Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

Goodwyn, Bryce

English

Bargaining Across Borders: The Prevalence of Collective Bargaining Agreements in American Sports and the Potential Implementation of the American Model Into the English Premier League

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-31-2025 
USA v. Edward Burgess 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Edward Burgess" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 247. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/247 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1497 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
EDWARD BURGESS, 
     Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 2:20-cr-00072-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable R. Barclay Surrick 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 14, 2025 
____________ 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 31, 2025) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
CHUNG, Circuit Judge. 
Edward Burgess was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) by possessing a 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
firearm as a convicted felon.  On appeal, he challenges the District Court’s denial of his 
motions to suppress the evidence of the firearm and dismiss the indictment against him.  
Because the District Court properly denied both motions, we will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND1 
 
In the spring of 2019, the Pennsylvania State Police Bureau of Liquor Control 
Enforcement began investigating the Glass Door Lounge (the Lounge) for selling liquor 
and tobacco without a license.  Officer Chandrea Pigatt led the investigation.  She 
surveilled the Lounge in person and researched it on social media.  Through her social 
media search, she learned that Edward Burgess identified himself as one of the co-owners 
of the Lounge.  On June 1, 2019, Officer Pigatt and two other officers, Officer Samira 
Strand and Officer Jena Finney, patronized the Lounge while undercover.  While there, 
the undercover officers ordered alcoholic drinks and made observations of the Lounge’s 
operations.2  After the visit, Officer Pigatt sent a certification request to the Pennsylvania 
Liquor Control Board to determine whether the Lounge had a valid liquor license.  The 
Liquor Control Board confirmed that the Lounge did not have a license.   
 Just over two weeks later, the same undercover officers returned to the Lounge.  
This time, they were accompanied by approximately 20 uniformed officers waiting 
outside the Lounge to conduct a raid.  While in the Lounge, the undercover officers again 
 
1 Because we write for the parties, we recite only facts pertinent to our decision. 
2 Undercover officers investigating unlicensed establishments are permitted to 
consume alcohol while working in order to preserve their safety and undercover status.   
 
3 
ordered alcoholic drinks.  The officers witnessed Burgess acting as a manager of the 
Lounge.  Specifically, they observed him walking in and out of staff doors and assisting 
staff at the bar.  However, they never saw him personally serve or otherwise handle 
alcohol or tobacco.  While the undercover officers were in the Lounge, Officer Pigatt sent 
text messages to the uniformed officers outside describing the number of people inside 
the Lounge and descriptions of suspects.  Officer Pigatt testified that she described 
Burgess in these text messages, and Officer Finney, who was also on the text thread, 
confirmed that Officer Pigatt provided a description of Burgess to the uniformed officers 
outside.   
 Later that night, Officer Pigatt signaled for the raid team to enter the Lounge.  The 
team entered and began securing suspects, including Burgess.  Two uniformed officers 
approached Burgess and took each of his arms.  He resisted, reached into his waistband, 
took out a firearm, and tossed it behind him.  Burgess was then arrested and charged with 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).   
 Burgess moved to suppress the evidence of the firearm, arguing the police lacked 
probable cause to arrest him and reasonable suspicion to seize him.  The District Court 
denied the motion.  Burgess then moved to dismiss the indictment due to spoliation of 
evidence based on the officers’ failure to preserve the text messages between the 
undercover officers and raid team on the night of the raid.  The District Court again 
denied the motion.  After a jury trial, Burgess was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1).   
 Burgess timely appealed.   
 
4 
II. DISCUSSION3 
 
A. Motion to Suppress 
 
Burgess first challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress.  The 
Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”  U.S. Const. 
Amend. IV.  When an officer stops an individual for investigatory purposes, such a stop 
must be supported by reasonable suspicion.  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 
(2000).  Reasonable suspicion “is a less demanding standard than probable cause and 
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.”  Id.  It does, 
however, “require[] at least a minimal level of objective justification.”  Id.  If reasonable 
suspicion is lacking, “evidence gathered as a result of an unlawful search or seizure must 
be suppressed at trial.”  United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 653 (3d Cir. 1993).  The 
same is true of evidence that is abandoned “when the abandonment of [that] property is 
precipitated by an unlawful seizure.”  Id. 
Here, two of the undercover officers testified that they witnessed Burgess acting as 
a manager or owner of the Lounge.  Additionally, one of the officers testified that social 
 
3  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s underlying factual findings for 
clear error and exercise plenary review of the District Court’s application of the law to 
those facts when reviewing motions to suppress and dismiss.  United States v. Perez, 280 
F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Menendez, 831 F.3d 155, 164 (3d Cir. 
2016).  “Under the clear error standard, reversal of the District Court’s factual findings is 
warranted only when the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  Menendez, 831 F.3d at 164 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Accordingly, “[i]f the district court’s account of the 
evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, we will not reverse it 
even if, as the trier of fact, we would have weighed the evidence differently.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
5 
media posts similarly indicated that Burgess was a co-owner of the establishment.  The 
District Court credited the officers’ testimony, found that the officers were conducting an 
investigative seizure of Burgess, and concluded that Burgess’s actions and the 
background evidence established they had reasonable suspicion to seize him.  We see no 
clear error in the District Court’s findings related to credibility and the facts leading up to 
the seizure and agree with its conclusion that the officers had reasonable suspicion to 
conduct an investigatory seizure of Burgess.  See United States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164, 
177 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 281 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Burgess does not challenge the District Court’s characterization of the officers’ 
actions as an investigative seizure, but argues that the undercover officers lacked 
reasonable suspicion because they never witnessed him serve or handle tobacco or 
alcohol, or partake in other illegal activity inside the Lounge.  This argument fails 
because Burgess’s actions as a manager and owner of an establishment serving and 
handling alcohol without a license were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that 
he was violating Pennsylvania law.  See 47 Pa. Stat. § 4-491(1) (stating that it is illegal 
“[f]or any person, by himself or by an employe or agent, … to sell or offer to sell any 
liquor” without a license, either “directly or indirectly”); Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123.4  
Thus, the District Court properly denied the motion to suppress. 
 
4 Burgess was seized by members of the raid team, not the undercover officers, but 
that does not alter our conclusion.  Officer Pigatt texted the raid team and identified 
Burgess as a suspect.  Under the collective knowledge doctrine, her knowledge “is 
imputed to the officer who actually conducted the seizure.”  United States v. Whitfield, 
634 F.3d 741, 745 (3d Cir. 2010); see Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 453 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
 
6 
B. Spoliation of Evidence 
 
Burgess next challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the 
indictment due to spoliation of evidence.  As we explained in United States v. Haywood:  
“[w]hatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, 
that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a 
significant role in the suspect’s defense.”  In order “[t]o meet this standard 
of constitutional materiality, evidence must both possess an exculpatory 
value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a 
nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by 
other reasonably available means.” 
 
363 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting California v. 
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984)).  Additionally, “unless a criminal defendant can 
show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence 
does not constitute a denial of due process of law.”  Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 
58 (1988); see Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 267 (3d Cir. 2004). 
Officer Pigatt testified that her text messages merely contained physical 
descriptions of Burgess and others who should be arrested by the raid team and an 
approximate number of people in the Lounge.  The District Court credited this testimony 
and held that the text messages did not have apparent exculpatory value when they were 
deleted.  Crediting this testimony was not clearly erroneous, see Kole, 164 F.3d at 177, 
and the District Court correctly held that the text messages did not have apparent 
exculpatory value because a mere physical description that matched Burgess would not 
be the type of evidence that “might be expected to play a significant role in [his] 
defense,” Haywood, 363 F.3d at 212 (quoting Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488).   
 
7 
The District Court also denied Burgess’s motion to dismiss because Burgess failed 
to show that the messages were deleted in bad faith.  Burgess points to no specific 
evidence of bad faith.  Instead, he claims that bad faith is the only possible explanation 
for the deletion of the messages.  Certain officers provided an alternative explanation, 
however, and testified that they deleted the messages because, if the messages were seen 
by an employee of the Lounge, the employee could infer that they were undercover 
officers, thus risking their safety.5  The District Court credited this testimony, and found 
that Burgess did not establish bad faith.  This finding was not clearly erroneous as 
Burgess merely asks us to draw different inferences from the evidence.  See Marcavage, 
609 F.3d at 281.  Accordingly, the District Court properly denied his motion to dismiss. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
5 Burgess also argues that bad faith can be inferred from the fact that other officers 
deleted the texts.  Even if these actions indicated bad faith, we would still affirm because 
the District Court did not clearly err in finding that the text messages were not 
exculpatory.  See Haywood, 363 F.3d at 212 (“Whatever duty the Constitution imposes 
on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be 
expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.” (cleaned up)). 


USA v. Edward Burgess

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-1-2025 
Askin Ozturk v. Attorney General United States of America 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Askin Ozturk v. Attorney General United States of America" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 250. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/250 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-2058 
____________ 
 
ASKIN OZTURK, 
   Petitioner 
                                       
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an 
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A220-903-271) 
Immigration Judge: Adam Panopoulos 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 14, 2025 
____________ 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 1, 2025) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
CHUNG, Circuit Judge. 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
Askin Ozturk1 petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
decision dismissing his appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) determination that 
Ozturk was ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal.  We will deny Ozturk’s 
petition for review because the BIA correctly determined that Ozturk provided material 
support to a Tier III terrorist organization and was therefore ineligible for asylum or 
withholding of removal. 
I. BACKGROUND2 
 
Ozturk, his spouse, and his minor children, natives and citizens of Turkey, entered 
the United States without inspection on January 30, 2022.  On January 31, 2022, the 
Department of Homeland Security issued Ozturk a notice to appear pursuant to Section 
212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).  Ozturk filed an 
application for asylum and withholding of removal.   
The IJ determined that Ozturk was statutorily barred from asylum, withholding of 
removal, and withholding under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) because Ozturk had provided material support to a Tier 
III terrorist organization.  Specifically, the IJ found that Ozturk held a leadership position 
in an organization called the Grey Wolves and found that the Grey Wolves were a Tier III 
terrorist organization.  The BIA dismissed the appeal, concluding that the IJ’s factual 
findings underlying the IJ’s determinations were not clearly erroneous.   
 
