Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-4-2025 
Jeffrey Gibson v. Penn Waste Inc 
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Recommended Citation 
"Jeffrey Gibson v. Penn Waste Inc" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 100. 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2327 
___________ 
 
JEFFREY GIBSON, 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PENN WASTE INC. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-01890) 
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
on January 16, 2025 
 
Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 4, 2025) 
____________________________________  
2 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Jeffrey Gibson filed a complaint against Penn Waste, Inc., alleging that it billed him for 
collecting garbage that it did not collect. The District Court dismissed his complaint for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On Gibson’s appeal, we affirmed the dismissal on the 
alternate grounds that his complaint did not state a claim on which relief could be granted 
and that leave to amend was not warranted. Gibson v. Penn Waste Inc., C.A. No. 21-1139 
(order entered Oct. 27, 2021). 
 At issue here is a motion to reopen the case that Gibson filed with the District Court 
over two and a half years later. Gibson asserted that Penn Waste continued to bill him for 
collecting uncollected garbage, and he attached a recent bill. He did not acknowledge, 
much less address, our reasons for affirming the dismissal of his complaint. The District 
Court construed Gibson’s motion as one under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) and denied it be-
cause he did not state grounds for such relief. 
Gibson appeals. We review the denial of relief under Rule 60(b)(6) for abuse of discre-
tion, see Satterfield v. Dist. Att’y Phila., 872 F.3d 152, 158 (3d Cir. 2017), and we may 
summarily affirm when an appeal presents no substantial question, see 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4(a) (2011). We will affirm in this case because Gibson did not assert any “extraordinary 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
3 
 
circumstances” as necessary for Rule 60(b)(6) relief, Satterfield, 872 F.3d at 158 (cleaned 
up), and did not assert grounds for relief under any other provision of Rule 60(b) either. 
Thus, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 


English

Jeffrey Gibson v. Penn Waste Inc

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-4-2025 
USA v. Jamar Williams, Sr. 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Jamar Williams, Sr." (2025). 2025 Decisions. 101. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/101 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 24-1962 
__________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JAMAR CLAYBORNE WILLIAMS, SR., 
  Appellant 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 3:22-cr-00404-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
__________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on November 12, 2024 
 
Before:    RESTREPO, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: February 4, 2025) 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________ 
 
 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
Appellant Jamar Clayborne Williams, Sr. (“Williams”) appeals his conviction and 
sentence. Williams admitted to violating the terms of his supervised release and was 
sentenced to one year and one day in prison. Williams’ appellate counsel filed an Anders1 
brief and requested leave to withdraw. For the reasons that follow, we will grant counsel’s 
motion to withdraw and affirm the District Court’s conviction and judgment of sentence. 
I.2 
 In May 2015, Williams was charged with possession with the intent to distribute 
dimethylone.3 He pleaded guilty and, in July 2015, was sentenced by Judge Bennett of the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland to a term of 120 months in prison to be 
followed by three years of supervised release. Six years later, the District Court granted 
Williams’ emergency motion for compassionate release, amending his sentence to time 
served with three years of supervised release. The District Court transferred jurisdiction of 
Williams to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Williams began 
his supervised release on August 9, 2021.  
Williams’ release conditions included: refraining from “commit[ting] another 
federal, state or local crime”; refraining from unlawful use or possession of controlled 
substances; submitting to periodic drug testing; and notifying his probation officer of any 
 
1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
2 As we write for the benefit of the parties, who are familiar with the background of this 
case, we set out only the facts and procedural history necessary for the discussion that 
follows. 
3 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 
3 
arrests or contact with a law enforcement officer within 72 hours. Over the next three years, 
and on five occasions, Williams pleaded guilty to state crimes as documented in the 
supervised-release-violation petition.  
On May 7, 2024, the District Court held a revocation hearing for Williams. Counsel 
for Williams reviewed the allegations with him. Williams declined the hearing and 
proceeded to plead guilty to the Class C violations of his supervised release. Williams did 
not raise any objections during this hearing. Williams now appeals his sentence and 
underlying conviction. Appointed appellate counsel, Jason F. Ullman, has filed an Anders 
brief and a motion to withdraw as counsel, which the government supports. Williams did 
not file a pro se informal brief in opposition. 
II.4 
A. Motion to Withdraw 
Under Anders, appointed appellate counsel can request permission to withdraw as 
counsel if, following a “conscientious examination of [the record],” they determine that the 
appellant’s case is “wholly frivolous,” and there is nothing “in the record that might 
arguably support the appeal.” 386 U.S. at 744. The Court must determine whether counsel 
“thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues,” United States v. Youla, 
 
