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Eric Daimler v. Chris Moehle

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2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-14-2025 
Robert Lee, Jr. v. Marirosa Lamas 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 24-2414 
_____________ 
 
ROBERT LEE, JR., INDIVIDUALLY AND FOR 
ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MARIROSA LAMAS; MICHAEL WENEROWICZ; 
TY STANTON, IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00241) 
District Judge: Hon. Cynthia M. Rufe 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 14, 2025 
_______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 14, 2025) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION∗ 
_______________ 
 
 
∗This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
 2 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
Robert Lee, Jr. sued three state correctional employees for unpaid wages. The 
District Court granted summary judgment for the Defendants and, finding no error, we 
will affirm. 
I. 
Lee, a former Corrections Officer Trainee at the State Correctional Institution 
Chester (SCI-Chester), filed a putative class action seeking relief for alleged violations of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219, and Pennsylvania 
Minimum Wage Act (PMWA), 43 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. §§ 333.101–.115. He sued 
three Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) employees in their individual 
capacities: Marirosa Lamas, SCI-Chester Superintendent, Michael Wenerowicz, Deputy 
Secretary Eastern Region, and Ty Stanton, Bureau of Human Resources Director. The 
District Court granted summary judgment for the Defendants, concluding that the FLSA 
claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment because the Commonwealth was the real 
party in interest and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Lee’s PMWA 
claim. Lee moved for reconsideration, which the District Court denied. He timely 
appealed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and denial of his motion for 
reconsideration.1  
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and 
we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment,” Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Lab. v. Nursing Home 
Care Mgmt. Inc., 128 F.4th 146, 154 (3d Cir. 2025), “meaning we review anew the 
District Court’s summary judgment decision[], applying the same standard it must 
 
 
 3 
II. 
While the District Court granted summary judgment based on the Eleventh 
Amendment, we need not wade into questions of sovereign immunity because Lee cannot 
maintain his FLSA claim against the Defendants.2 An individual is liable under the FLSA 
when he “exercises ‘supervisory authority over the complaining employee and was 
responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation’ while acting in the employer’s 
interest.” Thompson v. Real Est. Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 153 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 417 (3d Cir. 
2012)).  
Far from being responsible, the undisputed record shows that Defendants were not 
involved in the purported violation. Id. While they had supervisory roles, none of the 
Defendants were responsible for developing or enforcing wage and hour policies. Nor 
were Lamas or Wenerowicz “involved in recording or reporting officers’ time for payroll 
purposes.” App. 542 (Lamas); see App. 85–86 (Wenerowicz). And while Stanton 
 
apply,” Ellis v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., LLC, 11 F.4th 221, 229 (3d Cir. 2021). “[W]e 
may affirm for any reason supported by the record,” Rivera v. Redfern, 98 F.4th 419, 422 
(3d Cir. 2024), but summary judgment is only appropriate “if the movant shows that there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
2 This basis for affirmance is familiar to the parties. The Defendants argued in 
their motion for summary judgment that they could not “be liable as Plaintiff’s employer 
for FLSA violations.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. 29 at 13. And in his response to the motion, Lee 
marshalled a panoply of evidence to oppose this argument. While the District Court based 
its summary judgment ruling solely on sovereign immunity, we are not so constrained in 
our review of the record. See Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 751 (3d 
Cir. 2019); In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc., 335 F.3d 243, 250 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 
 
 4 
“supervised . . . employees who process payroll” for DOC, he and those employees “were 
not responsible for ensuring that the timesheets received from SCI-Chester accurately 
reflected time worked.” App. 83–84. Simply put, there is no genuine dispute that 
Defendants were not “responsible . . . for the alleged violation,” Thompson, 748 F.3d at 
153 (quoting Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 417).3 So we will affirm.4  
 
3 Because the District Court properly granted summary judgment on Lee’s FLSA 
claim, we perceive no abuse of discretion in its refusal to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction and dismissal of his PMWA claim without prejudice. See § 1367(c)(3); Kach 
v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009). And since we affirm the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment, we see no abuse of discretion in its denial of the motion for 
reconsideration. See Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petrol., LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 
753 (3d Cir. 2016); Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(explaining that “[t]he purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest 
errors of law or fact”). Nor are we concerned that this ruling comes before the parties 
have completed discovery. Thus far, they have engaged in “initial discovery related to 
conditional certification to proceed on a collective basis,” Dist. Ct. Dkt. 21 at 1, and a 
“limited merits discovery period to address the question of immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment,” Dist. Ct. Dkt. 33 at 1. Lee has not explained what additional discovery, 
which would “include Parties’ depositions, full discovery on the merits and damages, and 
any expert testimony if needed,” Dist. Ct. Dkt. 33 at 3, could add to this evaluation, 
considering all Defendants have already been deposed on their role in the alleged FLSA 
violations.  
4 Judge Shwartz would join her colleagues in affirming, in part, as to the named 
Defendants, but, given the information in the record developed from the limited 
discovery permitted, would vacate in part with instructions to provide Lee with leave to 
amend his complaint to name other individuals as defendants if any and conduct 
discovery concerning the actions of such individuals. 


