Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

USA v. Jamir  Ceruti

Abrams, Max

Making a Martyr: The Inequity of the Necessity Doctrine’s Application to the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

Martha Stringer v. County of Bucks

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-18-2025 
Kenneth Crandall v. Denis McDonough 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Kenneth Crandall v. Denis McDonough" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 502. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/502 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2899 
__________ 
 
KENNETH R. CRANDALL, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DENIS R. MCDONOUGH, Secretary Department of Veterans Affairs; DEPARTMENT 
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-00626) 
District Judge: Honorable John M. Younge 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 22, 2025 
Before:  HARDIMAN, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed June 18, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Kenneth Crandall appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his amended complaint.  
We will affirm.  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
I. 
 Crandall worked for the Department of Veterans Affairs (the “VA”) between 2010 
and 2013.1  Between 2011 and 2017, Crandall acted as a whistleblower for the federal 
government.  In 2012, the VA terminated Crandall’s employment, which Crandall 
successfully challenged.  He was again terminated in 2013, and the parties resolved his 
challenge to the termination by executing a settlement agreement.  Crandall agreed that 
he would never again work for the VA.   
 In 2018, Crandall applied to be accredited as a VA claims agent.  The VA’s Chief 
Counsel denied his application.  Chief Counsel explained that he questioned Crandall’s 
fitness to serve as a claims agent because Crandall had continually mocked VA 
employees after his employment ended.  Chief Counsel cited various emails that Crandall 
had sent to VA employees that reflected his “unprofessional, vengeful mentality.”  
Crandall alleged that the VA stored his emails in a system of records, and that the VA 
failed to protect his personal and sensitive information by storing it in an unsecure 
system.   
 Crandall brought this amended complaint against the VA and the VA’s Secretary, 
alleging that they violated provisions of the Privacy Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1), (4), 
(7), the First Amendment, the “Veterans Affairs Information Security Act,”2 and the 
 
1 For purposes of this appeal, we will accept the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true.  
See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 
2 The District Court construed Crandall’s complaint as asserting a claim under the 
Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006, 38 U.S.C. 
§ 5721 et seq.  The Court rejected the claim because it discerned no private right of action 
 
3 
 
Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”), 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).  The defendants moved 
to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  The District 
Court granted the motion without further leave to amend on the ground that Crandall 
failed to state a plausible claim for relief.  Crandall appealed.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s 
dismissal de novo.  See Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 341 (3d Cir. 2022).  “To 
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
 Crandall argues that the District Court erred by dismissing his WPA claim.  The 
District Court determined that Crandall failed to state a claim for relief because VA 
claims agents are not federal employees, and therefore Crandall’s claim did not arise out 
of an application for federal employment.  See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (prohibiting adverse 
personnel actions against “any employee or applicant for employment” because of certain 
disclosures).  The parties disagree as to whether the WPA covered Crandall as a former 
employee and a VA claims agent applicant.  We need not reach that issue, however, 
because as the appellees point out, the District Court was not the proper forum in which 
to bring the WPA claim.   
 
under that statute, and it determined that the claim would also fail under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 et seq.  Crandall does not challenge the 
disposition of this claim on appeal.   
 
4 
 
Generally, a WPA claimant must first seek corrective action from the Office of 
Special Counsel and the Merit Systems Protection Board.  See 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3).3  
The claimant can seek review of the Board’s disposition of the WPA claim by filing a 
petition with a federal court of appeals.  See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B); see also Elgin v. 
Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 10-12 (2012) (explaining that Congress precluded district 
court jurisdiction over most claims for personnel action taken against federal employees).  
The only way that a district court can review an agency decision under the WPA is if the 
complaint also raises issues under an antidiscrimination statute.  See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 7703(b)(2); Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 582 U.S. 420, 425-27 (2017); Jonson v. 
FDIC, 877 F.3d 52, 56 (1st Cir. 2017); cf. Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
 Here, even if Crandall had exhausted his administrative remedies, he still could 
not seek review in the District Court, because, as he makes clear in his pleadings, he did 
not bring a discrimination claim.  See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2).  The District Court therefore 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the WPA claim, and we will affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal on that ground.  But because dismissals for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction should be without prejudice, see Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 
188 F.3d 172, 182 (3d Cir. 1999), we will modify the District Court’s dismissal of the 
 
3 Under some circumstances, the claimant can proceed directly to the Merit Systems 
Protection Board without first seeking corrective action from the Special Counsel.  See 5 
U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3); 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a), (b).  
 
