Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-22-2025 
In Re: Bradley Livingston 
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Recommended Citation 
"In Re: Bradley Livingston" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 426. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/426 
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ALD-150        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 25-1858 
___________ 
 
IN RE: BRADLEY LIVINGSTON, 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 2:23-cv-23006) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.  
May 15, 2025 
 
Present BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed May 22, 2025) 
__________ 
 
OPINION 
__________ 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se Petitioner Bradley Livingston has filed a petition for writ of mandamus 
with this Court seeking the recusal of the assigned Magistrate Judge and other relief. We 
will deny the petition.   
Livingston filed a civil complaint related to the termination of his employment. 
The case was assigned to District Judge Julien X. Neals, and, since July 2024, to 
Magistrate Judge Stacey D. Adams, to handle pretrial matters. After filing his complaint, 
Livingston filed many motions in the District Court. For example, Livingston filed a 
 
2 
 
motion to compel summary judgment, then appealed Magistrate Judge Adams’ order 
denying him summary judgment.1  Livingston also filed motions/letters for entry of 
final/default judgment. Further, Livingston filed a motion to reassign the case. Livingston 
also sought the recusal of Magistrate Judge Adams, which she denied.  
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on January 13, 2025. That 
motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Adams. Livingston filed a response to the 
motion to dismiss on March 29, 2025. By order entered April 30, 2025, Magistrate Judge 
Adams directed the Clerk to administratively terminate 30 of Livingston’s outstanding 
motions (27 without prejudice, three with prejudice); stay the matter pending resolution 
of the motion to dismiss; and to not accept further filings from Livingston without an 
initial screening by District Judge Neals. On May 7, 2025, Chief Judge Bumb of the 
District of New Jersey issued a preclusion order, which, Inter alia, denied Livingston’s 
separate recusal motion against District Judge Neals and ordered Livingston to not to file 
motions or actions pursuing frivolous claims or claims related to or duplicative of those 
in this case.   
 Meanwhile, on May 5, 2025, Livingston filed a petition for writ of mandamus in 
this Court asking us to direct the recusal of Magistrate Judge Adams, to provide 
unspecified “relief for denial of due process and violations of Petitioner’s right to a fair 
trial,” and to issue an “order preserving and enforcing Petitioner’s right to a jury trial.” 
After Chief Judge Bumb’s order, Livingston filed in this Court what could be construed 
 
1 This Court dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
 
3 
 
as an amended mandamus petition complaining that the District Court “[a]ppears to have 
consolidated or obstructed all my filings in a retaliatory pattern.” He asks us to, inter alia, 
“[o]rder reinstatement and full review of this case and all other pending and newly filed 
cases initiated by Plaintiff, free of judicial bias, misidentification, or retaliation.”  
A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in extraordinary 
circumstances. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005). 
A writ should not issue unless the petitioner has “no other adequate means to attain the 
relief” sought and has shown that his right to the writ is “clear and indisputable.” Id. at 
378-79 (quoting Cheney v. United States Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004)).  
Livingston relies on 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) to support his mandamus petition. That 
statute provides that “[a]ny justice, judge or magistrate judge of the United States shall 
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.” Id. Mandamus is an appropriate vehicle for reviewing the denial of a recusal 
motion. Cf. Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 1993). 
However, Livingston has not shown that he has a “clear and indisputable” right to the 
writ of mandamus because he has not met the recusal standard, namely, that “a 
reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge’s 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 
220 (3d Cir. 2003).  
Livingston claims that Magistrate Judge Adams is biased against him because she 
has granted all of the Defendants’ motions while ignoring, delaying, or denying his 
motions. He also complains that she purportedly coached defense counsel by directing 
 
4 
 
them to file a motion to compel against him in a hearing and never “addressed” a 
defective certificate of service by Defendants. Finally, he claims that the District Court 
ignored his motion for Magistrate Judge Adams’ recusal.   
“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or 
partiality recusal motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). None of 
Magistrate Judge Adams’ rulings though provide an indicium of bias. As for Livingston’s 
allegations concerning “coaching”, the record does not indicate that Defendants filed a 
motion to compel after that conference and Livingston provides no underlying support 
for his conclusory allegation that Magistrate Judge Adams “coached” Defendants’ 
counsel.   
Livingston also claims that the District Court ignored his request for Magistrate 
Judge Adams’ recusal. This argument is belied by the record as Magistrate Judge Adams 
denied Livingston’s motion for her recusal. Livingston did not file an appeal of that 
decision to District Judge Neals, but instead filed a motion for reconsideration to 
Magistrate Judge Adams, which she then also denied. 
 Finally, to the extent that Livingston challenges Chief Judge Bumb’s recent 
preclusion order, we detect no sign of bias there either. Rather, as with Magistrate Judge 
Adams’ order, all we perceive are routine case management decisions, which are within 
the discretion of the District Court, and not an appropriate basis for mandamus relief. 
See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982) (a District 
Court has discretion over docket management). The extraordinary remedy of mandamus 
relief in this case is not warranted. Thus, we will deny Livingston’s mandamus petition.  


English

In Re: Bradley Livingston

Snyder, Julia A.