1  Ozturk’s spouse and minor children sought asylum as Ozturk’s derivative 
beneficiaries before the IJ and BIA.   
2 Because we write for the parties, we recite only facts pertinent to our decision. 
 
3 
II. DISCUSSION3 
On appeal, Ozturk challenges the BIA’s order dismissing his appeal of the IJ’s 
determination that he was subject to the terrorism bar for asylum and withholding of 
removal.4  “We may only consider the reasons provided by the [BIA], but where the 
[BIA] both adopts the findings of the Immigration Judge and discusses some of the bases 
for the Immigration Judge’s decision, we have authority to review the decisions of both 
the Immigration Judge and the [BIA].”  Saravia v. Att’y Gen., 905 F.3d 729, 734 (3d Cir. 
2018) (cleaned up).  “We review the agency’s factual findings under the highly 
deferential substantial-evidence standard: The agency’s findings of fact are conclusive 
unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  
Sunuwar v. Att’y Gen., 989 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2021) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted).  “We review questions of law de novo,” Saravia, 905 F.3d at 734, 
including “the legal determination of whether a group falls within the definition of an 
 
3  “We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252.”  Sesay v. Att’y Gen., 787 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 
4  Ozturk also argues that the IJ erroneously concluded that Ozturk has not suffered 
past persecution on account of his political opinion and that he has no well-founded fear 
of future persecution.  Since the BIA did not base its denial on the latter two points, we 
may not consider those arguments.  Saravia v. Att’y Gen., 905 F.3d 729, 734 (3d Cir. 
2018) (“We may only consider the reasons provided by the Board ….”); Orabi v. Att’y 
Gen., 738 F.3d 535, 539 (3d Cir. 2014).  In his statement of issues, Ozturk suggests he is 
also challenging whether the IJ and BIA made sufficient credibility determinations.  
Ozturk does not brief this argument, though, so it is forfeited.  John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. 
CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997).   
 
4 
undesignated terrorist organization.”  Uddin v. Att’y Gen., 870 F.3d 282, 289 (3d Cir. 
2017). 
The terrorism bar “precludes aliens” who have provided material support to a 
terrorist organization “from seeking several forms of relief, including withholding of 
removal” and asylum.  Id. at 284; see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).  The INA has 
established three tiers of terrorist organizations.  Uddin, 870 F.3d at 284-85; 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi).  Tier III terrorist organizations “are groups ‘of two or more 
individuals, whether organized or not, which engage[ ] in, or [have] a subgroup which 
engages in,’ terrorist activity.”  Uddin, 870 F.3d at 285 (alterations in original) (quoting 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III)).   
“[T]he Government must introduce evidence ‘indicat[ing]’ that a group qualifies 
as a Tier III terrorist organization.  Then, the burden shifts to the applicant to prove ‘by a 
preponderance of the evidence’ that the bar does not apply.”  Id. (second alteration in 
original) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2)).   
Ozturk first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the IJ’s 
determination, adopted by the BIA, that the Grey Wolves were “engage[d] in terrorist 
activity.”  Id.  The IJ cited evidence that the Grey Wolves “committed over 600 political 
murders” and “planned the 1981 assassination attempt of Pope John Paul II.”  AR 56.  
The IJ also concluded that the Grey Wolves engaged in torture, citing Ozturk’s testimony 
that “he witnessed other members bring dissidents into Grey Wolves meeting halls and 
beat the soles of their feet with batons.”  AR 57.  This is substantial evidence of terrorist 
 
5 
activity.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(IV), (V)(b), (VI); 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I), (II). 
Ozturk presents two arguments for why the Grey Wolves are nonetheless not a 
terrorist organization.  Each argument fails.   
First, he argues that the Grey Wolves are not an official organization, with no 
membership records or structured hierarchy.  The definition of a Tier III terrorist 
organization, however, is simply, “a group of two or more individuals, whether organized 
or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in, [activities defined as 
engagement in terrorist activity].”  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) (emphasis added).  
Because the statute does not require formal organization or hierarchy, Ozturk’s first 
argument fails. 
Ozturk next argues that the Grey Wolves are not a Tier III terrorist organization 
because there is no evidence that the acts of terrorism identified by the BIA and IJ were 
authorized by leadership, as Uddin requires.  Uddin, 870 F.3d at 284 (“[U]nless the 
agency finds that party leaders authorized terrorist activity committed by its members, an 
entity … cannot be deemed a Tier III terrorist organization.”).  The BIA’s finding that the 
acts of terrorism were authorized by leadership rested upon the Government’s evidence 
that the Grey Wolves had a “regimented, top-down organizational structure” “with a clear 
chain of command through which leadership communicates its orders,” and evidence that 
the Grey Wolves’ leadership authorized the many international incidents in which the 
Grey Wolves played a central role.  AR 57.  In addition, Ozturk himself testified that the 
“head of the Grey Wolves” gave members instructions to torture the members of the Grey 
 
6 
Wolves who did not obey orders.  AR 140.  In other words, there is substantial evidence 
that Grey Wolves’ leadership authorized the acts of terrorism and that the acts of 
terrorism were carried out by specific “inside members” of the Grey Wolves.  AR 139-
42.  While Ozturk argued that “[i]t is not clear who exactly leads the Grey Wolves,” this 
assertion does not rebut the substantial evidence in the record, including Ozturk’s own 
testimony, that leadership authorized the acts of terrorism.  Opening Br. at 6; Uddin, 870 
F.3d at 285.  We therefore conclude that the BIA did not err in designating the Grey 
Wolves a Tier III terrorist organization. 
There was also substantial evidence to support the BIA’s determination that 
Ozturk provided material support to the Grey Wolves.  Ozturk testified that he “recruited 
many new members into the group, purchased supplies for events … and served as a 
leader for the organization.”  Appx. 5.  These are “act[s] that [Ozturk] … reasonably 
should know, afford[ed the Grey Wolves] material support.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI); see also Sesay v. Att’y Gen., 787 F.3d 215, 221 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(collecting cases and noting that “the BIA and Courts of Appeals have repeatedly upheld 
findings that an alien’s” relatively low-level support is material); Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 
385 F.3d 293, 294 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[P]roviding food and setting up shelter for people 
engaged in terrorist activities constitutes affording material support ….” (internal 
quotations omitted)); Matter of A-C-M-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 303, 309-10 (BIA 2018) 
(concluding that cooking and cleaning constitutes material support).  
“If an alien is deemed a member of a Tier III organization, then he can avoid the 
terrorism bar if he can ‘demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that [he] did not 
 
7 
know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist 
organization.’”  Uddin, 870 F.3d at 285 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI)).  Ozturk argues that he did not know and could not have known the 
Grey Wolves were a terrorist organization because he was not a member.  Ozturk did not 
raise this argument before the BIA, and we therefore cannot consider it.  AR 33-35; See 
Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 447 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that a noncitizen 
“must exhaust all administrative remedies available to him as of right before the BIA as a 
prerequisite to raising a claim before us.” (emphasis in original)). 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  


Askin Ozturk v. Attorney General United States of America

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-22-2025 
In Re: Chryssoula Arsenis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: Chryssoula Arsenis" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 310. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/310 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
ALD-117        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 25-1365 
___________ 
 
IN RE: CHRYSSOULA ARSENIS, 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
(Related to 3:23-cv-02601) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
April 3, 2025 
Before:  BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed April 22, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In May 2023, Petitioner Chryssoula Arsenis, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint 
in the District Court against M&T Bank s/b/m Hudson Savings Bank (“M&T”) relating 
to a mortgage loan and asserting violations of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic 
Security Act (“CARES Act”), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 
and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).  At the time the complaint was 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
filed, the property securing the mortgage at issue was the subject of foreclosure 
proceedings in the state court.  The District Court, determining that the case was parallel 
to the state foreclosure action, dismissed the complaint without prejudice pursuant to the 
Colorado River abstention doctrine.  See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1976). 
Arsenis appealed.  While the appeal was pending, the state court entered an order 
granting summary judgment in favor of M&T, and this Court ordered supplemental 
briefing from the parties on the issue of claim preclusion.  This Court ultimately 
concluded that abstention was not warranted, vacated the District Court’s order of 
dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings.  See Arsenis v. M&T Bank, No. 24-
1151, 2025 WL 88838 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2025) (mandate issued Feb. 5, 2025).  In 
remanding the matter, we specifically declined to address in the first instance any 
preclusive effects from the state court grant of summary judgment.  Instead, we left the 
issue “to the District Court to address on remand.”  Id. at *3.  Upon the reopening of 
proceedings after remand, the District Court granted a motion by the Defendant to submit 
supplemental briefing on the issue of res judicata.  See D.Ct. ECF No. 33.   
Arsenis has now filed a petition for a writ of mandamus.  See 3d Cir. ECF No. 3 
(operative amended petition).  She asserts that the District Court’s order granting 
supplemental briefing on the issue of res judicata “exceeds the scope of the mandate 
issued by this Court,” and requests that we order the District Court to vacate its order.  3d 
Cir. ECF No. 3 at 1-2.  In addition, she has filed a motion requesting that this Court issue 
an emergency stay of any further proceedings in the District Court pending resolution of 
 
3 
 
her mandamus petition.   For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for a writ 
of mandamus and the motion for an emergency stay.   
A writ of mandamus will issue only in extraordinary circumstances.  See Sporck v. 
Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 1985).  Arsenis must show that she has a clear and 
indisputable right to the relief sought, and that a writ of mandamus from this Court is the 
only available remedy.  See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976).  Arsenis 
has not made such a showing.   
Arsenis asserts that she is entitled to relief because the District Court’s order 
authorizing supplemental briefing on the issue of res judicata is “in direct contravention” 
of this Court’s February 5, 2025 mandate ordering remand by “improperly reopen[ing] an 
issue that was already addressed and determined by this Court.”  3d Cir. ECF No. 3 at 2.  
Inexplicably, Arsenis cited “the Third Circuit’s explicit holding that res judicata was not 
warranted.”  Id. at 3.  This Court made no such holding. Rather, as explicitly noted in this 
Court’s order, “we decline[d] to address” the issue of claim preclusion, leaving it instead 
“to the District Court to address on remand” in the first instance.  Arsenis, 2025 WL 
88838 at *3.  As such, the order of remand specifically contemplated the District Court’s 
consideration of issues relating to claim preclusion. 
Because the District Court’s order does not violate this Court’s February 5, 2025 
mandate, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.  The motion for an 
emergency stay is also denied. 