5 
 
WPA claim so that the claim is dismissed without prejudice, see Curry v. Yachera, 835 
F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 Next, Crandall maintains that the District Court erred by dismissing his claims 
under the Privacy Act.  In his amended complaint, Crandall claimed that the defendants,4 
when managing the system of records for correspondences, failed to maintain only 
relevant and necessary records, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1), failed to publish in the Federal 
Register notice of the routine uses and categories of sources of the records, see 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(e)(4)(D), (I), and improperly maintained records describing how Crandall 
engaged in First Amendment activity, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7).5  To state a claim for 
monetary relief, Crandall needed to allege plausibly that the VA violated these Privacy 
Act provisions “in such a way as to have an adverse effect on” him, that the VA acted 
intentionally or willfully, and that he suffered actual damages from the violations.  5 
U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D), (4); Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 627 (2004).  But Crandall failed 
to plead that any alleged Privacy Act violation resulted in the damage he suffered—the 
denial of his VA claims agent application.  In other words, one cannot plausibly infer 
 
4 Crandall appears to have brought Privacy Act claims against both the VA and the VA 
Secretary.  But the Privacy Act authorizes civil suits only against federal agencies, not 
individuals.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1); Martinez v. Bureau of Prisons, 444 F.3d 620, 624 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (per curiam).  Thus, to the extent that Crandall brought these claims 
against the VA Secretary, dismissal was appropriate.  
 
5 In addition to Crandall’s claims for damages, he also appears to have requested access 
to his records under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1).  But Crandall did not allege that he previously 
requested access to his records and that his request was denied.  See, e.g., Taylor v. U.S. 
Treasury Dep’t, 127 F.3d 470, 476-77 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).  Nor did he raise the 
issue on appeal. 
 
6 
 
from Crandall’s amended complaint that Chief Counsel obtained Crandall’s emails from 
the system of records, or because of any alleged deficiencies in the system of records.  
Thus, the District Court did not err by dismissing Crandall’s Privacy Act claims.   
 Finally, Crandall concedes that he failed to state a First Amendment claim under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, but he argues that the District Court should have granted him another 
opportunity to plead a First Amendment claim.  Liberally construed, it appears that 
Crandall requests that this Court remand his case with instructions for the District Court 
to grant him leave to amend his complaint to bring a First Amendment claim under 
Bivens.  See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  But Crandall has not raised anything suggesting that he 
could state a First Amendment claim under Bivens.  See Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 
498 (2022) (citations omitted) (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court has “never held 
that Bivens extends to First Amendment claims” and holding that there is no Bivens 
remedy for First Amendment retaliation).  Thus, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by dismissing the complaint without further leave to amend.  See In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997); City of 
Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset Mgmt. Corp., 908 F.3d 872, 878 (3d Cir. 2018).   
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment as modified. 


Kenneth Crandall v. Denis McDonough

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-18-2025 
Kyon McDonald v. Attorney General United States of America 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Kyon McDonald v. Attorney General United States of America" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 503. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/503 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-2738 
____________ 
 
KYON DANE MCDONALD, 
                                       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an 
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A075-941-405) 
Immigration Judge:  Tamar H. Wilson 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 16, 2025 
____________ 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, Chief Judge, MONTGOMERY-REEVES and McKEE, Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Filed:  June 18, 2025) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
CHAGARES, Chief Judge.  
Kyon Dane McDonald petitions for review of a decision by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) determination 
that McDonald is removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will deny the petition. 
I.1 
McDonald is a native and citizen of Jamaica and a lawful permanent resident of 
the United States.  He was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, 
Pennsylvania, of voluntary manslaughter under the following provision:  
A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits 
voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the 
circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify the killing . . . , 
but his belief is unreasonable. 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2503(b).  He was sentenced to a term of 60 to 120 months of 
imprisonment.   
 McDonald received a Notice to Appear charging him as removable pursuant to 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, on 
grounds that his conviction was related to murder and was a crime of violence.  See 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), (F).  The IJ concluded that McDonald’s conviction did not 
qualify as an aggravated felony related to murder because the statute of conviction does 
not include an element of malice aforethought, but did qualify as a crime of violence 
because it includes the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force and requires proof 
 
