Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-11-2025 
Welch Foods Inc. v. General Teamsters Local Union No. 397 
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Recommended Citation 
"Welch Foods Inc. v. General Teamsters Local Union No. 397" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 558. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/558 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
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           NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 24-2889 
 ______________ 
 
WELCH FOODS INC.,  
a cooperative doing business as WELCH’S 
 Appellant 
 
v. 
 
GENERAL TEAMSTERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 397 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1:19-cv-00322) 
U.S. District Judge:  Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 8, 2025 
______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, FREEMAN, and RENDELL Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  July 11, 2025) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
  
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
PER CURIAM 
Appellant Welch Foods, Inc. (“Welch’s”), appeals the District Court’s order that 
left intact an arbitration award in favor of Appellee General Teamsters Local 397 (the 
“Union”).  Because the award violates the public policy against sexual harassment in the 
workplace, we will reverse the District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings. 
I 
Pat Woodward, a Union member and Welch’s employee, had a verbal altercation 
with another employee, Terri Lawson, in which both he and Lawson used foul language.  
For his part, Woodward used gender-based slurs.  Welch’s initially terminated both 
employees, but later reduced Lawson’s punishment to a ten-day suspension.  In 
Woodward’s termination papers, Welch’s asserted that he had “violate[d] Welch’s Rules 
of Conduct” by “creating a hostile work environment” through his use of “threatening 
and intimidating behavior and language” with Lawson.  JA 146.1  The Union filed a 
grievance on his behalf pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”), 
which was denied.  The Union then submitted the issue to an arbitrator, requesting 
Woodward’s reinstatement with back pay.2  
 
1 Welch’s noted that, specifically, Woodward engaged in “[d]isrespectful language 
that was abusive, sexually explicit and derogatory towards another co-worker and women 
in general” as well as “behavior which violates standards of common sense, common 
dignity or is in reckless disregard of [his] fellow employees or [his] company.”  JA 146.  
Welch’s had also previously disciplined Woodward after he went “on an extended rant” 
about an unspecified subject, and Welch’s informed him it would not tolerate such 
conduct in the future.  JA 165. 
2 The CBA provides in relevant part:  
 
3 
 
 The Arbitrator heard testimony from Woodward, Lawson, a witness to the 
altercation, and other employees.  The Arbitrator’s decision reviewed the testimony 
adduced,3 the parties’ arguments, and relevant CBA provisions.  The decision made very 
few factual findings.  It noted that (1) Lawson “instigated the argument,” and (2) 
Woodward and Lawson both raised their voices and used “inappropriate” and “foul” 
language.  JA 164–65.4  From this, the Arbitrator concluded that Welch’s had “just 
cause” to discipline Woodward, but that a ten-day suspension, rather than termination, 
was warranted.  JA 167.  
 Welch’s filed an action to vacate the arbitration award, asserting that it violated 
the public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace.  Both parties moved for 
 
[D]irection of the work force [], including the right to . . . discipline, and 
discharge employees . . . are the function and responsibility of management 
. . . . The Company may discharge an employee for any reason which, in its 
judgment, is in the interests of the Company except Union activity. The 
discharge of an employee is subject to review in accordance with the [CBA’s 
“Grievance and Arbitration” provisions.] . . . . In the event of [an] arbitration 
regarding the discharge of an employee, the arbitrator shall have the power 
in accordance with the circumstances to direct reinstatement or no 
reinstatement, with or without back pay, in whole or in part . . . . The decision 
or award of the arbitrator shall be . . . final and conclusive upon the parties. 
Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 6, 25. 
3 Witnesses testified that Woodward had shouted at Lawson, cursed, used 
gendered profanities, indicated that only men were “going anywhere in this Company,” 
and demanded that Lawson not badmouth him to others.  JA 152. 
Woodward testified that Lawson approached him in the breakroom and “got close 
to him,” and that he felt he had to defend himself.  JA 156.  He admitted to using 
gendered profanities in the context of asking Lawson why she had been telling people 
that he was biased against women and that he was sympathetic to management.  He 
denied that he had used certain slurs or made certain profane gestures.   
All agreed that profanity was frequently used at the plant.   
4 The Arbitrator did not report her credibility determinations but did note that the 
eyewitness had offered inconsistent statements.   
4 
 
summary judgment.  The District Court found that, because the Arbitrator had not made 
findings of fact regarding “the specific conduct of which Woodward was accused,” it was 
unable to determine whether he had engaged in sexual harassment.  JA 119.  As a result, 
it dismissed the motions without prejudice and remanded to the Arbitrator for her to 
specify (1) “her factual findings regarding the sexual harassment allegations against 
[Woodward],” and (2) if she “found merit to those allegations, her consideration of the 
‘pertinent public policy’ against sexual harassment in the workplace.”  JA 126. 
In response, the Arbitrator issued a clarification stating that she “based her 
findings on the reasons [Welch’s gave for terminating Woodward], which did not include 
a charge of sexual harassment.”  JA 132.  She further stated that she determined that “the 
discipline imposed on [Woodward]” was “too harsh” given that (1) Woodward was not 
the aggressor, (2) both he and Lawson “raised [their] voice[s] and . . . used inappropriate 
language,” and (3) Welch’s reduced Lawson’s discipline (but not Woodward’s) from 
termination to a 10-day suspension.  JA 132–33.  Finally, the Arbitrator reiterated that 
she “did not find [Woodward] engaged in sexual harassment and the Company did not 
contend in his termination letter that he was involved in sexual harassment.”  JA 133.  
The Arbitrator did not address the “pertinent public policy” considerations regarding 
sexual harassment because she did not make a finding that any had occurred.  JA 133.5 
 
5 The Arbitrator’s delay in issuing this clarified ruling does not mandate vacatur.  
Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1404.14(a) (setting forth the timing for arbitrators’ awards but clarifying 
that failure to abide by this timeline “will not invalidate the process or award”). 
5 
 
 The parties again moved for summary judgment, and this time the District Court 
granted summary judgment to Woodward and declined to vacate the Arbitrator’s award. 
The Court determined that the Arbitrator’s supplemental ruling clarified that Woodward’s 
conduct, “while offensive and inappropriate,” JA 19, “did not rise to the level of sexual 
harassment,” and that this conclusion was not “plainly inconsistent with [the Arbitrator’s] 
factual findings,” JA 17.  Therefore, “[b]ecause the Arbitrator’s clarification of her award 
disavow[ed] any finding that [Woodward] engaged in sexual harassment,” the Court 
concluded that the reinstatement and suspension award did not violate public policy.  JA 
11.  
Welch’s appeals.   
II6  
 Courts have “very limited power to review a labor arbitration award by an 
arbitrator appointed pursuant to a [CBA].”  Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Loc. 776, Int’l 
Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1441 (3d Cir. 1992).  When parties have agreed to 
arbitrate their dispute, courts must defer to “the arbitrator’s view of the facts and of the 
meaning of the contract,” as well as her “honest judgment” as to the appropriate remedy 
for a contractual breach.  United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 
37–38 (1987).  “[A]s long as the arbitrator’s award is drawn from the essence of the 
 
6 The District Court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 185 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise plenary review over this 
appeal from an order resolving cross-motions for summary judgment.”  Stroehmann 
Bakeries, Inc. v. Loc. 776, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1440 (3d Cir. 1992). 
6 
 
[CBA], a court may not vacate it even if the court finds the basis for it to be ambiguous or 
disagrees with its [legal] conclusions.”  Stroehmann, 969 F.2d at 1441.  
A court may, however, vacate an award where the arbitrator has construed a CBA 
in way that “explicitly conflict[s] with [a] well-defined, dominant public policy.”  Id.  
There is a well-defined, dominant public policy against sexual harassment in the 
workplace that “favor[s] voluntary employer prevention and application of sanctions 
against sexual harassment.”  Id. at 1441–42 (citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and regulations promulgated thereunder).7  In Stroehmann, we clarified that an 
arbitrator’s decision conflicts with the public policy against sexual harassment where it 
reinstates someone who has been accused of sexual harassment “without a determination 
that the harassment did not occur.”  Id. at 1442.8  
We read the Arbitrator’s clarification to say that she did not make a finding as to 
sexual harassment because Woodward was not charged with sexual harassment.  But this 
is not correct.  The charges described in Woodward’s termination letter (i.e., creation of a 
hostile work environment and use of “[d]isrespectful language that was abusive, sexually 
explicit and derogatory towards another co-worker and women in general,” JA 43), if 
 