A Modern Moby-Dick: The First Circuit Reveals How Man\u27s Unchecked Fixations Still Impact Nantucket\u27s North Atlantic Right Whale in Nantucket Residents Against Turbines v. U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-2-2025 
Michael Coniker v. Jeffrey Monfortoh 
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Recommended Citation 
"Michael Coniker v. Jeffrey Monfortoh" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 441. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/441 
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DLD-150        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 25-1112 
___________ 
 
PRESIDENT MICHAEL CONIKER; RESOURCE SOLUTIONS LLC 
    
 
v. 
 
BISHOP JEFFREY MONFORTOH; RANDY CHRISTENSEN, PRESIDENT 
(AFC.ORG); JOSEPH E. HUDAK, ESQ.; KYLE BROWN, DIRECTOR, BANK 
ESCALATIONS GROUP; PNC BANK; PA STATE POLICE; STATE 
TROOPER PADASAK; THE MEADOWS PSYCHIATRIC CENTER; USA FBI; FBI 
AGENT SCOTT FRANCIS; MATTHEW SENTNER, PA, BELLEVUE POLICE 
CHIEF; WILLIAM A. MCCAFFERTY, OH, STEUBENVILLE POLICE CHIEF; 
ANDREW HREZO; DIOCESE OF STEUBENVILLE 
 
Michael Coniker, Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-01184) 
District Judge:  Honorable Marilyn J. Horan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action, and on Appellees’ Motion for Summary Action, 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 15, 2025 
Before:  RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and NYGARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed June 2, 2025) 
_________ 
 
 
2 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Michael Coniker appeals from the District Court’s order denying 
his post-judgment motion to reopen.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s order. 
 In 2022, Coniker initiated a pro se civil action in the District Court on his own 
behalf and on behalf of Resource Solutions, LLC.  After Coniker amended his complaint 
twice, the District Court dismissed his case for failing to comply with Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).  On appeal, we summarily affirmed the District Court’s decision, 
as Coniker’s allegations were incomprehensible and thus too vague to notify the 
defendants of any potential claims against them.  See C.A. No. 23-1507. 
More than a year later, Coniker filed a motion to reopen his case.  He claimed that 
he paid three lawyers to file lawsuits related to his claims and argued that those lawyers 
should be required to account for his payments.  Coniker also requested that the U.S. 
Marshals Service take him into protective custody.  He included nearly a hundred pages 
of attachments with no further clarification.  The District Court denied his motion, and 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
3 
 
Coniker timely appealed.1  Several appellees have moved for summary action, and the 
Clerk has notified Coniker that the appeal will be considered for possible summary action 
regarding the remaining appellees. 
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Coniker’s motion, which did not provide a basis for reopening the final judgment issued 
in his case.2  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (setting forth grounds for relief from a final 
judgment); see also Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 255 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[A] 
party seeking Rule 60(b)(6) relief must demonstrate the existence of ‘extraordinary 
circumstances’ that justify reopening the judgment.”).  Coniker’s motion was also not 
based on any potential ground for reconsideration, such as an intervening change in law, 
newly discovered evidence, or “the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to 
prevent manifest injustice.”  See Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 
176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
1  As we explained in his prior appeal, Coniker cannot proceed pro se on behalf of 
Resources Solutions, LLC.  See Simbraw v. United States, 367 F.2d 373, 373-74 (3d Cir. 
1966) (per curiam). 
 
2  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the denial of Coniker’s 
motion for abuse of discretion.  See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  We may summarily affirm a district court’s decision, “on any basis supported 
by the record,” if the appeal fails to present a substantial question.  See Murray v. 
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 
4 
 
Accordingly, we grant the appellees’ motion for summary action and will affirm 
the District Court’s order.  


Michael Coniker v. Jeffrey Monfortoh

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-3-2025 
Edwena Leite v. School District of Philadelphia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Edwena Leite v. School District of Philadelphia" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 446. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/446 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-2607 
____________ 
 
EDWENA LEITE, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00306) 
District Judge: Honorable Timothy J. Savage 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 2, 2025 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, BIBAS, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 3, 2025)  
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Edwena Leite appeals a summary judgment for the School District of Philadelphia 
on her claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. We will affirm. 
I 
Leite was a special education teacher and liaison in the School District. An audit 
in February 2020 revealed that she had neglected her duties by failing to deliver students’ 
files to their new schools. It also found that Leite’s individual education programs for 
students lacked data and evidence and that she had provided “questionable levels of 
service” for them. App. 414 (capitalization altered). 
Leite learned that she was pregnant and informed school principal Zaida Alfaro in 
May 2020. A month later, Alfaro held an investigatory conference with Leite and her 
union counsel to discuss the audit’s findings. Alfaro issued an Unsatisfactory Incident 
Report (SEH-204), concluding that Leite had failed to provide adequate instruction to 
students, supply special education records, and manage confidential files. Alfaro made a 
preliminary recommendation to: (1) suspend Leite for three days, (2) issue her a written 
warning, and (3) place the SEH-204 and related documents in Leite’s personnel file. 
Following several years of sabbatical and extended sick leave, Leite was instructed 
to attend another disciplinary conference, this one to discuss the SEH-204. After that 
meeting, Alfaro wrote a Conference Summary Report that “revis[ed]” her 
recommendations in the SEH-204, reducing Leite’s suggested suspension to one day. 
App. 458. 
The last disciplinary proceeding was a second-level hearing in June 2023. 
 