In Re: Chryssoula Arsenis

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-30-2025 
Rice Enterprise v. RSUI Indemnity Co 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Rice Enterprise v. RSUI Indemnity Co" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 344. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/344 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 24-1880 
_____________ 
 
RICE ENTERPRISES, LLC 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
RSUI INDEMNITY CO and ZENITH INSURANCE 
COMPANY 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the  
Western District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 2:23-cv-00846) 
District Court Judge: Honorable Marilyn J. Horan 
_____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 16, 2025 
 
(Filed: April 30, 2025) 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
_________ 
O P I N I O N* 
_________ 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Rice Enterprises, LLC appeals the District Court’s order dismissing its 
claims for insurance coverage against Zenith Insurance Company and partially dismissing 
its claims against RSUI Indemnity Company. Appellant argues the District Court erred in 
applying two exclusions from the Zenith policy and in finding that coverage under 
RSUI’s “Umbrella” policy had not been “triggered.” Rice Enters., LLC v. RSUI Indem. 
Co., 705 F. Supp. 3d 460, 471–72 (W.D. Pa. 2023). We will affirm. 
I. 
Appellant operated eight McDonald’s franchises in Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania. On September 21, 2021, Appellant’s former employee, L.H., sued 
Appellant in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas for negligence. L.H. alleged 
Appellant had hired a manager who was a “Lifetime Offender” under Megan’s Law, who 
proceeded to sexually harass and ultimately rape L.H. JA282, 284, 290. 
Appellant sought coverage with respect to L.H.’s suit under three insurance 
policies: one issued by Zenith and two by RSUI. The Zenith policy was the “Employers’ 
Liability” half of a dual “Workers’ Compensation and Employers’ Liability” policy, 
which covered liability due to “bodily injury . . . aris[ing] out of and in the course of [an] 
injured employee’s employment.” JA361–62. RSUI’s two policies were a “Directors and 
Officers Liability” policy and a “Commercial Umbrella” liability policy. Rice Enters., 705 
F. Supp. 3d at 465. The Umbrella policy, the only RSUI policy at issue on appeal, 
provided for a defense if: 
3 
 
a. The applicable limits of insurance of the “underlying insurance” and 
other insurance have been used up in the payment of judgments or 
settlements; or  
b. No other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for 
damages covered by this policy. 
JA446. 
Zenith moved to dismiss all claims against it, and RSUI moved to dismiss 
Appellant’s claims only as to the Umbrella policy. The District Court granted both 
motions. 
As to the Zenith policy, the District Court ruled that two exclusions applied. The 
first, termed “C.4,” excluded coverage for “[a]ny obligation imposed by a workers’ 
compensation, occupational disease, unemployment compensation, or disability benefits 
law, or any similar law.” Rice Enters., 705 F. Supp. 3d at 467 (quoting Zenith policy). The 
District Court interpreted C.4 to bar coverage for any claim falling within the exclusive 
domain of Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act. Id. at 468. And it determined 
L.H.’s suit was such a claim because “the injuries and damages alleged by L.H. occurred 
during the course of [L.H.’s employment] and at L.H.’s Rice employment worksite.” Id. 
at 469. The second exclusion, “C.7,” barred coverage for “[d]amages arising out of 
coercion, criticism, demotion, evaluation, reassignment, discipline, defamation, 
harassment, humiliation, discrimination against or termination of any employee, or any 
personnel practices, policies, acts or omissions.” Id. at 467 (quoting Zenith policy). 
Because all allegations in L.H.’s complaint described harassing conduct by her 
supervisor, the District Court concluded C.7 applied. Id. at 469–70.  
4 
 
As to the RSUI Umbrella policy, the District Court determined that coverage was 
not “triggered” because there was no allegation that other insurance (such as RSUI’s 
Directors and Officers policy) had been used up or was unavailable. Id. at 472. 
Litigation then proceeded on the RSUI Directors and Officers policy. At 
Appellant’s request, the District Court certified its dismissal order as a final judgment 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), allowing Appellant to take the present 
appeal. Rice Enters., LLC v. RSUI Indem. Co., No. 23-cv-846, 2024 WL 1973498, at *5 
(W.D. Pa. May 3, 2024). 
II.1 
A. Zenith Policy 
We find it sufficient to analyze exclusion C.7 and do not reach C.4. Appellant 
argues the District Court erred in applying C.7 because Appellant’s liability arose out of 
“sexual misconduct” rather than “harassment.” Appellant’s Br. 18 (emphasis deleted). But 
Appellant provides no authority that the term “harassment” cannot include sexual 
misconduct, and, in ordinary usage, it can. See Patton v. Keystone RV Co., 455 F.3d 812, 
816 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[I]nstances of physical contact . . . have the potential to be among 
 
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the grant of a motion to dismiss 
de novo, City of Edinburgh Council v. Pfizer, Inc., 754 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2014), asking 
whether the “complaint . . . contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
Since the scope of a motion to dismiss is confined to “the allegations contained in the 
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record,” Schmidt v. 
Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014), we take the facts as they existed at the time of 
Appellant’s complaint and do not consider Appellant’s later settlement with L.H. 
5 
 
the most severe and psychologically damaging types of sexual harassment.”); Davis v. 
Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 653 (1999) (describing harassment under Title 
IX that included “numerous acts of objectively offensive touching” amounting to 
“criminal sexual misconduct”). 
Appellant also argues the case should have been allowed to proceed to discovery 
because the applicable Pennsylvania law was unsettled. But Appellant does not identify 
any facts that could be obtained in discovery that would change the outcome. And federal 
courts are empowered to decide unsettled questions of state law by predicting how the 
state’s highest court would rule. Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R. J. Enstrom Corp., 499 
F.2d 146, 147 (3d Cir. 1974). 
Accordingly, Appellant’s claims against Zenith were properly dismissed. 
B. RSUI Umbrella Policy 
The RSUI Umbrella policy provides for a defense2 if other insurance policies (such 
as the Directors and Officers policy) have been used up or are unavailable. Appellant’s 
complaint does not allege that either condition was met. In particular, the complaint does 
not allege that Appellant had exhausted the limits of the RSUI Directors and Officers 
policy or that that policy was not available to cover Appellant’s liability to L.H. Thus, 
Appellant’s claims under the RSUI Umbrella policy were properly dismissed. 
While Appellant now concedes that “the underlying insurance policies had not yet 
been exhausted,” Appellant nevertheless argues that the RSUI Umbrella policy should 
 
2 Appellant’s brief does not discuss the duty to indemnify or reference its declaratory 
judgment claims, and thus we do not consider those issues. 
6 
 
have been kept in the case for convenience. Appellant’s Br. 20. However, the question on 
a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is whether “a complaint . . . contain[s] sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted). Since that standard was not met, the District Court 
was correct to dismiss the claim. Appellant also suggests that a reversal as to Zenith could 
affect the RSUI Umbrella policy. Since we have not reversed as to Zenith, we need not 
consider that argument. 
III. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 


Rice Enterprise v. RSUI Indemnity Co

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-1-2025 
Marianne Sawicki v. Michael Kipphan 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
Nos. 24-2033 & 24-2120 
_______________ 
MARIANNE SAWICKI,  
    Appellant in No. 24-2033 
v. 
MICHAEL M. KIPPHAN; LORI HEATON; HUNTINGDON-BEDFORD-FULTON 
AREA AGENCY ON AGING; CHRISTOPHER B. WENCKER; DAVID G. SMITH; 
COUNTY OF HUNTINGDON, PENNSYLVANIA; GEORGE N. ZANIC; ANGELA 
ROBINSON; RICHARD A. WILSON; BOROUGH OF HUNTINGDON, 
PENNSYLVANIA 
 
Richard A. Wilson, Borough of Huntingdon,  
    Appellants in No. 24-2120 
_______________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1:21-cv-02031) 
District Judge: Hon. Jennifer P. Wilson 
_______________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on April 29, 2025 
Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
(Filed: May 1, 2025) 
 
 
 