7 The concepts of sexual harassment and hostile work environment are closely 
related, as a hostile work environment may be created through sexual harassment.  See 
e.g., Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2009).  
8 Stroehmann also cited with approval an out-of-circuit case which held that 
reinstatement does not violate public policy where the arbitration award finds that the 
accused did in fact commit sexual harassment, and also finds that lesser discipline is 
adequate to ensure that the grievant will not commit sexual harassment in the future.  969 
F.2d at 1443 n.4 (citing Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Allied Indus. Workers, 959 F.2d 685 
(7th Cir. 1992)). 
7 
 
proven, amounts to sexual harassment as a matter of law.  See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–68 (1986) (setting forth pleading standard for “‘hostile 
environment’ theory of sexual harassment”); cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (“Unwelcome 
. . . verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when . . . 
such conduct has the purpose or effect of . . . creating an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive working environment.”).  
The Arbitrator’s award did not make a finding as to whether Woodward had 
sexually harassed Lawson, as Stroehmann requires.  Her reduction of Woodward’s 
punishment was based on her view that Lawson and Woodward should receive the same 
level of discipline, given that Lawson instigated the incident and that both Lawson and 
Woodward both used inappropriate and foul language.  When asked to specify her fact-
finding regarding the sexual harassment allegations against Woodward, the Arbitrator 
disavowed any finding as to whether sexual harassment occurred.  Her clarification stated 
that she “did not find sexual harassment to be one of the charges the Company outlined 
against [Woodward]. It was not included in the discharge letter provided to 
[Woodward].”  JA 132.  She later reiterated that she “did not find [Woodward] engaged 
in sexual harassment and the Company did not contend in his termination letter that he 
was involved in sexual harassment.”  JA 133.  Viewed in context, this was not a finding 
that Woodward did not engage in sexual harassment.  Instead, these statements show that 
the Arbitrator did not think it necessary to make a factual finding regarding Woodward’s 
alleged sexual harassment, as the term “sexual harassment” was not used in the 
termination letter.  
8 
 
Accordingly, just as in Stroehmann, leaving Woodward’s reinstatement in place 
could “allow a person who may have committed sexual harassment to continue in the 
workplace without a determination of whether sexual harassment occurred” and would 
“undermine[] [Welch’s] ability to fulfill its obligation to prevent and sanction sexual 
harassment in the workplace.”  969 F.2d at 1442.9  Because it lacks a finding that 
Woodward did not commit the sexual harassment of which he was accused, the 
Arbitrator’s decision violated public policy.  Accordingly, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order granting the Union’s motion for summary judgment and denying Welch’s 
motion for summary judgment.  We will remand with instructions to vacate the 
Arbitrator’s award and remand for further proceedings.  The District Court shall once 
again request that the Arbitrator specify her factual findings and determine whether 
Woodward created a hostile work environment by using language that was sexually 
explicit and derogatory towards women (i.e., committed sexual harassment, as alleged in 
his termination letter).10  If the Arbitrator finds that Woodward did engage in sexual 
harassment, and nevertheless finds it appropriate to reinstate him, she should explain why 
 
9 Given these parallel concerns, it is immaterial that the arbitrator in Stroehmann 
expressly refused to find whether sexual harassment had occurred, whereas here, the 
Arbitrator arguably declined to make such a finding.  
10 It would also be helpful if the Arbitrator were to indicate whose testimony she 
credits as to what occurred.  The absence of a credibility determination makes the task of 
a reviewing court more difficult. 
9 
 
lesser discipline is appropriate in light of the public policy against sexual harassment in 
the workplace.11   
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District Court’s order and remand 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
11 See, e.g., Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Se. Elec. Coop. of Durant, Okla., 882 
F.2d 467, 469–70 (10th Cir. 1989) (reinstatement of employee accused of sexual 
harassment did not violate public policy where arbitrator noted “no prior conduct 
involving a sexual offense” and a “penitent and apologetic attitude”); Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 959 F.2d at 686–87 (reinstatement decision did not violate public policy where 
arbitrator found employee committed sexual harassment, but that “severe discipline short 
of discharge would be adequate to deter him from further misconduct”). 


Welch Foods Inc. v. General Teamsters Local Union No. 397

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-14-2025 
USA v. Delancey Melvin 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Delancey Melvin" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 562. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/562 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
           NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 24-1826  
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DELANCEY MELVIN, 
     Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1:21-cr-00071-001) 
U.S. District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 13, 2025 
______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 14, 2025 ) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
  
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Delancey Melvin appeals the District Court’s order denying his suppression 
motion and its sentencing judgment.  For the reasons set forth herein, we will affirm in 
part, vacate in part, and remand.  
I 
Pennsylvania State Trooper Jared Fluck applied for a warrant to search a residence 
in Franklin County, Pennsylvania, where Trooper Fluck averred Melvin was a resident.  
In support of the application, Trooper Fluck stated that Maryland State Trooper James 
Ward had contacted him about an ongoing drug trafficking investigation and relayed that 
a “creditable and reliable source” told Ward that Melvin: (1) was a known cocaine 
supplier in Hagerstown, Maryland; (2) visited Greencastle, Pennsylvania, and 
Hagerstown from his New York City home about one weekend per month; (3) traveled 
from New York to Greencastle with a “large amount” of cocaine; (4) showed the source a 
“black taped ‘Brick’ shaped object” while in the residence; (5) described the brick as his 
“work,” which he would “turn for quick sale and profits to payoff [sic] prior debts”; (6) 
paid $43,000 for the brick; and (7) stored the brick in the kitchen of the Franklin County 
residence.  App. 35.  
A state magistrate granted the search warrant application.  During the search, law 
enforcement discovered cocaine and Melvin told law enforcement that he had brought the 
drugs from New York the day prior and had come to Greencastle three times to sell 
cocaine.   
3 
 
Melvin was indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  Melvin moved to suppress the drugs and his statements to law 
enforcement, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause to search the residence.  The 
District Court denied the motion because it found: (1) the affidavit established a fair 
probability that contraband would be found at the residence; (2) a magistrate could 
conclude that the source was sufficiently reliable because (a) the source knew specific 
information about Melvin’s drug-dealing operations and (b) this information was 
corroborated by law enforcement’s knowledge of Melvin’s drug activity; and (3) even if 
the warrant lacked probable cause, the good faith exception applied because a reasonable 
officer would believe that probable cause supported the warrant.  United States v. Melvin, 
No. 1:21-cr-71, 2022 WL 710187, at *3-5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2022).  Melvin thereafter 
pleaded guilty to the drug charge conditioned on his right to appeal the suppression order.   
At sentencing, the District Court concluded that Melvin was a “career offender” 
under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)(3) because his instant conviction was for a “controlled 
substance offense” under § 4B1.2(b) and he had three prior drug convictions under New 
York law that counted as qualifying career-offender offenses.  The Court calculated an 
offense level of twenty-nine and a criminal history category of VI, resulting in a 
Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment.   
Melvin requested a downward variance to a range of 84 to 105 months’ 
imprisonment.  The District Court varied downward and sentenced Melvin to 140 
months’ imprisonment after considering Melvin’s (1) nine adult convictions, (2) past 
recidivism, (3) commitment to parenting, rehabilitation, and not reoffending, (4) 
4 
 
employment, (5) character letters, (6) difficult upbringing, and (7) age.  The Court 
acknowledged that Melvin’s criminal history was non-violent,1 but noted that drug-
dealing is itself a destructive crime.  It also considered the Sentencing Commission’s data 
for sentences imposed on drug offenders like Melvin and concluded its sentence was not 
significantly different from those imposed upon others similarly charged.     
Melvin appeals.   
II2 
 We address Melvin’s suppression and sentencing arguments in turn. 
A3 
A magistrate may issue a search warrant if the information in the application 
provides probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime may be found at the place to 
be searched.  See United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 2001).  When 
reviewing that determination, we examine whether a substantial basis supported the 
magistrate’s probable cause conclusion and give it “great deference.”  Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).  Even if no substantial basis existed, however, we may uphold 
 
1 Melvin noted he was a “drug trafficking only” offender with no violent predicate 
offenses and pointed to a Sentencing Commission study concluding that there are “clear 
and notable differences between drug trafficking only career offenders and those career 
offenders who have committed a violent offense.”  App. 132, 141 (citing United States 
Sentencing Commission, 2016 Report to the Congress: Career Offender Enhancements, 
available at https://www.ussc.gov/research/congressional-reports/2016-report-congress-
career-offender-enhancements).  
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).    
3 Our review of the District Court’s reliance on the good faith exception is plenary.  
See United States v. Williams, 3 F.3d 69, 71 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993).   
5 
 
the order denying suppression under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.  
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).  If law enforcement acted in good faith 
in securing and executing a warrant, the evidence gathered pursuant to it will not be 
suppressed even if a court later concludes that the probable cause determination was 
erroneous.  United States v. Caesar, 2 F.4th 160, 169 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Leon, 468 
U.S. at 922).  A “warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish that a law 
enforcement officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search,” United States v. 
Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted), and 
typically “will obviate the need for any deep inquiry into [the] reasonableness of the 
officer’s reliance on the warrant,” Caesar, 2 F.4th at 170 (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
Melvin asserts that the good faith exception does not apply because “the warrant 
was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official 
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.”  Appellant’s Br. 27 (quoting Zimmerman, 
277 F.3d at 437).  To succeed on this argument, Melvin must show that the affidavit was 
a “bare bones” document that contained no indicia of probable cause to support the 
magistrate’s finding.  See Hodge, 246 F.3d at 309.  Melvin fails to meet his burden 
because the affidavit stated, among other things, that he was involved in drug trafficking, 
had transported drugs from New York that he intended to sell, regularly traveled to 
Greencastle and Hagerstown, was a known supplier of cocaine, and, on the day of the 
search, was storing drugs at the residence.  Further, the source provided a first-hand 
account of Melvin’s activities and the presence of drugs at the residence on the day the 
6 
 
warrant was sought.  Thus, the affidavit is not so “lacking in indicia of probable cause” 
that no reasonable officer would believe it to be valid.  See id.  Therefore, the good faith 
exception applies, and the District Court properly denied the suppression motion. 
B4 
We next consider whether the District Court erred in sentencing Melvin as a career 
offender under the Sentencing Guidelines.  For Melvin to be designated a career offender, 
he must have been at least 18 years old at the time of the instant offense, the instant 
offense must be a controlled substance offense, and he must have had two prior 
convictions that are controlled substance offenses as defined under the applicable career 
offender Guidelines provision, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.5  To determine whether Melvin’s prior 
convictions constitute controlled substance offenses, we compare the meaning of a 
controlled substance offense under the 2018 Guidelines with the elements of Melvin’s 
statutes of conviction, N.Y.P.L. §§ 220.34 and 220.39.  See United States v. Dawson, 32 
F.4th 254, 260 (3d Cir. 2022). 
 