3 
 
Following that, Hearing Officer Shelia Wallin issued a Summary Report, which upheld 
Alfaro’s findings but modified her recommendations. The final recommendations 
included: (1) a written warning and (2) forwarding of the Report, SEH-204, and “all 
related documents” to Leite’s personnel file. App. 461. A few months later, Leite 
resigned and took a higher-paying position in a different school district. 
Leite sued the School District under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., asserting claims for pregnancy discrimination, race 
discrimination, and retaliation.1 She alleged that documents from the disciplinary 
proceedings were placed in her personnel file, inhibiting her from securing new 
employment. 
During discovery, the School District produced Leite’s personnel file, which had 
no documents relating to the 2020 disciplinary proceedings. The School District also 
submitted the declaration of Matthew Rambo, Manager of Employee Records. He 
attested there were no documents in Leite’s file from the proceedings, and no one had 
requested removal of documents from her file. Rambo also stated that employees’ files 
were “accessible only to a limited number of School District personnel” and not to 
“outside employers, prospective employers and/or non-School District entities.” App. 
470–71. 
Following discovery, the School District moved for summary judgment, which the 
District Court granted. Leite appealed. 
 
1 The District Court dismissed Leite’s retaliation claim, which she does not appeal. 
 
4 
 
II2 
Leite contends that summary judgment was improper because there is a genuine 
dispute about whether the documents from the disciplinary proceedings were placed in 
her personnel file, interfering with her ability to secure a new job. The District Court 
observed that, if proven, that allegation would constitute an adverse employment action 
under Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024). But it determined that Leite had 
failed to identify facts from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the disciplinary 
documents were in her file and accessible to prospective employers. So she did not 
establish an “injury respecting her employment terms or conditions.” Id. at 359. We 
agree. 
Leite argues that the District Court erred “[g]iven the lower bar of Muldrow” for 
her prima facie case. Leite Br. 14. But she misreads Muldrow. While it broadened the 
scope of what can constitute an adverse action, Muldrow did not alter the non-movant’s 
burden at summary judgment to identify facts from which a reasonable juror could infer 
that the alleged adverse action occurred. 
Leite has not shown an adverse action. She points to Alfaro’s and Wallin’s 
recommendations that documents relating to the disciplinary action be placed in her 
personnel file. But Leite acknowledges that she never viewed her own file, and she offers 
no evidence that those recommendations were carried out. In fact, the record suggests the 
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s summary judgment de novo. Faush v. 
Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 
5 
 
opposite: the file produced during discovery contained no documents relating to any of 
the disciplinary proceedings. 
Leite insists that only a factfinder can decide whether it believes the School 
District’s evidence. But she offers no reasons to doubt that evidence, let alone any 
evidence of her own that these documents ever made it into her file. The School District 
maintains a policy of keeping disciplinary documents in employees’ personnel file unless 
an employee applies to remove them. Leite never requested that any of her documents be 
removed. And even if the documents were put in her file, Leite has provided no evidence 
that prospective employers had access to her file or otherwise knew of her disciplinary 
history.3 
Leite’s failure to show a genuine dispute of material fact as to her alleged adverse 
employment actions dooms both claims. Jones v. Sch. Dist., 198 F.3d 403, 411 (3d Cir. 
1999) (race discrimination); Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 365 (3d Cir. 
2008) (pregnancy discrimination). So the School District was entitled to summary 
judgment. 
* * * 
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
3 To the extent that Leite contends that the disciplinary process itself constitutes an 
adverse employment action, that argument fails. She has not shown how the School 
District’s disciplinary process—which was conducted according to procedure—
constituted a “harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.” 
Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355. Without more, her conclusory assertion that she suffered 
“emotional and mental anguish” from the process, Leite Br. 10, does not preclude 
summary judgment. 


Edwena Leite v. School District of Philadelphia

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-3-2025 
Universal Underwriters Insurance Co v. John Swenson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Universal Underwriters Insurance Co v. John Swenson" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 448. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/448 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1939 
____________ 
 
UNIVERSAL UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
v. 
 
JOHN SWENSON, 
  Appellant 
               
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3:21-cv-00259) 
District Judge: Honorable Julia K. Munley 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 2, 2025 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, BIBAS, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 3, 2025)  
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 John Swenson appeals the District Court’s summary judgment for Universal 
Underwriters Insurance Company. We will affirm, essentially for the reasons stated by 
the District Court in its cogent opinion. 
I 
While driving a truck for his employer, Kress Auto Wreckers, Swenson was 
involved in a collision with an underinsured motorist. Because his injuries resulted in 
costly medical bills, Swenson requested repayment from Kress’s insurer, Universal. 
At the time of Swenson’s accident, Universal insured Kress employees against 
bodily injuries caused by underinsured motorists. Kress’s 2008–2009 policy provided an 
underinsured motorist coverage limit of $35,000, except for certain “designated 
individuals” who would be covered up to $300,000. App. 584 (capitalization altered). But 
unlike prior versions—which had identified Kress’s co-owners as “designated 
individuals”—the 2008–2009 policy left the “list [of] designated individuals” section 
blank. Id. (capitalization altered). 
 Because Kress’s policy did not list Swenson as a “designated individual,” 
Universal offered the basic policy limit of $35,000. But Swenson pressed for more. In his 
view, the policy’s silence as to “designated individuals” meant that all insureds were 
entitled to $300,000 in coverage. To resolve this disagreement, Universal filed a 
declaratory judgment action in the District Court. Following discovery, Universal moved 
for summary judgment. 
The District Court granted Universal’s motion. It reasoned that the insurance 
 