 
2 
_______________ 
OPINION* 
_______________ 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge.  
Marianne Sawicki sued nearly a dozen officials and municipalities for allegedly violat-
ing her constitutional rights. The District Court dismissed her second amended complaint 
and the defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees. We will affirm.  
This saga begins with cats. Barbara Kissinger ran a nonprofit cat shelter. In 2019, police 
stopped her van, detained it, and recovered many cats. According to the complaint, “police 
locked the van and let it sit on the street with the animals inside for about 36 hours,” causing 
many of the cats to die. Dist. Ct. Dkt. 85, 2nd Am. Compl., at 17–18 (¶ 42). Yet Kissinger 
was charged with animal abuse, and solo civil-rights lawyer Marianne Sawicki represented 
her in that case. She also represented Kissinger in another case: One of the municipalities, 
Huntingdon Borough, demolished Kissinger’s house and filed a civil lien against her to 
recover the costs.  
Next, we come to allegations of revenge. Sawicki alleges that a judge with a longstand-
ing grudge against her removed her from representing Kissinger in the criminal case. She 
also claims that the Borough had not given Kissinger the notice required by statute, expos-
ing the Borough to massive liability. To protect the Borough, officials allegedly conspired 
to stop her by crushing her legal practice and by forcing her to defend her law license. The 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 
precedent. 
3 
judge and others reported her to the bar disciplinary board, where they testified that she was 
erratic and behaved disruptively in ways symptomatic of “severe mental illness.” Dist. Ct. 
Dkt. 85, Second Am. Compl., at 63 (¶ 187). Sawicki says this bar proceeding cost her not 
only time and money, but also a “marked deterioration of physical and mental health” that 
forced her to retire her law license and drastically scale back her remaining pro bono prac-
tice. Id., at 85 (¶ 273). 
The board found ten ethical violations and recommended suspending her law license 
for a year and a day. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did so. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. 
v. Sawicki, No. 3005 Disciplinary Docket No. 3, 2023 Pa. LEXIS 1726 (Dec. 22, 2023) 
(per curiam). 
Meanwhile, Sawicki sued the Borough, the county, the Borough’s lawyer, and various 
judicial officials in federal court. In her second amended complaint, she alleged First 
Amendment retaliation against her for her protected advocacy for Kissinger and violations 
of due process in depriving her of her law practice and its funds. The District Court dis-
missed that complaint for failure to state a claim and denied leave to amend a third time. 
Sawicki appeals. We review de novo. Doe v. Hesketh, 828 F.3d 159, 166–67 (3d Cir. 2016).  
First, Sawicki argues that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because her claims were 
not yet ripe; she was not suspended until after it dismissed her case. But she concedes that 
her formal suspension from practicing law is not her alleged injury. Rather, “[t]he injury 
identified in the pleading was … the gradual strangulation of [her] law practice” and “extin-
guish[ing] her constitutionally protected activity of speaking out in advocacy for civil 
rights.” Appellant’s Br. at 33. Her complaint devoted sixteen paragraphs to these and other 
4 
injuries that she had already sustained because of the pending disciplinary proceedings. 
See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 425 (2021) (listing both monetary harms 
and constitutional-rights violations as Article III injuries). Those allegations were enough 
to show that her claims had ripened. Her injuries were not “dependent on contingent future 
events that may not occur as anticipated,” like the state’s suspending her law license. 
Trump v. New York, 592 U.S. 125, 131 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). They had 
already happened.  
Turning to the merits, Sawicki fails to state a First Amendment retaliation claim. Her 
allegations boil down to saying that the defendants triggered a state bar investigation to 
prevent her from litigating civil-rights cases. But “[w]hen a public official is sued for alleg-
edly causing a third party to take some type of adverse action against a plaintiff’s speech, 
we have held that defendant’s conduct must be of a particularly virulent character.” 
McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 2001). Criticizing the plaintiff or even 
urging adverse action is not enough; “[r]ather, defendant must ‘threaten’ or ‘coerce’ the 
third party to act.” Id. “[I]n the absence of a threat, coercion, or intimidation intimating that 
punishment, sanction, or adverse regulatory action will follow, such speech does not 
adversely affect a citizen’s First Amendment rights even if defamatory.” Id. (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). Sawicki does not clear this hurdle: She never alleges that anyone 
threatened or coerced the board. Plus, her conclusory conspiracy allegations are implausi-
ble. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
Sawicki also challenges the dismissal of her due-process claims. As she concedes, she 
cannot use a federal district court to appeal a state Supreme Court’s disciplinary 
5 
adjudication. D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486–87 (1983). Instead, she 
says the officials subverted the disciplinary process by filing false reports and lying to inves-
tigators. But that assertion is just her retaliation theory repackaged. So it too crashes into 
McLaughlin’s bar.  
And the District Court properly denied Sawicki leave to amend yet again. Amendment 
would be futile because her theories are baseless, and her proposed third amended com-
plaint did nothing to cure these deficiencies.  
Cross-appealing, the Borough and its lawyer say the District Court should have held a 
hearing on whether Sawicki litigated in bad faith and should have awarded attorney’s fees. 
But as they admit, awarding attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a civil-rights case is 
discretionary. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). We review for abuse of discretion. Raab v. City of 
Ocean City, 833 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2016). On these facts, the District Court could have 
found the lawsuit frivolous and awarded attorney’s fees. But given Sawicki’s mental impair-
ments, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in choosing not to do so. We will thus 
affirm both the dismissal with prejudice and the denial of attorney’s fees.  


Marianne Sawicki v. Michael Kipphan

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-6-2025 
Charles Bennett v. Bayer Corporation 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1807 
____________ 
 
CHARLES BENNETT,  
Ex Rel, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BAYER CORPORATION, An Indiana Corporation; 
JOHNSON & JOHNSON, a New Jersey Corporation; 
MERCK & CO., INC., a New Jersey Corporation*; 
JOHNSON & JOHNSON PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT, 
L.L.C.; 
ORTHO-MCNEIL-JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS 
 
(*Dismissed pursuant to Clerk’s Order dated 06/21/2024) 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No. 2:17-cv-04188) 
District Judge:  Honorable Esther Salas 
 
  Argued January 17, 2025 
____________ 
 
Before:  PHIPPS, FREEMAN, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed April 10, 2025) 
 
Andrew Grosso [ARGUED] 
Andrew Grosso & Associates 
1250 Connecticut Avenue NW 
Suite 700 
Washington, DC 20036 
 
 
2 
Robert A. Magnanini 
Stone & Magnanini 
400 Connell Drive 
Suite 6200 
Berkeley Heights, NJ 07922 
 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
Paul J. Fishman 
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer 
One Gateway Center 
Suite 1025 
Newark, NJ 07102 
 
Allon Kedem [ARGUED] 
Christian D. Sheehan 
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer 
601 Massachusetts Avenue NW 
Suite 1121 
Washington, DC 20001 
 
Michael A. Rogoff 
Debra E. Schreck 
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer 
250 W 55th Street 
New York, NY 10019 
 
Counsel for Bayer Corp. 
 
Kendall T. Burchard 
Mark W. Mosier [ARGUED] 
Eli Nachmany 
Krysten Rosen Moller 
Covington & Burling 
850 10th Street NW 
One City Center 
Washington, DC 20001 
 
Counsel for Johnson & Johnson 
 
Douglas Hallward-Driemeier 
Ropes & Gray 
2099 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 
 
3 
Washington, DC 20006 
 
Counsel for Amicus Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
 
Charles W. Scarborough 
Caroline W. Tan [ARGUED] 
United States Department of Justice 
Appellate Section 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 
Washington, DC 20530 
 
Counsel for Amicus United States of America 
____________ 
OPINION1 
____________ 
CHUNG, Circuit Judge. 
Relator Dr. Charles Bennett filed this qui tam action under the False Claims Act 
(“FCA”) against pharmaceutical companies Bayer, Johnson & Johnson, and others.  
Bennett asserts that the defendants fraudulently induced the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) to approve certain antibiotic drugs, and thus are liable under the 
FCA for the ensuing prescription costs paid by federal healthcare programs.  Defendants 
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the District Court granted their motion.   
We will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND2 
This qui tam action concerns two fluoroquinolone-class antibiotic drugs used to 
 
1 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
2 Because we write for the parties, we recite only facts pertinent to our decision. 
 
4 
treat a wide variety of conditions.  Ciprofloxacin was developed by Bayer and approved 
by the FDA in 1987.  Levofloxacin was developed by Johnson & Johnson and approved 
by the FDA in 1996. 
In his complaint, Bennett alleged that the defendants knew that both drugs caused 
serious side effects, including neurological and psychiatric damage, but omitted or 
misrepresented information about these side effects to the FDA during and after the New 
Drug Application (“NDA”) process.  According to Bennett, the defendants “fraudulently 
induced [the FDA] to grant its approval to these drugs without appropriate warning labels 
that would otherwise have been required,” and were therefore “marketed to, prescribed 
for, and used by patients who should not have used the[] drugs.”  Br. at 6.  Prescriptions 
for these drugs, in turn, caused “the submission of millions of claims a year to federal” 
healthcare programs that would “have never been reimbursed by the government” had the 
defendants been truthful.  App. at 294. 
The District Court dismissed Bennett’s complaint on two independent grounds.  
First, it held that Bennett’s fraudulent inducement theory of FCA liability was not viable 
because the government was not induced to enter into a contract with the defendants.  
The District Court next concluded that, even if Bennett’s theory of liability were viable, 
Bennett failed to plead falsity, a necessary element of an FCA claim.  Specifically, the 
District Court concluded that Bennett failed to allege that the defendants “misrepresented 
or omitted any required disclosures” or knowingly made any false or fraudulent 
statements to the FDA.  App. at 20. 
Bennett timely appealed. 
 
5 
II. DISCUSSION3 
A. Standard of Review 
We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).  U.S. ex rel. 
Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 486 (3d Cir. 2017).  Because this Court’s 
“review is plenary, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record.”  Hassen v. 
Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 861 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). 
To survive a motion to dismiss, Bennett’s complaint must “contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).  Moreover, 
because Bennett’s FCA claim alleges that the defendants committed fraud, his complaint 
is subject to the heightened pleading standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).  See U.S. ex rel. 
Moore & Co., P.A. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 306-07 (3d Cir. 
2016).  Under Rule 9(b), Bennett must allege “with particularity the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake,” including “the who, what, when, where and how of the 
events at issue.”  Id. at 307 (citations omitted). 
B. Bennett Failed to Sufficiently Plead an FCA Violation 
“A False Claims Act violation includes four elements: falsity, causation, 
knowledge, and materiality.”  Petratos, 85 F.3d at 487 (citations omitted).  Bennett failed 
to plead falsity and materiality.4 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
4 We do not address whether fraudulent inducement liability under the FCA is limited 
to situations where the government is induced to enter a contract, as Bennett’s claim fails 
 
6 
Bennett asserts two ways that the defendants misled the FDA into approving the 
drugs.  First, the defendants allegedly withheld clinical data on the prevalence and 
severity of the drugs’ side effects.  According to Bennett, the defendants “had to have 
known” about “the adverse neurological and psychiatric effects of their…drugs” after 
conducting “human and animal studies” as part of the NDA process in the 1980s and 
1990s.  Br. at 9-10 (emphasis omitted).  The defendants were allegedly on notice about 
the adverse side effects in 2014, at the latest, after Bennett filed two Citizen Petitions 
with the FDA concerning the drugs’ side effects.   
Second, the defendants allegedly disaggregated data concerning the drugs’ side 
effects, “camouflaging the safety issues.”  Br. at 11.  Specifically, this “disaggregation” 
allegedly allowed the defendants to report relatively low rates of multiple side effects 
instead of grouping them together as manifestations of a broader condition that Bennett 
refers to as “fl[uo]roquinolone-associated disability” or “FQAD.”5  App. at 256.  Had 
defendants appropriately aggregated the symptoms, Bennett asserts, the FDA would have 
had “a true picture of FQAD” incidence.  App. at 274. 
Neither of these allegations satisfy the heightened pleading standard under Rule 
9(b). 
 
under any theory. 
 