4 Although this is a procedural reasonableness challenge, and we review claims of 
procedural reasonableness for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 
558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc), “[w]e exercise plenary review over a [d]istrict 
[c]ourt’s determination that an offense constituted a controlled substance offense for 
purposes of determining career offender status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1,” United States v. 
Shabazz, 233 F.3d 730, 731 (3d Cir. 2000). 
5 The Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, requires us to apply the 
2018 Guidelines, which were in effect when Melvin committed the 2020 offense of 
conviction because the definition of controlled substance offense in the Guidelines in 
effect at the time of his 2024 sentencing encompassed a broader range of conduct, and 
thus could have resulted in a harsher sentence than the 2018 Guidelines.  See U.S.S.G. §§ 
1B1.11(a), (b)(1), 4B1.2(d) (2023); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a), (b)(1) (2018); United States v. 
Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 193 (3d Cir. 2010). 
7 
 
The Guidelines define a controlled substance offense, as relevant here, as an 
“offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
year, that prohibits the . . . distribution[] or dispensing of a controlled substance.”  
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).  Because the Guidelines do not include a definition of distribution 
or dispensing, we look to dictionaries.6  
  Black’s Law Dictionary defines distribution to mean “giving out or division 
among a number, sharing or parceling out, allotting, dispensing, apportioning.”  Dawson, 
32 F.4th at 261 (quoting Distribution, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)).7  We may 
also consider definitions contained in the relevant statute.  Id. at 263.  The Controlled 
Substances Act (“CSA”) defines distribute as “deliver (other than by administering or 
dispensing) a controlled substance,” and defines deliver as “the actual, constructive, or 
attempted transfer of a controlled substance . . . .”  21 U.S.C. § 802(8), (11).  In the drug 
context, deliver means the “actual, constructive, or attempted transfer” of a controlled 
substance to another.  Dawson, 32 F.4th at 262 (quoting Delivery, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)) (emphasis omitted).8   In Dawson, we concluded that 
distribution in the Guidelines’ definition of “controlled substance offense” included 
 
6 Under United States v. Nasir, we consider the Guidelines commentary to 
interpret a Guidelines provision only when the plain text of the provision itself “is 
genuinely ambiguous.”  17 F.4th 459, 471 (3d Cir. 2021) (en banc) (quoting Kisor v. 
Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 575 (2019)).  Because the controlled substance offense language in 
this provision is not genuinely ambiguous, we do not consider the commentary.   
7 See also Distribution, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“The action of 
dividing and dealing out or bestowing in portions among a number of recipients; 
apportionment, allotment.”).  
8 See also Deliver, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“To hand over, 
transfer, commit to another’s possession or keeping.”). 
8 
 
“attempted transfer,” which refers to a situation where the defendant sought to deliver 
drugs to an intended recipient, but the success of that act was interrupted by an 
intervening event, such as the interception of the package by someone other than the 
intended recipient or an arrest before the drugs are handed off.  32 F.4th at 262.   
 Dispense means “weigh out, pay out, distribute, regulate, manage, control.”  
Dispense, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).9  The CSA defines dispense to mean 
“deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research subject by, or pursuant to 
the lawful order of, a practitioner, including the prescribing and administering of a 
controlled substance and the packaging, labeling or compounding necessary to prepare 
the substance for such delivery.”  21 U.S.C. § 802(10). As these definitions demonstrate, 
dispensing also requires an act to effectuate a delivery even if that delivery to the 
intended recipient is not successful.  
Melvin’s statutes of prior conviction criminalize the knowing and unlawful sale of 
a narcotic preparation, N.Y.P.L. § 220.34, or a narcotic drug, id. § 220.39.  Under these 
state statutes, the term sell means “to sell, exchange, give or dispose of to another, or to 
offer or agree to do the same.” 10  Id. § 220.00(1).  Offers to sell under these statutes 
 
9 See also Dispense, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“To mete out, deal 
out, distribute; to bestow in portions or from a general stock.”). 
10 This definition of sell first appears in the 1965 version of the statute.  1965 N.Y. 
Laws 2440-41.  Dictionary definitions at the time define offer, in the criminal context, as 
“mak[ing] an effort to effect some object, as, to offer to bribe.”  Offer, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (4th rev. ed. 1968).  Additionally, Black’s Law Dictionary defines offer to sell 
as “merely contemplat[ing] the proffer, proposal, presentation, or exhibition of something 
to another for acceptance or rejection,” Offer, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th rev. ed. 
1968), but this definition differs from offer to sell under N.Y.P.L. §§ 220.34, 220.39, and 
 
9 
 
include “an offer or agreement to sell even if actual delivery does not occur, provided 
that, at the time of the offer or agreement, the person has the intent and ability to make 
the sale.”  Model Jury Instructions, Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third 
Degree, Penal Law 220.39(1) (New York State Unified Court System Committee on 
Criminal Jury Instructions 1979, rev. 2003);11 People v. Samuels, 99 N.Y.2d 20, 24 
(2002).  A defendant who has the “intent and ability” to make the sale he offers violates 
the New York statutes even if he did not engage in the act of distribution, delivery, or 
transfer (actual or attempted as contemplated in Dawson).12 
Accordingly, because New York’s offer to sell law criminalizes conduct not 
encompassed within the definitions of “distribution” and “dispensing” under the 2018 
Guidelines, Melvin’s New York convictions do not qualify as predicate offenses under 
 
220.00(1), which require the offer to be bona fide.  See United States v. Bryant, 571 F.3d 
147, 157-58 (1st Cir. 2009) (distinguishing bona fide offers from mere offers). 
11 See also Model Jury Instructions, Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the 
Fourth Degree, Penal Law 220.34(1) (New York State Unified Court System Committee 
on Criminal Jury Instructions 1979, rev. 2003).    
12 Some courts have concluded, in the immigration context, that an offer to sell a 
controlled substance is “a substantial step towards committing the crime of distributing a 
controlled substance,” because such an act is “perpetrated in furtherance of a sale, 
typically as part of the negotiation for the price and quantity.”  E.g., Ochoa-Salgado v. 
Garland, 5 F.4th 615, 621-22 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Thus, an offer to sell under [the relevant 
state law] constitutes attempted delivery under the CSA.”); see also Pascual v. Holder, 
723 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2013).  These observations were made in the context of 
whether these state convictions were drug trafficking crimes under immigration laws, 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B); 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and did not address whether the offer to 
sell offense was a controlled substance offense under the 2018 Guidelines. 
The Government’s reliance on cases that conclude that an offer to sell is a 
controlled substance offense for career offender purposes is misplaced as those cases 
predate Nasir or are from Courts of Appeal not bound by Nasir. 
10 
 
the career offender Guidelines provision.  Therefore, we will vacate his sentence and 
remand to the District Court to sentence him without applying § 4B1.1.13 
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.  
 
13 Because we will vacate Melvin’s sentence, we need not decide whether the 
District Court failed to consider the need for its sentence to avoid unwarranted disparities. 