3 
 
policy unambiguously “provided coverage higher than $35,000 for designated 
individuals, and [Swenson was] not listed as a designated individual.” Universal 
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Swenson, 2024 WL 1683636, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2024). 
The Court rejected Swenson’s contention that an empty list of “designated individuals” 
entitled all insureds to $300,000 in coverage, noting that he “cited no authority” for this 
alternative view. Id. So the Court granted Universal summary judgment and issued a 
declaratory judgment. Swenson timely appealed.1 
II2 
 Swenson makes largely the same argument on appeal that he made before the 
District Court: because the 2008–2009 policy did not list any “designated individuals,” 
all insureds are entitled to $300,000 in coverage. And to the extent that the policy is 
ambiguous with respect to additional coverage, he says, the ambiguity should be resolved 
against Universal, the policy’s drafter. Like the District Court, we are unpersuaded. 
Under Pennsylvania law, the terms of an insurance policy are ambiguous “if they 
are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation when applied to a particular set of 
facts.” Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999). 
As for Swenson’s claim, there is only one reasonable interpretation of the 2008–2009 
 
1 The District Court also rejected Swenson’s “stacking” theory of coverage. He does not 
appeal that portion of the District Court’s opinion. 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is de novo. Sapa Extrusions, Inc. v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 939 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 
4 
 
policy. “[D]esignated individuals” may access $300,000 in coverage; all other insureds 
are limited to $35,000. App. 584 (capitalization altered). Because Swenson is insured but 
not a “designated individual[],” his coverage is capped at $35,000. Id. (capitalization 
altered). 
Swenson’s alternative interpretation is untenable. It is strange that Kress 
designated no beneficiaries for its additional coverage. But Swenson’s reading—that all 
insureds are “designated individuals”—would be stranger still. On his view, the policy’s 
exception would swallow the rule, completely nullifying the baseline coverage of 
$35,000. We decline to “resort to [this] strained contrivance in order to find an 
ambiguity.” Madison Constr. Co., 735 A.2d at 106. 
* * * 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court’s summary judgment. 


Universal Underwriters Insurance Co v. John Swenson

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-9-2025 
Barbara Clark v. Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Barbara Clark v. Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 468. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/468 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-3197 
__________ 
 
BARBARA ANNE CLARK 
 
v. 
 
HOSPITAL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA; PENN MEDICINE 
ORTHOPEDICS; BETTY S ALDER, INSURANCE ATTORNEY 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:24-cv-02970) 
District Judge: Honorable John F. Murphy 
__________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 7, 2025 
Before:  KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 9, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
 Barbara Anne Clark, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s November 5, 
2024 Order dismissing her complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  We will 
affirm the Court’s order. 
 In 2023, Clark filed a complaint against the named defendants, alleging they had, 
over a period of several years, committed medical malpractice in the treatment of her left 
foot, causing her lasting injuries and significant pain and suffering.  After being served 
and entering an appearance, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction.  After receiving briefing and hearing oral argument on the 
matter, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1) and dismissed Clark’s complaint without prejudice.  The District 
Court determined that the parties were all domiciled in Pennsylvania and therefore not 
diverse for purposes of federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and that Clark 
had failed to invoke federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because her claims arose 
under state law.  Clark now appeals, and also seeks a default judgment against the 
appellees for their alleged failure to timely respond in the District Court.  
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Dismissals under Rule 12(b)(1) are 
reviewed de novo.  See Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 
2006).  In reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), we review only whether the well-
pleaded allegations on the face of the complaint, taken as true, allege facts sufficient to 
invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the District Court.  Id. 
 
3 
 
We agree that the District Court correctly granted the motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction.  Nothing in Clark’s filings with this Court meaningfully 
addresses the District Court’s conclusion that her complaint failed to establish subject-
matter jurisdiction, either by diversity or federal question.  She cannot establish diversity 
jurisdiction, as her complaint expressly pleads that all parties are domiciled in 
Pennsylvania and that all relevant medical treatment occurred within the state.  Johnson 
v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 346 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating that complete 
diversity means that “no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any of the 
defendants” (quotation marks omitted)).  Nor did she plead federal question jurisdiction.  
Her complaint solely alleged a state-law medical-malpractice claim.  While she argues on 
appeal that she has established federal question jurisdiction based on her right to petition 
the federal judiciary under the First Amendment of the Constitution, she did not plead a 
First Amendment claim.  See Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 188; see generally Patchak v. Jewell, 
828 F.3d 995, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining that “the right to access federal courts is 
subject to Congress’s Article III power to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior 
courts of the United States”).  As a result, Clark’s complaint failed to establish that the 
District Court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction, and the District Court correctly 
granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on those grounds. 
Clark has also filed a motion in this Court in which she requests that a default 
judgment be entered against the appellees for their alleged failure to respond to her initial 
 