5 Dr. Deborah Boxwell, an FDA official studying the side effects of 
fluoroquinolone-class drugs, defined FQAD as a “disability” resulting from “adverse 
events reported from two or more…body systems” that lasts “30 days or longer after 
stopping the fluoroquinolone.”  App. at 484 n.2.  According to the FDA, however, FQAD 
“is not accepted medical terminology” and the term “is not used in clinical practice.” 
 
7 
1. Omission of Prevalence Data 
Bennett fails to allege what, if anything, the defendants knew or withheld from the 
FDA during the NDA process.  At most, Bennett asserts that the defendants “had to have 
known” about the adverse side effects based upon studies defendants were required to 
conduct.  Br. at 10.  This is a textbook Rule 9(b) pleading deficiency in the form of 
speculation.  See City of Warren Police and Fire Ret. Sys. v. Prudential Fin., Inc., 70 
F.4th 668, 680 (3d Cir. 2023); Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 155 
(3d Cir. 2014). 
Nor are we persuaded by Bennett’s assertion that the defendants failed to disclose 
relevant side-effect data in reports to the FDA after the NDA was approved.  As Bennett 
notes, the defendants acknowledged the new data but “denied that their drugs had any 
linkage to” the side effects or any need to change their labeling at hearings before the 
Joint Meeting of the Antimicrobial Drugs Advisory Committee and the Drug Safety Risk 
Management Advisory Committee, both of which are run by the FDA.  Br. at 10 
(emphasis omitted).  Simply stated, although Bennett asserts that the defendants falsely 
claimed the drugs did not cause the side effects,6 the defendants’ conduct cannot be said 
 
6 Bennett’s allegation that the defendants “denied the connection between [the 
drugs] and their side effects,” App. 287, is similarly undeveloped.  Bennett fails to 
specify what denials were false and the only possible identifiable such statement was 
made at the 2015 Joint Meeting.  Bennett does not allege, though, that the defendants 
knew the data established causation at that time.  See Dist. Ct. ECF 71-7 at 10 
(identifying “emerging safety issues” with fluoroquinolone-class antibiotics (emphasis 
added)); United States v. Care Alternatives, 952 F.3d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that 
“the plain language of the FCA denotes scienter as an element independent of falsity”).  
 
8 
to be an “omission” of any kind, as they neither hid, nor denied, the existence of the data. 
2. Disaggregating Side-Effect Data 
Bennett’s second allegation of fraud relies on the defendants’ use of disaggregated 
side-effect data in their NDA.  He argues that the defendants “intentionally disaggregated 
individual symptomatic components” that would have revealed a higher incidence of 
FQAD.  Br. at 31-32.  In Bennett’s view, the use of disaggregated data was therefore 
misleading. 
We disagree.  Bennett does not allege that the data itself was false, only that its 
organization or presentation was misleading.  Even assuming that slicing and dicing 
otherwise accurate data can amount to a false or fraudulent statement, the central problem 
with Bennett’s contention is that he fails to allege such aggregated data would be 
material.  Bennett fails to plausibly allege with specificity that the FDA would have 
recognized FQAD as a diagnosis and that aggregated data would have led the FDA to 
deny the NDA or take other action.  This is especially true given that it appears that the 
FDA did in fact have aggregated data, as shown in the drug approval letters.  Stated 
simply, Bennett’s disaggregated-data theory fails to plausibly allege the necessary 
element of materiality. 
We therefore conclude that Bennett failed to plausibly allege an FCA violation. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm. 


Charles Bennett v. Bayer Corporation

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-9-2025 
Tariq Wyatt v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2520 
__________ 
 
TARIQ WYATT, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SUPERINTENDENT MAHANOY SCI; L. CRONAUER, DSFM Deputy Superintendent 
of SCI-Mahanoy; JOHN E. WETZEL, Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections; GEORGE LITTLE, Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-00414) 
District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 2, 2025 
Before:  RESTREPO, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 9, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 Tariq Wyatt appeals pro se from the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint.  
We will affirm.  
I. 
 Wyatt is a Pennsylvania state prisoner.  He was previously housed at SCI 
Mahanoy.  In 2019, SCI Mahanoy issued a memorandum advising of the prison’s 
violence deterrence strategy.  Under the policy, the prison could lock down a unit for up 
to 36 hours if any inmate in the unit committed certain violent acts.  Wyatt alleged that 
the policy had been implemented statewide, and that the 36-hour lockdowns were 
“continuing and systematic” and had occurred more than 20 times throughout the state.1 
 Wyatt claimed that the policy was unconstitutional because the prisons were 
punishing innocent inmates to deter future violent behavior.  He explained that punishing 
an innocent person “causes pent up rage[] and has a deep psychological effect on 
someone.”  Wyatt further explained that he experienced psychological trauma from being 
punished for others’ actions.  According to Wyatt, he resided in a treatment unit for 
inmates with mental illness, he spoke with mental health staff on numerous occasions, the 
staff knew that he was not responding well mentally, and his mental stability was 
deteriorating from the lockdowns.   
 Wyatt filed a civil rights complaint against the Superintendent and Deputy 
Superintendent of Mahanoy, and the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of 
 
1 For this reason, Wyatt requested that his case be certified as a class action. 
 
3 
Corrections, alleging that the violence reduction strategy violated his rights under the 
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  He sought declaratory relief and an 
injunction to cease the policy, as well as monetary damages and a jury trial.  A Magistrate 
Judge recommended dismissing the complaint with prejudice against the defendants in 
their official capacities because the Eleventh Amendment barred the claims.  The 
Magistrate Judge determined that Wyatt failed to state a claim for relief against the 
individual defendants, but that he should be granted leave to amend the complaint.  
Having received no objection to the report and recommendation, the District Court 
adopted it, dismissing the complaint with prejudice against the defendants in their official 
capacities, but with leave to amend as to the defendants in their individual capacities.   
 Wyatt notified the Court that he had not received the report and recommendation 
in time to object because his mail had been returned to sender, and he sought additional 
time to file his objections.  The Court denied the request as moot.  Later, when Wyatt 
filed his second amended complaint, he objected to being required to amend his 
complaint instead of having additional time to challenge the Magistrate Judge’s report 
and recommendation.  The District Court overruled the objections, explaining that the 
Court had given Wyatt ample time to amend his complaint, and therefore Wyatt suffered 
no prejudice from the denial of his request for additional time to object to the Magistrate 
Judge’s report and recommendation.  
 
4 
 The defendants moved to dismiss Wyatt’s second amended complaint under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The District Court granted the motion and 
dismissed the complaint without further leave to amend.  Wyatt appealed. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise plenary review over a 
District Court’s decision to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss” for failure to state a 
claim, “accept[ing] all factual allegations as true and constru[ing] the complaint in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff.”  Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 
2016).   
 Wyatt’s arguments on appeal lack merit.2  First, Wyatt argues that the District 
Court erred by failing to extend his time to object to the Magistrate Judge’s report and 
recommendation.  We review this issue for abuse of discretion.  See Drippe v. Tobelinski, 
604 F.3d 778, 783 (3d Cir. 2010).  We cannot say that the District Court abused its 
discretion here because Wyatt has not established any prejudice from the claimed 
inability to object.  After the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and 
recommendation, Wyatt had two opportunities to amend his complaint against the 
individual defendants.  Wyatt appears to argue that, had he been given more time to 
object, he would have challenged the determination that he could not bring a claim for 
injunctive relief against the defendants in their official capacities.  But any objection to 
 
2 Wyatt does not challenge the District Court’s dismissal of his Fifth Amendment claim. 
 
5 
that determination would not have changed the case outcome because, as explained 
below, Wyatt failed to allege plausibly that the defendants violated his constitutional 
rights.   
 Wyatt also argues that the District Court erred by dismissing his Eighth 
Amendment claims.  To succeed on a claim that confinement conditions violate the 
Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the alleged deprivation was 
“objectively, sufficiently serious,” and (2) the prison official had a “sufficiently culpable 
state of mind.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  A plaintiff can satisfy the first element by alleging sufficient facts 
that he was “deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”  Thomas v. 
Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).  A plaintiff satisfies the second 
element by alleging facts that “show[] that prison officials acted with deliberate 
indifference to the inmate’s health or safety or conditions of confinement that violated the 
inmate’s constitutional rights.”  Id. (citation omitted).  A plaintiff might also plead an 
Eighth Amendment claim by showing that (1) “the defendants were deliberately 
indifferent to his or her medical needs” and (2) “those needs were [objectively] serious.”  
Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).   
The District Court properly explained that Wyatt did not allege in his complaint 
how many times he experienced the 36-hour lockdowns personally.  But even if we 
assume that he experienced them for the more than 20 times that he alleged they occurred 
“throughout the Pennsylvania state prisons,” Wyatt still failed to plead facts sufficient to 
 