Robert Lee, Jr. v. Marirosa Lamas

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-14-2025 
John McCrorey v. City of Philadelphia 
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"John McCrorey v. City of Philadelphia" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 402. 
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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 23-2539 
_____________ 
 
JOHN MCCROREY, 
                  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 2:22-cv-02227) 
District Judge: Honorable Chad F. Kenney 
_____________ 
 
Argued November 12, 2024 
____________ 
 
Before: RESTREPO, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 14, 2025) 
 
David M. Koller [ARGUED] 
Koller Law 
2043 Locust Street, Suite 1B 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
Kelly S. Diffily [ARGUED] 
City of Philadelphia 
Law Department 
1515 Arch Street, 15th Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
Counsel for Appellee 
 
2 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
John McCrorey, a former lieutenant in the Philadelphia Police Department’s 
Narcotics Bureau, sued the City of Philadelphia for age discrimination and retaliation after 
he was transferred to a different division close to his retirement date.  The District Court 
granted summary judgment for the City, but that was before the Supreme Court decided 
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024).  Because Muldrow set forth a new 
standard for assessing what constitutes an adverse employment action, we will vacate the 
judgment denying McCrorey’s age-discrimination claim and remand for further 
proceedings.  We will, however, affirm the District Court’s judgment denying his retaliation 
claim.  
I. 
McCrorey worked as a supervisor in the Philadelphia Police Department’s Narcotics 
Field Unit (NFU) from 2014 until his retirement in 2021.  The NFU, which operates as part 
of the Narcotics Bureau, consists of six divisions that cover the different parts of the city.  
Until September 2020, McCrorey supervised the East Division of the NFU, which included 
the neighborhood of Kensington and what was at the time “the biggest open[-]air drug 
market in the country.”  A110.   
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 
precedent. 
3 
 
In July 2020, Christopher Flacco was appointed the Chief Inspector of the Narcotics 
Bureau.  He was tasked with fixing the Narcotics Bureau and “get[ting] it working.” A112.  
Members of Philadelphia’s City Council expressed a particular desire for an improved 
narcotics enforcement strategy in Kensington.   
At the time of Chief Inspector Flacco’s appointment, McCrorey was irrevocably 
scheduled to retire on October 23, 2021.  Back in 2017, he enrolled in Philadelphia’s 
Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP), which allowed employees with 
Philadelphia-issued pensions to make an irrevocable commitment to retire within four 
years in exchange for receiving the accrued pension payments for those years.  DROP 
helped city agencies address future staffing needs by providing current employees’ exact 
retirement dates.  
McCrorey alleges that Chief Inspector Flacco met with NFU supervisors on 
September 22, 2020, and commented on the advanced age of the East Division’s personnel.  
Flacco asked which officers had enrolled in DROP and McCrorey raised his hand.  
McCrorey also contends that Flacco told the supervisors that he did not believe “the police 
force needed a bunch of fifty-year-old cops in uniform acting as an [Emergency Response 
Group].”  A39.  At that same meeting, Flacco named a lieutenant and two other sergeants—
all men in their 40s—as the new supervisors in the East Division.  
As part of this reorganization effort, Chief Inspector Flacco removed McCrorey’s 
entire squad—all over 50 years old—from the East Division.  McCrorey, who was 61 years 
old at the time, was reassigned to the Northwest Division.  His title, base salary, and job 
responsibilities did not change.  Immediately following his reassignment, McCrorey went 
4 
 
on sick leave and began “running time,” the practice of using accrued leave when nearing 
retirement.  He never reported to his position at the Northwest Squad.  McCrorey instead 
provided several doctors’ notes between October 2020 and March 2021, claiming that his 
absence was due to “medical reasons” and anxiety. 
While on sick leave, on February 23, 2021, McCrorey filed a Charge of 
Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  The 
complaint alleged that Chief Inspector Flacco discriminated against him by transferring 
him to the Northwest Division based on his age.   
Five months later, McCrorey—after being on sick leave for about ten months—filed 
a form seeking to extend his DROP retirement beyond October 2021.  To address staffing 
shortages, the Mayor of Philadelphia had approved a one-time DROP extension for those 
scheduled to retire between July 2021 and June 2022.  The DROP extension election form 
stated that the applicant had to be currently able to work in order to qualify.   
McCrorey was deemed unqualified for a DROP extension because he was not able 
to work when he applied.  Lieutenant James Ferguson, the officer who oversaw the 
extension requests for the Police Department, testified that he was not aware of McCrorey’s 
EEOC complaint.  He also testified that no officer on extended sick or injury leave was 
granted a DROP extension.  McCrorey alleges he received a phone call from an 
unidentified individual who told him that Chief Inspector Flacco was responsible for the 
denial.  But Flacco testified that he played no role in deciding DROP extension requests 
and had no knowledge of McCrorey’s application.  
5 
 
The EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights letter in March 2022.  In June, 
McCrorey filed his complaint against the City of Philadelphia asserting claims of age 
discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 
P.S. § 951 et seq.   
After hearing argument, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the City of Philadelphia.  Regarding the discrimination claim, it found McCrorey failed to 
prove that his transfer to a different NFU division constituted an adverse employment 
action.  On the retaliation claim, it concluded McCrorey did not establish that the denial of 
his DROP extension application was a materially adverse action, or that there was a causal 
link between his EEOC complaint and the application’s denial.  McCrorey appealed.   
II.1 
We review de novo the District Court’s decision to deny summary judgment.  Reilly 
v. City of Atl. City, 532 F.3d 216, 223 (3d Cir. 2008).  To prevail on its motion, the City had 
to establish there was no genuine dispute of material fact and prove that it was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Ellis v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 11 F.4th 221, 229– 30 (3d Cir. 
2021).  A fact is material if it could “affect the outcome of the suit.”  Mall Chevrolet, Inc. 
v. Gen. Motors LLC, 99 F.4th 622, 631 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1996)).  A dispute is genuine if a reasonable factfinder could 
resolve the dispute in favor of the nonmovant.  Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).  
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Our Court has appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
6 
 
When reviewing the summary-judgment record, we must credit the evidence of the 
nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.  Peifer v. Bd. of 
Prob. & Parole, 106 F.4th 270, 275 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). 
a. Age-Discrimination Claim 
ADEA and PHRA age-discrimination claims are analyzed under the three-step 
burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green: (1) the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the burden 
shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action; 
and (3) the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish the reasons given were pretexts 
for discrimination.  411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973).2  The plaintiff maintains the ultimate 
burden of showing that age was the determinative reason for the discrimination, not just a 
“motivating factor.”  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009). 
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, McCrorey was required to 
show that: (1) he was over 40; (2) he was qualified for the job; (3) he suffered an adverse 
employment action; and (4) he was replaced or passed over in favor of someone sufficiently 
younger to support an inference of discriminatory motive.  Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 
F.3d 684, 689–90 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Potence v. Hazelton Area Sch. Dist., 357 F.3d 366, 
370 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
 
2 In age-discrimination cases such as this one, we apply the same analysis to PHRA and 
ADEA claims “except where there is something specifically different in [the PHRA’s] 
language requiring that it be treated differently.”  Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 
432 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).   
7 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that 
McCrorey did not establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.  Specifically, it found 
that his transfer to the Northwest Division did not qualify as an “adverse employment 
action” because he did not suffer a “significant” change to his employment.  A17.  The 
District Court rejected McCrorey’s argument that the transfer to a division that he alleged 
was less prestigious, less likely to facilitate career advancement, and offered fewer 
opportunities for earning overtime, qualified as an adverse employment action.  Instead, it 
deemed that the reassignment to the Northwest Division “resulted in no direct, immediate 
economic harm” because McCrorey maintained his title and received the same base salary.  
A19.   
After the District Court’s ruling, the Supreme Court decided Muldrow v. City of St. 
Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024).3  Muldrow expressly rejected the rule that the harm an 
employee suffers must be “significant . . . [o]r serious, or substantial, or any similar 
adjective suggesting that the disadvantage . . . must exceed a heightened bar” for there to 
be an adverse employment action.  Id. at 355 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Instead, a transferred employee claiming discrimination is only required to show 
they suffered “some harm” with respect to “an identifiable term or condition of 
employment.”  Id.  
 