USA v. Delancey Melvin

CBV Inc. v. ChanBond LLC

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

Kevin Johnson v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI

Pamela Kern v. DAS Companies Inc

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-1-2025 
Bruce Norton v. Joseph Adams 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Bruce Norton v. Joseph Adams" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 622. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/622 
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ELD-017-E        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 25-2361 
___________ 
 
BRUCE NORTON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JOSEPH C. ADAMS, in his official capacity; MATTHEW D. MENGES, in his official 
capacity; YORK COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS; DEUTSCHE BANK 
NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee for Saxton Asset Securities Trust2007-2 
Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates Series 2007-2; JESSICA N. MANIS, Esq., in 
her official capacity; and STERN & EISENBERG, P.C. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1:25-cv-01216) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 29, 2025 
Before:  BIBAS, NYGAARD, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 1, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
PER CURIAM 
This is an interlocutory appeal filed by pro se appellant Bruce Norton. The appeal 
challenges an order of the District Court refusing to enjoin an upcoming sheriff’s sale. 
Norton’s motion to expedite the appeal is granted and, for the reasons set forth below, we 
will summarily affirm the order under review.  
I. Background 
Norton relays that he was the defendant in a foreclosure action concerning his 
home in York County, Pennsylvania. That action resolved in favor of the plaintiff, 
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank). See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. 
Co. as Tr. for Saxon Asset Sec. Tr. 2007-2 Mortg. Loan Asset Backed Certificates, Series 
2007-2 v. Norton, 276 A.3d 235 (table), 2022 WL 730594, at *5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022).1 
After obtaining its foreclosure judgment, Deutsche Bank filed a quiet title action 
and was again successful. A writ of execution issued; Burton’s home is slated for auction 
at a sheriff’s sale on August 4, 2025. The state trial court denied Norton’s emergency 
motion to stay the sale pending disposition of his latest appeal to the Superior Court.2  
 
1 Norton’s subsequent attempt to have the foreclosure judgment vacated, on account of 
alleged fraud, was rejected by the trial court. 
 
2 That appeal was argued on June 17, 2025, and a decision is pending. See Deutsche 
Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., Tr. c/o PHH Mortg. Corp. & Saxon Asset Co., Sec. Tr. 2007-2, 
Mortg. Loan Asset Backed C, c/o PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Norton, Docket No. 53 MDA 
2025 (Pa. Super. Ct.). There is no indication on the Superior Court’s docket that Norton 
has withdrawn the appeal, despite his recent representation that “he is not pursuing 
further remedies in the Pennsylvania state courts with respect to the foreclosure and quiet 
title proceedings[.]” DC ECF No. 6 at 1.    
3 
 
Norton then turned to federal court, filing a pro se civil rights action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. He named as defendants the state trial court and two of its judges, plus 
Deutsche Bank and its counsel. Norton’s complaint challenged various aspects of the 
foreclosure and quiet-title actions, and in part repackaged as federal due process claims 
arguments he unsuccessfully made in those actions. Compare Norton, 2022 WL 730594, 
at *3–5 with DC ECF No. 1 (Complaint) at 14–15. Norton also used his complaint to 
argue at length against Younger abstention3 and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine4 and other 
legal theories that he anticipated would be used to thwart his § 1983 action. 
As for relief, Norton requested only equitable remedies. Specifically, Norton 
sought: a declaration that his constitutional rights have been violated, and an order 
enjoining enforcement of the foreclosure judgment unless he is given an opportunity to 
present his due process claims in a neutral forum. 
After filing his complaint, Norton filed what he called a “motion for temporary 
restraining order and preliminary injunction.” DC ECF No. 3 at 1. With that motion, 
Norton sought to enjoin the August 4, 2025 sheriff’s sale, while stressing that he did not 
seek to have the foreclosure judgment overturned or vacated. 
The Magistrate Judge issued a Report recommending that Norton’s motion be 
denied. The Magistrate Judge reasoned that “[c]ourts in this circuit have declined to issue 
 
 
3 See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
 
4 See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 
U.S. 413 (1923).  
4 
 
preliminary injunctive relief to enjoin aspects of state court foreclosure proceedings, 
including sheriff’s sales, finding that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibits such relief.” DC 
ECF No. 10 at 2 (collecting unpublished district court decisions). Over Norton’s 
objections, the District Court entered an order on July 16, 2025, agreeing with the 
Magistrate Judge, adopting the Report, and denying Norton’s motion. This interlocutory 
appeal followed.  
II. Jurisdiction 
Norton’s motion seeking to enjoin the sheriff’s sale requested a temporary 
restraining order (TRO) and, after a hearing, a preliminary injunction. Those forms of 
relief are differentiated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65; whereas a preliminary 
injunction “must be issued with notice to the adverse party,” a TRO may issue “without 
notice where it is ‘clearly show[n] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage 
will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.’” Hope v. 
Warden York Cnty. Prison, 956 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
65(b)(1)(A)). TROs also are much shorter in duration, as a rule (two weeks, absent 
consent to or good cause for an extension). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2). 
When the two forms of relief are denied, moreover, there are different 
jurisdictional consequences. An order denying a request for a TRO is not immediately 
appealable. See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2010); see also A.A.R.P. v. 
Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1034, 1035 (2025) (Alito, J., dissenting). The opposite is true of an 
order denying a request for a preliminary injunction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) 
(providing that “the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from[ ] 
5 
 
[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States . . . granting, continuing, 
modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions”).  
So, insofar as Norton’s motion sought and the District Court denied a TRO, we 
lack appellate jurisdiction to consider the July 16, 2025 order at this time. But insofar as 
Norton sought a preliminary injunction—and that is the most-fair construction of his pro 
se motion—we can immediately review the July 16, 2025 order. See Hope, 956 F.3d at 
160 (“Where ... a purported TRO goes beyond preservation of the status quo and 
mandates affirmative relief, the order may be immediately appealable under 
§ 1292(a)(1).”); see also In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchise Litig., 689 F.2d 1150, 1155 
n.7 (3d Cir. 1982). We thus exercise appellate jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1). 
III. Merits 
The District Court’s decision to deny Norton’s motion for a preliminary injunction 
was grounded exclusively in the Anti–Injunction Act (A-IA), 28 U.S.C. § 2283.5 That 
statute reads as follows: “A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay 
proceedings in a State court except [1] as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or [2] 
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or [3] to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 
U.S.C. § 2283.  
The general rule is thus that “an injunction against execution or any other 
proceeding to enforce a state judgment is forbidden as well as one against the prosecution 
of state litigation to obtain a judgment.” Jos. L. Muscarelle, Inc. v. Cent. Iron Mfg. Co., 
 
5 The District Court’s interpretation and application of the A-IA is reviewed de novo. See 
In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 369 F.3d 293, 304 (3d Cir. 2004). 
6 
 
328 F.2d 791, 793 (3d Cir. 1964). And while there are three statutorily prescribed 
exceptions, those exceptions “are to be construed narrowly,” In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 
220, 233 (3d Cir. 2002), the practical effect of which is that the A-IA “prohibits most 
federal court injunctions staying state court proceedings,” In re Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am. Sales Pracs. Litig., 314 F.3d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 2002). Cf. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. 
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 297 (1970) (“Any doubts as to the propriety of 
a federal injunction against state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of 
permitting the state courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the 
controversy.”).  
All that said, we are somewhat skeptical of a categorical rule—one seemingly 
applied by the District Court here—that “state court foreclosure proceedings . . . do not 
fall within one of [the A-IA’s exceptions].” DC ECF No. 13 at 4. Where, for example, the 
sole relief sought in a federal action is the enjoinment of a sheriff’s sale authorized by a 
state court judgment, and a federal district court’s allowing the sale to go forward will 
moot the entire federal action, might temporary enjoinment of the sale be “necessary” to 
“aid” the federal district court’s jurisdiction? Cf. In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d at 234 
(explaining that for the second exception to apply, “the state action must not simply 
threaten to reach judgment first, it must interfere with the federal court’s own path to 
judgment”). We need not answer that question in this appeal, however, because the 
District Court was ultimately correct not to enjoin the sheriff’s sale.6   
 
6 Our reluctance to agree with the District Court’s A-IA analysis in the context of 
Norton’s motion for a preliminary injunction should not be read as a conclusion that none 
7 
 
 To obtain a preliminary injunction, Norton had to persuade the District Court that 
“(1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he will suffer irreparable harm without 
preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities favors an injunction, and (4) an injunction is 
in the public interest.” Veterans Guardian VA Claim Consulting LLC v. Platkin, 133 
F.4th 213, 218 (3d Cir. 2025). But Norton inarguably could not satisfy the first, 
“gateway” prong of the test. Id. Among the myriad reasons why that is so, Norton failed 
to show a reasonable probability that 
• his insistence that he is not seeking to invalidate the state foreclosure judgment 
is reconcilable with his argument that this same judgment cannot now be 
enforced, an argument based on reasons that necessarily call into question the 
validity of the judgment; i.e., he failed to sufficiently show that his federal 
action was not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see In re Madera, 586 
F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine is implicated 
when, ‘in order to grant the federal plaintiff the relief sought, the federal court 
must determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered or must 
take action that would render that judgment ineffectual.’”) (citation omitted); 
 
• his § 1983 claims were meaningfully different from the claims and arguments 
he raised in state court against identical or in-privity parties—that the former 
were not merely the latter costumed in the language of federal due process—
and were thus not barred as matter of law by preclusion principles, cf. Sec’y 
United States Dep’t of Lab. v. Kwasny, 853 F.3d 87, 94–95 (3d Cir. 2017); 
 
• his § 1983 claims were cognizable against defendants who, like Deutsche Bank 
and its counsel, were neither state actors, see Benn v. Universal Health Sys., 
Inc., 371 F.3d 165, 169–70 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2004), nor plausible conspirators 
with state actors, cf. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150–52 
(1970); and 
 
• his § 1983 claims against the state court judges were not defective as a matter 
of law on the ground of judicial immunity, see Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 
12–13 (1991) (per curiam) (“If judicial immunity means anything, it means 
 
of the relief requested in Norton’s complaint is barred by the A-IA. 
8 
 
that a judge ‘will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was 
in error . . . or was in excess of his authority.’”) (citation omitted).  
 To be clear, we have not concluded that Norton is sure to lose in the ongoing 
federal litigation below, on the bases described in this opinion or otherwise. Rather, we 
hold only that he inarguably failed to satisfy the preliminary injunction standard, and that 
the District Court was thus right to deny the request for such extraordinary relief.  
IV. Conclusion 
In light of our assessment above, we disagree with Norton that the summary action 
standard “is not met here.” Doc. 6 at 2. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s July 16, 2025 order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 (2011); 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6 
(2018). 