6 
state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim.  Wyatt did not provide enough detail about 
the conditions he faced during the lockdowns, or his mental health, such that a court 
could conclude that he was denied basic life necessities.  Cf. Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 
167, 173-74, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2022) (holding that the plaintiff, who was previously 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and paranoid schizophrenia, stated a plausible Eighth 
Amendment claim for being placed in isolation for 7 months by alleging that he 
experienced “increased hallucinations, paranoia, self-mutilation, sleeplessness, and 
nightmares”); Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 216-17, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding 
that the parents of a prisoner who was previously diagnosed with impulse control 
disorder and anti-social personality disorder, had been identified as a suicide behavior 
risk, and had previously engaged in self-harm plausibly stated an Eighth Amendment 
claim for the prisoner’s multiple 30-day stints in solitary confinement, during which he 
committed suicide).  Further, although Wyatt claimed that staff knew that the lockdown 
policy was deteriorating his mental stability, he did not indicate that any of the named 
defendants were aware of his alleged injuries or were involved in his treatment, or lack 
thereof.  See Thomas, 948 F.3d at 138; Pearson, 850 F.3d at 534-35.  Finally, as Wyatt 
concedes, the lockdowns were intended to deter prison inmate violence, which is a 
legitimate penological interest.  See Porter v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 446 (3d 
Cir. 2020); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003) (stating that 
promoting internal security in prisons is “perhaps the most legitimate of penological 
goals”); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974) (“[C]entral to all other corrections 
 
7 
goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities 
themselves.”).  
Next, Wyatt argues that the District Court erred by dismissing his Fourteenth 
Amendment due process claim.  To determine whether an inmate has sufficiently stated a 
due process claim for deprivation of a liberty interest, the Court considers whether the 
alleged deprivation “impose[d] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation 
to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”  Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706-07 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).  Wyatt claims that his 
allegations regarding his mental health were enough to show that he suffered an atypical 
and significant hardship.  But again, Wyatt did not provide sufficient factual detail about 
his mental health.  And aside from the lockdowns’ durations, Wyatt provided no detail 
about the lockdown conditions such that this court could conclude that any hardship he 
experienced was atypical in relation to ordinary prison life.  Cf. Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 
140, 143-44 (3d Cir. 2000).  Nor did he sufficiently allege that the lockdowns’ durations 
were atypical.  See, e.g., Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 532 (3d Cir. 2003). 
Because Wyatt failed to state a claim for relief, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by declining to consider Wyatt’s class action certification request.  See Polsky 
v. United States, 844 F.3d 170, 172 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam).  Accordingly, we 
will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  To the extent that Wyatt seeks other relief on 
appeal, it is denied. 


Tariq Wyatt v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-14-2025 
Keith Cauley v. Geisinger Clinic 
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https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/401 
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        NON PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 24-1435 
_____________ 
  
 
KEITH CAULEY, M.D., Ph.D.,  
 Appellant 
 
v. 
 
GEISINGER CLINIC, 
 
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 4:21-cv-0045) 
District Court: Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on November 12, 2024 
 
Before: RESTREPO, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 14, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not 
binding precedent. 
2 
 
Appellant Keith A. Cauley, M.D. appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Appellee Geisinger Clinic (“Geisinger”) on his breach of contract and promissory 
estoppel claims.  Dr. Cauley also challenges the District Court’s denial of his discovery request 
and his motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we 
affirm. 
I. 
Dr. Cauley worked as a Neuroradiology Associate at Geisinger from September 2015 
until September 2019.  Following peer reviews that raised concerns about Dr. Cauley’s 
performance, Geisinger placed him on administrative leave, and he subsequently resigned.  
During his administrative suspension, Dr. Cauley retained an attorney and negotiated a 
resignation agreement rather than face potential termination proceedings.  His resignation 
agreement provided that he would be permitted to review the peer review records that had led to 
his administrative leave and that Geisinger would provide neutral employment references 
limited to his dates of employment.    
Dr. Cauley later sought employment at several other healthcare facilities without success.  
The record indicates that Geisinger sent only one reference letter to a prospective employer that 
provided Dr. Cauley’s employment dates and confirmed he exercised clinical privileges at 
Geisinger.  The record also shows that Dr. William Millar, a physician who was an employee of 
Geisinger, told the prospective employer that Dr. Cauley might not be a good fit for their 
hospital.    
Dr. Cauley filed suit against Geisinger in January 2021, claiming breach of contract, 
misrepresentation, and defamation.  He added a promissory estoppel claim in a Second 
3 
 
Amended Complaint.  In January 2022, the District Court dismissed the misrepresentation and 
defamation claims but allowed the breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims to 
proceed.  These remaining claims centered around Dr. Cauley’s allegations that Geisinger (1) 
provided negative references and (2) failed to allow him access to peer review records, violating 
the resignation agreement.  In its January 2022 Order, the District Court granted Dr. Cauley 
leave to file a Third Amended Complaint by February 17, 2022.     
After extensive discovery, Dr. Cauley requested additional documents relating to 
Geisinger’s peer review policies and the peer reviews concerning his performance.  Following a 
hearing, the District Court denied this request.  The discovery period closed June 10, 2023, and 
on July 31, 2023, Dr. Cauley filed a motion seeking leave to file a Third Amended Complaint to 
add claims for defamation and fraudulent inducement.  The District Court denied the motion.  
On August 24, 2023, Geisinger moved for summary judgment on Dr. Cauley’s remaining 
claims, and the Court subsequently granted that motion on the breach of contract and promissory 
estoppel claims.  Dr. Cauley’s timely appeal followed.    
II.1 
A. The District Court’s Denial of Dr. Cauley’s Request for Documents Relating to 
Geisinger’s Peer Review Policies 
 
We review the District Court’s discovery rulings for abuse of discretion.  Camiolo v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 334 F.3d 345, 354 (3d Cir. 2003).  To meet this standard, Dr. 
Cauley “must show that the court’s decision was arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable.” 
 
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
4 
 
United States v. Collins, 36 F.4th 487, 494 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Democrat Nat’l Comm. v. 
Republican Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 192, 201 (3d Cir. 2012)).  He has failed to meet this burden.   
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that 
is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 26(b)(1).  The Rules further provide that considerations of proportionality include “the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative 
access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in 
resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its 
likely benefit.”  Id.  The scope of discoverable information is not unlimited.  Bayer AG v. 
Betachem, Inc., 173 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Although the scope of discovery under the 
Federal Rules is unquestionably broad, this right is not unlimited and may be circumscribed.”).  
As we have emphasized, “discovery is not intended as a fishing expedition permitting the 
speculative pleading of a case first and then pursuing discovery to support it; the plaintiff must 
have some basis in fact for the action.”  Zuk v. E. Pa. Psychiatric Inst. of the Med. Coll. of Pa., 
103 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 1996).   
Dr. Cauley requested four categories of documents: (1) Geisinger’s peer review hearing 
procedures; (2) Geisinger’s policy on professional practice review; (3) underlying diagnostic 
images relied upon in his peer review process; and (4) emails regarding his peer reviews.2  The 
District Court determined that these materials were irrelevant to Dr. Cauley’s remaining claims, 
which only concerned whether Geisinger provided negative references or denied opportunities 
 
2 Dr. Cauley also requested encrypted text messages, but Geisinger produced them to him 
on May 15, 2023.   
5 
 
to review peer review records.   
We find no abuse of discretion in this ruling.  The peer reviews—their procedures, 
underlying images, and related communications—had no bearing on whether Geisinger 
complied with its obligations under the resignation agreement.  Although Dr. Cauley argues that 
these documents were relevant to paragraphs 18-24 of his Second Amended Complaint, those 
paragraphs relate to claims that had already been dismissed from the case.  More tellingly, Dr. 
Cauley acknowledges that he sought the evidence for a future amended complaint—not for the 
claims at hand.  The District Court reasonably recognized this request as the very definition of a 
fishing expedition.  Thus, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dr. Cauley’s 
discovery request. 
 
B. The District Court’s Denial of Dr. Cauley’s Motion for Leave to File a Third 
Amended Complaint 
 
We review the District Court’s denial of Dr. Cauley’s motion for leave to file a Third 
Amended Complaint for abuse of discretion.  In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 
F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997).  When a party seeks to amend a pleading after the deadline 
established in a scheduling order, as in this case, the movant must first show “good cause” under 
Rule 16(b)(4).  Premier Comp Solutions, LLC v. UPMC, 970 F.3d 316, 319 (3d Cir. 2020); see 
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the 
judge’s consent.”).  Good cause “depends in part on a plaintiff’s diligence.”  Premier, 970 F.3d 
at 319.   
Only after the movant successfully establishes good cause does the court proceed to the 
6 
 
more liberal amendment standard of Rule 15(a), which directs the court to give leave “when 
justice so requires.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see also Premier, 970 F.3d at 319.  As we have 
noted, “Absent undue or substantial prejudice, an amendment should be allowed under Rule 
15(a) unless denial can be grounded in bad faith or dilatory motive, truly undue or unexplained 
delay, repeated failure to cure deficiency by amendments previously allowed or futility of 
amendment.”  Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390, 400 (3d Cir. 2004) (cleaned up).  The question of 
substantial prejudice “requires that [the court] focus on the hardship to the defendants if the 
amendment were permitted.”  Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  The court should consider “whether allowing an amendment would result in 
additional discovery, cost, and preparation to defend against new facts or new theories.”  Id.  
At the first step of the analysis, the District Court found that Dr. Cauley failed to 
demonstrate good cause under Rule 16(b)(4).  The Court acted well within its discretionary 
authority in making this determination.  Dr. Cauley moved to amend on July 31, 2023— 
17 months after the February 17, 2022 amendment deadline, and seven weeks after discovery 
closed.  Although Dr. Cauley claims that discovery revealed new information supporting a 
defamation claim, the record shows he had received this information by April 28, 2023, yet 
waited another 94 days to file his motion.  Moreover, his proposed fraudulent inducement claim 
was based on allegations about threats to report him to the National Provider Data Bank—
information that had been available since the beginning of the litigation and was referenced in 
his earlier Complaints.  This unexplained delay amply supports the District Court’s finding of a 
lack of diligence and good cause.  
As an alternative ground for denial, the District Court determined that—even if Dr. 
7 
 
Cauley had established good cause—the amendment would cause substantial prejudice to 
Geisinger under Rule 15(a).  This determination was equally sound.  As the Court noted, the 
proposed amendment would have added new claims after discovery had closed and Geisinger 
had filed a dispositive motion.  These new claims would have required significant additional 
investigation into several matters: Geisinger’s legal authority to report to the National Provider 
Database; the factual basis for such a report at the time Dr. Cauley was allegedly threatened; 
communications between various physicians; and the nature and content of interactions between 
certain physicians.  Moreover, permitting the amendment would have effectively mooted 
Geisinger’s pending summary judgment motion, “thereby voiding the money, time, and efforts 
expended in preparing that motion and essentially forcing Geisinger to litigate this case again 
from the very beginning.”  Appx. 50.  As we have noted, prejudice to the non-moving party is 
“the touchstone for the denial of an amendment,” Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (quoting Conrnell & Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 573 F.2d 
820, 823 (3d Cir. 1978)), particularly when an amendment would “result in additional discovery, 
cost, and preparation to defend against new facts or new theories,” Cureton, 252 F.3d at 273.  
Granting the amendment would have placed such a hardship on Geisinger.  
For these reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of Dr. 
Cauley’s motion under both Rule 16(b)(4) and Rule 15(a). 
 