4 The United States District Court for the District of Maryland had jurisdiction over 
Williams’ criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. The United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania exercised jurisdiction over Williams’ supervised 
release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3605 and had jurisdiction to modify or revoke a term of 
supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and (g). We have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We exercise plenary review in 
determining whether there are any nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Simon v. Gov’t of V.I., 
679 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 2012). 
4 
241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001), and ensured that the record is free of anything that “might 
arguably support the appeal.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. 
When counsel submits an Anders brief, this Court must determine “(1) whether 
counsel adequately fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and (2) whether an independent 
review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.” Youla, 241 F.3d at 300; see also 
McCoy v. Ct. of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988) (stating that an 
issue is frivolous if it “lacks any basis in law or fact”). 
Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule (“LAR”) 109.2 requires appellant’s counsel to 
serve the brief to both the government and the appellant. The government must file a 
response brief, and the appellant may file a pro se response brief. Youla, 241 F.3d at 300. 
If “the [appellate] panel agrees that the appeal is without merit, it will grant counsel’s 
Anders motion, and dispose of the appeal without appointing new counsel.” LAR 109.2(a). 
In this case, Williams did not file a pro se response brief. A review of the record 
shows that appellate counsel has satisfied the requirements of both LAR 109.2 and Anders. 
Appellate counsel’s review has not revealed any non-frivolous basis upon which Williams 
can appeal. We agree and will therefore grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. 
B. Voluntariness of Williams’ Guilty Plea 
In revoking a term of supervised release, a district court must find that a defendant 
violated the conditions of the release based on a preponderance of the evidence. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000). If a defendant 
admits to violating the terms of his supervised release, the inquiry is confined to whether 
the plea was both counseled and voluntary. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 
5 
(1989). To assess whether a plea is voluntary, the court must “make sure [the defendant] 
has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.” Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969). This includes examining the “totality of the attendant 
circumstances [including] evidence that sheds light upon the target’s comprehension of the 
charges against him and evidence as to his appreciation of the nature of the rights afforded 
him.” United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 2006)). 
Here, the totality of the circumstances clearly suggests that Williams voluntarily 
entered his plea with a full understanding of its consequences. The District Court addressed 
Williams to ensure he understood the revocation proceedings and his rights. In addition, 
counsel verified his discussion with Williams regarding his right to a revocation hearing. 
After this colloquy, Williams waived his rights to a hearing, and pleaded guilty to the 
alleged Grade C violations of supervised release. We are therefore satisfied that Williams 
entered a counseled, voluntary plea to the Grade C violations of his supervised release. 
C. Williams’ Challenge of his Conviction 
Williams pleaded guilty in state court to five convictions arising out of the incidents 
documented in the supervised-release-violation petition. Proof of a subsequent state court 
criminal conviction is sufficient to establish a violation of supervised release. See United 
States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341, 344 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that defendant’s guilty plea to a 
state charge of felon in possession of a firearm was sufficient to establish a violation and 
justify revocation). Here, the proof of Williams’ five guilty pleas is more than adequate to 
6 
establish Grade C violations. As such, there is an adequate basis for the revocation of 
Williams’ supervised release. 
D. Legality of Williams’ Sentence 
The legality of a sentence must be based on a set of reasonableness factors. 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a). This Court reviews the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for 
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Woronowicz, 744 F.3d 848, 851 (3d Cir. 2014). A 
sentencing court abuses its discretion only if “no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the [sentencing] 
court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009). “As long as a 
sentence falls within the broad range of possible sentences that can be considered 
reasonable in light of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, we must affirm.” United States v. 
Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Here, the District Court accurately calculated the statutory and Guidelines ranges. 
The Guidelines revocation range, based on Mr. Williams’ Criminal History Category of 
VI, was between eight and fourteen months if convicted of any Grade C violations; and 
between twenty-one and twenty-seven months, capped at the statutory maximum of 2 years 
imprisonment, if convicted of any Grade B violations. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a).  
The District Court heard defense counsel, Williams, and the Government on the 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) and § 3583(e) sentencing factors. The court considered these arguments 
and adequately addressed the sentencing factors while propounding a sentence. Ultimately, 
the sentence was within the Guidelines range and below the statutory maximum of two 
7 
years. Nothing in the record supports a challenge to Williams’ sentence, and we therefore 
affirm the District Court’s sentence of one year and one month. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm 
Williams’ judgment of conviction and sentence. 
 


USA v. Jamar Williams, Sr.

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-5-2025 
Michael Lyles v. Greyhound Bus Lines 
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Recommended Citation 
"Michael Lyles v. Greyhound Bus Lines" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 108. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/108 
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the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
BLD-065        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2409 
___________ 
 
MICHAEL SHEAR LYLES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
GREYHOUND BUS LINES; 
ALLIED UNIVERSAL SECURITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-01524) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kai N. Scott 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect,  
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or 
Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 16, 2025 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 5, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Michael Lyles, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the District 
Court’s order dismissing his complaint upon screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm the District 
Court’s judgment. 
Lyles’ complaint1 alleges injuries arising from an incident that occurred prior to 
his incarceration. Lyles was at the Greyhound bus station in Philadelphia charging his 
phone when he briefly stepped outside, leaving the phone and a bag of his belongings in 
the station. When he tried to get back into the station to retrieve the phone and bag, a 
private security officer employed by Allied Universal Security blocked his entry. Though 
Lyles was able to retrieve his belongings once the officer “left [his] presence for a 
moment,” Complaint at 8, they later had a verbal confrontation that culminated in the 
officer’s punching Lyles in the face, pulling out a gun, and threatening to shoot him.   
Lyles asserts federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various 
state law claims against Greyhound and Allied. The District Court sua sponte dismissed 
the federal constitutional claims with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for 
failure to state a claim because Lyles failed to meet the state action requirement for 
§ 1983 claims, dismissed the state law claims without prejudice after declining to 
 
1 Because this case was dismissed under § 1915(e)(2), we accept the allegations in Lyles’ 
complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to him. See Mator v. Wesco 
Distrib., Inc., 102 F.4th 172, 178 (3d Cir. 2024). We also construe Lyles’ filings 
liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). 
3 
 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them, and denied leave to amend. This appeal 
followed.2  
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 
2020), and review its decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of 
discretion. Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 175 (3d Cir. 1999). We may 
summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. Murray v. Bledsoe, 
650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 We agree with the District Court that Lyles’ complaint failed to plead that the 
defendants were state actors for § 1983 purposes. To state a claim under § 1983, Lyles 
was required to allege that the defendants, while acting under color of state law, deprived 
him of a federal right.  See Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005).  The 
“color of state law element is a threshold issue,” and thus there is no liability under 
§ 1983 if the defendants were not acting under color of state law. Groman v. Township of 
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 Private actors, such as the non-governmental defendants named here, can be said 
to act under color of state law only if their conduct is “fairly attributable” to the state.  
 
2 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Though Lyles’ 
notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after entry of the District Court’s June 10, 
2024 order, the District Court has since granted relief under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or 
(6). See CA No. 12. Lyle’s notice of appeal is therefore timely, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction. 
 