1 We write for the parties and therefore recite only those facts pertinent to our decision. 
3 
 
of specific intent to use deadly force without justification.  The IJ therefore ordered 
McDonald’s removal.  
McDonald timely appealed the IJ’s ruling to the BIA.  He argued that, in 
Pennsylvania, voluntary manslaughter includes a “knowing” mens rea, bringing it outside 
the scope of the definition of crime of violence.  The BIA rejected his claim, observing 
that the Supreme Court has held in an analogous context that a crime of violence 
encompasses “purposeful or knowing conduct,” and that McDonald cited no case 
suggesting that Pennsylvania interprets the term “knowing” in a manner that would give 
rise to a categorical mismatch.  Appendix (“App.”) 44 (citing Borden v. United States, 
593 U.S. 420, 434 (2021)).  The BIA therefore affirmed the IJ’s decision.  This timely 
petition for review followed.  
II. 
 We employ the categorical approach to determine whether a state criminal 
conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”), assessing whether the state statute applies to any conduct falling outside of the 
INA’s definition.  See Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U.S. 385, 389 (2017).  We 
have jurisdiction to consider this question of law pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  
See Ng v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 392, 394 (3d Cir. 2006).  Our review is plenary.  Id. at 
395. 
The INA defines “aggravated felony” as, among other things, a “crime of violence 
4 
 
. . . for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.”2  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(F).  Congress, in turn, has defined “crime of violence” to mean “an offense 
that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 
the person or property of another.”  18 U.S.C. § 16(a); see also Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 
162, 166 (3d Cir. 2001).   
McDonald claims, as he did before the BIA, that his Pennsylvania voluntary 
manslaughter conviction applies to conduct outside of the INA’s aggravated felony 
definition because it may be committed “knowingly.”  See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2503(b).  
He argues that “knowingly” is a lesser mens rea than “intentionally,” which means that 
the crime may be committed without specific intent and therefore is not categorically a 
crime of violence.  He relies on Commonwealth v. Biesecker, in which the Superior 
Court of Pennsylvania recognized that there is a “significant difference between the[] two 
mental states” of knowing and intending.  161 A.3d 321, 327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (citing 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 302(b) (defining levels of culpability under Pennsylvania law)). 
Differences between the mental states of knowing and intending is of little 
moment, however, because the Supreme Court has held that both mental states are 
sufficiently culpable for purposes of a crime of violence.  In Borden, the Supreme Court 
recognized in the analogous context of the Armed Career Criminal Act that “[p]urpose 
and knowledge are the most culpable levels in the criminal law’s mental-state 
‘hierarchy,’” and there is only a limited, often unimportant, distinction between the two.  
 
2 It is undisputed that McDonald’s conviction is a felony for which the term of 
imprisonment is at least one year.   
5 
 
593 U.S. at 426.  In contrast to the lesser mental states of negligence and recklessness, 
both purpose and knowledge satisfy the crime of violence definition.  Id. at 434; see also 
United States v. Henderson, 80 F.4th 207, 213 (3d Cir. 2023) (observing that, to be a 
“crime of violence,” the offense must be committed “with a knowing or intentional state 
of mind”).  We agree with the BIA that Borden applies in the INA context, and we 
determine that its reasoning is conclusive.  The fact that Pennsylvania voluntary 
manslaughter can be committed “knowingly” does not bring it outside of the definition of 
a crime of violence. 
   We are also unpersuaded by McDonald’s claim that voluntary manslaughter is a 
general intent crime.  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has observed that a necessary 
element of voluntary manslaughter is the specific intent to kill.  Commonwealth v. Pitts, 
404 A.2d 1305, 1308 (Pa. 1979) (quoting Commonwealth v. Mason, 378 A.3d 807, 808 
(Pa. 1977)).  McDonald has not directed us to any contrary Pennsylvania authority 
holding that voluntary manslaughter may be committed in the absence of specific intent. 
 McDonald’s crime of conviction includes as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.  Its inclusion of 
a “knowing” mens rea places the conviction squarely within the definition of a “crime of 
violence” under the INA and does not indicate that the crime may be committed without 
specific intent.  McDonald therefore has failed to show that he was not convicted of a 
crime of violence. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 


Kyon McDonald v. Attorney General United States of America

Miller Plastic Products Inc v. NLRB

In Re: Wawa, Inc. Data Security Litigation

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-25-2025 
Ricky Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Fein Such Kahn & Shepard 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Ricky Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Fein Such Kahn & Shepard" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 523. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/523 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
ALD-164        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 25-1301 
___________ 
 
RICKY KAMDEM-OUAFFO, 
    Appellant 
v. 
 