C. The District Court’s Grant of Summary Judgment  
We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  Chavarriaga v. N.J. 
Dep’t Corrs., 806 F.3d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 2018).  Under this standard, we apply the same test as 
8 
 
the District Court, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and 
drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.  Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 
137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020). 
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a).  Material facts are those “that could alter the outcome” of the litigation, “and 
disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the 
position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”  EBC, Inc. v. 
Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern Group Ltd., 9 
F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993)).  A defendant “meets this standard when there is an absence of 
evidence that rationally supports the plaintiff’s case.”  Clark, 9 F.3d at 326.   
The party requesting summary judgment bears the initial burden of supporting its motion 
with evidence from the record.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  When the 
movant properly supports its motion, the nonmoving party must show the need for a trial by 
setting forth “genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact 
because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).  The nonmoving party will not withstand summary judgment if 
all it has are “[u]nsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions.”  Betts v. 
New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010).  Instead, it must “identify those 
facts of record which would contradict the facts identified by the movant.”  Port Auth. of N.Y. 
and N.J. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Childers v. Joseph, 
842 F.2d 689, 694-95 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
9 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, to establish a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate: “(1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms; (2) a breach of the 
contract; and (3) resultant damages.”  Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(brackets omitted) (quoting Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. v. Law Firm of 
Malone Middleman, P.C., 137 A.3d 1247, 1258 (Pa. 2016)).  A claim for promissory estoppel 
requires proof that “(1) the promisor made a promise that he should have reasonably expected to 
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; (2) the promisee actually took action or 
refrained from taking action in reliance on the promise; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by 
enforcing the promise.”  Cornell Narberth, LLC v. Borough of Narberth, 167 A.3d 228, 239 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2017) (quoting Crouse v. Cyclops Indus., 745 A.2d 606, 610 (Pa. 2000)).   
Dr. Cauley’s contract and promissory estoppel claims rest on two allegations: first, that 
Geisinger provided negative references that prevented him from obtaining employment 
elsewhere; and second, that Geisinger failed to provide him access to peer review records.  
Neither allegation finds support in the record to survive summary judgment.   
Regarding the negative references claim, the evidence shows only one instance where a 
Geisinger physician, Dr. Millar, provided anything that could be construed as a negative 
reference, telling a prospective employer that Dr. Cauley might not be a good fit.  However, as 
the District Court correctly determined, Dr. Millar was not Dr. Cauley’s supervisor at the time of 
the resignation agreement and did not qualify as the “Employer” bound by the neutral reference 
provision.  Dr. Cauley argues that Dr. Millar’s comments should be attributed to Geisinger, but 
the record does not support this contention.  Dr. Millar was not speaking on behalf of Geisinger 
when providing his assessment to the prospective employer.  We also note the neutrality 
10 
 
provision did not include language obligating Geisinger to affirmatively prevent its employees 
from providing references in their personal capacities.  The record confirms that Geisinger 
provided only one reference letter regarding Dr. Cauley—a neutral letter to the prospective 
employer stating only his employment dates and confirming that he exercised clinical privileges 
during that time.  This letter fully complied with Geisinger’s obligations under the resignation 
agreement. 
Dr. Cauley also speculates that Aalpen Patel, M.D. (one of Dr. Cauley’s supervisors at 
Geisinger) provided negative information to Christopher G. Filippi, M.D. (a physician at another 
prospective employer).  However, Dr. Filippi testified that he had no knowledge of Dr. Cauley’s 
resignation circumstances or any peer review involving Dr. Cauley and denied receiving any 
negative information from Geisinger.  Dr. Patel similarly testified that he would not be able to 
discuss any specifics regarding Dr. Cauley’s employment with Dr. Filippi.  Dr. Cauley’s 
unsupported speculation about the content of conversations between Dr. Patel and Dr. Filippi 
cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.  See 
Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 228 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation 
omitted) (“Speculation and conjecture may not defeat a motion for summary judgment.”).  
As for the peer review records, the evidence establishes that Geisinger provided Dr. 
Cauley with multiple opportunities to review these documents.  Dr. Patel testified that Dr. 
Cauley had scheduled a meeting to review the peer review records, but Dr. Cauley failed to 
attend.  Gino Mongeluzzo, M.D., another Geisinger physician, similarly testified that Dr. Cauley 
was given an opportunity to review the peer review documents.  After his resignation, Dr. 
Cauley was offered additional opportunities to review the records on October 27, 2020 and May 
11 
 
12, 2021, as documented in the declaration of Cindy A. Sheridan, Esq., Associate Chief Legal 
Officer at Geisinger’s Department of Legal Services.  
Dr. Cauley claims his testimony creates a factual dispute on this issue, but he failed to 
identify any specific testimony contradicting the evidence that Geisinger offered him 
opportunities to review the records.  The text communications he cites with Dr. Mongeluzzo do 
not contradict the fact that opportunities were provided; they merely indicate that Dr. Cauley did 
not take advantage of those opportunities.     
Viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to Dr. Cauley, we find no genuine 
dispute of material fact regarding whether Geisinger breached its contractual obligations or 
made promises that would give rise to a promissory estoppel claim.  The record clearly shows 
that Geisinger provided a neutral reference letter and offered Dr. Cauley multiple opportunities 
to review the peer review records.  Dr. Cauley has not presented evidence that would allow a 
reasonable jury to find in his favor on either claim. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment and orders of the District Court. 


Keith Cauley v. Geisinger Clinic

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-16-2025 
Shawn Williams v. Jaime Sorber 
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Recommended Citation 
"Shawn Williams v. Jaime Sorber" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 412. 
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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2046 
__________ 
 
SHAWN WILLIAMS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JAIME SORBER, Former Superintendent of SCI Phoenix; JOHN E. WETZEL, Former 
Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; GEORGE M. LITTLE, Former 
Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
___________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-02982) 
District Judge:  Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 28, 2025 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 16, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Shawn Williams, a Pennsylvania prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order 
granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss his amended civil rights complaint.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. 
In 2023, Williams, a Pennsylvania prisoner, filed a pro se complaint, which he 
later amended, raising claims related to his transfer to the “quarantine housing 
(segregated confinement) unit” at SCI Phoenix during the COVID-19 pandemic.  He 
named as defendants Jaime Sorber, a former superintendent of SCI Phoenix, as well as 
John E. Wetzel and George M. Little, two former secretaries of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections.  Williams asserted that he “declined to be vaccinated due to 
his religious beliefs.”  As part of an effort by Superintendent Sorber to remove all 
unvaccinated prisoners from the general prison population, Williams was transferred to a 
quarantine unit, where he remained from approximately August 1, 2021, until April 1, 
2022.  While in the quarantine unit, Williams was housed with an inmate who had 
recently tested positive for COVID.  In addition, Williams was subject to restrictive 
conditions that, he claimed, “took a toll on his mental and physical well being.”  He also 
alleged that his “efforts to pursue a legal claim [were] hindered . . . when he was not 
allowed access to an adequate law library.” 
The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), holding that Williams failed to state claims for alleged 
violations of his Eighth Amendment, substantive and procedural due process, equal 
3 
 
protection, First Amendment, and access to the courts rights.  Williams timely appealed.  
(ECF 30.) 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise 
de novo review over the order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss.  Chavarriaga v. 
N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 2015).  To avoid dismissal, “a complaint 
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and internal 
quotation omitted). 
III. 
A. Eighth Amendment Claims 
The Eighth Amendment protects prison inmates against cruel and unusual 
punishment.  See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1986).  To assert an Eighth 
Amendment conditions of confinement claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that (1) 
objectively the conditions were so serious that they constituted a denial of the “minimal 
civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and (2) subjectively the prison officials acted with 
“deliberate indifference[,]” i.e., that prison officials knew of and disregarded a substantial 
risk of serious harm.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 837 (1994). 
Williams alleged that while he was on the quarantine unit between August 1, 
2021, and April 1, 2022, he was allowed out of his cell for only short periods of time per 
day to use the phone, to shower, and to access the kiosk.  He further claimed that he was 
“not allowed access to the law library/regular library, religious services, vocational 
4 
 
programs, legal visits, contact visits, or anything else off the housing unit[,]” including 
the “yard.”  Williams also asserted that he was “only allowed to have four [Z]oom visits” 
and was not “permitted physical contact with any of his visitors under any 
circumstances.”  On August 18, 2021, Williams was “forced out of [his] cell[] . . . 
wear[ing] a T-shirt[s], underwear, and shower shoes” and made to “stand in the middle of 
the dayroom for dogs to sniff him while guards tossed his cell.”  Between December 3, 
2021, and December 17, 2021, and again between January 19, 2022, and February 2, 
2022, COVID-19 outbreaks required that the quarantine unit be put on “indefinite 
lockdown,” which meant that Williams “had no access to cleaning supplies, clean (fresh) 
air, law library etc. and [he] was also denied access to see the psychologist when he 
requested.”   
The conditions described above are not sufficiently extreme for a jury to conclude 
that Williams was deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”  See 
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981) (stating that the Eighth Amendment does 
not guarantee comfortable incarceration); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 
(1992) (holding that only “extreme deprivations” are sufficient to make out a conditions 
of confinement claim).  Although Williams’ time outside his cell was restricted, he still 
had regular access to food, showers, recreation, and communications via video.  See 
Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1225 n.17 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding prisoner’s 
allegations of limited access to employment, education, housing assignment, religious 
programming, recreation time and equipment, telephone and commissary did not state an 
Eighth Amendment claim); Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2001) 
5 
 