4 
 
See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982). To determine whether state action 
exists in such a circumstance, we consider “(1) whether the private entity has exercised 
powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether the private 
party has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials; and (3) whether the state 
has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the acting party that it 
must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.” Kach v. Hose, 589 
F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). 
Lyles’ complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations from which a reasonable 
person could infer that the defendants were state actors or engaged in state action. 
Regarding the defendants’ relationship to the state, Lyles alleged only that the private 
security officer fraudulently “presented himself as a law enforcement officer” during 
their encounter. Complaint at 9. Even under the liberal pleading standards afforded to pro 
se litigants, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), this allegation 
does not suffice, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial 
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”); Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (explaining that a plaintiff’s complaint must 
contain more than “labels and conclusions”). 
 We also discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision not to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(c)(3); see also Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 567 (3d Cir. 2017). 
5 
 
Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 


Michael Lyles v. Greyhound Bus Lines

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-5-2025 
Kenneth Rosellini v. Gary Wilcox 
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Recommended Citation 
"Kenneth Rosellini v. Gary Wilcox" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 110. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/110 
This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
          NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT  
_____________ 
 
No. 22-2610 
_____________ 
 
KENNETH J. ROSELLINI, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
GARY WILCOX, In his individual and official capacity; 
HON. FRANK LAROCCA, In his individual capacity and official capacity; 
MICHAEL DOBLIN, DDS, In his official capacity; 
JUDGE EDWARD TORACK, In his individual capacity; 
MARIE LIHOTZ, In her individual capacity; 
HANY MAWLA, In his individual and official capacity; 
MARIE SIMONELLI, In her individual and official capacity; 
STUART RABNER, In his individual and official capacity; 
CARMEN DIAZ-PETTI, In her official capacity; 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY DISTRICT XI ETHICS COMMITTEE; 
NORMAN KLEIN, In his official capacity; 
ROBERT C. PAPA, In his official capacity 
 
_____________ 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:20-CV-20101) 
District Judge: Hon. Madeline Cox Arleo 
 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on November 15, 2024 
 
Before: RESTREPO, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  February 5, 2025) 
 
 
2 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
On December 22, 2020, attorney Kenneth Rosellini filed a 296-page complaint in fed-
eral court against multiple defendants alleging a sprawling conspiracy to violate his First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Included in the long list of defendants were the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey’s District XI Ethics Committee (the “Ethics Committee”) and 
two of its members, Norman Klein and Robert C. Papa (together with the Ethics Commit-
tee, the “Ethics Committee Defendants”), as well as several New Jersey state court judges 
(the “Judicial Defendants”) and other individuals.1  At the time he filed the complaint, 
Rosellini faced ongoing disciplinary proceedings for openly refusing to comply with mul-
tiple sanctions orders entered in New Jersey state courts. 
The District Court dismissed the claims against the Judicial Defendants and Ethics 
Committee Defendants.  As to the claims against the Ethics Committee Defendants, the 
District Court abstained under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).  The District Court 
later abstained again on those same claims when denying Rosellini’s motion for relief from 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
1  The Judicial Defendants were Hon. Gary N. Wilcox, Hon. Stuart Rabner, Hon. Hany 
A. Mawla, Hon. Marie P. Simonelli, Hon. Marie E. Lihotz and Hon. Edward V. Torack.  
The other defendants were Carmen Diaz-Petti, Hon. Frank LaRocca and Michael Doblin.  
None of the claims against these defendants are at issue in this appeal.  
 
 
3 
the order based on newly discovered evidence.  Rosellini timely appealed both orders and 
raises only one issue: whether the District Court erred in applying the Younger abstention 
doctrine to dismiss the claims against the Ethics Committee Defendants.  Because we find 
the District Court did not err in abstaining under Younger, we will affirm both orders. 
I.2 
In 2016, Rosellini sought to vacate five orders entered in a divorce action before the 
New Jersey Superior Court.  The court denied Rosellini’s motion on res judicata grounds 
and sanctioned him for “filing a frivolous motion.”  App. 315.  On appeal, the New Jersey 
Appellate Division affirmed and imposed additional sanctions.  Openly refusing to comply, 
Rosellini filed a petition for certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court challenging the 
constitutionality of the snowballing sanctions.  That court denied the petition, granted a 
motion by the opposing party for attorney’s fees and imposed further sanctions. 
On November 15, 2019, the Ethics Committee filed a complaint against Rosellini al-
leging he violated Rule 3.4(c) and Rule 8.4(d) of the New Jersey Rules of Professional 
Conduct (“RPC”) by openly refusing to comply with multiple court orders.3  The Ethics 
Committee held a hearing on November 20, 2020.  On December 22, 2020—before the 
Ethics Committee issued its decision—Rosellini filed his federal complaint.  He alleged a 
 
2  Since we write primarily for parties already familiar with this case, we include only 
those facts necessary to reach our conclusion.   
3  RPC 3.4(c) states that “[a] lawyer shall not . . . knowingly disobey an obligation under 
the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obliga-
tion exists.”  RPC 8.4(d) states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . en-
gage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  
 
 
4 
wide-ranging conspiracy to perpetrate fraud and violate his First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights through unconstitutional sanctions and retaliatory disciplinary proceedings. 
As to the Ethics Committee Defendants, Rosellini asked the District Court to declare 
that (1) New Jersey Court Rule 1:20-15(h)—which provides for constitutional challenges 
to the proceedings to be raised in a petition for review to the New Jersey Supreme Court—
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it restricts the abil-
ity to raise constitutional claims; (2) RPC 3.4(c) and RPC 8.4(d) violate the First and Four-
teenth Amendments to the extent they interfere with his right to free speech and advocacy; 
and (3) RPC 3.4(c) and RPC 8.4(d) may not be used as retaliation for the exercise of rights 
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
On March 31, 2021, the Ethics Committee recommended dismissal of the ethics charges 
with one member dissenting.  Under New Jersey Court Rule 1:20-15(e), the Director of the 
Office of Attorney Ethics (“OAE”) can appeal the dismissal of an ethics complaint to the 
Disciplinary Review Board (“DRB”), which reviews the decision de novo.  The OAE did 
just that, appealing the dismissal of the charges against Rosellini.   
While the ethics appeal was pending before the DRB, on October 14, 2021, the District 
Court granted the motions to dismiss filed by the Ethics Committee Defendants and Judi-
cial Defendants in this case.  As to the Ethics Committee Defendants, the District Court 
dismissed the claims under the Younger abstention doctrine because the state disciplinary 
proceedings were ongoing with an appeal pending before the DRB. 
On April 20, 2022, the DRB issued a decision reversing the Ethics Committee’s dis-
missal of the ethics complaint and imposing a three-month suspension with the added 
 