Bruce Norton v. Joseph Adams

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-12-2025 
Azer Scientific LLC v. Quidel Corp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Azer Scientific LLC v. Quidel Corp" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 658. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/658 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
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inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
  
No. 24-1022 
______________ 
 
AZER SCIENTIFIC LLC  
 
v.  
 
QUIDEL CORPORATION, 
   Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 5:21-cv-02972) 
U.S. District Judge: Honorable John M. Gallagher 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 5, 2024 
______________ 
                                                                
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and McKEE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  August 12, 2025) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
Quidel Corporation appeals the judgment entered in favor of Azer Scientific LLC 
on Azer’s breach of contract claim.  Because the District Court did not err in concluding 
that a contract was formed between Quidel and Azer, we will affirm. 
 I1 
Quidel manufactures at-home COVID-19 test kits and needed a supplier to help 
fill its kits with reagent.  In March 2021, Azer approached Quidel about providing tube-
filling services for Quidel test kits.  Azer sent Quidel an email stating that “[if] we decide 
to work together on this project, we would ask Quidel to commit to a minimum order of 
12 months usage for 48 million prefilled tubes.”  App. 343.  Quidel requested “tier 
pricing,” and Azer emailed a proposal setting forth prices associated with different 
volume commitments.  App. 351.  Quidel stated that it would be “moving forward 
immediately with ordering at the 3M/week for 12 months tier.”  App. 355.  Azer 
requested a purchase order and Quidel informed Azer that it needed certain internal 
approvals before it could supply it.2  Azer stated that it was willing to “trust the verbal 
commitment that was given today” and proceed with purchasing the equipment needed to 
fulfill Quidel’s order.  App. 367.  Quidel cautioned that “[w]hile it is likely that we will 
move forward, the ultimate decision and signoff will be by higherups in the company,” 
and that it expected to “firm up the answer and direction” soon.  App. 367.  Thereafter, at 
 
1 We recite the undisputed facts, drawing “all inferences in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 
575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009). 
2 The purchase order was a Quidel form used to request shipments from suppliers.  
3 
Quidel’s request, Azer sent a quote for filling 156 million tubes over a 12-month 
commitment and also provided a quote for manufacturing the reagent.  
On March 25, 2021, Quidel emailed Azer, (1) requesting that Azer send an 
“updated quote to reflect volume of 10M fills/month for 1 year (120M fills total)”; and 
(2) stating that it would send “written approval to place orders for equipment today 
(3/25).”  App. 393.  Azer replied: “Please see updated quote for 2.5M filled tubes per 
week . . . . Please confirm to me in writing that we are approved to order the equipment 
and that we have your commitment.  I look forward to receiving the purchase order next 
Monday.”  App. 395.  Quidel replied: “Please use this note as confirmation that we will 
be moving forward with the 2.5M/week (10M/month) commitment and to support Azer’s 
order of equipment.  We are working on the [purchase order] now.”  App. 400.  Azer 
responded: “We have began [sic] to order all necessary components as well as the 
automation.  I look forward to working with . . . the whole Quidel team!”  App. 399-400.   
After Quidel clarified the volume of tubes it sought and Azer provided another 
updated quote, (1) Azer wired $290,000 to the manufacturer who would produce the 
custom filling machines that Azer would use to fulfill Quidel’s orders, and (2) Quidel 
sent Azer a signed purchase order reflecting the price and quantity agreed upon in the 
March 25 emails as well as a draft supply agreement.3  The parties continued to discuss 
the terms of a written supply agreement while Azer procured the equipment and prepared 
 
3 The supply agreement included various additional terms addressing compliance 
with FDA regulations, quality control, and termination, among other things.   
4 
to begin production.  By mid-June 2021, Quidel decided to “ramp down” its production 
of “COVID products with respect to Azer [and other suppliers]” because of a reduced 
sales forecast for at-home COVID tests.  App. 580.4  The parties never fully executed a 
purchase order or supply agreement and ultimately reached an impasse concerning how 
to proceed.     
Azer sued Quidel for, among other things, breach of contract.  After discovery, the 
parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.  The District Court granted Azer 
partial summary judgment, holding that the March 25 email communications formed a 
contract.  Azer Sci. Inc. v. Quidel Corp., No. 5:21-CV-02972-JMG, 2022 WL 17419347 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2022).  Thereafter, a jury found Quidel breached the contract and 
awarded Azer $8,521,609.   
Quidel appeals.   
II5 
The issue in this appeal is whether the parties formed a contract under 
Pennsylvania law.6  A contract is formed where (1) “both parties manifested an intention 
to be bound by the agreement”; (2) “the terms of the agreement are sufficiently definite to 
 
4 Quidel and Azer thereafter discussed alternative purchase arrangements.  Other 
than samples, Azer never produced any filled tubes for Quidel.   
5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a District Court’s grant of summary judgment de 
novo.  Cranbury Brick Yard, LLC v. United States, 943 F.3d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 2019).  
Summary judgment is only appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
6 The parties agree that Pennsylvania law governs their contractual dispute.    
5 
be enforced”; and (3) “there was consideration.”  ATACS Corp. v. Trans World 
Commc’ns, Inc., 155 F.3d 659, 666 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying Pennsylvania law); see also 
Channel Home Ctrs., Div. of Grace Retail Corp. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291, 299 (3d Cir. 
1986) (same).7    
The terms of the parties’ agreement were sufficiently definite to form an 
enforceable contract.  “Whether the terms [of a contract] are sufficiently definite is a 
question of law.”  Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 585 (3d Cir. 
2009) (applying Pennsylvania law).  The parties must agree to the essential terms and 
“the fact that additional provisions would enhance the position of both parties is not 
controlling.”  Field v. Golden Triangle Broad., Inc., 305 A.2d 689, 694 (Pa. 1973).  
Essential terms include the “time or manner of performance, price to be paid, or the like.”  
Lombardo v. Gasparini Excavating Co., 123 A.2d 663, 666 (Pa. 1956).  Because the 
emails between Quidel and Azer show that the parties agreed that Azer would sell Quidel 
the District Court correctly concluded that the terms of the contract were sufficiently 
definite.8 
 
7 The parties do not dispute the element of consideration. 
8 That the parties were still working out the supply agreement and that the March 
25 emails lacked provisions governing quality control, the timing of deliveries, the 
termination fee for a breach, and insurance, among other things, does not mean that the 
terms of the March 25 agreement were not sufficiently definite.  See, e.g., Greene v. 
Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192, 1201 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (“Vague and indefinite 
agreements are routinely enforced as long as courts are able to supply ‘reasonable’ 
terms.”); Field, 305 A.2d at 694 (explaining that parties’ failure to specify additional 
terms which “would enhance the[ir] position” will not prevent courts from finding that a 
contract was formed). 
6 
We also agree with the District Court that the parties manifested an intent to be 
bound by these terms.  “In ascertaining the intent of the parties to a contract, it is their 
outward and objective manifestations of assent, as opposed to their undisclosed and 
subjective intentions, that matter.”  Tr. Under Deed of Wallace F. Ott, 271 A.3d 409, 416 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “[T]he intent of the 
parties to a written contract is contained in the writing itself.”  Krizovensky v. 
Krizovensky, 624 A.2d 638, 642 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).  “[P]arties may bind themselves 
contractually” even when “they intend, at some later date, to draft a more formal 
document.”  Am. Eagle Outfitters, 584 F.3d at 582 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
No reasonable juror could fail to find that the parties manifested an intent to be 
bound as of March 25.  See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (explaining that summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the 
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving 
party”).  On March 25, Azer requested explicit confirmation that the parties had a deal on 
the product, quantity, and price, and Quidel provided such confirmation.  Thereafter, 
Quidel provided Azer with a signed purchase order and Azer ordered manufacturing 
equipment and began producing samples with Quidel’s knowledge and approval.9  
 
9 See Yellow Run Coal Co. v. Alma-Elly-Yv Mines, Ltd., 426 A.2d 1152, 1154 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (“The fact that one [party], with the knowledge and approval of the 
other, has begun performance is nearly always evidence that they regard the contract as 
consummated and intend to be bound thereby.” (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)). 
7 
Moreover, the fact that the March 25 exchange came after a previous exchange in which 
Quidel had recognized that the parties were close to creating a binding agreement and 
explicitly stated that it was not yet ready to commit to the transaction indicates that 
Quidel knew how to express that it was not yet ready to enter into a binding contract with 
Azer.10   
Accordingly, the District Court properly concluded that the parties formed a 
contract. 
 