(concluding that the denial of recreation privileges for no more than ninety days was not 
cruel and unusual punishment); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 137 (2003) 
(explaining that withdrawal of visitation privileges for limited period for legitimate 
purpose does not deprive inmate of basic necessities).  In addition, the temporary loss of 
access to the law library and legal visits, religious services, and vocational programs, did 
not deprive Williams of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.  Griffin v. 
Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that life’s necessities include 
“basic human needs, such as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal 
safety”).  Furthermore, Williams failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim based on the 
August 2021 search because he did not allege facts suggesting that the defendants were 
“rid[ing] roughshod over [his] property rights with impunity” in a “calculated harassment 
unrelated to prison needs.”  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984).   
Williams also failed state a claim based on the denial of his request to see a 
psychologist after he expressed suicidal thoughts.  It is well settled that liability under 
§ 1983 may not be based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.  See Durmer v. 
O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 n.14 (3d Cir. 1993).  Williams did not indicate that any of the 
three named defendants were aware of his request to see a psychologist or that they were 
involved in the decision to deny it.  Instead, his complaint alleged only that he reported to 
“staff” that he was having suicidal thoughts and that “staff” denied his request to see a 
psychologist.  The District Court determined that Williams’ allegations regarding the 
denial of mental health care “are not tied to any of the named defendants.”  Williams has 
6 
 
not meaningfully challenged that ruling,1 nor has he argued that the District Court abused 
its discretion in holding that further amendment of his complaint would be futile.  See In 
re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (stating that litigants forfeit claims that they 
fail to develop in an opening brief). 
We also conclude that Williams failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim based 
on his allegation that the defendants housed him with an inmate who had recently tested 
positive for COVID.  According to Williams, that inmate tested positive a few days 
before being transferred to SCI Phoenix on November 1, 2021, was not retested prior to 
being moved into Williams’ cell, and told Williams that he still had mild symptoms.  But 
despite exposure to his cellmate, Williams did not contract COVID and he did not allege 
that he otherwise suffered or will suffer any harm as a result of being housed with a 
potentially COVID-positive inmate in November 2021.  See Bayley’s Campground, Inc. 
v. Mills, 985 F.3d 153, (1st Cir. 2021) (noting that record supportably showed that 
COVID had an incubation period of up to two weeks).  Under these circumstances, we 
conclude that Williams’ allegations are insufficient to state a claim under the Eighth 
Amendment.  See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 49-50 (2008) (explaining that although 
“subjecting individuals to a risk of future harm—not simply actually inflicting pain—can 
qualify as cruel and unusual punishment,” to constitute a violation of the Eighth 
 
1 Although Williams states in his brief that he informed Superintendent Sorber that he did 
not have “adequate access to . . . psych” services, we “may only look to the factual 
allegations asserted in the complaint.”  Gordon v. Wawa, Inc., 388 F.3d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
 
7 
 
Amendment, “the conditions presenting the risk must be ‘sure or very likely to cause 
serious illness and needless suffering,’ and give rise to ‘sufficiently imminent dangers.’”  
(quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 34-35 (1993))).  
B. Substantive and Procedural Due Process 
The District Court properly rejected Williams’ substantive and procedural due 
process claims.  In the amended complaint, Williams vaguely alleged that the restrictions 
that he faced in the quarantine unit violated his substantive due process rights.  But the 
defendants’ actions in trying to limit the spread of the virus at SCI Phoenix were not so 
egregious or outrageous as to shock the conscious.  See Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 
782 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Conduct can violate substantive due process if it shocks the 
conscience, which encompasses only the most egregious official conduct.”) (cleaned up).   
In addition, Williams failed to state a procedural due process claim based on his 
transfer to the quarantine unit.  A prisoner’s procedural due process rights are violated 
when he is deprived of a legally cognizable liberty interest, which occurs when the prison 
“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life.”  Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).  It is well settled 
that a prisoner does not have a protected right to be placed in the cell or unit of his 
choice.  See Sheehan v. Beyer, 51 F.3d 1170, 1174 (3d Cir. 1995).  And we have held 
that months-long stays in restrictive confinement did not implicate a liberty interest.  See 
Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 645, 654 (3d Cir. 2002); Griffin, 112 F.3d at 706-08 
(holding that fifteen months in administrative custody was insufficient to trigger a due 
process protections).  In this case, the District Court concluded that the “process afforded 
8 
 
was sufficient to account for the interests at stake . . . because the prison had an interest in 
preventing the spread of Covid and keeping inmates safe, and inmates were given the 
opportunity to either take the vaccine or, if they could not do so, accept more restrictive 
housing.”  We agree.  Williams alleged that he was notified of the reasons for the transfer 
to the quarantine unit and that he had an opportunity to use the prison grievance system to 
challenge the transfer.  His suggestion that prison officials failed to respond to his 
grievances and that those grievances resulted in “no fair resolution” is not sufficient to 
establish a procedural due process violation.  Cf. Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 
(7th Cir. 2001) (stating that “the existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no 
liberty interest on a prisoner”). 
C. Equal Protection 
Williams alleged that he was treated differently than other inmates because he was 
housed on the quarantine unit for being unvaccinated even though he was not sick and 
consistently tested negative.  To state an equal protection claim, Williams had to allege 
that “(1) the defendant treated him differently from others similarly situated, (2) the 
defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for the difference in 
treatment.”  Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 243 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing 
Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006)).  The District Court 
properly rejected this claim because Williams did not allege facts suggesting that he was 
intentionally treated differently from other similarly situated SCI Phoenix inmates.  See 
Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 337 (3d Cir. 2010).  In fact, Williams asserted 
that “only unvaccinated inmates were being quarantined.”   
9 
 
D. First Amendment Retaliation 
According to Williams, the defendants housed him on the quarantine unit in 
retaliation for exercising his right to practice his religion and his right to refuse medical 
treatment.  To state a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation, a claimant must 
allege that (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) he suffered an 
adverse action “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his 
[constitutional] rights,” and (3) the constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial 
or motivating factor” for the adverse action.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 
2001) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The District Court 
properly held that Williams failed to plausibly allege that the exercise of his 
constitutional rights was a substantial factor in the defendants’ decision to transfer him to 
the quarantine unit.  It is clear from the amended complaint that Williams and other 
unvaccinated inmates were transferred to the quarantine unit to prevent the spread of 
COVID.  Williams claimed that he chose to not be vaccinated for religious reasons, but 
that that does not establish that the exercise of his religion was a “substantial or 
motivating” factor in the decision to move him to the quarantine unit.    
E. Access to the Courts 
Prisoners have a constitutional right of meaningful access to the courts.  See Lewis 
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996).  To state a cognizable access-to-courts claim, a 
plaintiff must allege: (1) an “actual injury” (i.e., a lost opportunity to pursue a 
nonfrivolous claim challenging his sentence or conditions of confinement); and (2) that 
there is no other remedy, save the present civil rights suit, that can possibly compensate 
10 
 
for the lost claim.  Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).  
Referring to his Post-Conviction Relief Act proceedings, Williams alleged that the 
defendants prevented him from “properly prepar[ing] his Nunc Pro Tunc Petition to the 
PA Supreme Court on or about October 19, 2021.”  Publicly available records in those 
proceedings indicate that the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of his 
PCRA petition on May 7, 2020.  Commonwealth v. Williams, 2020 WL 2299761 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. May 7, 2020); see also Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(recognizing that courts may take judicial notice of matters of public record, including 
judicial proceedings).   
Williams alleged that, when he learned that his attorney failed to file a petition for 
allowance of appeal, his confinement in the quarantine unit prevented him from using the 
law library to prepare a request for leave to file the petition.  But the docket reflects that 
he did file a petition for allowance of appeal on August 4, 2020, three days after he was 
transferred to the quarantine unit.  Commonwealth v. Williams, 2825 EDA 2018 (Pa. 
Super. Ct.)  Then, on October 19, 2021, Williams – who was still on the quarantine unit – 
sought permission to file a petition for allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc.  
Commonwealth v. Williams, 73 EM 2021 (Pa.).  As the defendants noted, Williams’ 
appeal of the Superior Court decision was long overdue by the time he was placed on the 
quarantine unit.  Moreover, he did not explain how access to the law library would have 
assisted in the preparation of his request to file a petition for allowance of appeal nunc 
pro tunc, nor did he identify why the underlying challenge to his sentence would have 
been successful.  See Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205-06 (explaining that prisoners must 
11 
 
describe the underlying arguable claim well enough to show that it is more than “mere 
hope”).  Under these circumstances, Williams failed to state a plausible access to the 
courts claim.   
IV. 
In sum, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.2 
 
 
2 The Appellees’ Motion to Partially Strike Appendix is granted.  Because the material in 
Exhibits A through D of Williams’ Appendix was not before the District Court, those 
exhibits are stricken from the record.  See Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 435 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (stating that a party may supplement the record on appeal in only “exceptional 
circumstances”). 


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