FEIN SUCH KAHN & SHEPPARD, P.C., “FSKS”; 
BORELLI & ASSOCIATES P.L.L.C., “BA”; PHILIP A. KHAN, Esq.; MICHAEL J. 
BORRELLI, Esq.; ANTHONY P. MALECKI, Esq.; DOLORES M. DEALMEIDA, Esq.; 
BRIAN P.S. MCCABE, Esq.; ROBERT A. BRUNO, J.S.C.; SETTLEMENTS 
SYSTEMS INC; ROBERT T. LOUGY, A.J.S.C.; MICHELLE M. SMITH; ARMANDO 
B. FONTOURA; TD BANK N.A.; PEPSICO INC.; LUBOJA AND THAU LLP; 
JONATHAN C. THAU, LLP; RICHARD M. HUNTER, Esq.; RICHARD M. HUNTER 
PLLC; LONDON FISCHER LLP; DR. PETER GIVEN; DR. NAIJIE ZHANG; AIDA 
COSTELLO; JOHN DOE; JANE DOE; ABC CORPORATION (1-10) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-04174) 
District Judge: Honorable Zahid N. Quraishi 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Appellant’s and Appellees’ Motions for Summary Action 
June 12, 2025 
 
Before:  BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed June 25, 2025) 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Ricky Kamdem-Ouaffo appeals from the District Court’s order 
denying his post-judgment motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. 
 In 2022, Kamdem-Ouaffo filed a federal lawsuit challenging the garnishment of 
funds from his bank accounts pursuant to state court orders.  The District Court dismissed 
his claims and later imposed a limited filing injunction against him.  We affirmed both 
decisions on appeal.  See Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Fein Such Kahn & Sheppard, P.C., No. 23-
2089, 2024 WL 5244699, at *3 (3d Cir. Dec. 30, 2024).  Kamdem-Ouaffo then filed a 
motion in the District Court for leave to seek reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b), alleging that the judgment was unconstitutional.   
 In a text order, the District Court denied his motion, noting that it lacked authority 
to disturb our ruling on appeal and that Kamdem-Ouaffo could have raised his arguments 
on appeal.  In response, Kamdem-Ouaffo filed an additional motion requesting to seek 
reconsideration and to correct statements in his prior motions, which the District Court 
denied.  Kamdem-Ouaffo has appealed.  Several appellees and Kamdem-Ouaffo have 
moved for summary action.1 
 
1  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review orders enforcing a filing 
injunction for abuse of discretion.  See Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 331 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  We may summarily affirm a district court’s decision if the appeal fails to 
present a substantial question.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(per curiam). 
 
3 
 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kamdem-Ouaffo leave 
to file his motions, pursuant to the filing injunction.  We have already concluded that the 
injunction was appropriately entered here and, in any event, Kamdem-Ouaffo did not 
present any basis for reopening the final judgment issued in his case.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
60(b) (setting forth grounds for relief from a final judgment); see also Budget Blinds, Inc. 
v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2008).   
Accordingly, we grant the appellees’ motions for summary action and will affirm 
the District Court’s orders.2 
 
2 Kamden-Ouaffo’s pending motions are denied. 


Ricky Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Fein Such Kahn & Shepard

Dulitzky, Ariel E.

Righting Sports Law: The Contribution of the United Nations

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-2-2025 
Trena Scott v. Project HOME 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Trena Scott v. Project HOME" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 532. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/532 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-3392 
__________ 
 
TRENA DENISE SCOTT, 
          Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PROJECT HOME; PROJECT HOME/SAINT COLUMBA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:23-cv-02504) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joshua D. Wolson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 23, 2025 
 
Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 2, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Trena Scott appeals pro se from the District Court’s order granting the defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment.  We will affirm. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
I. 
In June 2023, Scott filed a pro se complaint in the District Court against her 
former employer, Project HOME, and a related entity.  Scott brought various claims 
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, including claims of retaliation and racial 
discrimination.  The District Court dismissed all of her claims except for a retaliation 
claim based on Scott’s complaint to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) in June 2021 and Scott’s subsequent termination in August 2021.  
Scott filed an amended complaint in the District Court, and the District Court again 
dismissed all of her claims except for the retaliation claim.  After the parties completed 
discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment.  The District Court granted the 
motion.  This appeal ensued.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.1  Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 
767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014).  Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A genuine dispute of material fact 
 
1 In her opening brief, Scott’s only challenge is to the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the defendants on the retaliation claim.  Our review is thus limited to that 
claim, and we deem forfeited any other potential challenges to the District Court’s other 
rulings.  See M.S. by & through Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that the appellant forfeited claims by failing to raise them in 
the opening brief).   
 