10 Quidel’s claim that it only agreed to “support Azer’s order of equipment,” App. 
400, fails because the language of the emails show that it agreed to far more, specifically 
to purchase a set amount of filled tubes over a set period of time.  App. 400; see Am. 
Eagle Outfitters, 584 F.3d at 582 (“In assessing intent, the object of inquiry is not the 
inner, subjective intent of the parties, but rather the intent a reasonable person would 
apprehend in considering the parties’ behavior.”). 
8 
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.11, 12 
 
11 Judge McKee would vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further 
proceedings because, from his point of view, there exists a triable issue of fact as to the 
parties’ intent to form a contract.  Judge McKee views the record as showing that there is 
conflicting evidence as to whether the parties intended that a particular writing would 
constitute a complete expression of their agreement, and that the jury should resolve 
those conflicts.  Channel Home Ctrs., 795 F.2d at 300-01.  Judge McKee notes that, while 
the March 25 emails did contain specific contractual terms, those emails reference an 
outstanding purchase order and supply agreement that would govern the relationship 
between the parties.  Since those documents were not fully executed, issues like a 
termination fee remained unresolved.  Although such a fee is not always material, Judge 
McKee believes that it cannot be said that the fee is immaterial here, given the 
circumstances in which the negotiations took place.  More specifically, the demand for 
Quidel’s test kits was subject to change dramatically based upon the course of the 
pandemic.  Accordingly, Judge McKee concludes that it cannot be said that Quidel’s 
concerns about a termination fee were immaterial or that the March 25 emails outwardly 
manifested an intent to be bound to an agreement to purchase the product and that it 
cannot be presumed as a matter of law that what remained to be worked out between the 
parties was merely a perfunctory squabble over irrelevant conditions of a final agreement. 
12 While one panel member, see supra at n. 11, views the absence of certain terms 
as an indication that the parties did not intend to enter a binding contract, the parties’ 
failure to discuss ancillary terms in the March 25 emails does not show such a lack of 
intent and rather, reveals a desire to quickly agree on the terms that would allow for the 
fast production of a product used to address the global pandemic. 


Azer Scientific LLC v. Quidel Corp

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-19-2025 
Michael Rivera v. New Castle County Police Department 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Michael Rivera v. New Castle County Police Department" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 678. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/678 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1338 
____________ 
 
MICHAEL A. RIVERA, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NEW CASTLE COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT; 
CORPORAL ANDREW ROSAIO; OFFICER JOSEPH 
MIHALYI; SERGEANT BRADLEY LANDIS; 
OFFICER KENNETH GUARINO; MASTER CORPORAL 
SILVIO MARTIN 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(District Court No. 1:20-cv-01758) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory B. Williams 
____________ 
 
Argued on July 7, 2025 
____________ 
 
Before:  RESTREPO, BIBAS, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 19, 2025) 
2 
 
 
Sophie Davish 
Forrest Lovett 
Will W. Sachse 
Dechert  
2929 Arch Street  
18th Floor, Cira Centre 
Philadelphia, PA 19104 
 
William Rider [ARGUED] 
University of Pennsylvania 
Penn Carey Law 
3501 Sansom Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19104 
 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
Daniel A. Griffith [ARGUED]  
Whiteford Taylor & Preston 
600 N King Street, Suite 300 
Wilmington, DE 19801 
 
Counsel for Appellee 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
CHUNG, Circuit Judge. 
Michael Rivera filed a complaint against the New 
Castle County Police Department (“NCCPD”) and several 
3 
 
John Doe officers.  The John Does were later identified 
(“Officer Defendants”) and Rivera added them in an amended 
complaint.  The District Court granted the Officer Defendants’ 
motion to dismiss, determining that the amended complaint 
was untimely and did not relate back to Rivera’s original 
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).  Because the District 
Court did not apply the correct standard in determining 
whether the amendment related back, we will vacate and 
remand. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
On December 23, 2020, Rivera filed a complaint against 
“New [C]astle [C]ounty PD, officers, Detectives, Turnkey 
officers Doe.”  Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 2 at 1.  Rivera alleged that 
the police officers violated his constitutional rights during a 
traffic stop and subsequent search.  Because Rivera was a 
prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, the District Court 
screened his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 
§ 1915A(a).  The District Court found that Rivera appeared to 
allege “cognizable Fourth Amendment and excessive force 
claims against the Doe Defendants[,]” but that the claim 
against the NCCPD was “legally frivolous[.]”  Dist. Ct. Dkt. 
No. 9 at 5.  The District Court therefore dismissed the claim 
against the NCCPD but in “the interests of justice” directed 
service against the NCCPD solely to identify the Doe 
Defendants.  Id. 
 
The NCCPD responded to that order on November 12, 
2021, identifying the Doe Defendants as Corporal Andrew 
Rosaio, Officer Joseph Mihalyi, Sergeant Bradley Landis, 
Officer Kenneth Guarino, and Master Corporal Silvio Martin.  
The NCCPD also filed four documents: a complaint Rivera 
4 
 
filed with the NCCPD the day after his arrest identifying 
Officer Mihalyi (spelled “Mahalley”), Master Corporal Martin, 
and an unknown individual as participating in his arrest; two 
undated Exoneration Letters from the NCCPD which identified 
Rosaio as the unknown individual and also named Officers 
Martin and Master Corporal Mihalyi; and the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing in Rivera’s state court criminal 
proceedings, in which Sergeant Landis and Officer Guarino 
(spelled “Quarino”) were identified.   
 
Rivera moved to amend the case caption to add the 
Officer Defendants on December 6, 2021.  On December 28, 
2021, the District Court granted Rivera’s motion and directed 
service on the Officer Defendants.  The Officer Defendants 
moved to dismiss the claim on March 22, 2022, arguing that 
the complaint was untimely because amending the complaint 
to add the Officer Defendants did not “relate back” to the filing 
date of the original complaint.1  Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 34 at 17-21.  
In so moving, the Officer Defendants asked the District Court 
to take judicial notice of the four documents filed by the 
NCCPD.  They argued that these documents established that 
Rivera knew their names when he filed his original complaint 
and made no mistake when he chose not to name them as 
defendants.  They argued that accordingly, Rivera’s amended 
complaint did not relate back to the original under Rule 15(c).   
 
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, 
concluding that the amended complaint was untimely because 
 
1  The parties agree that Rivera filed his initial complaint 
within the two-year statute of limitations.  Opening Br. at 3; 
Response Br. at 2.   
 
5 
 
Rivera “indisputably knew” the names of the Officer 
Defendants when he filed his original complaint.  Dist. Ct. Dkt. 
Nos. 42 at 8.  It thus concluded that the amended complaint did 
not relate back under Rule 15(c).  Id.  Rivera filed a motion to 
reconsider, which the District Court denied.  Rivera timely 
appealed.   
 
II. DISCUSSION2 
 
Rule 15(c) “governs when an amended pleading ‘relates 
back’ to the date of a timely filed original pleading and is thus 
itself timely even though it was filed outside an applicable 
statute of limitations.”  Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 
U.S. 538, 541 (2010).  Under Rule 15, a plaintiff may change 
the name of the party against whom claims are asserted only if 
(1) “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of 
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted 
to be set out—in the original pleading;” and (2) within the 
ninety-day time period for serving a defendant after a 
complaint is filed provided by Rule 4(m), “the party to be 
brought in by amendment ... received such notice of the action 
that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits and ... 
knew or should have known that the action would have been 
 
2  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We 
review a district court’s decision granting a motion to dismiss 
under a plenary standard,” including “a district court’s 
interpretation and application of Rule 15(c), and the dismissal 
of a claim based on the statute of limitations.”  Fowler v. 
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009); Glover v. 
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 698 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(internal citation omitted).   
6 
 
brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper 
party's identity.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).  In Krupski, the 
Supreme Court addressed Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii)’s requirement 
that “the party to be brought in by amendment … knew or 
should have known that the action would have been brought 
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s 
identity.”  560 U.S. at 541 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)).  The Court specified that “Rule 
15(c)(1)(C)(ii) asks what the prospective defendant knew or 
should have known during the Rule 4(m) period, not what the 
plaintiff knew or should have known at the time of filing her 
original complaint.”  Id. at 548 (emphasis in original). 
 