 
5 
condition that Rosellini satisfy the sanctions orders against him prior to reinstatement.4  
After the DRB issued its decision, Rosellini moved to vacate the October 14, 2021 order 
dismissing the claims against the Ethics Committee Defendants and Judicial Defendants.5  
On July 28, 2022, the District Court denied that motion, rejecting Rosellini’s contention 
that abstention was no longer appropriate because the DRB’s decision showed that (1) he 
lacked an adequate forum to raise his constitutional claims in the ethics proceedings and 
(2) the ethics proceedings were brought in bad faith.  The only issue on appeal is whether 
the District Court erred in abstaining under Younger from deciding Rosellini’s claims 
against the Ethics Committee Defendants in its October 14, 2021 and July 28, 2022 orders. 
II.6 
A. The Younger Abstention Doctrine 
We first address whether the District Court erred in finding the legal requirements for 
Younger abstention were met.  “To promote comity between the national and state 
 
4  The facts available to the District Court when it abstained end here, but Rosellini’s 
state disciplinary proceedings continued.  He petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court to 
review the DRB’s decision, and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied that petition on 
May 16, 2023.  On May 19, 2023, the New Jersey Supreme Court entered an order censur-
ing Rosellini and instructing him to satisfy the sanctions orders previously entered against 
him.  It then issued a clarifying order on July 21, 2023 that specified the amount of sanc-
tions to be paid ($12,287.50) and the method of payment.  After Rosellini still refused to 
comply, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an order on November 16, 2023, at the 
request of OAE, suspending Rosellini from the practice of law. 
5  The District Court construed Rosellini’s motion as a request under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b)(2), which permits relief from a final order based on newly discov-
ered evidence. 
6  The District Court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  This 
Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because Rosellini appeals only as to the 
 
 
6 
governments, Younger requires federal courts to abstain from deciding cases that would 
interfere with certain ongoing state proceedings.”  Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State, 938 
F.3d 453, 461 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Sprint Comm’s, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77–78 
(2013); Younger, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).  Younger abstention is appropriate if “(1) there are 
ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate 
important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to 
raise the federal claims.”  Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 
Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005)).  
The District Court correctly determined that those legal requirements were met.  Rosel-
lini contests only the third requirement.  He claims the New Jersey attorney-discipline pro-
ceedings do not afford him an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims.  But 
the Supreme Court—in an almost identical case—held the opposite.  See Middlesex Cnty. 
Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435–36 (1982) (“In light of the 
unique relationship between the New Jersey Supreme Court and the local Ethics Commit-
tee, and in view of the nature of the proceedings, it is difficult to conclude that there was 
no ‘adequate opportunity’ for [the plaintiff] to raise his constitutional claims.”).  When 
assessing “whether a federal plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional 
 
District Court’s decision to abstain from considering the claims against the Ethics Com-
mittee Defendants.  See Hi Tech Trans, LLC v. New Jersey, 382 F.3d 295, 302 (3d Cir. 
2004) (holding decision to abstain constitutes final appealable order).  “We exercise ple-
nary review over a trial court’s . . . determination of whether Younger abstention is proper.”  
Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of N.J., 27 F.4th 886, 890 (3d Cir. 2022) (omis-
sion in original) (quoting Hamilton v. Bromley, 862 F.3d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 2017)). 
 
 
7 
claims,” the proper inquiry is “whether ‘state law clearly bars the interposition of the con-
stitutional claims.’”  Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 755 F.3d 176, 184 
(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425–26 (1979)) (emphasis omitted).  
“In making this determination, we consider whether state law raises procedural barriers to 
the presentation of the federal challenges.”  Id. (citing Moore, 442 U.S. at 430).  
Rosellini faced no procedural barriers here.  In fact, New Jersey’s disciplinary rules 
provide two avenues for constitutional challenges to the proceedings.  An attorney can 
(1) petition the New Jersey Supreme Court for immediate, interlocutory review upon a 
showing of irreparable harm during the proceedings, N.J. Ct. R. 1:20-16(f)(1), or (2) raise 
constitutional challenges in a petition for review after an adverse decision by the DRB, 
N.J. Ct. R. 1:20-16(f)(2).  Rosellini chose only the second avenue.  If anything, Rosellini 
limited his own opportunities to raise his constitutional claims.  
Rosellini points to the DRB’s expression of doubt that he properly raised the constitu-
tional challenges in the ethics proceeding as proof that he lacks an adequate forum.  But as 
the District Court noted in its July 2022 Order, “the mere possibility that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court may find that [Rosellini] failed to properly preserve his constitutional 
claims does not suggest that New Jersey has erected procedural barriers that ‘clearly bar’ 
a party from raising constitutional claims.”  App. 18.  Rosellini also contends that the New 
Jersey Supreme Court did not “meaningful[ly] review” and “failed to address . . . in any 
way” his constitutional arguments.  Appellant’s Br. at 14.  As proof, he points to the brevity 
of the May 16, 2023, order denying his petition.  True, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
denied Rosellini’s petition without explanation.  But that does not change the fact that 
 
