truck sideswiped another vehicle before turning off the main 
road.  The truck came to a stop, and the two people in the truck threw the bags from the 
truck into the brush.  The truck then slowly drove back towards the main road where the 
ground agents had arrived and were waiting to intercept the truck.  Before the truck 
reached the agents, the flight officer told the agents that something appeared to have been 
thrown out of the left side of the truck.  The agents waited for the truck at the bottom of 
the dead-end road, and when it approached, they identified themselves as law 
enforcement.  The agents removed the two people from the truck and placed them under 
4 
arrest.3  After the arrests, agents noticed an oil trail behind the truck, followed the oil trail 
up the road to a dead end, and discovered the bags where the flight agent had seen the 
bags thrown into the brush.  The agents found roughly 210 kilograms of cocaine, worth 
approximately $2.1 million in the bags.4  
After the Government rested its case, Stephen testified.  His testimony about the 
events of the night of November 29 was largely consistent with the testimony of the 
agents but with two key differences.  First, Stephen testified that Robinson pulled out a 
gun when they were waiting on the beach for the boat and threatened him with it 
repeatedly throughout the events of the evening.  Second, after they threw the bags out of 
the truck and were driving back down the dirt road, Robinson threw the gun “in the bush” 
and then told Stephen “Do not say anything.  Do not say anything before anything 
happens to you or your family.  Don’t say nothing.”  App. 758–59.  Stephen testified that 
he was frightened because Robinson knew where he lived, and Stephen feared for his life 
and his family’s safety.   
After the close of testimony, Stephen renewed the motion for acquittal that was 
originally denied at the close of the Government’s case in chief.  The District Court took 
the motion under advisement.  The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the conspiracy 
charge and guilty on the possession with intent to distribute charge.  Stephen moved for a 
 
3 At trial, the agents identified the driver as Russell Robinson and the passenger as 
Stephen.   
4 A chemist testified at trial about the nature and quantity of the substance in the bags.   
5 
new trial under Rule 33.  At sentencing, the District Court denied Stephen’s renewed 
motion for acquittal and his motion for a new trial.  This appeal followed.   
II. DISCUSSION5 
Stephen makes two arguments on appeal.  First, he argues that the District Court 
erred by denying his motion for acquittal because the Government did not present 
sufficient evidence to prove that Stephen (1) knew there was a controlled substance in the 
bags or (2) intended to distribute the controlled substance in the bags.  Second, he argues 
that the District Court erred by denying his motion for a new trial premised on the same 
grounds and the inconsistent verdicts.  Neither argument prevails.   
A. Motion for Acquittal 
“We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant or denial of a motion for 
acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence, applying the same standard as the 
district court.”  United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1002 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United 
States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005)).  “[A] district court must ‘review the 
record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational 
trier of fact could have found proof of [guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt based on the 
available evidence.’”  Brodie, 403 F.3d at 133 (quoting United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 
473, 476 (3d Cir. 2002)).  “Because the reviewing court must treat all of the incriminating 
evidence as true and credible, ‘[t]he burden on a defendant who raises a challenge to the 
 
