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2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-30-2025 
Neil Binder v. Coldwell Banker Real Estate LLC 
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"Neil Binder v. Coldwell Banker Real Estate LLC" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 343. 
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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-1997 
__________ 
 
NEIL BINDER, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COLDWELL BANKER REAL ESTATE LLC 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-07425) 
District Judge:  Honorable Madeline C. Arleo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 28, 2025 
 
Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 30, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Neil Binder, proceeding pro se, appeals from orders of the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey granting the defendant’s motions to dismiss, and 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
denying his request for reconsideration, in an action seeking to challenge a judgment that 
was entered against him in a separate action.  We will affirm.  
 In December 2014, Coldwell Banker Real Estate Services LLC (“Coldwell 
Banker”) brought an action against Binder and a group of entities that he controlled, 
alleging that they failed to pay royalty and marketing fees pursuant to franchise 
agreements.  Following a two-day bench trial, the District Court entered judgment in 
favor of Coldwell Banker, concluding, in relevant part, that the defendants breached the 
franchise agreements.1  Binder appealed, and we affirmed.  See Coldwell Banker Real 
Est. LLC v. Bellmarc Grp. LLC, No. 21-2862, 2022 WL 3644183, at *1 (3d Cir. Aug. 24, 
2022) (not precedential). 
 Binder then initiated a separate action, alleging that Coldwell Banker submitted 
fraudulent documents in the prior case.  Coldwell Banker filed a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Binder’s claims were 
barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.  The District Court agreed and granted 
Coldwell Banker’s motion, holding that Binder’s claims were precluded because a final 
judgment had been entered on the merits in a prior case that involved the same 
underlying claim and the same parties.2  Binder filed a timely motion for reconsideration.  
 
1 During the course of the prior litigation, the District Court also rejected the defendants’ 
counterclaims. 
 
2 The District Court also denied Binder’s motion for recusal, but he has not challenged 
that portion of the decision on appeal.  See M.S. ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. 
Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that claims were forfeited where 
appellant failed to raise them in opening brief).  
 
3 
The District Court construed that motion as being brought pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 59(e) and denied it. Binder appealed.   
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s dismissal on res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds.  See Venuto 
v. Witco Corp., 117 F.3d 754, 758 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 
275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021) (stating that “[w]e exercise plenary review over a district 
court’s grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to [Rule] 12(b)(6)”).  And we review for 
abuse of discretion the District Court’s order denying Binder’s motion for 
reconsideration.  See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 
669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).   
The District Court did not err in concluding that res judicata bars Binder’s claims.  
Res judicata requires “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the 
same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.”  
Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 341-42 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Lubrizol Corp. v. 
Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir. 1991)).  Notably, “[t]he doctrine of res judicata 
bars not only claims that were brought in a previous action, but also claims that could 
have been brought.”  In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008).  
There is no dispute that the first two res judicata requirements are met:  there has 
been a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties.  With 
respect to the third requirement, the District Court accurately explained that “[a]lthough 
 
 
 
4 
[Binder’s] allegations are labeled as fraud claims, [he] essentially seeks a re-trial on the 
same set of facts already litigated—whether he defaulted on the Franchise[] Agreements 
in violation of the parties’ contract.”  In the prior suit, the parties accused each other of 
breaching the franchise agreements.  One of the issues was whether Binder defaulted on 
paying royalty and marketing fees.  Resolution of that issue turned in part on documents 
that the parties submitted, or attempted to submit, into evidence.   
In the present action, Binder sought to void the judgment in the prior case based 
on a claim that some of the documents submitted by Coldwell Banker in the prior action 
were fraudulent and led the District Court to “believe[] that [one of the entities that 
Binder controlled] was delinquent in its obligations under a Franchise Agreement signed 
by the parties.”  Binder also asserted that the District Court in the prior proceeding 
improperly rejected his attempt to introduce a document titled “Tables and Graphs,” 
which allegedly would have “revealed that [he] was in full compliance with the terms of 
the Franchise Agreement.”3  These allegations make clear that Binder’s present suit is 
based on the same cause of action as the prior case Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 
F.3d 247, 277 (3d Cir. 2014) (stating that “‘we take a broad view of what constitutes the 
same cause of action’ and that ‘res judicata generally is thought to turn on the essential 
similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims’” (quoting 
 
3 We note that we considered and rejected this argument in Binder’s prior appeal.  See 
Coldwell Banker Real Est. LLC, 2022 WL 3644183, at *3 (stating that “we discern no 
abuse of discretion in the District Court’s exclusion of a document that purported to be a 
summary but repeatedly failed to reference source documents and contained argument 
and conjecture about the future”). 
 
5 
Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 261 (3d Cir. 2010) (cleaned up)).  Because 
all three res judicata requirements are met, the claims brought in the underlying action, 
which either were or could have been raised in the prior case, are precluded.    
In his brief, Binder argues that res judicata is inapplicable because he sought relief 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60.  Rule 60(b)(3) permits a litigant to obtain 
relief from final judgment by establishing, through clear and convincing evidence, that 
the opposing party engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct, and that this 
misconduct prevented them from fully and fairly presenting their case.  See Brown v. Pa. 
R.R. Co., 282 F.2d 522, 527 (3d Cir. 1960); Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 207 (3d 
Cir. 1983).  But a Rule 60(b)(3) motion must be made “no more than a year after the 
entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).  
Binder’s complaint in the underlying action, if construed as a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, 
would have been untimely because it was filed in December 2022, well over a year after 
the District Court entered judgment in the prior case in September 2021.  In addition, 
Binder’s unsupported allegations of fraud were insufficient to justify an independent 
action under Rule 60(d)(1), see Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(explaining that the court may relieve a party from a judgment under Rule 60(d)(1) in 
order to “prevent a grave miscarriage of justice”), or reopening under Rule 60(d)(3), see 
In re Bressman, 874 F.3d 142, 150 (3d Cir. 2017) (stating that a party seeking relief under 
Rule 60(d)(3) must establish fraud upon the court “by clear, unequivocal and convincing 
evidence” (citation omitted)). 
 