The District Court did not follow Krupski.  Instead, the 
District Court took judicial notice of Rivera’s complaint to the 
NCCPD, the exoneration letters, and the preliminary hearing 
transcript to conclude that “Plaintiff indisputably knew the 
identities of Defendants when he filed the Complaint and, 
therefore, the amendment inserting them in place of the John 
Does did not relate back to the Complaint[.]”  Dist. Ct. Dkt. 
No. 42 at 8.3  But focusing on Rivera’s knowledge was 
improper, as “the question under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) is what 
the [Officer Defendants]” knew or should have known in light 
of Rivera’s mistake.  Krupski, 560 U.S. at 553-54.  This error 
was not harmless as the Officer Defendants had actual 
knowledge that they were being sued, despite Rivera’s original 
 
3 The parties agree that the other requirements of Rule 
15(c) are met. 
 
7 
 
mistake in failing to name them, in the requisite period.4  This 
is evident from the fact that counsel entered an appearance on 
their behalf on March 3, 2022, within the ninety-day Rule 4(m) 
period.5  Given their knowledge, under a straightforward 
application of Rule 15(c) and Krupski, the amended complaint 
does relate back to the original and was timely filed. 
 
In the alternative, in considering Rivera’s knowledge, 
the District Court may have been determining whether Rivera 
made a mistake, pursuant to the second clause of Rule 15(c).  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) (an amended complaint relates 
 
4 Thus, even if the District Court were considering 
Rivera’s knowledge to resolve whether the Officer Defendants 
knew or should have reasonably known that they were the 
proper defendants but for Rivera’s mistake (which is not clear 
from the opinion), we would still vacate. 
 
5  In this case, the Rule 4(m) period began to run on 
December 28, 2021, since that was when the court finished 
screening Rivera’s complaint and ordered service of the 
amended complaint on the Officer Defendants.  The parties do 
not dispute the District Court’s conclusion that the ninety-day 
period under Rule 4(m) thus concluded on March 27, 2022.  
See Rivera Br. at 12; Tr. at 14:47-15:03 (“[W]e don’t dispute 
[the District Court’s] finding” of notice to the defendants); 
Urrutia v. Harrisburg Cnty. Police Dep’t, 91 F.3d 451, 453-54 
(3d Cir. 1996) (noting that the time period for relation back of 
an amended complaint is suspended while a court screens a 
complaint, but that when the court orders service of the 
amended complaint, the suspension ends and the Rule 4(m) 
period begins to run); Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 17. 
8 
 
back to the original, when among other things, there was “a 
mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.”).  We have 
previously held that, for purposes of Rule 15, a plaintiff’s 
ignorance of a defendant’s identity is a mistake.  Singletary v. 
Pa. Dep't. of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 201 (3d Cir. 2001).  Here, 
Rivera stated in his original and amended complaint that 
“multiple defendants” had “yet to be identified” and that he 
was “in the process of requesting” more information.  Dist. Ct. 
Dkt. Nos. 2 at 1, 8 at 1.  The Officer Defendants contested this 
in their motion to dismiss by offering the four documents filed 
by the NCCPD and arguing that Rivera had actual knowledge 
of their names yet did not name them. 6  In that case, knowledge 
would be relevant to determining whether or not Rivera did 
make a mistake. 
 
At best, the four documents offered by the Officer 
Defendants created a factual dispute regarding Rivera’s 
knowledge of their identities, establishing that Rivera had 
knowledge of their identities at the time the documents were 
created.  The District Court imputed that knowledge to Rivera 
at the time he filed his original complaint, despite the fact that 
approximately two years had elapsed, Rivera was incarcerated 
at that time, and he stated in both his complaint and a 
supplement to his complaint that he did not know the Officer 
Defendants’ names.  In other words, the District Court made 
an inference in a light less favorable to Rivera. 
 
 
6 In Krupski, the Supreme Court suggested, as have we, 
that a mistake is not committed when a plaintiff knows a 
defendant’s identity and strategically chooses not to name that 
person.  Krupski, 560 U.S. at 549.  We need not decide that 
here. 
9 
 
The District Court improperly resolved this factual 
dispute in granting the motion to dismiss as untimely.  “In this 
circuit … we permit a limitations defense to be raised by a 
motion under Rule 12(b)(6) only if the time alleged in the 
statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been 
brought within the statute of limitations.  However, if the bar 
is not apparent on the face of the complaint, then it may not 
afford the basis for a dismissal of the complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6).”  Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(internal quotations, citations, and brackets omitted).  Despite 
the fact that Rivera plainly stated in his complaint that he did 
not know the Officer Defendants’ identities, the District Court 
found that “Plaintiff indisputably knew the identities of 
Defendants when he filed the Complaint[.]”  Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 
42 at 8.  At the motion to dismiss stage, the District Court was 
obligated to “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and 
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the 
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”  Phillips v. 
Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 
2002)).  This is so even when facts in judicially noticed 
documents conflict with those in the complaint.  Doe v. 
Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 342 (3d Cir. 2022) (“When the 
truth of facts in an ‘integral’ document are contested by the 
well-pleaded facts of a complaint, the facts in the complaint 
must prevail.”).7 
 
7 We note that, while knowledge may have been relevant 
to the mistake alleged here, it would not necessarily have been 
dispositive.  Under Krupski, a plaintiff may have full 
knowledge of a defendant’s identity and yet still mistakenly 
 
10 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate and remand 
the District Court’s order denying the motion for 
reconsideration of the motion to dismiss for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
 
fail to name the defendant.  Krupski, 560 U.S. at 549, 554-55 
(determining that knowing the identity of the defendant, but 
misunderstanding the role the defendant played “in the events 
giving rise to the claim at issue” is “clearly a mistake 
concerning the proper party’s identity.” (internal quotations 
omitted)). 


Michael Rivera v. New Castle County Police Department

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-25-2025 
Michael Goodson, Sr. v. City of Philadelphia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Michael Goodson, Sr. v. City of Philadelphia" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 703. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/703 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
 
  NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 24-1438 
_____________ 
 
MICHAEL GOODSON, SR., 
    Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 CITY OF PHILADELPHIA;  
CHIEF INSPECTOR CHRISTOPHER FLACCO 
                 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:22-cv-03728) 
District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 5, 2024  
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and McKEE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 25, 2025) 
 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________________ 
 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and under I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.  
 
2 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Michael Goodson appeals two District Court Orders (1) denying his motion to 
voluntarily dismiss his case without prejudice and (2) granting summary judgment in 
favor of the City of Philadelphia and Chief Inspector Flacco (together “the City”) on, 
among other claims, Goodson’s claims of racial discrimination and retaliation in violation 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1  
 For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of 
Goodson’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. We will vacate the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment in favor of the City and remand for further proceedings. 
I.  
 Goodson moved for voluntary dismissal after the City moved for summary 
judgment. The District Court denied the motion as improper given the procedural posture 
of the case.2 It granted Goodson leave to respond to the City’s pending motion for 
summary judgment and warned that a failure to respond “may result in the dismissal of 
 
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) to (2). 
2 The District Court explained that:  
 
[D]espite the challenges attributed to Mr. Green [Goodson’s 
preferred counsel], Mr. Lassiter has remained Plaintiff’s 
counsel of record throughout this litigation, including the filing 
of the underlying motion on Goodson’s behalf. Under these 
circumstances, Goodson appears not to have met his 
responsibility to diligently prosecute the action, nor has he 
offered any explanation as to why Mr. Lassiter was unable to 
do so.  
 
App. 4-5 n.1. 
 
3 
 
this action for failure to prosecute.”3 Goodson did not file a response by the deadline 
imposed.  Rather than dismiss for a failure to prosecute as it warned it would do if 
Goodson failed to respond, the District Court granted the City’s motion for summary 
judgment. It reasoned: “having failed to respond to Defendant’s motion or to even engage 
in any affirmative discovery, Plaintiff has not and cannot meet his summary judgment 
burden.”4 This timely appeal followed. 
II. 5 
A. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Goodson’s motion 
for voluntary dismissal.  
 
 Goodson argues that the District Court abused its discretion in denying his motion 
to voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice because exceptional circumstances 
deprived him of an opportunity to litigate his claims.  
 We review the denial of a motion for voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure Rule 41(a)(2) for abuse of discretion.6 A district court abuses its 
discretion when it applies incorrect legal standards, fails to consider relevant factors, or 
reaches a decision that is clearly unreasonable.7  Rule 41(a)(2) permits voluntary 
dismissal by court order “on terms that the court considers proper.”8 In assessing Rule 
 
3 App. 5. 
4 App. 6-7 n.2. 
5 We have jurisdiction to review this final order of the District Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
6 Est. of Ware v. Hosp. of Univ. of Pa., 871 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2017); Ferguson v. 
Eakle, 492 F.2d 26, 28 (3d Cir. 1974).  
7 See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 295 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (providing that, except as specified elsewhere in the rule, “an 
action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms that the 
court considers proper”). 
 