5  The District Court had jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
6 
sufficiency of the evidence is extremely high.’”  United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 329 
(3d Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 203–
04 (3d Cir. 2005)).   
“Under this particularly deferential standard, we ‘must be ever vigilant . . . not to 
usurp the role of the jury by weighing credibility and assigning weight to the evidence, or 
by substituting [our] judgment for that of the jury.’  Furthermore, ‘we review the 
evidence as a whole, not in isolation, and ask whether it is strong enough for a rational 
trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Caraballo-
Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (internal citation omitted) 
(alterations in original) (first quoting Brodie, 403 F.3d at 133; and then quoting United 
States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 480 (3d Cir. 2010)).  This Court can overturn a verdict 
“only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighted, from which 
the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 
192, 206 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Riley, 621 F.3d at 329). 
Stephen challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only as to two elements of the 
charged offense: (1) that Stephen knew that the bags contained a controlled substance; 
and (2) that Stephen intended to distribute the controlled substance.  Because there is 
evidence in the record from which a rational juror could find Stephen knew that the bags 
contained a controlled substance and intended to distribute that substance, the District 
Court did not err by denying the motion for acquittal.   
7 
1. Knowledge of Controlled Substance  
Stephen argues that there is insufficient evidence for a jury to find that he knew 
the bags contained a controlled substance.  “The prosecution may satisfy its burden 
entirely through circumstantial evidence.”  United States v. Mercado, 610 F.3d 841, 845 
(3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 2006)).  And 
“[c]ircumstantial inferences drawn from the evidence” are permissible as long as they 
“bear a ‘logical or convincing connection to established fact.’”  Caraballo-Rodriguez, 
726 F.3d at 425 (quoting United States v. Cartwright, 359 F.3d 281, 291 (3d Cir. 2004)).  
The circumstantial evidence supports a reasonable inference that Stephen knew that the 
bags contained a controlled substance.  Robinson and Stephen met a boat with its lights 
completely off, in the dead of night, on a secluded beach and quickly unloaded seven 
bags into their truck and drove away.  When law enforcement later tried to pull over the 
truck, they fled and once out of sight, ditched the bags in the brush.  Based on these facts, 
a rational juror could conclude that Stephen knew the bags contained a controlled 
substance.  Cf. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 431–33 (“With this in mind, we 
specifically disavow the reasoning we previously embraced—that the jury’s verdict could 
not stand when the evidence was as consistent with contraband other than controlled 
substances[.]”). 
2. Intent to Distribute  
Stephen also contends that there is insufficient evidence for a jury to find that he 
intended to distribute the cocaine.  Stephen argues that there is no evidence that he 
intended to distribute the cocaine to anyone other than Robinson, and because Robinson 
8 
already possessed the cocaine, this does not qualify as distribution.  “When a defendant is 
found in possession of a sufficiently large quantity of drugs, an intent to distribute may 
logically be inferred from the quantity of drugs alone.”  United States v. Rodriguez, 961 
F.2d 1089, 1092 (3d Cir. 1992) (first citing United States v. Ocampo, 937 F.2d 485, 488 
(9th Cir. 1991); then citing United States v. Brown, 921 F.2d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 1990); 
and then citing United States v. Montoya, 782 F.2d 1554, 1555 (11th Cir. 1986)).  Here, 
the quantity of drugs, roughly 210 kilograms, worth an estimated $2.1 million dollars, is 
sufficient to support the inference that neither Stephen nor Robinson were possessing the 
cocaine solely for personal use.  Indeed, a rational juror could infer that either Stephen 
intended to personally distribute the cocaine to someone other than Robinson or that he 
intended for Robinson to distribute the cocaine to a third person and was facilitating that 
distribution through his actions assisting with the receipt and transport of the cocaine 
such that he is liable under an aiding and abetting theory.  See Mercado, 610 F.3d at 846–
49.  Because these are inferences that a rational juror could draw based on established 
facts—the sheer volume of cocaine being received and transported by Robinson and 
Stephen—the fact that inferences favoring Stephen’s theory of the case could also be 
drawn from the established facts is not a basis for reversing the jury’s verdict.  See 
Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 432 (“Reversing the jury’s conclusion simply because 
another inference is possible—or even equally plausible—is inconsistent with the proper 
inquiry for review of sufficiency of the evidence challenges[.]”).   
Because there is sufficient evidence in the record for a rational juror to find that 
Stephen knew the bags contained a controlled substance and that he intended to distribute 
9 
the controlled substance, the District Court did not err in denying Stephen’s motion for 
acquittal. 
B. Motion for a New Trial  
“We review the denial of a Rule 33 motion for abuse of discretion.”  United States 
v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Jasin, 280 F.3d 355, 
360 (3d Cir. 2002)).  “The District Court abuses its discretion if its analysis and 
conclusions are ‘arbitrary or irrational,’ or if its ‘decision “rests upon a clearly erroneous 
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.”’”  
United States v. Gonzalez, 905 F.3d 165, 195 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. 
Schneider, 801 F.3d 186, 198 (3d Cir. 2015)).  Unlike a motion for acquittal based on 
insufficiency of the evidence, “when a district court evaluates a Rule 33 motion it does 
not view the evidence favorably to the Government, but instead exercises its own 
judgment in assessing the Government’s case.”  Silveus, 542 F.3d at 1004 (quoting 
United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2002)).  But “[a] district court can 
order a new trial on the ground that the jury’s verdict is contrary to the weight of the 
evidence only if it ‘believes that “there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice 
has occurred—that is, that an innocent person has been convicted.”’”  Brennan, 326 F.3d 
at 189 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Johnson, 302 F.3d at 150).  Therefore, 
“[m]otions for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence are not favored.  Such 
motions are to be granted sparingly and only in exceptional cases.”  Id. (alteration in 
10 
original) (quoting Government of Virgin Islands v. Derricks, 810 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 
1987)).  
Stephen argued in front of the District Court, and argues on appeal, that a new trial 
should have been granted based on insufficient evidence coupled with the inconsistent 
verdicts.  But, as discussed above, there was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to 
find Stephen guilty of possession with intent to distribute.  While considering Stephen’s 
motion for a new trial, the District Court appropriately considered the evidence, including 
Stephen’s testimony, which it did not find credible.  And the Supreme Court has 
explained that the only thing an inconsistent verdict can tell us is “that either in the 
acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not 
show that [the jurors] were not convinced of the defendant’s guilt.”  United States v. 
Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1984) (quoting Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 
(1932)).  The District Court applied the correct legal standard in concluding that there 
was not a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice had occurred.  We cannot conclude 
that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Stephen’s motion for a new trial.   
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 


USA v. Trevor Stephen

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-14-2025 
Christopher Harris v. Lesko 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Christopher Harris v. Lesko" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 39. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/39 
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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2604 
__________ 
 