3 Although Muldrow addressed a discrimination claim under Title VII, the analysis applies 
to McCrorey’s age-discrimination claim.  See Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 
698 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Because the prohibition against age discrimination contained in the 
ADEA is similar in text, tone, and purpose to the prohibition against discrimination 
contained in Title VII, courts routinely look to law developed under Title VII to guide an 
inquiry under the ADEA.”).  
8 
 
Following Muldrow, it is possible the District Court would differently assess the 
adverse-action element of a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.  See e.g., Peifer, 
106 F.4th at 277 (citing Muldrow’s holding “that, contrary to our prior precedent, an 
employee need not demonstrate that the asserted adverse employment action was a ‘serious 
and tangible’ employment-related harm”) (citation omitted).  This Court in Peifer 
remanded a Title VII discrimination case so that the district court could reassess its grant 
of summary judgment under Muldrow’s “some” employment-related harm standard.  Id.  
We will follow our precedent, vacating the grant of summary judgment for Muldrow’s age-
discrimination claim and remanding so that the District Court can apply the new standard 
enunciated in Muldrow. 
b. Retaliation Claim  
McCrorey’s retaliation claim alleges that the Police Department denied his 
application to extend his DROP retirement date because he filed an EEOC complaint 
alleging age discrimination.   
We apply McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting framework when, as here, there is 
no direct evidence of retaliation.  Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 
2015).  Under this framework, a plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim first must establish a 
prima facie case by showing: (1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) adverse action 
by the employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; 
and (3) a causal connection between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s 
adverse action.  Id. at 193 (quoting Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 300 (3d Cir. 
9 
 
2007)).  The parties agree that the first prong is met because McCrorey’s filing his EEOC 
complaint constituted a protected employee activity.  
In granting summary judgment, the District Court found McCrorey failed to 
establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether: (1) he experienced an adverse 
employment action following his EEOC complaint; and (2) even if such an adverse action 
were sufficiently alleged, that his EEOC complaint caused the adverse action.  
Even assuming arguendo McCrorey was subjected to an adverse employment action 
after the filing of his EEOC complaint, there is no reason to remand his retaliation claim 
because the District Court properly concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove 
there was a causal connection between his protected activity and the denied application.  
We agree with the District Court that he failed to establish that the Police Department’s 
decisionmakers were aware of the EEOC complaint when they rejected McCrorey’s request 
to extend his retirement date.  Instead, the record established the opposite; Lieutenant 
Ferguson, who reviewed the extension applications for the Police Department, testified that 
he was not aware of McCrorey’s EEOC complaint.  He instead testified that he denied the 
application because McCrorey was on sick leave and that no applicant on extended leave 
was granted an extension.   
* * * 
Because we conclude the District Court’s denial of McCrorey’s retaliation claim is 
supported by the record, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment with regard to this 
issue.  But we will vacate the grant of summary judgment with regard to the age-
10 
 
discrimination claim and remand so that the District Court can apply Muldrow to the 
adverse-action prong of a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework.  


John McCrorey v. City of Philadelphia

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-15-2025 
Jemma Hussey v. Pennington School 
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"Jemma Hussey v. Pennington School" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 406. 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 24-1862 
______________ 
 
JEMMA BREANNA HUSSEY; 
JEANNA ELIZABETH HUSSEY, 
      Appellants 
 
v. 
 
THE PENNINGTON SCHOOL; HEADMASTER WILLIAM S. HAWKEY; 
DEAN OF STUDENTS CHAD A. BRIDGES; BOARD CHAIRMAN PETER TUCCI; 
ASSISTANT DEAN CAROLINE HALL; DEAN OF ACADEMIC AFF SCOTT 
PEELER; DIRECTOR OF CERVONE JO PROCKOP; 
JOHN TOURANGEAU; PARENT OF MINOR MARTHA TOURANGEAU 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3:20-cv-14673) 
U.S. District Judge: Honorable Zahid N. Quraishi 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 13, 2025 
______________                                                              
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  May 15, 2025) 
 
 
 
 
 
______________ 
2 
 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Jemma and Jeanna Hussey appeal the District Court’s order denying them relief 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) from the order dismissing their complaint 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).  Because the Husseys are time-barred from 
seeking Rule 60 relief, we will affirm.  
I 
The Husseys allege that on October 20, 2018, one of Jemma’s Pennington School 
classmates pushed her, causing her to fall and hit her head, and assaulted her again eight 
days later.  On October 21, 2020, Jemma and her mother, Jeanna, filed a complaint 
alleging that (1) Jemma’s classmate1 assaulted her twice; (2) the Pennington School and 
several of its administrators failed to (a) accommodate Jemma’s disabilities caused by the 
incident in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 et seq.; 
and (b) respond to the bullying she experienced in violation of the New Jersey Anti-
Bullying Bill of Rights Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:37-15 et seq.; and (3) all defendants 
inflicted emotional distress upon Jeanna under New Jersey common law, see Portee v. 
Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 526-28 (N.J. 1980).   
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 The Husseys allege that the classmate’s parents are vicariously liable for their 
then-minor child’s actions.  
3 
 