4 
 
41(a)(2) motions, courts must consider whether dismissal will prejudice the defendant, 
based on factors such as the stage of litigation, effort, and expense incurred by the 
defendant, and whether a motion for summary judgment has been filed.9  
 Here, the District Court acted within its discretion in denying the motion. Goodson 
moved for voluntary dismissal a year into this litigation, after discovery closed and after 
the City moved for summary judgment. In denying his motion, the District Court 
explained:  
In their motion, Defendants note that Plaintiff did not engage 
in any affirmative discovery, nor did he serve any document 
requests or interrogatories or notice any depositions. In 
addition, Plaintiff did not appear for his own deposition. As 
noted, Plaintiff has also failed to respond to Defendants’ 
motion. Instead, Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss his 
complaint without prejudice.10 
 
 Goodson argues that his chosen counsel’s illness and inability to enter an 
appearance hindered his participation in litigation. That does not negate his chosen 
counsel’s substantial delay in filing an appearance. It also does not explain why his 
retained counsel did nothing for an entire year—including failing to notice any 
depositions or respond to the City’s notice to depose Mr. Goodson. Under these 
circumstances, it is obvious that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Goodson’s motion to dismiss without prejudice.  
B. The District Court erred in granting summary judgment.  
 
9 Est. of Ware, 871 F.3d at 285-86. 
10 App. 6 n.2. 
 
5 
 
We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the 
record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.11 Summary judgment is 
appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.12 Rule 56 does not authorize a default grant of summary 
judgment. Rather, it requires courts to independently evaluate the record before them to 
determine whether the moving party has met its summary judgment burden.13  
Here, the District Court’s Order does not comport with the requirements of Rule 
56. The Order granting summary judgment states only: “having failed to respond to 
Defendant’s motion or to even engage in any affirmative discovery, Plaintiff has not and 
cannot meet his summary judgment burden.”14 Goodson’s failure to respond does not 
relieve the District Court of its responsibility under Rule 56(e)(3).15  There is nothing in 
the District Court’s Order to reflect that it determined that “the motion and supporting 
materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that [the City] is entitled to” 
judgment as a matter of law.16 Under Rule 56(e)(3), the District Court was required to 
clearly consider the record before granting summary judgment. While we certainly 
understand the District Court’s loss of patience with the inexcusable conduct of 
 
11 Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Trailing Co., 180 F.3d 518, 521 (3d Cir. 1999). 
12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3) (“[T]he court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion 
and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the 
movant is entitled to it.”). 
14 App. 7 n.2. 
15 Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(explaining that it is “well-settled” that a nonmoving party’s failure to respond does not 
automatically entitle the moving party to a favorable grant of summary judgment). 
16 See supra note 18. 
 
6 
 
Goodson’s counsel over a period of more than one year, we cannot affirm a grant of 
summary judgment on this record.  
Our decision today is not meant to suggest that the District Court has no recourse 
on remand.  As noted above, in its Order denying voluntary dismissal, the District Court 
instructed Goodson to respond to the City’s pending motion for summary judgment or 
risk dismissal for a failure to prosecute.  Thus, on remand, the District Court could 
proceed as it had warned Goodson it would if he failed to respond—dismiss the 
complaint based on Goodson’s failure to prosecute.17  The City’s motion for summary 
judgment would then become moot.18  
III.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court's December 22, 2023 
Order denying Goodson’s motion to dismiss without prejudice and vacate its February 6, 
2024 Order granting summary judgment in favor of the City. We will remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
17 The District Court should consider the factors we set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984) before entering a final order dismissing this 
complaint for a failure to prosecute. See Hamer v. LivaNova Deutschland GmbH, 994 
F.3d 173, 180 n.25 (3d Cir. 2021) (“District Courts must ordinarily consider the six 
factors laid out by Poulis . . . before dismissing a case by court order under Rule 41(b).”). 
Alternatively, under Celotex, the District Court could examine whether the City showed 
that Goodson could not make “a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to” his case for which he “will bear the burden of proof at trial.” See 
Mall Chevrolet, Inc. v. Gen. Motors LLC, 99 F.4th 622, 630 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P 56(c)(1)(B) 
(allowing a movant to support a summary judgment motion by “showing . . . that an 
adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact” asserted). 
18 See Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).  


Michael Goodson, Sr. v. City of Philadelphia

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-26-2025 
Tariq Wyatt v. Municipality of Commonwealth of Harrisburg 
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Recommended Citation 
"Tariq Wyatt v. Municipality of Commonwealth of Harrisburg" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 710. 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
CLD-184        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 25-1372 
___________ 
 
TARIQ WYATT, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MUNICIPALITY OF COMMONWEALTH OF HARRISBURG; MUNICIPALITY OF 
COMMONWEALTH OF MECHANICSBURG; JUDGE JENNIFER P. WILSON, In 
their Individual and Official Capacity; JUDGE MARTIN C. CARLSON, In their 
Individual and Official Capacity; KIMBERLY A. ADAMS, Esq., In their Individual and 
Official Capacity; DAG JONATHAN M BLAKE, In their Individual and Official 
Capacity; GOVERNOR TOM WOLFE, In their Individual and Official Capacity; AG 
MICHELLE A. HENRY, In their Individual and Official Capacity 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-00509) 
District Judge:  Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 17, 2025 
 
Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 26, 2025) 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Tariq Wyatt, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, appeals pro se from the District 
Court’s order dismissing his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We will 
summarily affirm, with one modification. 
I. 
 Wyatt filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting an access to the courts 
claim against municipal defendants Harrisburg and Mechanicsburg. Wyatt’s claims arise 
from two different suits he previously filed.1 According to Wyatt, mail sent to him from 
the Pennsylvania Attorney General and Department of Corrections (DOC) offices was 
sent as nonprivileged, rather than privileged, correspondence, in violation of DOC 
policy.2 Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson’s Report and Recommendation (R&R) 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 See Wyatt v. Hauser, et al., 1:22-cv-00092 (defendants’ motion for summary judgment 
granted, appeal pending at C.A. No. 25-1517) & Wyatt v. Mason, et al., 1:22-cv-00414 
(defendants’ motion to dismiss granted, affirmed on appeal at C.A. No. 24-2520). 
 
2 Because this case was adjudicated at the motion to dismiss stage, we accept all factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012). We also 
 
3 
 
recommended dismissing the complaint without prejudice for failure to identify the 
proper defendants in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. District Court 
Judge Jennifer P. Wilson overruled Wyatt’s timely objections and adopted the R&R in its 
entirety.  
Wyatt then filed an amended complaint in which he named several additional 
defendants in their official and individual capacities: Judges Carlson and Wilson, former 
and current Governors of Pennsylvania Tom Wolf and Josh Shapiro, then-Pennsylvania 
Attorney General Michelle Henry, Deputy Attorney General Jonathan Blake, and 
assistant counsel for the Pennsylvania DOC Kimberly Adams. The complaint seeks 
injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, as well as class action status. The case was 
reassigned to District Court Judge Malachy E. Mannion. Wyatt filed a motion for 
appointment of counsel, which the District Court denied. It then screened the amended 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). It dismissed the § 1983 official-capacity 
claims for monetary damages against Adams, Blake, Wolf, Shapiro, and Henry without 
prejudice, dismissed as moot the § 1983 official-capacity claims for declaratory or 
injunctive relief against Adams and Wolf, denied the request for class action status with 
 
construe Wyatt’s filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per 
curiam).   
 
4 
 
prejudice, and dismissed the remaining claims with prejudice. It also denied leave to 
amend. Wyatt timely appealed. 
II. 
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District 
Court’s sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 
229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may summarily affirm “on any basis supported by 
the record” if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 
650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. To 
survive dismissal, a complaint must set out “sufficient factual matter” to show that its 
claims are facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  
Prisoners have a constitutional right of meaningful access to the courts. See Lewis 
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). To state a cognizable access-to-courts claim, a 
plaintiff must allege: (1) an “actual injury” (i.e., a lost opportunity to pursue a 
nonfrivolous claim challenging his sentence or conditions of confinement); and (2) that 
there is no other remedy, save the present civil rights suit, that can possibly compensate 
for the lost claim. Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).  
Dismissal of Wyatt’s amended complaint was appropriate because it fails to allege 
an actual injury. He complains that certain mail related to his other pending suits was sent 
to him by Blake and Adams as nonprivileged correspondence in violation of PA DOC 
 
5 
 
ADM 803—but even assuming Blake and Adams violated said policy,3 Wyatt fails to 
point to any actual injury that resulted from the alleged violation. He states that he 
received a motion filed in Wyatt v. Hauser late because it was sent as nonprivileged 
correspondence, but also acknowledges that he requested and was granted an extension of 
time to respond.  He also complains that in Wyatt v. Mason, he did not receive Judge 
Carlson’s R&R until after it was adopted by Judge Wilson. But in adopting the R&R, the 
District Court dismissed some claims with prejudice, others without, and provided leave 
to amend, which Wyatt did twice. He did move for reconsideration because of his 
delayed receipt of the R&R, but the District Court deemed the motion withdrawn after he 
filed his first amended complaint. His complaint thus lacks sufficient facts to plausibly 
allege that he lost an opportunity to pursue his claims, meritorious or otherwise.  
Considering the foregoing, the District Court did not abuse its discretion or 
otherwise err in dismissing the complaint without leave to amend after determining 
that further amendment would have been futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 
293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  
 
3 As the District Court correctly pointed out, it does not appear that they did. 
 
6 
 
Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s judgment, but will modify the dismissal to be with prejudice in 
its entirety.4 
 
4 Wyatt’s pending motion to stay this appeal is denied. 


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