CHRISTOPHER HARRIS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
OFFICER LESKO, Badge No. 3374, individually and as a police officer for the; 
OFFICER DOHAN, Badge No. 4690, individually and as a police officer for the;  
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-01475) 
District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 9, 2025 
Before: SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 14, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
Pro se Appellant Christopher Harris appeals from the District Court’s orders 
denying his motions to vacate the dismissal of his case and denying reconsideration 
thereof.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s orders. 
I 
Harris commenced his civil action against two police officers and the City of 
Philadelphia in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in 2016.  In 2018, Harris added 
several federal law claims and Appellees removed the case to the District Court.  The 
District Court dismissed Harris’s suit pursuant to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s 
Local Rule of Civil Procedure 41.1(b)1 because a status conference had established, on 
the record, that the parties had settled.  Harris filed several unsuccessful motions with the 
District Court, arguing it had improperly dismissed his case under Rule 41.1(b) because 
he had refused to sign the agreement and therefore the parties had not settled.  Harris then 
appealed to this Court.  We dismissed Harris’s appeal in part because the notice of appeal 
was untimely as to the underlying orders of dismissal.  See Harris v. Lesko, 763 F. App’x 
291, 293-94 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (non-precedential).  However, we affirmed the 
District Court order over which we had jurisdiction, a denial of reopening or 
reconsideration, because Harris had argued the underlying merits of his claim instead of 
“present[ing] any new evidence, facts, or issues that would tend to show that the 
settlement agreement was fraudulent, or that the District Court made some sort of mistake 
in its judgment.”  Id. at 293. 
 
1  Rule 41.1(b) requires dismissal of a case with prejudice when the parties settle the 
matter. 
3 
 
In January 2024, back in the District Court, Harris filed a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(3) motion to vacate the District Court's 2018 judgment on the grounds of 
fraud.  Harris then filed a second motion to vacate for fraud on the court pursuant to Rule 
60(d)(3).  The District Court denied Harris’s motions in February 2024 after treating both 
as Rule 60(b) motions and finding them untimely under Rule 60(c)(1).  Harris then filed 
three successive Rule 60(d)(3) motions asking the District Court to vacate the order of 
dismissal for fraud on the court.  The District Court denied Harris’s motions on April 2, 
2024.  Harris filed a motion for reconsideration on April 17, 2024, which the District 
Court denied on August 13, 2024.  Harris timely appealed.   
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, but we stress the narrow scope of 
this appeal.  Harris’s notice of appeal is timely only as to the District Court’s April 2, 
2024 order denying his Rule 60(d)(3) motions to vacate for fraud on the court and its 
subsequent order denying reconsideration.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(iv) (stating that a 
timely filed Rule 59 motion tolls the time to file an appeal); York Grp., Inc. v. Wuxi 
Taihu Tractor Co., 632 F.3d 399, 401-02 (7th Cir. 2011).  The notice of appeal is not 
timely as to any other prior order issued by the District Court, and we therefore lack 
jurisdiction to review those orders.  See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007).  
We exercise plenary review of any legal questions, and we review the District Court’s 
decision to deny the motions for abuse of discretion.  See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. 
Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999); see generally In re 
4 
 
Bressman, 874 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2017); Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 162 (3d 
Cir. 2011).   
After a review of the record, we conclude the District Court did not err when 
denying Harris’s Rule 60(d)(3) motions for relief and his motion for reconsideration.  A 
district court “may set aside a judgment based upon its finding of fraud on the court when 
an officer of the court has engaged in ‘egregious misconduct,’” such as bribery or 
fabrication of evidence.  In re Bressman, 874 F.3d at 150 (quoting Herring v. United 
States, 424 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2005)).  Such a finding “must be supported by clear, 
unequivocal and convincing evidence” of “(1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of 
the court; (3) which is directed at the court itself; and (4) in fact deceives the court.”  
Herring, 424 F.3d at 386-87 (citation omitted).   
In this case, Harris asked the District Court to vacate the 2018 order of dismissal 
and recuse from hearing the case.  Harris contended that the District Court itself had 
committed fraud and “harmed the integrity of the judicial process” when it dismissed his 
complaint based on Rule 41.1(b) since Harris had thereafter refused to sign the written 
terms of the settlement and had provided “clear evidence” of his refusal to the District 
Court.  Harris further contended that because the District Court had not held an 
evidentiary hearing regarding whether he had signed the settlement agreement, the “fraud 
upon the court was directed at the ‘record’ itself.”  (ECF 38 at 5.)  On appeal Harris raises 
similar arguments.     
The record reflects that the District Court dismissed the case because the parties, 
during a status conference the day prior to the dismissal, had agreed on the record to 
5 
 
settle the matter.  (ECF 7, 8.)  Although Harris later refused to sign the written terms, he 
has not shown  the type of “egregious misconduct” or “intentional fraud” that would 
justify setting aside the judgment at this late stage.  See Herring, 424 F.3d at 390; In re 
Bressman, 874 F.3d at 152-53.  The District Court therefore did not err in denying 
Harris’s motions to vacate for fraud on the court and his subsequent motion for 
reconsideration.2 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.   
 
 
 
2  We further discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision not to recuse.  
See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (providing that adverse legal 
rulings are not proof of prejudice or bias and almost never a basis for recusal); 
Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). 


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