4 
 
complaint within 21 days.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i).  A motion for a default 
judgment should be filed in the District Court, not the Court of Appeals, see Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 1, 55, and in any event, the defendants entered an appearance and filed their motion 
seeking dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction within 21 days of service, as 
required by Rule 12.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i).  
For these reasons, the District Court’s judgment will be affirmed.  Clark’s motion 
for a default judgment is denied. 


Barbara Clark v. Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-9-2025 
USA v. Norberto Castillo-Lopez 
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"USA v. Norberto Castillo-Lopez" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 474. 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1500 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
NORBERTO CASTILLO-LOPEZ, 
            Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:20-cr-00266-002) 
District Judge: Honorable J. Nicholas Ranjan 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 6, 2025 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, BIBAS, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 9, 2025) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Norberto Castillo-Lopez appeals his judgment of sentence after a jury found him 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
guilty of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine. We will 
affirm. 
I 
Castillo-Lopez supplied cocaine to a co-conspirator in Ohio who redistributed it in 
Pennsylvania. So he was indicted in the Western District of Pennsylvania for conspiring 
to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. 
He was charged and later indicted for another drug-related offense in the Southern 
District of Ohio. And following his arrest, Castillo-Lopez was indicted yet again in the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania for illegally reentering the United States. 
After the parties reached a plea agreement providing for the global resolution of 
these charges, the District Court scheduled a change-of-plea hearing. But before the 
hearing, Castillo-Lopez changed his mind and wanted to go to trial. 
At a status conference, the prosecutor described the plea agreement. The District 
Court remarked that Castillo-Lopez’s sentencing “exposure” across the three cases was 
“significant” and said that the plea agreement “seems like a good deal.” App. 57–58. 
During another status conference, the Court again said that the plea agreement was 
“pretty favorable” after discussing Castillo-Lopez’s possible sentencing exposure. App. 
70. 
Castillo-Lopez proceeded to trial, and the jury found him guilty of the cocaine-
related offense. His Guidelines sentencing range was 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. 
At sentencing, the Court acknowledged the particular circumstances that influenced 
Castillo-Lopez’s decision to go to trial. The Court explained that a downward variance, 
3 
 
“the equivalent of essentially a three point downward adjustment,” was appropriate to 
reflect what Castillo-Lopez “would have received for acceptance of responsibility.” App. 
130. The Court imposed a 135-month sentence, and Castillo-Lopez appealed. 
II1 
Castillo-Lopez argues that the District Court plainly erred by participating in plea 
discussions, thereby violating Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
We need not decide whether the Court violated Rule 11(c)(1) because Castillo-Lopez has 
not shown that his substantial rights were affected. See United States v. Dominguez 
Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81 (2004). 
Castillo-Lopez does not argue that he was prejudiced during his trial. Instead, he 
claims that the District Court’s comments “create[d] the appearance of a premature 
commitment to a sentence of at least a certain level of severity.” Castillo-Lopez Br. 38 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Crowell, 60 F.3d 199, 205 (5th Cir. 
1995)). The record shows otherwise. 
The Court’s explanation for its downward variance showed leniency, not 
vindictiveness. And the fact that Castillo-Lopez was sentenced well below his Guidelines 
sentencing range renders prejudice implausible. So Castillo-Lopez has not shown that 
“the probability of a different result is sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome” of his sentencing. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83 (cleaned up). 
 We will therefore affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 


USA v. Norberto Castillo-Lopez

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-11-2025 
In Re: Anthony Bailey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: Anthony Bailey" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 483. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/483 
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1 
 
DLD-064        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-3316 
___________ 
 
IN RE: ANTHONY K. BAILEY, 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
(Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 1:18-cv-01188) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
January 16, 2025 
 
Before: RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed June 11, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Anthony Bailey petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1651, seeking relief from the District Court’s dismissal of his employment action for 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We will deny his petition. 
In 2022, we vacated and remanded the District Court’s dismissal of Bailey’s New 
Jersey Wage Theft Act claim against NRG Energy, Inc., but we affirmed the District 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
Court’s dismissal of Bailey’s other claims. See Bailey v. Millenium Grp., No. 21-1752, 
2022 WL 3754617 (3d Cir. Aug. 30, 2022). On remand, the District Court declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Bailey’s wage theft claim and dismissed the 
claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Bailey filed a petition for writ of mandamus, 
arguing that the District Court erred in finding that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, 
and that the District Court disobeyed our mandate by dismissing the wage-theft claim on 
an alternative basis. 
Mandamus relief “is an extreme remedy reserved for only the most extraordinary 
situations.” In re Abbott Laboratories, 96 F.4th 371, 379 (3d Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). To 
obtain mandamus relief, Bailey must show “(1) a clear and indisputable abuse of 
discretion or error of law, (2) a lack of an alternate avenue for adequate relief, and (3) a 
likelihood of irreparable injury.” See id. “[A] writ of mandamus should not be issued 
where relief may be obtained through an ordinary appeal.” In re Baldwin, 700 F.3d 122, 
127 (3d Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).  
Here, Bailey could have directly appealed from the District Court’s final order 
dismissing his wage-theft claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Bailey filed his 
mandamus petition on December 16, 2024, about one month past his deadline to timely 
appeal.1 We will not find that Bailey “now lacks adequate alternative means to obtain the 
 
1 The District Court entered its opinion and final order on October 16, 2024. Bailey’s 
deadline to timely appeal was November 15, 2024. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). 
 