6 
In sum, we conclude that the District Court properly granted Coldwell Banker’s 
motion to dismiss on res judicata grounds.  To the extent that Binder challenges the 
denial of his motion for reconsideration, we discern no abuse of discretion, as that motion 
failed to allege “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of 
new evidence that was not available . . .; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or 
fact or to prevent manifest injustice.”  Max’s Seafood Café, 176 F.3d at 677.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.4 
 
4 Binder’s motion to file a supplemental appendix is denied.   


Neil Binder v. Coldwell Banker Real Estate LLC

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-30-2025 
Eran Rubinstein v. Bank of America NA 
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Recommended Citation 
"Eran Rubinstein v. Bank of America NA" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 346. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/346 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
          NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 23-2410 
_____________ 
 
ERAN RUBINSTEIN; SUSAN M. BOLTZ-RUBINSTEIN, 
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
BANK OF AMERICA NA; BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON; ARCH CAPITAL 
GROUP US INC; ANN M. GOLIO; J. MARK SWINTEK; NATIONAL RESIDENTIAL 
ASSETS CORP; DOES 1 THROUGH 100 INCLUSIVE; TERRI Y. STALLINGS; KIM 
B. MARTINEZ; CHAD M. ANDERSON. 
_____________ 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 2:22-cv-04774) 
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on September 16, 2024 
 
Before: RESTREPO, PHIPPS, and MCKEE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 30, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
2 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
The instant case is but one chapter of a protracted legal battle between Eran Rubinstein, 
Susan M. Boltz-Rubinstein (collectively, “Appellants”), and the entities and individuals 
whom Appellants contend collaborated to wrongly foreclose on Appellants’ home.  Since 
initiating Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings in 2010, Appellants have filed numerous 
adversary proceedings and appeals, culminating in this case filed on December 1, 2022, in 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  In their complaint, Appellants 
bring claims against Appellees under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (“RICO”) for allegedly collaborating in a “false lien scheme.”  JA45. 
The District Court dismissed Appellants’ complaint on July 6, 2023, finding 
Appellants’ RICO claims to be barred by res judicata, the applicable statute of limitations, 
and Boltz-Rubinstein’s bankruptcy.  Because Appellants’ claims are time-barred, we will 
affirm. 
I.  Background1 
On November 15, 2005, Bank of America issued two mortgage loans to Susan Boltz-
Rubinstein to finance the purchase of Appellants’ home, a residence located in Furlong, 
Pennsylvania.  Bank of America sold the first of these loans, a $593,334 first-lien loan (the 
“First Mortgage Loan”), to Bank of New York Mellon on January 7, 2006.  Pursuant to the 
terms of this sale, Bank of America continued to service this loan on behalf of Bank of 
New York Mellon.  Bank of America did not assign the second-lien loan (the “Second 
 
1  Since we write primarily for parties already familiar with this case, we include only 
those facts necessary to reach our conclusion. 
 
 
3 
Mortgage Loan”) to Bank of New York Mellon in this transaction, and in 2008 assigned it 
to United Guaranty Residential Insurance Company of North Carolina. 
In 2010, Bank of America mailed Appellants a pre-foreclosure letter, Boltz-Rubinstein 
filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and Bank of America assigned the First Mortgage Loan 
to National Residential Assets Corp.  In 2011, the 2010 assignment of mortgage was 
recorded in Bucks County, Pennsylvania and a corresponding proof of claim was filed in 
Boltz-Rubinstein’s bankruptcy proceeding.  
In the years that followed, Appellants initiated numerous adversary proceedings 
challenging the legitimacy of the assignments of the First Mortgage Loan and Second 
Mortgage Loan and alleging that Bank of America had violated the automatic stay 
associated with Boltz-Rubinstein’s bankruptcy.  The Bankruptcy Court dismissed most of 
Appellants’ claims but allowed Appellants’ claim for violation of the bankruptcy stay to 
proceed.  When this claim, too, failed at trial, Boltz-Rubinstein appealed the Bankruptcy 
Court’s judgment to the District Court, which affirmed.  Boltz-Rubinstein appealed to this 
Court. 
While Boltz-Rubinstein’s appeal was pending, Appellants engaged in a May 13, 2021 
mediation with Bank of America.  A corporate official with settlement authority was 
required to participate in this mediation, but Appellants contend that Bank of America 
violated this requirement by sending Chad M. Anderson, allegedly a “contractor” who 
“lacked ‘settlement authority.’”  JA36.  Appellants do not describe the outcome of this 
mediation, and ultimately this Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment. 
 