3 
exists if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
III. 
The District Court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on 
Scott’s retaliation claims.  Under the burden-shifting framework established by 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, a plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a 
prima facie case of retaliation.  See 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  To establish a prima facie 
case, the plaintiff must show that she engaged in Title VII-protected activity, that she 
suffered an adverse action, and that a causal nexus existed between the adverse action 
and the protected activity.  See Canada v. Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc., 49 F.4th 340, 346 
(3d Cir. 2022).  If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden then shifts to the employer to 
articulate a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for taking the adverse employment action.  
See id.  “If the employer meets this burden, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the employer’s proffered explanation was false, and that retaliation was 
the real reason for the adverse employment action.”  Id. (cleaned up).    
Here, even assuming that Scott could establish a prima facie case of retaliation 
based on her complaint to the EEOC and subsequent actions,2 we agree with the District 
 
2 We note that Scott’s brief raises many arguments regarding protected activity that she 
claims to have engaged in after her complaint to the EEOC in June 2021.  We do not 
address those arguments because, even assuming they could support a prima facie case, 
there is still insufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the 
defendants’ stated reasons for her firing were pretextual.   
 
4 
Court’s determination that Project HOME articulated legitimate non-retaliatory reasons 
for firing her, and that Scott failed to produce evidence that would permit a reasonable 
factfinder to conclude that those reasons were pretextual.  See Canada, 49 F.4th at 346.  
The record shows that Project HOME employees, including Scott’s supervisors, had 
raised concerns about her poor performance and her lack of professionalism for many 
months prior to her June 2021 EEOC complaint.3  Project HOME placed Scott on her 
second performance improvement plan (“PIP”) in February 2021 (though she refused to 
sign it, she does not dispute that it was issued to her).  Just prior to the EEOC complaint, 
in June 2021, Scott was denied a promotion, and she did not dispute that her lack of 
interpersonal relationship skills was the reason she did not receive the promotion.  After 
contacting the EEOC, Scott continued to have similar issues documented at work, and in 
August 2021, Project HOME terminated her employment.  Given this lengthy record of 
concerns that were raised about Scott’s performance and professionalism, no reasonable 
juror could find that those reasons were pretextual and that retaliation was the actual 
motive for her firing.  See Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 262 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (explaining that this requires evidence of “weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions from which a reasonable juror could 
 
3 Among other things, supervision forms from September 2020 and October 2020 show 
that Scott was counseled to be less confrontational and more professional with her 
communications.  And a January 2021 email thread among Scott’s supervisors noted 
concerns that she was creating a problematic work environment.   
5 
conclude that the Defendants’ explanation is unworthy of credence, and hence infer that 
the employer did not act for the asserted” non-retaliatory reasons) (cleaned up). 
On appeal, Scott argues that a reasonable juror could infer pretext because she was 
given “no prior written or verbal warnings,” and because there was “no history, record or 
documentation of [her] performance issues or insubordination prior to her termination.”  
Appellant’s Br. at 8, 26.  But those arguments ignore evidence throughout record, 
including the supervision forms, emails, and PIPs, all of which provided her with 
warnings and documented these issues for many months prior to her EEOC complaint 
and her subsequent termination.  Finally, contrary to Scott’s arguments, see id. at 28–30, 
the District Court properly relied upon the plain text of a July 21, 2021 email, which 
made no mention of discrimination, rather than Scott’s characterizations of that email.  
See generally Barber v. CSX Distribution Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 701–02 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(explaining that a complaint of “unfair treatment in general” and “dissatisfaction with the 
fact that someone else was awarded the position” did not constitute protected conduct 
when it did “not specifically complain about . . . discrimination”).   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 


Villanova University

Not a member yet

USA v. Jamir Ceruti