3 
 
relief he seeks simply because he allowed the time for an appeal to expire.” See Oracare 
DPO, Inc. v. Merin, 972 F.2d 519, 523 (3d Cir. 1992).2  
Consequently, we deny Bailey’s petition for writ of mandamus. 
 
 
2 Even if mandamus were an appropriate avenue for relief, the District Court did not 
ignore our mandate by dismissing Bailey’s wage theft claim on an alternative basis not 
foreclosed by our opinion. 


In Re: Anthony Bailey

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-31-2025 
Ramon Placencia v. Commissioner Social Security 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Ramon Placencia v. Commissioner Social Security" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 246. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/246 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
No. 24-1887 
   
 
RAMON PLACENCIA, 
Appellant 
v. 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
       
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No. 2:23-cv-00911) 
District Judge: Honorable Jamel K. Semper 
       
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on March 27, 2025 
Before: BIBAS, PHIPPS, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: March 31, 2025) 
___________ 
OPINION* 
___________ 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
Ramon Placencia applied for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423, for a disabling condition he alleged began on February 15, 2009. He 
has wended his way through the administrative appeals process ever since. This appeal is 
about the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) latest decision that Placencia was not disabled 
between February 15, 2009 and December 4, 2012. 
Placencia raises two objections. First, he claims that the ALJ failed to explain his 
finding that none of Placencia’s impairments, either alone or together, was presumptively 
disabling. And second, he argues that the ALJ’s finding that he could perform light and 
simple tasks lacked substantial evidentiary support. We disagree. There is ample support 
in the record to support both findings, so we affirm. 
I 
Placencia’s warehouse job laid him off in February 2009. Shortly after, he applied 
for disability insurance, alleging that he was disabled by several physical and mental im-
pairments. Between the time he was laid off and December 2012, Placencia had visited 
several medical professionals to address chronic and acute health problems. At least six 
physicians and psychologists also reviewed his medical records during this period to eval-
uate his disability claims. 
A 
Placencia’s physical impairments included diabetes, hypertension, and, later, a min-
istroke. His first medical visit during the relevant period was to his primary care physician, 
 
3 
Dr. Gregorio Guillen, in April 2009. According to the records from this check-up, Placen-
cia’s diabetes was “better controlled” and his hypertension was “at goal.” Tr. 257.1  
Though he did not seek significant treatment for any physical complaints over the 
next year, he did attend other physical consultative examinations for his disability claim. 
The first was in November 2009 with Dr. Francky Merlin. Placencia told Dr. Merlin that 
he had pain in his left leg and felt depressed. His glucose level was also high.  
Two months later, Dr. David Schneider, another medical consultant, reviewed 
Placencia’s records. He found that Placencia had poorly controlled his diabetes and hyper-
tension, but saw “no evidence of any end organ damage.” Tr. 303. In Dr. Schneider’s view, 
Dr. Merlin’s findings “were es[s]entially within normal limits,” and Placencia could per-
form light work. Tr. 303. 
In May 2010, Placencia suffered a ministroke. He was admitted to the hospital and 
presented with left-sided weakness, slurred speech, and facial drooping. Within a few 
hours, his primary symptoms had resolved; within a week, his weakness was improving; 
and within four months, he was “asymptomatic.” Tr. 360.  
After his ministroke, two more medical consultants reviewed his records. Dr. Robert 
Walsh performed his review in September 2011. He concluded that Placencia struggled to 
push and pull, but could still perform light-exertion work, like standing, walking, and car-
rying. Dr. James Paolino then reviewed Placencia’s records in March 2012. His assessment 
essentially mirrored Dr. Walsh’s. 
 
1 “Tr.” refers to the certified administrative transcript, which is found at Dkt. No. 10. 
 