Because the Husseys never filed proof of service of their complaint, the Clerk of 
the District Court issued a notice of call for dismissal under Rule 4(m) for failing to prove 
service.  The Husseys did not respond, and on February 23, 2021, the District Court 
dismissed the complaint without prejudice.    
More than two years later, the Husseys moved to “reinstate [the] complaint under 
Rule 4(m),” JA33, which the District Court construed as a motion for relief from the 
dismissal order under Rule 60(b).  The Court denied the motion, reasoning that the 
Husseys’ failure to comply with applicable deadlines was not due to “excusable neglect,” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), because (1) the Husseys did not promptly seek relief; (2) 
litigating their claims after such a long delay would prejudice the defendants; (3) 
although the Husseys’ counsel faced personal and health challenges, he communicated 
with Defendants in January 2021, demonstrating his ability to litigate the case during the 
time he claimed to have suffered setbacks; and (4) counsel’s proffered excuses, including 
that he learned of the case’s dismissal in September 2021, but took no action until May 
2023, while litigating another case in the interim—belied his claim of acting in good 
faith, JA3-5 (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380, 394 
(1993)).  The Court further explained that the Husseys were time-barred under Rule 
60(c)(1) from seeking Rule 60(b)(1) relief because they filed their motion more than one 
year after the dismissal of the complaint and they had not demonstrated “extraordinary 
circumstances” justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6).  JA5 (citing inter alia Liljeberg v. 
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 n.11 (1988)). 
4 
 
The Husseys appeal.   
II2  
The District Court properly analyzed the Husseys’ motion under Rule 60(b) rather 
than Rule 4(m).  Rule 60(b) allows parties to seek relief from final orders under certain 
circumstances.  Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 533 (2022).  Although the 
Husseys’ complaint was dismissed without prejudice, the dismissal order became final 
upon the running of their claims’ statutes of limitations.3  Green v. Humphrey Elevator & 
Truck Co., 816 F.2d 877, 878 n.4 (3d Cir. 1987).  Accordingly, the District Court 
correctly analyzed the Husseys’ motion as seeking relief from a final order under Rule 
60(b) rather than Rule 4(m).  See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(construing a motion to “reopen” a case dismissed for failure to effect service as a motion 
under Rule 60(b)). 
Under Rule 60(b), courts may relieve a party from a final order based on one of 
six grounds.  Because the Husseys sought to demonstrate through their motion a 
“justifiable excuse” for their failure to effect service, JA79, the District Court properly 
 
 2 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1367.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see Lasky v. Cont’l Prods. Corp., 
804 F.2d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 1986).  We review the District Court’s order for abuse of 
discretion.  See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008) (Rule 
60(b) motions). 
3 The Husseys concede that the statutes of limitations had run before the motion 
was filed.   
5 
 
construed their motion as one seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1),4 which permits courts to 
grant relief in the event of a party’s “excusable neglect.”5  However, because a Rule 
60(b)(1) motion must be filed “no more than a year after the entry of the [relevant final] 
order,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1), and the Husseys did not seek relief until well-past the 
one-year deadline, the District Court properly denied the Husseys’ request for relief as 
time-barred.  See Bainbridge v. Governor of Fla., 75 F.4th 1326, 1334 (11th Cir. 2023) 
(affirming denial of Rule 60(b)(1) relief sought years after final order as untimely).  
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
 
4 The Husseys do not argue for, and the record does not support, relief based on 
the grounds identified in Rule 60(b)(2) through (5).  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) (newly 
discovered evidence), (b)(3) (fraud), (b)(4) (void judgment), (b)(5) (satisfied, vacated, or 
no-longer-equitable judgment).  As to Rule 60(b)(6)’s catch-all provision, “a party may 
not avail himself of the broad ‘any other reason’ clause of 60(b) if his motion is based on 
grounds specified in clause (1)—[including] excusable neglect.”  Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 
863 n.11 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Because the Husseys’ arguments for relief 
rested entirely on explanations for their failure to timely address service of the complaint, 
the District Court properly interpreted the Husseys’ motion under Rule 60(b)(1) and the 
Husseys therefore cannot avail themselves to the catch-all provision in Rule 60(b)(6).   
5 “[F]or purposes of Rule 60(b), ‘excusable neglect’ is understood to encompass 
situations in which the failure to comply with a filing deadline is attributable to 
negligence.”  Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 394. 