 
8 
Rosellini had an adequate opportunity to present his constitutional challenges in the peti-
tion.  New Jersey erected no procedural barriers that clearly barred him from raising the 
claims.  Thus, the legal requirements for Younger abstention were met. 
B. The Bad-Faith Exception to Younger Abstention  
Even when the legal requirements for Younger abstention are met, a district court 
should not abstain if the plaintiff shows that “(1) the state proceedings are being undertaken 
in bad faith or for purposes of harassment or (2) some other extraordinary circumstances 
exist, such as proceedings pursuant to a flagrantly unconstitutional statute, such that defer-
ence to the state proceeding will present a significant and immediate potential for irrepara-
ble harm to the federal interests asserted.”  Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 
1989) (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435).  The Supreme Court has explained that the bad-
faith exception to Younger applies “[o]nly in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions 
undertaken by state officials . . . without hope” of success.  Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 
85 (1971).   
Rosellini argued that the District Court should have applied the bad-faith exception to 
Younger for the first time in his motion for relief from the October 2021 order.  He contends 
the District Court erred by abstaining again in the July 2022 order because “irregularities 
contained in the DRB Decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court Orders, and OAE actions, 
prove that these ethics proceedings are in bad faith.”  Appellant’s Br. at 26–27.  Yet Ro-
sellini has presented nothing to suggest the proceedings were initiated by the Ethics Com-
mittee Defendants for purposes of retaliation and without hope of success.  Rosellini criti-
cizes the DRB’s decision to suspend his license and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s denial 
 
 
9 
of his petitions, but these conclusions are not proof of any irregularity, much less bad faith.  
The DRB and New Jersey Supreme Court cited his refusal to comply with valid court or-
ders as the reason for his suspension—not his filing of this federal complaint.  And in any 
event, Rosellini challenges the District Court’s abstention from the claims against the Eth-
ics Committee Defendants, not claims against the DRB or the New Jersey Supreme Court.7  
In sum, Rosellini rehashes challenges to the merits of the state court sanctions orders 
and the conclusions reached by the DRB and New Jersey Supreme Court in the disciplinary 
proceedings.  Even if meritorious, these allegations are unrelated to whether the proceed-
ings were initiated to harass him or without hope of success.  Thus, the District Court 
properly found that Rosellini failed to allege sufficient facts to show that the “bad faith” 
exception to the Younger doctrine should apply. 
III. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s October 14, 2021, 
and July 28, 2022, orders.8 
 
7  In further support of his bad-faith exception argument, Rosellini cites information 
that is beside the point.  Rosellini notes that the dissenting opinion to the initial recommen-
dation by the Ethics Committee references his federal complaint, but that does not prove 
that the proceedings were initiated in retaliation against him for filing his federal complaint.  
He also cites unrelated ethics proceedings against a New Jersey judge and other attorneys 
and claims they received lighter discipline for worse conduct.  This all misses the mark.  It 
is the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings that must be in bad faith for the exception 
to Younger to apply—contentions of an unfair outcome are irrelevant.   
8  Rosellini’s August 13, 2024, motion, see 3d Cir. ECF No. 44, is denied as moot. 


Kenneth Rosellini v. Gary Wilcox

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-13-2025 
USA v. Shawn Baldwin 
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Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Shawn Baldwin" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 130. 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
 
 
No. 23-3238 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
SHAWN BALDWIN, 
    Appellant 
 
 
 
 
(D.N.J. No. 2:18-cr-00580-001) 
 
 
 
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING 
 
 
 
 
Present:  CHAGARES, Chief Judge, and HARDIMAN, RESTREPO, BIBAS, PORTER, 
MATEY, PHIPPS, FREEMAN, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, CHUNG, and 
ROTH∗, Circuit Judges 
 
 
The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant in the above-entitled case having 
been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this Court, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the petition for rehearing by the panel is GRANTED.  The Clerk is 
 
∗ Judge Roth’s vote is limited to panel rehearing only. 
directed to file the amended opinion contemporaneously with this order.  As the revisions 
do not affect the disposition of the appeal, the judgment will remain as filed. 
A majority of the judges of the circuit in regular service not having voted for rehearing, 
the petition for rehearing by the Court en banc is DENIED. 
 
      BY THE COURT, 
 
 
      s/ Stephanos Bibas 
      Circuit Judge 
 
Date: February 13, 2025 
CLW/cc: Mark E. Coyne, Esq. 
                Norman Gross, Esq. 
                Laura K. Gasiorowski, Esq. 


USA v. Shawn Baldwin

USDC for the District Court of the Virgin Island

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-3-2025 
USA v. One 1962 Aero Twin Commander 500B, Tail No. N37CK 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1277 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
ONE 1962 AERO TWIN COMMANDER 500B, TAIL NO. N37CK, SERIAL NO. 
500A-1251-76, 
 
    Russell Robinson, 
            Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
for the Virgin Islands 
(D.C. Civil No. 3:22-cv-00041) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert A. Molloy
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 11, 2024 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, Chief Judge, MONTGOMERY-REEVES and FISHER,  
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 3, 2025) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
2 
Russell Robinson is a claimant in this civil forfeiture proceeding involving the 
defendant property, an aircraft. The Government asserts that Robinson taxied the aircraft 
across a runway of an airport while not properly licensed, in violation of federal law, 
subjecting the aircraft to forfeiture. The United States began the proceeding by filing a 
complaint in District Court. After striking Robinson’s claim contesting the forfeiture, the 
District Court entered a forfeiture judgment for the United States and denied Robinson’s 
subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment. Robinson appeals pro se the judgment 
of forfeiture and the order denying the motion to alter or amend the judgment. Because 
Robinson does not address the District Court’s conclusion that he lacked statutory 
standing as a claimant, he forfeits a dispositive issue. We will affirm.1 
“In order to stand before a court and contest a forfeiture, a claimant must meet 
both Article III and statutory standing requirements.”2 The District Court first concluded 
that Robinson lacked Article III standing because he failed to produce sufficient evidence 
of ownership in the aircraft. It found that the documents he submitted only suggested that 
the owner was Taj Leasing, Inc., a company that Russell claimed to have invested in and 
incorporated to acquire the aircraft, and of which he asserted he was an officer. The 
District Court said that, even if Robinson were an officer or sole shareholder of Taj 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over the defendant property under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 (federal questions). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (final decisions 
of district courts). 
2 United States v. $487,825.00 in U.S. Currency, 484 F.3d 662, 664 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 
 