 
4 
On December 1, 2022, Appellants initiated the instant suit against Appellees.  
Appellants’ amended complaint, filed on February 21, 2023, brought claims pursuant to 
RICO, alleging that Appellees engaged in a “corrupt scheme to fraudulently, systematically 
and uniformly create and place a false lien on [Appellants’] property.”  JA51.  Appellants 
also brought claims for quiet title and declaratory relief which were not raised on appeal. 
The “scheme” alleged by Appellants began with a “corrupt” amendment to the loan 
mortgage servicing agreement between Bank of New York and Bank of America in 2010, 
followed in the same year by the assignment of Appellants’ mortgage “pursuant to the 
corrupt amendment.”  JA51–52.  Appellants allege that several other steps in furtherance 
of this scheme followed between 2011 and 2018, including the 2011 recording of the 
mortgage assignment and a series of letters sent to Appellants between 2016 and 2018 
regarding the mortgage. 
Appellants also contend that they received a collection letter associated with the 
mortgage on November 1, 2022, and that in 2021, a Bank of America agent paid Chad M. 
Anderson via wire or mail “for his services in relation to preparing for and attending the 
May 13, 2021 mediation in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.”  JA54.  Appellants allege 
that Bank of America’s “[u]se of Chad M. Anderson” in this 2021 mediation “served to 
relieve actual [Bank of America] mortgage resolution associates from being tasked to 
perform work, including testimony, pertaining to the creation and concealment of the false 
lien scheme.”  JA45. 
In March 2023, Appellees moved to dismiss, and the District Court granted Appellees’ 
motions on July 6, 2023.  The District Court found Appellants’ RICO claims to be barred 
 
 
5 
by res judicata, the statute of limitations, and Boltz-Rubinstein’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy.  
Appellants moved for reconsideration on July 16, 2023, which the District Court denied on 
July 28, 2023.  Appellants appealed to this Court on August 4, 2023. 
II. Discussion2 
Though the District Court identified three independent bases for the dismissal of 
Appellants’ complaint, we need only address one to affirm: the statute of limitations for 
RICO claims.  See TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2019) (“We may affirm 
on any basis supported by the record[.]”). 
“The limitations period for a federal RICO claim is four years[,]” a period which 
“begins to run when the plaintiff knows or should know of both its injury and the source 
of its injury.”  LabMD Inc. v. Boback, 47 F.4th 164, 179 (3d Cir. 2022).  “The cause of 
action accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or predictable.”  
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634–35 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 
384, 391 (2007)). 
“The limitations period for a RICO claim may be equitably tolled ‘where a pattern 
remains obscure in the face of a plaintiff’s diligence in seeking to identify it[.]’”  LabMD 
 
2  The District Court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  This 
Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
“We exercise plenary review of a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss.”  
McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP, 756 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing 
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011)).  “We review the denial 
of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion[,]” United States v. Kalb, 891 F.3d 
455, 459 (3d Cir. 2018), except that when reconsideration “was denied for legal reasons[,]” 
“we review this decision de novo,” United States ex rel. Ascolese v. Shoemaker Constr. 
Co., 55 F.4th 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2022). 
 
 
6 
Inc., 47 F.4th at 181.  Equitable tolling requires “active misleading by the defendant,” 
which involves “tak[ing] steps beyond the challenged conduct itself to conceal that conduct 
from the plaintiff.”  Id.  To establish fraudulent concealment meriting the application of 
equitable tolling, there are “three necessary elements” that “[t]he plaintiff has the burden 
of proving[:]” “(1) ‘active misleading’ by the defendant, (2) which prevents the plaintiff 
from recognizing the validity of her claim within the limitations period, (3) where the 
plaintiff’s ignorance is not attributable to her lack of ‘reasonable due diligence in 
attempting to uncover the relevant facts.’”  Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 260 F.3d 
239, 256 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Forbes v. Eagleson, 228 F.3d 471, 486 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
Here, the District Court concluded that “[t]he alleged RICO predicate acts primarily 
involve the drafting and recording of the mortgage assignments which occurred in 2008, 
2010, and 2011” as well as “various mailings about [Appellants’] loans dating from 2011 
to early 2018.”  JA6.  Because “[t]his case was filed on December 1, 2022,” the District 
Court found that the alleged acts between 2008 and 2018 occurred outside the statute of 
limitations.  Id.  The District Court then found that the post-2018 acts alleged by Appellants 
were nothing more than “new acts . . . used ‘as a bootstrap to recover for injuries caused 
by other earlier predicate acts that took place outside the statutory period.’”  Id. (quoting 
Annuli v. Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)).  Finally, the District Court found 
equitable tolling did not apply because Appellants were not actively misled and “instead 
had actual notice of the parts of the alleged scheme via public filings and documents 
between 2011 and early 2018.”  Id. 
 
 
7 
Appellants argue that the District Court’s finding was clearly erroneous because 
Appellants alleged predicate acts taking place on May 13, 2021 and November 1, 2022.  
Appellants contend that Chad M. Anderson’s appearance at the 2021 mediation and the 
associated payment made to him was a new predicate act resulting in a new injury: “[t]he 
loss of a chance to obtain a settlement.”  Appellants’ Br. at 12.  Appellants urge this Court 
to apply the “separate accrual” rule, in which “commission of a separable, new predicate 
act within a 4–year limitations period permits a plaintiff to recover for the additional 
damages caused by that act.”  Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 190 (1997). 
Appellants’ arguments are unavailing.  As an initial matter, the purported predicate act 
that took place on November 1, 2022—the mailing of a collections letter—did not result in 
a new injury to Appellants, nor do Appellants argue in their submissions to this Court that 
it did.  Likewise, Chad M. Anderson’s mediation appearance did not result in a new injury 
to Appellants that could support their RICO claims.  Appellants’ complaint is devoid of 
any allegations that Anderson’s presence denied Appellants “a chance to obtain a 
settlement”—a conclusion that does not follow from Appellants’ mere allegation that 
Anderson lacked settlement authority.  Appellants’ Br. at 12. 
Even assuming arguendo that Anderson’s attendance at the 2021 mediation impaired 
Appellants’ ability to settle their case, this loss would not give rise to a valid RICO claim.  
“[S]ection 1964(c)’s limitation of RICO standing to persons ‘injured in [their] business or 
property’ has a ‘restrictive significance,’” Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 483 (3d Cir. 
2000) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)), demanding “proof of 
a concrete financial loss and not mere injury to a valuable intangible property interest[,]” 
 