Jemma Hussey v. Pennington School

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-20-2025 
Robert Cason v. Middlesex County Prosecutors Office 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Robert Cason v. Middlesex County Prosecutors Office" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 421. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/421 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-1969 
__________ 
 
ROBERT G. CASON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MIDDLESEX COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE; OLD BRIDGE POLICE 
DEPARTMENT; OFFICER G. BRACHT; ANTONIO J. TOTO; PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
OFFICE NEWARK NJ; SAYREVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT; C. TEATOR 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-05503) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert Kirsch 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 9, 2025 
Before:  BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 20, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
 Robert G. Cason appeals pro se from the District Court order which dismissed his 
amended complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the following 
reasons, we will affirm. 
I 
In September 2022, Cason filed a short complaint against the Middlesex County 
Prosecutors’ Office (MCPO) and other state and private Defendants alleging that they 
had committed fraud and perjury in a court proceeding. After the District Court dismissed 
the complaint without prejudice for failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8, Cason filed an amended complaint, adding a few Defendants. Cason’s 
amended complaint is centered upon two documents that the MCPO filed in a civil rights 
action Cason pursued in D.N.J. Civ. No. 18-cv-2101.1 The first document was MCPO’s 
June 15, 2021 affidavit and certificate of service at the end of its motion to dismiss, 
which, according to Cason, falsely asserted that MCPO had served Cason and falsified 
Cason’s signature. The second document was a July 20, 2021 letter from the MCPO 
asking the District Court relist its motion to dismiss the complaint because Cason had not 
been properly served. According to Cason, the inconsistency between these two 
documents is proof of fraud and forgery. He seeks damages based on Defendants alleged 
violation of (1) 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (making false statements); (2) 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail 
 
1 This Court affirmed the dismissal of Cason’s amended complaint in D.N.J. Civ. No. 18-
cv-2101. See Cason v. Middlesex Cty. Prosecutors Office, C.A. No. 23-1545, 2024 WL 
4455675 (3d Cir. Oct. 10, 2024) (per curiam) (not precedential).                            
 
3 
 
fraud); (3) 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (perjury); and (4) 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (making false 
declarations). He sought monetary damages as relief.  
 The District Court sua sponte dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court explained that, inter alia, the federal criminal 
statutes relied upon by Cason did not provide him with a private right of action, and, in 
any event, that the two documents relied upon by Cason did not show any wrongdoing.  
 Cason appealed. He also filed in our Court a motion requesting relief from 
“Circuit Court Judgments and Orders Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).”  
II 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Cason’s amended 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373 (3d 
Cir. 2020).  
III 
 The District Court correctly dismissed Cason’s amended complaint. The criminal 
statutes on which he relies do not create a private right of action. See Bauer v. Elrich, 8 
F.4th 291, 295 (4th Cir. 2021) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1621); Lee v. 
United Stages Agency for Int’l Dev., 859 F.3d 74, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (no private right of 
action under 18 U.S.C. § 1001); Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1138-39 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1623); Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank, 167 
 
4 
 
F.3d 402, 407-08 (8th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases and finding no private right of action 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1341). To the extent Cason complains that the District Court was 
biased, nothing in the record supports that assertion.     
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.2  
 
2 We have considered all of the arguments Cason made on appeal in Dkt. # 10, 11, 15, 
and 18 and they do not warrant further discussion. Cason’s Rule 60(b) motion is denied.    


Robert Cason v. Middlesex County Prosecutors Office

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-20-2025 
USA v. Steven Wilson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Steven Wilson" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 423. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/423 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________________ 
 
No. 24-1507 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
STEVEN WILSON, 
                           Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 3:22-cr-00250-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on April 17, 2025 
 
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 20, 2025) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
 
2 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
Steven Wilson was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment on federal drug-related 
charges in March 2024.  He appeals his sentence, contending the court improperly 
considered dismissed state charges against him at his sentencing.  We disagree and will 
affirm. 
Wilson pled guilty to drug-related charges in August 2023.  Before his sentencing, 
state law enforcement officers found him with a stolen, fraudulently registered truck.  The 
state charged Wilson in connection with that encounter.  His presentence report in this case 
included these charges.  At sentencing, the court stated in relevant part, 
Your convictions, [Assistant U.S. Attorney] Ms. Roberts has detailed with 
considerable effect here. I won’t repeat them again. Your own lawyer in his 
presentencing memorandum on your behalf where he did advocate for you, 
but he acknowledges a significant criminal history and you do. I can’t sit here 
and say anything different. I won’t repeat all of the offenses for which you 
were convicted and for which you spent time in incarceration, but they begin 
in 2007, and Ms. Roberts, as I said, detailed all of them, and they continued 
right up to the present time, and what’s notable about these -- again, for some 
reason today, Ms. Roberts is two steps ahead of me -- what she pointed out 
is true, every time you were incarcerated, you were paroled and you violated 
parole. I can go through these convictions item by item by item here, 
conviction by conviction, but it seems to be unnecessary because Ms. Roberts 
pointed out already to significant effect. 
App. 86.  Wilson was ultimately sentenced to 180 months in prison and six years of 
supervised release, below the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range of 188 to 235 
months.  After his sentencing, the state dismissed its pending charges. 
 