3 
Leasing, Inc., he still lacked Article III standing because those positions do not convey 
legal ownership. The District Court also concluded that Robinson lacked statutory 
standing, finding that he “failed to assert his interest in the property at issue ‘in the 
manner set forth in the Supplemental Rules,’18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A).”3 According to 
the District Court, none of his pleadings qualified as an answer to the Government’s 
complaint or a pre-answer motion to dismiss, and they were also untimely. 
We exercise de novo review of Robinson’s standing to contest forfeiture because it 
is a question of law.4 But the District Court’s factual findings “that underlie its legal 
conclusion as to standing cannot be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.”5  
Robinson contests only an evidentiary finding about Article III standing. He 
argues that a document issued by the Federal Aviation Administration listing the aircraft 
registered to Taj Leasing, Inc. does not determine its ownership for the purposes of 
Article III standing. While this may be true, it is Robinson’s evidentiary burden to 
demonstrate that he has Article III standing to contest forfeiture.6 Here, he is not arguing 
on an affirmative basis that he has standing, only that Taj Leasing, Inc. is not an owner. 
This does not advance Robinson’s overall challenge to the District Court’s findings, but 
subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or forfeited and “courts have an independent 
 
3 JA67. 
4 See United States v. Contents of Accts. Nos. 3034504504 & 144-07143 at 
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 971 F.2d 974, 984 (3d Cir. 1992). 
5 Id.  
6 Id. at 986. 
 
 
4 
obligation to satisfy themselves of jurisdiction if it is in doubt.”7  
“Article III standing requires the claimant to show an interest in the property 
sufficient to create a ‘case or controversy’” and is “commonly associated with an inquiry 
into injury-in-fact, causation, [and] redressability.”8 In civil forfeiture cases, “[c]ourts 
generally do not deny standing to a claimant who is either the colorable owner of the 
[property] or who has any colorable possessory interest in it.”9 This is because an owner 
or possessor of property that is seized suffers an injury that can be redressed by return of 
the property.10 We have held that a claimant who exercises dominion and control over 
property he or she does not own demonstrates a colorable possessory interest sufficient to 
confer standing.11 Thus, the District Court’s factual findings were erroneously based on 
the view that Robinson needed legal title to the aircraft to satisfy the requirements for 
Article III standing.12 
 
7 Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 76–77 (3d Cir. 2003). 
8 Contents of Accts. Nos. 3034504504 & 144-07143, 971 F.2d at 984–85. 
9 Id. at 985. 
10 Id. 
11 Contents of Accts. Nos. 3034504504 & 144-07143, 971 F.2d at 985–86; see also 
Mantilla v. United States, 302 F.3d 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2002). 
12 Similarly, if Robinson were indeed a shareholder of Taj Leasing, Inc., he meets 
Article III standing requirements to contest the forfeiture because the loss of the 
corporation’s aircraft would cause him personal financial harm. But this conclusion 
would not determine whether Robinson meets statutory standing or prudential standing 
requirements. See Potter v. Cozen & O’Connor, 46 F.4th 148, 157 (3d Cir. 2022) 
(holding that shareholders are barred from suit as a prudential matter but have Article III 
standing); see also United States v. M/Y Galactica Star, 13 F.4th 448, 455–56 (5th Cir. 
2021) (holding that a shareholder had Article III standing to contest the forfeiture of a 
corporation’s asset but not statutory standing). 
 
 
5 
Here, the record demonstrates Robinson’s colorable possessory interest in the 
aircraft. First, he operated the aircraft when he taxied it to the parking apron. Second, the 
investigating agent’s affidavit attached to the Government’s complaint claimed that 
Robinson had a “principal stake in the aircraft” and he used Taj Leasing, Inc. “as a shell 
company to disguise his ownership.”13 Robinson may not have held legal title to the 
aircraft, but he exercised dominion and control over it. Thus, he has Article III standing 
to contest the forfeiture.14  
Next, we consider the issue of statutory standing. Robinson’s opening brief does 
not address the District Court’s conclusion that he lacked statutory standing. The 
Government argues that Robinson’s failure to discuss statutory standing constitutes a 
forfeiture that dooms his appeal. In his reply, Robinson only notes that “subject matter 
jurisdiction can never be waived, and can be raised at any stage of the proceedings.”15  
Statutory standing is not a jurisdictional issue.16 Where statutory standing 
concerns a plaintiff’s power to bring claims, Article III standing (which is one facet of 
 
13 JA27. 
14 In general, we have a duty to “correct any legal error infecting” factual findings.  
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 
583 U.S. 387, 398 n.7 (2018). Because the record only permits the finding that Robinson 
has a colorable possessory interest in the aircraft, we need not remand the case to the 
District Court for further evidentiary review. See Bedrosian v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
912 F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2018).  
15 Reply Br. 2. 
16 Wallach v. Eaton Corp., 837 F.3d 356, 363 n.9 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 
 
6 
subject matter jurisdiction) concerns our Court’s power to hear them.17 Arguments about 
statutory standing can be waived, and by extension, forfeited.18 Because Robinson never 
raised statutory standing in his opening brief nor meaningfully addressed the issue in his 
reply, we deem this argument forfeited.19 The forfeiture is fatal to his challenge because 
statutory standing is an independent and sufficient basis for striking his claim.20  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
forfeiture.   
 