 
8 
id. at 483.  Though Appellants contend that Anderson undercut their ability to settle, they 
fail to allege any associated concrete financial loss.  This same failing applies to 
Appellants’ allegation that a payment was transmitted to Anderson in 2021: similarly, 
Appellants do not allege that this payment caused them a concrete financial loss.   
Accordingly, none of the post-2018 alleged predicate acts advanced by Appellants 
caused new damages cognizable under RICO.  Because the only predicate acts giving rise 
to damages occurred prior to December 1, 2018—four years prior to the filing of 
Appellants’ December 1, 2022 complaint—Appellants’ RICO claims are time-barred 
unless saved by the application of equitable tolling.  But, as the District Court correctly 
found and Appellants have not challenged on appeal, Appellants failed to establish that 
they were “actively misled” as required for equitable tolling.  Mathews, 260 F.3d at 256.  
Appellants’ RICO claims are thus time-barred. 
III.  Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s July 6, 2023 order. 


Eran Rubinstein v. Bank of America NA

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-6-2025 
Charles Bennett v. Bayer Corporation 
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Recommended Citation 
"Charles Bennett v. Bayer Corporation" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 361. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/361 
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Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 24-1807 
 
CHARLES BENNETT, 
Ex Rel, 
                  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BAYER CORPORATION, An Indiana Corporation; 
JOHNSON & JOHNSON, a New Jersey Corporation; 
MERCK & CO., INC., a New Jersey Corporation*; 
JOHNSON & JOHNSON PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.; 
ORTHO-MCNEIL-JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS 
 
      (*Dismissed pursuant to Clerk's Order dated 06/21/2024) 
 
D.N.J. No. 2:17-cv-04188 
 
Before: PHIPPS, FREEMAN, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
_________________________________ORDER________________________________ 
Due to errors in the opinion and judgment, as further outlined below, an amended 
opinion and judgment will be issued to correct said errors.  The caption of both the 
opinion and judgment reflect that that the Honorable James B. Clark, III was the District 
Judge in this matter.  The opinion and judgment have been amended to reflect that the 
Honorable Ester Salas was the District Judge in this matter.  No other amendments were 
made.  The Clerk is directed to file the amended opinion and judgment.  These 
amendments do not change the date of filing, April 10, 2025. 
 
        By the Court, 
 
        s/ Cindy K. Chung   
        Circuit Judge 
 
Dated: May 6, 2025 
Tmm/cc: All Counsel of Record 
 


Charles Bennett v. Bayer Corporation

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-7-2025 
USA v. Lafon Ellis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Lafon Ellis" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 372. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/372 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1914 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
v. 
 
LAFON ELLIS, 
Appellant 
 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2:19-cr-00369-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on March 7, 2025  
 
Before: MATEY, FREEMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 7, 2025) 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________
  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
FREEMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
LaFon Ellis was convicted of a firearm offense and sentenced to 78 months’ 
imprisonment.  He appeals from his sentence, challenging the District Court’s denial of 
an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction to his offense level under the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence. 
I 
In December 2022, Ellis pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  In preparation for sentencing, the Probation 
Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) on February 14, 2023.  The 
PSR subtracted two points from Ellis’s offense level for acceptance of responsibility, 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), and it calculated a Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months’ 
imprisonment. 
Ellis was confined in the Allegheny County Jail following his guilty plea.  Three 
days after the Probation Office completed the PSR, correctional officers at the jail 
recovered a large quantity of controlled substances from underneath the mattress Ellis 
was occupying.  During the incident, Ellis stated, “You finally got me after all this time.”  
App. 93. 
In May 2023, correctional officers recovered a razor blade and balloons containing 
controlled substances from Ellis’s person, and they recovered controlled substances from 
Ellis’s cell.  A third cell search in July 2023 uncovered more controlled substances.  In 
addition to these three incidents, Ellis had eighteen misconduct reports in his jail record.    
 
3 
After the government learned about Ellis possessing controlled substances and a 
razor blade, it informed the District Court that it opposed the offense-level reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility.  The Probation Office agreed with the government.  It issued 
an addendum to the PSR that removed the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction and 
calculated a Guidelines range of 77 to 96 months’ imprisonment.  
At Ellis’s sentencing hearing, the government introduced a written summary of 
Ellis’s misconduct at the jail, and an officer with firsthand knowledge of the incidents 
testified that the summary was accurate.  Ellis did not object to the written summary, 
cross-examine the officer, or present any evidence.  Through counsel, he stated that he 
was not accepting responsibility for the controlled substances found during the May and 
July 2023 cell searches.  (When the District Court asked whether Ellis was “not 
challenging” the February 2023 incident, Ellis’s counsel responded, “No.”  App. 75.)  He 
also stated that many of his jail misconduct reports were the subject of pending 
administrative appeals.   
The District Court found that Ellis committed misconduct at the jail on multiple 
occasions, including by possessing controlled substances and other contraband.  Over 
Ellis’s objection, it declined to apply the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.  After 
considering the Guidelines range of 77 to 96 months’ imprisonment, the District Court 
imposed a 78-month sentence.  It noted that it would have imposed the same 78-month 
sentence even if the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction applied.  
Ellis timely appealed.   
 