 
 
3 
 
We ordinarily review the imposition of a sentence for abuse of discretion.1  Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  Here, our review is for plain error because Wilson 
failed to object at his sentencing, which he does not contest in his reply brief.  United States 
v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014).  Under plain error review, we reverse 
when (1) “there [is] an error or defect” that has not been “affirmatively waived;” (2) “the 
legal error [is] clear or obvious,” not “subject to reasonable dispute”; (3) “the error . . . 
affected the appellant’s substantial rights,” i.e., “affected the outcome of the district court 
proceedings”; and (4) the error “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Wilson contends the court’s statement shows it “considered a pending state charge 
as a conviction at the time of [his] sentencing.”  Appellant’s Br. 7.  A court may not impose 
a sentence based on a “bare arrest record—without more.”  United States v. Berry, 553 
F.3d 273, 284 (3d Cir. 2009).  A mere arrest “does not justify an assumption that a 
defendant has committed other crimes and . . . therefore [does] not support increasing 
his/her sentence in the absence of adequate proof of criminal activity.”  Id.  The same logic, 
Wilson argues, bars the consideration at sentencing of charges that are later dropped.  
But we cannot say the court committed a “clear or obvious” error here because the 
sentencing colloquy does not unambiguously show the court considered those dismissed 
 
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
 
 
 
4 
 
state charges.  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135.  Wilson points to the following portion of the 
statement: “I won’t repeat all of the offenses for which you were convicted and for which 
you spent time in incarceration, but they begin in 2007 . . . and they continued right up to 
the present time.”  App. 86.  He contends this “shows that the district court included [his] 
pending state prosecution as a conviction because the district court mentions that [his] 
convictions ‘continued right up to the present time,’” and the temporally closest criminal 
proceeding against Wilson other than this case was the pending state prosecution.  
Appellant’s Br. 11.  But the most natural reading of the court’s statement is that it excludes 
his pending state prosecution from consideration, since it is limited to “offenses for which 
[Wilson] w[as] convicted and for which [he] spent time in incarceration.”  Appellant’s Br. 
11 (emphasis added).  And Wilson was neither convicted nor incarcerated on those charges.  
By “present time,” the court most likely referred, perhaps imprecisely, to the instant offense 
for which Wilson was convicted and being sentenced.  Appellant’s Br. 11. 
Even if the statement is at best unclear as to whether the court considered the 
dropped charges, that is enough to survive plain error review because the error is “subject 
to reasonable dispute,” i.e., not “clear or obvious.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135; see United 
States v. Holman, 840 F.3d 347, 355 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Moreover, any ambiguity with 
respect to the district court’s statements [at sentencing] is debatable at most and thus does 
not rise to . . . plain error.” (citations omitted)).  Accordingly, we need not reach the 
government’s argument that the state charges against Wilson were a proper basis for the 
court’s sentence. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.  


USA v. Steven Wilson

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-28-2025 
USA v. Abdul Outlaw 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Abdul Outlaw" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 433. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/433 
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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 24-2114 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
    Appellant 
v. 
 
ABDUL OUTLAW 
_____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No.: 2:21-cr-00382-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Brian R. Martinotti 
_____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 15, 2025 
 
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and 
RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 28, 2025) 
 
 
Sabrina G. Comizzoli 
Mark E. Coyne 
2 
 
Alina Habba 
Office of United States Attorney 
970 Broad Street 
Room 700 
Newark, NJ 07102 
 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
Michael J. Pappa 
Rudnick Addonizio Pappa & Comer 
25 Village Court 
Park Village 
Hazlet, NJ 07730 
Counsel for Appellee 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Though they are often discussed in tandem, probable 
cause to search is not the same as probable cause to arrest. The 
facts in this case could have plausibly supported a search of 
Appellee Abdul Outlaw’s vehicle. But they did not support his 
arrest, and therefore did not support a search incident to his 
arrest. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order 
suppressing the fruits of the officer’s unlawful search.  
I. 
On the evening of December 31, 2020, four plainclothes 
police officers in unmarked cars patrolled a high-crime area in 
Newark. One of the officers, Detective Marc Castro, testified 
that on this patrol, he spotted a parked, running Audi that had 
its sunroof open and “heavy aftermarket tints.” App. 60. As 
3 
 