4 
B 
Placencia’s mental impairments included depression and anxiety. In April 2009, he 
told Dr. Guillen, his primary care physician, that he had been feeling depressed, so 
Dr. Guillen prescribed him antidepressants. Around that time, Placencia also sought treat-
ment from a mental-health provider. He told the provider that he had felt depressed for 
around ten years, but that his symptoms had intensified in the last year. The provider diag-
nosed him with an adjustment disorder with anxious and depressed mood and prescribed 
him therapy and medication. Though Placencia failed to attend therapy, he responded pos-
itively to the medication.  
Placencia also underwent mental examinations for his disability claim. He first saw 
Dr. J. Theodore Brown, Jr. in November 2009. According to Dr. Brown’s notes, Placencia 
appeared despondent, was disoriented to time, forgot objects presented to him, and failed 
to perform simple calculations. Dr. Brown diagnosed him with major depression with psy-
chotic features and anxiety disorder. Placencia’s second examination was with Dr. Pradip 
Gupta in August 2011. Again, he failed to do simple calculations, but this time, he followed 
three-step commands and remembered objects. Dr. Gupta, unlike Dr. Brown, found “[n]o 
psychosis,” and diagnosed Placencia with persistent depressive disorder. Tr. 962. 
Finally, as part of Placencia’s disability review, three other psychologists reviewed 
his medical records. Dr. Jane Shapiro found in January 2010 that he could understand, re-
member, and carry out instructions, concentrate, respond to supervision, and adapt to rou-
tine workplace changes. She acknowledged Dr. Brown’s “one-time exam[ination]” but 
gave “greater weight” to other treatment evidence because his findings were “not 
 
5 
consistent” with the broader record. Tr. 326. Next, Dr. Michael Britton reviewed Placen-
cia’s records in September 2011. His findings tracked Dr. Shapiro’s. Finally, in March 
2012, Dr. Michael D’Adamo reviewed Placencia’s records and concluded that he could 
perform simple work.  
C 
After reviewing these records, the ALJ determined that Placencia was not disabled 
between February 15, 2009 and December 4, 2012. He found that Placencia had severe 
impairments—the ministroke, diabetes, hypertension, depression, and anxiety—but that 
none was presumptively disabling under the governing regulations. The ALJ then consid-
ered the impairments together to determine whether they were the medical equivalent of 
any impairments in the regulatory listings. He concluded they were not.  
Because the ALJ did not find the impairments presumptively disabling, he next as-
sessed Placencia’s residual functional capacity—the most work he could do despite his 
limitations—and found that he could have performed a range of light and simple tasks. He 
gave great weight to the assessments of Drs. Schneider and Shapiro, and also cited the 
assessments of Drs. Britton, D’Adamo, Paolino, and Walsh.  
Placencia appealed the ALJ’s decision to the District Court, which concluded that 
there was a “substantial basis within the record to support the findings of the ALJ” and 
affirmed his decision. Supp. App. 40. Placencia then timely appealed to us. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s decision—a final order of 
the Commissioner of Social Security—under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have jurisdiction to 
 
6 
review the District Court’s decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the Commis-
sioner’s factual findings for “substantial evidence,” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)—the amount of 
“evidence … a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Reefer 
v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 
389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if we might have drawn a dif-
ferent conclusion, we may not “weigh the evidence or substitute [our own] conclusions for 
those of the fact-finder.” Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992). 
III 
To determine whether a claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act, an ALJ 
applies a five-step test. For the disputed period, the ALJ assesses whether the claimant: 
1. was working, 
2. had a severe impairment, 
3. suffered from an impairment listed in the regulations as presumptively disa-
bling,  
4. could return to his past work, and 
5. could perform other work.  
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At Step 4, the ALJ also assesses the claimant’s residual functional 
capacity. Id.  
Placencia argues on appeal that the ALJ erred at Steps 3 and 4. First, he contends 
that the ALJ did not adequately articulate why he was not presumptively disabled at Step 3. 
Second, he asserts that the ALJ’s residual-functional-capacity finding at Step 4 was not 
supported by substantial evidence. Because both findings are supported by substantial ev-
idence, we affirm. 
 
7 
A 
The enumerated impairments in the regulations—the so-called listings—are so se-
vere that they establish presumptive disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). They set a “higher 
level of severity than the statutory standard” for disability. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 
532 (1990). “Most of the listed impairments are permanent or expected to result in death.” 
20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(c)(4). An impairment meets the requirements of a listing only if it 
“satisfies all of the criteria of that listing.” Id. § 404.1525(c)(3). If it does not, the claimant 
may argue that his impairment, or combination of impairments, is “medically equivalent” 
to a listing on the ground that it is “at least equal in severity and duration” to the listing 
criteria. Id. § 404.1526(a). “[A]llegations of pain or other symptoms” may not substitute 
for “a missing or deficient sign or laboratory finding.” Id. § 404.1529(d)(3). 
Placencia first contends that the ALJ did not adequately consider his high blood-
sugar and blood-pressure readings. But substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion 
that those readings do not satisfy the listings’ criteria for presumptive disability because of 
diabetes or hypertension. Both conditions are presumptively disabling only if they detri-
mentally affect other body systems. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 §§ 9.00B (ex-
plaining how diabetes is evaluated under the listings); 4.00H.1 (explaining how hyperten-
sion is evaluated under the listings). The ALJ rested his findings on record evidence that 
Placencia’s physical examinations were generally unremarkable aside from his high blood-
pressure and blood-sugar readings and that he did not report significant symptoms associ-
ated with his diabetes and hypertension. A reasonable mind could conclude from this evi-
dence that Placencia’s diabetes and hypertension did not detrimentally affect other body 
 