4 
II1 
In the District Court, Ellis bore the burden of establishing by a preponderance of 
the evidence that he was entitled to an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.  United 
States v. Mercado, 81 F.4th 352, 360 (3d Cir. 2023).  We review the District Court’s 
denial for clear error.  Id.  We afford the District Court’s ruling great deference because 
the District Court was “in a unique position to evaluate [the] defendant’s acceptance of 
responsibility.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 193 (3d Cir. 2002)).  
Although a pretrial guilty plea is “significant evidence of acceptance of 
responsibility,” that evidence “may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant that is 
inconsistent with such acceptance of responsibility.”  U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt n.3; 
Mercado, 81 F.4th at 360 (concluding comments one and three to § 3E1.1 are entitled to 
deference and accorded controlling weight).  And “[c]ontinu[ed] criminal activity, even 
differing in nature from the convicted offense, is inconsistent with an acceptance of 
responsibility and an interest in rehabilitation.”  Mercado, 81 F.4th at 359 (quoting 
United States v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
Here, the District Court considered Ellis’s pretrial guilty plea and his post-plea 
criminal activity, which included possession of controlled substances.  Its conclusion that 
Ellis did not demonstrate acceptance of responsibility for his offense was not clearly 
erroneous. 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 
5 
*  * * 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence. 


USA v. Lafon Ellis

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-16-2025 
USA v. Dontrace Blaine 
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"USA v. Dontrace Blaine" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 415. 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 23-2908 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DONTRACE BLAINE, 
     Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3:21-cr-00159-002) 
U.S. District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 16, 2025 
______________ 
                                                                
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 16, 2025) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Dontrace Blaine appeals his conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon.  His 
counsel has filed a motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  
Because there are no nonfrivolous issues warranting relief, we will grant his counsel’s 
motion and affirm.  
I 
While he was incarcerated for a crime of violence,1 Blaine beat another inmate 
with a combination lock concealed in cloth while his co-defendant stabbed the inmate, 
causing the inmate significant injuries.  A grand jury indicted Blaine for assault with a 
dangerous weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(3) and 2, and possession of 
contraband in prison in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2) and (d)(1)(B).   
Blaine pleaded guilty to the assault charge.  At his plea hearing, the District Court 
confirmed Blaine’s competence and that he had not been coerced into pleading guilty.    
After explaining and confirming Blaine’s understanding of the charges, his trial rights, 
the penalties, and the sentencing guidelines, the Court accepted the plea.   
At sentencing, the District Court determined that the Guidelines base offense level 
was fourteen and that two separate four-level increases for use of a dangerous weapon 
and causing bodily injury and a three-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility 
 
1 In 2013, Blaine was convicted of second-degree murder while armed and 
possessing a firearm during a crime of violence and was sentenced to 288 months’ 
imprisonment.  While serving this sentence, he was convicted of possessing 
contraband—a shank—and was sentenced to an additional ten months’ imprisonment.  
3 
 
applied, resulting in a total offense level of nineteen.2  With a criminal history category of 
IV, the Court determined that Blaine’s Guidelines range was 46 to 57 months’ 
imprisonment.  Blaine filed two pro se motions for downward departures based on the 
conditions of his confinement, which were denied for a lack of a Guidelines basis.  
Through counsel, Blaine also sought a downward variance based on, among other things, 
a then-proposed Guidelines amendment that would reduce his criminal history category.3    
The Government supported the variance based on this forthcoming amendment and thus 
asked the Court to impose a sentence within the range for a criminal history category III 
offender of 37 to 46 months’ imprisonment.  The District Court granted the variance 
given the imminent amendment and sentenced Blaine to thirty-seven months.4    
Blaine appeals and his counsel moves to withdraw under Anders.5 
 
2 At the hearing, Blaine sought to object to the dangerous weapon enhancement, 
but his counsel and the District Court explained that he had stipulated to the enhancement 
in his plea agreement and that there was no basis to argue that he had not used a 
dangerous weapon.  Blaine also initially objected to the bodily injury enhancement but 
withdrew the objection for lack of a “legitimate argument.”  App. 76.   
3 See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 821 (adopted Nov. 1, 2023). 
4 Specifically, the Court explained that he imposed the sentence based on (1) the 
use of a dangerous weapon, (2) Blaine’s significant criminal history, (3) Blaine’s conduct 
while incarcerated, (4) the serious and violent nature of the assault, and (5) the need to (a) 
promote respect for the law, (b) provide Blaine with just punishment, (c) avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities, and (d) deter Blaine and others from similar criminal 
conduct.  The Court rejected Blaine’s variance requests based on his conditions of 
confinement and his co-defendant’s 31-month sentence because Blaine’s conditions of 
confinement were the result of his poor conduct while incarcerated and the sentencing 
disparity was because Blaine’s criminal history was more significant than that of his co-
defendant.   
5 Blaine filed three letters raising appellate issues.   
4 
 
II6 
Our local rules allow a criminal defendant’s appellate counsel to file a motion to 
withdraw and an accompanying brief under Anders when she concludes, upon review of 
the record, that “the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit.”  3d Cir. L.A.R. 
109.2(a).  When counsel submits an Anders brief, we must determine: “(1) whether 
counsel adequately fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and (2) whether an independent 
review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 
296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Brookins, 132 F.4th 
659, 665-66 (3d Cir. 2025).7   
A 
To determine whether counsel has fulfilled her Anders obligations, we examine 
her brief to see if it (1) shows that she thoroughly examined the record in search of 
appealable issues and identified those that arguably support the appeal, Smith v. Robbins, 
528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000), and (2) explains why all issues identified are frivolous, United 
States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780-81 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Brookins, 132 F.4th at 
666.  Blaine’s counsel has fulfilled these obligations. 
 