17 Potter, 46 F.4th at 155. 
18 See id. at 156. (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193–94 (1976) (concluding 
that arguments related to prudential standing could be waived)).   
19 Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 146 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (“[W]e [will not] reach arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief or at 
oral argument.”); Higgins v. Bayada Home Health Care Inc., 62 F.4th 755, 763 (3d Cir. 
2023) (concluding that an appellant who “made only passing reference to [an argument] 
on appeal” forfeited it). 
20 See Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1993). 


USA v. One 1962 Aero Twin Commander 500B, Tail No. N37CK

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

USA v. Brian Nestor

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-3-2025 
In Re: Derrick Martin King 
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"In Re: Derrick Martin King" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 178. 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
ALD-086        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 25-1216 
___________ 
 
IN RE: DERRICK MARTIN KING, 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to Nos. 2:21-mc-01230, 2:24-cv-01693) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
February 20, 2025 
Before:  BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed March 3, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Derrick Martin King has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in which he 
requests relief related to multi-district litigation (“MDL”) in the District Court.  See 
generally In re Philips Recalled CPAP, Bi-Level Pap, & Mech. Ventilator Prods., No. 
MC 21-1230, 2024 WL 869109, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 29, 2024).  We will deny the 
petition. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
 King has alleged that he suffered injuries from the use of a medical device that has 
been recalled.  King’s lawsuits based on those alleged injuries have been transferred to 
the District Court as part of the MDL.  In the MDL proceedings, the District Court 
entered pre-trial orders providing that “only the PLC [Plaintiff’s co-lead counsel] and 
Plaintiffs Steering Committee (PSC)—not any individual Plaintiff or their counsel—may 
conduct general discovery in this MDL, and that discovery in individual matters is not 
permitted at this juncture.”  In re Philips Recalled CPAP, 2024 WL 869109, at *1.  On 
February 29, 2024, the District Court denied King’s motion challenging these orders.  See 
id. at *3.  In his mandamus petition, King requests that we direct the District Court to 
provide him with discovery materials that have been provided to the PLC and PSC.1   
Additionally, on May 9, 2024, a proposed master settlement agreement (“MSA”) 
was filed in the District Court.  See In re Philips Recalled CPAP, Bi-Level Pap, & Mech. 
Ventilator Prods. Liab. Litig., W.D. Pa. No. 2:21-mc-01230, MDL No. 3014, ECF No. 
2768.  Several plaintiffs, including King, objected to the MSA on various grounds, 
including that the settlement excluded plaintiffs with certain injuries.  See id., ECF Nos. 
2780, 2796, 2804.  The District Court overruled those objections, explaining, in part, that 
individuals with nonqualifying injuries are nonsettling parties that lack standing to 
challenge the MSA.  See id., ECF No. 2880.2  In his mandamus petition, King also 
requests that we enjoin the District Court from entering the MSA. 
 
1 After he filed his mandamus petition, King filed a brief indicating that he has been 
provided with at least some, and possibly all, of the discovery that he sought. 
2 Moreover, at the time of this ruling, King had voluntarily dismissed his pending lawsuit 
in the MDL, see ECF No. 2840, though he has since filed another lawsuit that was 
 
3 
 
A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in extraordinary cases.  See 
In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).  To obtain 
mandamus relief, a petitioner “must establish that (1) no other adequate means exist to 
attain the relief he desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of the writ is clear and 
indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.”  Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (cleaned up). 
Here, King has not shown a clear and indisputable right to the relief that he seeks.3  
See generally In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 718 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir. 
2013) (explaining that “the district judge must be given wide latitude with regard to case 
management in order to effectively achieve the goals set forth by the legislation that 
created the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation”); In re Fine Paper Litig. State of 
Wash., 632 F.2d 1081, 1087 (3d Cir. 1980) (discussing “the general rule that a 
nonsettling party may not object to the terms of a settlement which do not affect its own 
rights”).  Nor has King shown that the ongoing District Court MDL proceedings will be 
inadequate for him to pursue the relief that he seeks in his lawsuits.  See In re Philips 
Recalled CPAP, W.D. Pa. No. 2:21-mc-01230, MDL No. 3014, ECF No. 3066 
(discussing the status of King’s pending case in the MDL).  And to the extent that King 
seeks to challenge the District Court’s rulings on his motions objecting to the pre-trial 
 
transferred to the MDL, see ECF No. 3066. 
 
3 To the extent that King has been provided with the discovery that he seeks, the portion 
of his mandamus petition requesting such relief is moot.  See Blanciak v. Allegheny 
Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698–99 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
4 
 
discovery orders and the MSA, this mandamus proceeding may not be used as a 
substitute for an appeal.  See Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[A] writ 
of mandamus may not issue if a petitioner can obtain relief by appeal.”). 
Accordingly, we will deny the mandamus petition. 


In Re: Derrick Martin  King

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-13-2025 
Norman Shaw,Jr. v. Wayne Memorial Hospital 
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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-1522 
___________ 
 
NORMAN SHAW, JR., 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WAYNE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-01594) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Susan E. Schwab 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 4, 2025 
Before:  BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 13, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Norman Shaw appeals from the District Court’s judgment in favor 
of Wayne Memorial Hospital. We will affirm. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
I.  
On November 26, 2019, while Shaw was incarcerated at a federal prison in 
Waymart, Pennsylvania, another prisoner bit his left pinky finger. Shaw was brought to 
Wayne Memorial Hospital’s emergency room. At the emergency room, Dr. Sorini 
allegedly informed Shaw that his hand could not be x-rayed because the x-ray machine 
was broken. It’s undisputed that emergency room staff cleaned, sterilized, bandaged, and 
splinted Shaw’s finger, and gave him a tetanus shot. Shaw was discharged back to the 
prison, and prison medical personnel prescribed him antibiotics. On January 7, 2020, 
Shaw’s hand was x-rayed, revealing a fracture on the bitten finger. On January 16, 2020, 
Shaw saw a hand specialist, who applied a splint and recommended future surgical 
intervention based on his x-ray results. Shaw asserts that surgery was scheduled for 
February 6, 2020, but he was transferred from the prison three days before the surgery.  
Shaw sued the hospital, alleging violations of the Emergency Medical Treatment 
and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.1 He demanded $20 million for 
his pain and suffering, noting the “deteriorating condition” of his finger and his 
“deformed permanent disability.” See ECF No. 1 at 12. The District Court2 denied the 
 
1 We do not address Shaw’s vaguely asserted medical negligence or gross negligence 
claim, because his appellate briefs do not address it. 
 