8 
systems. After all, an ALJ is “entitled to rely not only on what the record says, but also on 
what it does not say.” Lane v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 100 F. App’x 90, 95 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(citing Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1553 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
Placencia also says that the ALJ did not pay adequate attention to his hypertension 
and resulting ministroke when deciding that he did not suffer any impairment equivalent 
to one in the listings. But the ALJ did. He explained the relevant listings criteria and con-
cluded that the record did not show findings of listing-level severity. And he “later went on 
to discuss” in detail why the ministroke did not cause significant impairment. Cosme v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 845 F. App’x 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2021). Although Placencia presented 
with slurred speech and weakness during the acute phase of the ministroke, those symp-
toms resolved within “one to two hours” of his arrival at the emergency room. App. 17. 
One of Placencia’s primary care physicians, Dr. Mohammed Islam, recorded that his weak-
ness had improved later that month, and that Placencia was “asymptomatic” a few months 
later. Tr. 360.  
Placencia challenges as well the ALJ’s finding that his mental impairments were not 
presumptively disabling, either on their own or together with his other impairments. He 
specifically objects to the ALJ’s decision not to give more weight to Dr. Brown’s examina-
tion. But our role at this stage is not to decide whether we agree with how the ALJ weighed 
the record evidence—it is to decide whether a reasonable mind could accept the ALJ’s 
conclusion based on the evidence before him. See Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d 
Cir. 1999). The ALJ here considered Dr. Brown’s report and concluded that his findings 
were inconsistent with Placencia’s remaining medical records, which showed that he 
 
9 
responded positively to medication and generally had adequate memory, concentration, and 
judgment. The ALJ gave greater weight to Dr. Shapiro’s opinion, which was that 
Dr. Brown’s “one-time examination” was “inconsistent with” Placencia’s treatment his-
tory, including records from his psychiatrist. App. 22–23. A reasonable mind could draw 
the same conclusion from the record. See Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 614 (3d Cir. 
2014) (noting that the ALJ can give less weight to or reject some medical evidence, so long 
as he provides an explanation). 
B 
Residual functional capacity is the most work the claimant can do despite his limi-
tations, and it is “based on all the relevant evidence in [a] case record.” 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1545(a)(1). In making this determination, an ALJ is “free to accept some medical 
evidence and reject other evidence,” as long as “he provides an explanation for discrediting 
the rejected evidence.” Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 614.  
The ALJ here found that Placencia was capable of light, simple work based on at 
least six expert assessments. Three physicians concluded that Placencia’s physical impair-
ments limited him to light work. And three psychologists concluded that he was capable of 
simple tasks.  
Placencia contends that the ALJ’s residual-functional-capacity finding was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence because its “entire … evidentiary legitimacy” came from 
the assessments of Drs. Schneider and Shapiro. Appellant’s Br. 49. But that is inaccurate. 
The record contains other supportive assessments from Drs. Walsh, Paolino, Britton, and 
D’Adamo. Placencia relatedly argues that the ALJ’s light-work finding rested solely on 
 
10 
evidence predating his 2010 ministroke. But that is inaccurate too. Drs. Walsh and Paolino 
concluded that he was capable of light work in September 2011 and March 2012.  
Placencia also claims that the ALJ’s findings that he could lift, carry, stand, and 
walk, but not push or pull, were “irreconcilable.” Appellant’s Br. 53. They are not. 
Drs. Walsh and Paolino both concluded that he could lift, carry, stand, and walk, but would 
have trouble pushing or pulling. Those are distinct functions, and the ALJ did not act un-
reasonably in relying on the opinions of expert physicians to conclude that some of those 
functions were more limited than others.  
Finally, Placencia challenges the ALJ’s finding that he was capable of simple tasks 
in light of his earlier finding at Step 3 that he suffered from “moderate limitations” in 
“broad areas of mental functioning.” Appellant’s Br. 48; App. 23. We rejected an argument 
like this one in Hess v. Commissioner of Social Security, 931 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2019). We 
declined there to adopt a “categorical prohibition against using a ‘simple tasks’ limitation 
after an ALJ has found that a claimant ‘often’ faces difficulties in ‘concentration, persis-
tence, or pace.’ Rather, a ‘simple tasks’ limitation is acceptable after such a finding, as long 
as the ALJ offers a valid explanation for it.” Id. at 212. The ALJ here did so: Placencia’s 
moderate limitations were not so significant that he could not perform simple tasks—a 
finding fortified by the assessment of Dr. Shapiro. 
* * * 
Placencia believes that the ALJ looked at the record and drew the wrong conclusion. 
In his view, the better interpretation is that he was disabled between February 15, 2009 and 
December 4, 2012. But our role at this stage is not to reweigh the evidence—it is to 
 
11 
determine whether a reasonable mind could have reviewed that evidence and reached the 
same conclusion as the ALJ. One could, so we affirm.  


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Michael Coniker v. Jeffrey Monfortoh

Edwena Leite v. School District of Philadelphia

Universal Underwriters Insurance Co v. John Swenson

Barbara Clark v. Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania

USA v. Norberto Castillo-Lopez

In Re: Anthony Bailey

Ramon Placencia v. Commissioner Social Security

USA v. Anthony Brookins

40,620

41,076