 6 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In conducting an Anders analysis, we exercise plenary review to 
determine whether there are any nonfrivolous issues for appeal.  Penson v. Ohio, 488 
U.S. 75, 80-83 & n.6 (1988).  
7 An issue is frivolous if it “lacks any basis in law or fact.”  McCoy v. Ct. of 
Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988); see also Brookins, 132 F.4th at 
665 (observing that “[i]f there is an issue that is ‘arguable’ on its merits, then the appeal 
is not frivolous”). 
5 
 
Because Blaine pleaded guilty, his counsel correctly recognizes the appealable 
issues here are limited to (1) the District Court’s jurisdiction; (2) the voluntariness of his 
plea; and (3) the reasonableness of his sentence.  See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 
62 (1975) (per curiam); United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742.  Counsel’s brief explains why jurisdiction exists, why any challenge to Blaine’s 
plea or sentence would be frivolous, and why none of the issues Blaine raised in his pro 
se letters are nonfrivolous.  Accordingly, because the brief thoughtfully explains why the 
possible appealable issues are frivolous, Blaine’s counsel has fulfilled her Anders 
obligations.  Youla, 241 F.3d at 300. 
B 
 We next independently review the record to confirm that no nonfrivolous 
appealable issues exist.  When, as here, counsel satisfies Anders’s requirements, “we may 
limit our review of the record to the issues counsel raised.”  United States v. Langley, 52 
F.4th 564, 569 (3d Cir. 2022).  As explained below, any challenge to the District Court’s 
jurisdiction or to Blaine’s plea or sentence would be frivolous, and none of the issues 
Blaine identified in his pro se letters support his appeal. 
 First, the District Court had jurisdiction because Blaine was charged with a federal 
offense, namely assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(3) 
6 
 
and 2.8  See 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  Thus, any challenge to the District Court’s jurisdiction 
would be baseless. 
 Second, any challenge to the voluntariness of Blaine’s plea would lack merit.  The 
Constitution and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 require courts, before accepting 
a guilty plea, to  
advise the defendant . . . of the waiver of certain constitutional rights[,] . . . 
the nature of the charges to which he . . . is pleading guilty, the “maximum 
possible penalty” to which he . . . is exposed, [and] the court’s “obligation to 
apply the Sentencing Guidelines,”  
 
as well as its discretion to depart from them.  United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 
202-03 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)).   
The District Court’s plea colloquy met these requirements.9  The Court placed 
Blaine under oath, confirmed Blaine’s competence, explained that the Government could 
use any statement he made against him, and then ensured he understood his constitutional 
rights, including his rights to (1) plead not guilty and proceed to trial with the assistance 
of counsel who could confront, cross examine, and subpoena witnesses; (2) testify or not 
testify at trial; and (3) be presumed innocent unless the Government proved his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Court also confirmed Blaine understood the offense to 
which he was pleading guilty, the penalties he might face, and the Court’s discretion 
 
8 Our review of jurisdictional issues is plenary.  United States v. Williams, 369 
F.3d 250, 252 (3d Cir. 2004). 
9 Because there were no objections to the plea before the District Court, we review 
for plain error.  United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002). 
7 
 
under the Sentencing Guidelines.  The Court determined that Blaine had not been coerced 
into entering his plea and that there was a factual basis for the plea.  Thus, the record 
shows that the plea complied with the Constitution and Rule 11 and supports the Court’s 
finding that the plea was knowing and voluntary.  Therefore, there is no issue of arguable 
merit concerning the plea’s validity. 
 Third, Blaine lacks any basis to challenge the reasonableness of his sentence.10  
Blaine’s sentence is procedurally reasonable because the District Court (1) accurately 
calculated the applicable Guidelines range, (2) expressly denied Blaine’s pro se departure 
motions,11 and (3) meaningfully considered all the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, 
 
10 Because Blaine did not object to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence 
before the District Court, we review for plain error.  United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 
F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).  We review the substantive reasonableness of his 
sentence for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Pawlowski, 27 F.4th 897, 911 (3d Cir. 
2022). 
11 The District Court explained that it was “not aware of any section of the 
[G]uidelines” that permitted a sentencing court to depart based on an offender’s pre-
sentence placement in solitary confinement.  App. 77.  We have jurisdiction to review 
that legal conclusion as it suggests that the Court believed it lacked the authority to depart 
on that basis.  United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2000).  There is 
disagreement “among the district courts of this Circuit over the propriety and wisdom of 
considering the conditions of confinement as a basis for downward departures,” but 
several courts have ruled “that granting a departure on this ground is not categorically 
foreclosed.”  Id. at 248 n.9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Nevertheless, 
departures based on factors not expressly set forth in the Guidelines should be “highly 
infrequent.”  Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (quoting U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. 
A, p.6 (1995)).  This principle, plus the District Court’s (1) correct observation that 
incarcerated offenders “do[] not have a right to any particular placement in the 
institution,” App. 77; see Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 2000), (2) 
consideration of Blaine’s request for a variance based on his confinement conditions, and 
(3) observation that the restrictiveness of these conditions was due to his own conduct,   
 
8 
 
See United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).  Moreover, given the 
District Court’s detailed explanation for its sentence, see supra note 4, including its 
recognition of the violent nature of the crime, Blaine’s conduct while in prison, and his 
criminal history, we cannot say that no reasonable sentencing court would impose the 
same sentence.  See United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  
Therefore, any challenge to the reasonableness of Blaine’s sentence would be baseless. 
 Finally, none of the issues Blaine identified in his pro se letters are nonfrivolous.  
In two of the letters, Blaine claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, 
but generally such an argument is not properly raised on direct appeal.  United States v. 
Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2003).  In the third letter, Blaine seeks assistance in 
filing a motion for a reduction of sentence imposed for his prior conviction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3582,12 but this request is not related to the judgment on appeal, and to the 
extent Blaine challenges any aspect of an order entered in a different case, he was 
required to file a timely appeal of that order.  See United States v. Tabor Ct. Realty Corp., 
943 F.2d 335, 342 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining that “a party aggrieved by a decision of the 
district court must file an appeal in order to receive relief from the decision”). 
 Accordingly, there are no nonfrivolous issues to raise on appeal. 
 
lead us to conclude that there was no plain error in denying the departure motions based 
on Blaine’s confinement conditions.  
12 United States v. Blaine, No. 15-038 (W.D. Pa. filed Dec. 8, 2015). 
9 
 
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm. 