2 Here, the District Court refers to a Magistrate Judge acting with the parties’ consent, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 
 
3 
 
hospital’s motion to dismiss but ultimately granted its motion for summary judgment. 
Shaw timely appealed.  
II.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment, and our review is plenary. See Anglemeyer v. Ammons, 92 F.4th 
184, 188 (3d Cir. 2024). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that that party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We may affirm the District Court’s judgment on any 
basis supported by the record. See Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d 
Cir. 2014). 
III. 
Shaw’s opening brief tersely asserts that the District Court erred in granting the 
hospital’s summary judgment motion. Considering the minimal record that Shaw 
provided at summary judgment, we are satisfied that the District Court did not err.3 
 
3 Shaw also asserts that the District Court erred by dismissing his case under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 41(b). The hospital moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) (based 
on Shaw’s failure to cooperate in discovery), or in the alternative, for summary judgment. 
The District Court acknowledged those alternative bases, but it did not dismiss the action 
pursuant to Rule 41(b); it instead granted the motion for summary judgment on Shaw’s 
EMTALA claims.  
 
4 
 
Congress enacted EMTALA to minimize the practice of “patient dumping”4 
among hospitals that voluntarily participate in Medicare or Medicaid programs. See 
Torretti v. Main Line Hosps., Inc., 580 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2009). EMTALA generally 
requires hospitals to (1) appropriately medically screen people who request emergency 
room care for emergency medical conditions, and (2) stabilize any emergency medical 
conditions before discharging or transferring people to other medical facilities. See 
§ 1395dd(a)-(c). EMTALA “was not intended to create a federal malpractice statute or 
cover cases of hospital negligence.” Torretti, 580 F.3d at 173; see also Nartey v. 
Franciscan Health Hosp., 2 F.4th 1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases). Instead, 
EMTALA claims generally focus on “disparate patient treatment.” See Torretti, 580 F.3d 
at 174; Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(“[EMTALA] is intended not to ensure each emergency room patient a correct diagnosis, 
but rather to ensure that each is accorded the same level of treatment regularly provided 
to patients in similar medical circumstances,” based on the hospital’s standard screening 
procedures). 
Shaw asserted that the hospital violated EMTALA’s screening provision because 
its emergency room staff did not provide an x-ray or otherwise detect the fracture in his 
finger. EMTALA required the hospital to “provide for” Shaw to have “an appropriate 
 
4 Patient dumping is generally defined as a hospital’s refusal to treat certain emergency 
room visitors or transfer of emergency room patients to other institutions without 
providing appropriate care, often due to lack of insurance. See Torretti, 580 F.3d 168, 
173 (3d Cir. 2009).  
5 
 
medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital’s emergency 
department, including ancillary services routinely available to the emergency department, 
to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition . . . exist[ed].” See § 
1395dd(a) (emphasis added). Shaw does not dispute that on November 26, 2019, the 
emergency room’s x-ray machine was not working. That is fatal to his EMTALA 
screening claim. See del Carmen Guadalupe v. Negron Agosto, 299 F.3d 15, 21-22 (1st 
Cir. 2002) (“A claim of inappropriate medical screening based on a failure to provide 
certain diagnostic tests must at least address whether the hospital was capable of 
performing such tests.”).  
Shaw’s stabilization claim is unclear, but he at least asserts that the hospital should 
have transferred him to a facility that could x-ray his finger. However, EMTALA’s 
screening provision does not require a transfer for screening purposes. To the extent that 
Shaw presents this as a stabilization claim, it doesn’t fit the relevant standard. For Shaw’s 
stabilization claim to survive summary judgment, he needed to show that there was a 
material factual dispute that (1) he had an emergency medical condition,5 (2) the hospital 
actually knew about his condition, and (3) his condition was not stabilized6 before he was 
 
5 EMTALA defines an emergency medical condition as a medical condition marked by 
“acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of 
immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in [1] placing the 
health of the individual . . . in serious jeopardy, [2] serious impairment to bodily 
functions, or [3] serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.” § 1395dd(e)(1). 
 
6 According to EMTALA, an emergency medical condition is “stabilized” if “no material 
deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable medical probability, to result 
6 
 
transferred or discharged. See Torretti, 580 F.3d at 178. Shaw’s stabilization claim fails 
because he concedes that hospital staff did not detect the fracture, and EMTALA did not 
require the hospital to stabilize that undetected fracture before discharging him. See 
Torretti, 580 F.3d at 178 (quoting Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139, 145 
(4th Cir. 1996)) (“[EMTALA] does not hold hospitals accountable for failing to stabilize 
conditions of which they are not aware, or even conditions of which they should have 
been aware.”). The hospital knew that Shaw had a bite wound. There is no dispute that it 
provided some treatment for the bite wound, and Shaw did not argue that the treatment he 
received fell short of the treatment that the hospital normally provided to emergency 
patients with open bite wounds. Because the stabilization claim fails for these reasons, we 
do not consider Shaw’s argument that the District Court erred in determining that he 
needed a medical expert to prove his stabilization claim. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.7 
 
from or occur during” the individual’s transfer or discharge from the hospital. See 
§ 1395dd(e)(3)(B)-(e)(4). 
 
7 We grant Wayne Memorial Hospital’s motion to provide a supplemental appendix.  


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