USA v. Dontrace Blaine

Levy, Benjamin S.

A Monumental Tug of War: The Clash over Presidential Authority and National Monuments in Murphy Co. v. Biden

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-12-2025 
Chaka Kwanzaa v. Girard Tell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Chaka Kwanzaa v. Girard Tell" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 486. 
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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-3066 
__________ 
 
CHAKA KWANZAA, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
GIRARD TELL, Officer, Pleasantville Police Department; RYAN VAN SYCKLE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No.1:19-cv-16052) 
District Judge:  Honorable Renée M. Bumb 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 6, 2025 
Before:  BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed June 12, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se Appellant Chaka Kwanzaa appeals from the District Court’s orders granting 
summary judgment to Defendants.  We will affirm.   
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
I. 
 Kwanzaa commenced his civil action against numerous defendants, including 
Officers Girard Tell and Ryan Van Syckle, in 2019.  Kwanzaa’s operative complaint 
asserted that Tell violated his equal protection rights by racially profiling him prior to 
approaching his vehicle with no probable cause and thereafter conducting an improper 
search of the vehicle, stealing a ring, and along with Van Syckle, falsely arresting him.  
The District Court screened the complaint and dismissed with prejudice all of appellant’s 
claims, apart from the claim that his ring was stolen.  In 2021, the District Court granted 
summary judgment to Tell on that claim.  After Kwanzaa appealed, we affirmed the 
District Court’s order in part and vacated in part, remanding for further proceedings on 
Kwanzaa’s claim of an improper search by Tell and his claims of false arrest and 
violation of equal protection rights against both Tell and Van Syckle.  Kwanzaa v. Tell, 
No. 21-1939, 2022 WL 16756334, at *3-4 (3d Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (not precedential). 
After discovery, Tell filed a new motion for summary judgment.  In June 2024, the 
District Court entered an order which (1) granted summary judgment to Tell as to the 
remaining claims against him and (2) instructed Van Syckle to submit a letter as to 
whether he joined the motion or whether no claims remained against him.  Van Syckle 
responded that he had not been a party defendant after the District Court’s 2019 opinion, 
and that no claims remained against him.  In October 2024, the District Court dismissed 
the claims against Van Syckle and entered judgment, finding that even assuming that our 
 
3 
 
remand had revived the claims of false arrest and violations of equal protection against 
Van Syckle, Kwanzaa had not pursued those claims during discovery and that those 
claims failed for the same reasons as against Tell.  Kwanzaa timely appealed. 
II. 
We exercise de novo review over a District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  
See Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 2017).  Summary judgment is 
proper when the record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  The non-
moving party “must show where in the record there exists a genuine dispute over a 
material fact.”  Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007).  We 
view the facts in the light most favorable to Kwanzaa, who “is entitled to every 
reasonable inference that can be drawn from the record.”  Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. 
Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000).   
III. 
 At the outset, as the appellees stress, Kwanzaa has not meaningfully challenged 
the District Court’s decision in his opening brief.  “[A]ppellants are required to set forth 
the issues raised on appeal and to present an argument in support of those issues in their 
opening brief.”  Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).  Arguments are to 
be supported by “the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the 
record on which the appellant relies.”  Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).  Failure to do so 
 
4 
 
generally results in an issue being forfeited on appeal.  See, e.g., Kost, 1 F.3d at 182; Lara 
v. Comm’r Pa. State Police, 125 F.4th 428, 432 n.5 (3d Cir. 2025) (reiterating that “[a]n 
issue is [forfeited] unless a party raises it in its opening brief” (quotation marks omitted)).  
Although we construe pro se filings liberally, we still only address issues that appellants 
properly raised in the opening brief.  See, e.g., Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 
n.5 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam); see also Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 
245 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that pro se litigants “must abide by the same rules that apply to 
all other litigants”). 
In his brief, Kwanzaa asserts with little elaboration that the District Court erred 
because it ignored evidence in the Municipal Court record of Tell’s illegal search of his 
vehicle and stealing of his ring, arbitrarily denied him the opportunity to conduct full 
discovery, and relied on conclusory and biased determinations to grant summary 
judgment when there were “clearly disputed material facts.”  We do not agree.  The 
District Court properly considered whether the record demonstrated any genuine issues of 
material fact before granting summary judgment even though Kwanzaa failed to provide 
a statement of disputed facts.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  To the extent Kwanzaa argues that 
the District Court erred because the Municipal Court record contained evidence of Tell 
stealing his ring, we already affirmed the entry of summary judgment regarding this 
claim in 2022, see Kwanzaa, 2022 WL 16756334, at *2, and decline to revisit that ruling 
here.   
 
5 
 
Further, the District Court did not deny Kwanzaa the opportunity to conduct full 
discovery.  Although the District Court administratively terminated Kwanzaa’s motion 
for discovery, it directed Defendants to respond to the requests and provided that any 
discovery disputes should be presented before the end of discovery.  The record does not 
show that Kwanzaa presented any disputes to the District Court.  Moreover, a review of 
the record does not show evidence of bias on the part of the District Court, nor 
demonstrate that it based the grant of summary judgment on conclusory determinations.  
Finally, Kwanzaa has not identified any “clearly disputed material facts” that should have 
prevented the entry of summary judgment. 
IV.  
 For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   


Chaka Kwanzaa v. Girard Tell

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-16-2025 
Rejeana Silla v. Holdings Acquisition Co LP 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
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"Rejeana Silla v. Holdings Acquisition Co LP" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 495. 
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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-1468 
__________ 
 
REJEANA M. SILLA, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
HOLDINGS ACQUISITION CO., L.P., d/b/a RIVERS CASINO; HOLDINGS 
ACQUISITION CO., L.P. AND RIVERS CASINO, a joint venture Walton Street 
Capital, L.L.C. and High Pitt Gaming, L.P. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-00963) 
District Judge: Honorable Mark R. Hornak 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 12, 2025 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 16, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
2 
 Pro se appellant ReJeana Silla appeals the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant, Rivers Casino (“Rivers”).  We will affirm.  
 Silla worked as a bartender for Rivers.  Rivers terminated Silla’s employment after 
she was rated “needs improvement” during her 45-day performance review.  She sued 
Rivers for sex and disability discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and a hostile work 
environment under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”).  
She also included a state law claim for breach of contract.   
 Eventually,1 both parties moved for summary judgment.  The District Court 
granted Rivers’s motion as to Silla’s federal law and PHRA claims and dismissed the 
state breach-of-contract claim without prejudice after declining to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction.  The District Court also denied Silla’s summary judgment motion.  Silla 
appealed.  
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s summary judgment ruling.  See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 
767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014).  We may affirm the “judgment on any basis supported 
by the record.”  United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS Caremark Corp., 875 F.3d 746, 753 
(3d Cir. 2017).  Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no 
 
1 The District Court initially dismissed Silla’s Title VII and ADA claims with prejudice as 
untimely, and the state law claims without prejudice.  We vacated the District Court’s 
judgment and remanded for further consideration of the timeliness issue.  Silla v. 
Holdings Acquisition Co. LP, No. 20-3556, 2021 WL 4206169, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 
2021) (per curiam). 
 
 
3 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is 
sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.  
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
 We agree with the District Court that Silla’s Title VII claims could not survive 
Rivers’s summary judgment motion.  Silla’s quid pro quo harassment claim, for example, 
failed because she did not offer evidence that any part of her employment with Rivers 
was affected by “unwelcome sexual advances,” “requests for sexual favors,” or other 
“verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature” within the company.  Bonenberger v. 
Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 27 (3d Cir. 1997) (alteration omitted) (quoting Robinson v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1296 (3d Cir. 1997)).  Silla’s disparate treatment claim 
also failed, as she did not offer evidence that Rivers treated her differently than other 
employees because she was female.  See Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 798 
(3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that the “central focus” of a prima facie discrimination claim is 
whether the employer is treating employees less favorably than others because of their 
protected characteristics).   
Further, Silla could not maintain a retaliation claim because there is no evidence 
that she engaged in protected activity.  See Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340–41 
(3d Cir. 2006).  Her complaints to her employer did not concern any harassment or 
discrimination based on a protected class; rather, Silla complained that her co-workers 
were criticizing how she performed her job duties.  See id. at 341 (“[T]he employee must 
hold an objectively reasonable belief, in good faith, that the activity they oppose is 
 
 
4 
unlawful under Title VII.”).  And because the treatment that Silla endured was generally 
about her work performance, and not because she was female, she failed to establish that 
Rivers had a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.  See Huston v. Procter & 
Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2009); cf. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (cleaned up) (explaining that Title VII is violated “[w]hen 
the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . . that 
is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and 
create an abusive working environment”).  
 We further agree with the District Court’s entry of summary judgment against 
Silla on her ADA claims.  Even assuming, arguendo, that Silla has a qualifying disability 
under the ADA, there is no evidence that she ever requested an accommodation for that 
disability.  See Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 186 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Rather, Silla requested a scheduling accommodation so that she could take public 
transportation after her shift.  She also indicated a preference to work in the non-smoking 
bar, but there is no evidence that the request was related to her disability.  Additionally, 
there is no record evidence that Silla was mistreated or fired because of her disability, and 
her complaints to her employer about her problems with co-workers had nothing to do 
with any disability.  Thus, Silla’s ADA claims lacked the evidentiary support needed to 
survive summary judgment.  See Turner v. Hershey Chocolate USA, 440 F.3d 604, 611 
(3d Cir. 2006) (ADA discrimination); Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 
(3d Cir. 1997) (ADA retaliation); Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 
661, 666–67 (3d Cir. 1999) (ADA hostile work environment).  
 
 
5 
 For the reasons given above, the District Court did not err by granting Rivers’s 
summary judgment motion and, as a result, denying Silla’s competing summary 
judgment motion.2  We will thus affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
 
2 Silla has forfeited on appeal any issues regarding her state-law claims.  See In re 
Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that a litigant’s failure to develop 
claims results in forfeiture); see also Castillo Condo. Ass’n v. HUD, 821 F.3d 92, 101 (1st 
Cir. 2016) (explaining that a party’s “bare reference to pages in the appendix” does not 
protect against issue-forfeiture).  But even if she had not forfeited those issues, the 
outcome of this appeal would not change.  The District Court properly treated Silla’s 
PHRA claims as coextensive with her Title VII and ADA claims and rejected them on 
like grounds, see Atkinson v. LaFayette Coll., 460 F.3d 447, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006); Kelly 
v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996), and the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Silla’s 
breach-of-contract claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 


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