Castro’s vehicle approached the Audi, he testified that he 
smelled burning marijuana,1 and decided to conduct a vehicle 
stop. At the time, it was a crime in New Jersey to operate a 
vehicle while in possession of marijuana. 
Castro then stepped out of his vehicle, illuminated the 
Audi’s windshield with his flashlight, and saw that there were 
two occupants in the vehicle. One of those occupants—the 
driver—was Appellee Abdul Outlaw. When he shined his 
flashlight into the windshield, Castro did not see Outlaw or the 
passenger smoking marijuana, exhibiting signs of being under 
the influence of marijuana, discarding anything, or making 
furtive movements. Castro approached the driver’s side of the 
Audi, Outlaw rolled down his window, and Castro saw smoke 
emanating from the window and noticed that “the smell of 
burning marijuana became more pungent.” Id. at 64. Upon 
request, Outlaw provided his license, registration, and 
insurance documents without making sudden or furtive 
movements, and while keeping his hands in plain view. 
Castro then asked Outlaw to step out of the vehicle, 
“[d]ue to the belief there’s criminal activity afoot in the vehicle 
due to the smell of burning marijuana, along with physically 
seeing the smoke emanating from the vehicle.” Id. at 65. He 
did not, however, see Outlaw or the passenger smoking 
 
1 Though it was a cold day, Castro kept his window rolled 
down “to be aware of sounds, odors, [and] smells.” App. 59. 
He testified that he knew the smell was burning marijuana from 
his training and experience as a detective in the Newark Police 
Department’s criminal intelligence unit, which included 
“hundreds” of encounters with marijuana or other controlled 
substances. Id. at 62. He also testified that there were no 
pedestrians in the Audi’s vicinity. 
4 
 
marijuana, ask them if they had been smoking marijuana, smell 
marijuana on their breath or clothing, or observe that they 
appeared to be under the influence of marijuana. Castro 
decided to pat down Outlaw “[d]ue to the burning marijuana 
inside the vehicle” and his “belie[f] there may be more 
contraband or weapons, and due to officers’ safety.” Id. at 66. 
Castro found a firearm with a scratched-off serial number and 
a prescription bottle with 3.6 grams of raw marijuana on 
Outlaw’s person, and (after the pat-down) placed him under 
arrest. Castro testified that the raw marijuana he uncovered was 
not the burning marijuana he smelled. 
Officers also searched the passenger. They did not find 
anything illicit and did not arrest her. They also did not find 
any weapons or drugs in the car, nor did they find marijuana 
residue or paraphernalia that could confirm Castro’s testimony 
that he smelled burning marijuana. 
The officers issued two motor vehicle summonses to 
Outlaw for his illegally tinted windows and possession of 
marijuana (the raw marijuana in the bottle) in a motor vehicle 
in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 39:3-75, 4-49.1. Outlaw was 
also charged with unlawful possession of a firearm and 
unlawful possession of marijuana in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 2C:39-7B(1), 39-5B, 39-3D, 35-10A(4). Later, after the 
Government adopted the case for federal prosecution, a grand 
jury charged Outlaw in a one-count indictment with unlawful 
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
Outlaw moved to suppress the evidence obtained from Castro’s 
search (i.e., the firearm and prescription bottle with marijuana), 
and, after an evidentiary hearing and supplemental briefing, the 
District Court granted Outlaw’s motion. The court reasoned 
that, while the vehicle stop was lawful given the tinted 
windows and burning marijuana smell, Castro did not have 
5 
 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search Outlaw’s 
person. This appeal followed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. This Court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, as 
the United States Attorney has certified that it complies with 
§ 3731’s requirements. 
We review “the District Court’s denial of a motion to 
suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings 
and exercise[] plenary review of the District Court’s 
application of the law to those facts.” United States v. 
Alexander, 54 F.4th 162, 170 n.10 (3d Cir. 2022) (alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 
(3d Cir. 2002)).  
III. 
The sole issue before us is whether Detective Castro had 
probable cause to arrest Outlaw. If there was probable cause to 
arrest Outlaw, it was permissible to search his person. See 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (“When 
an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that 
the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his 
escape.”). The fact that Castro searched Outlaw before the 
formal arrest is of no moment—if there was probable cause to 
arrest Outlaw prior to the pat-down, there was no Fourth 
Amendment violation. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 
111 (1980); United States v. Paige, 870 F.3d 693, 700–01 (7th 
Cir. 2017) (no Fourth Amendment violation where officer 
conducted pat-down shortly before arresting defendant, where 
6 
 
officer smelled marijuana on defendant prior to search); United 
States v. Wright, 844 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 2016) (same).2 
The Fourth Amendment permits an officer to arrest a 
suspect without a warrant where there are “facts and 
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that are 
sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable 
caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the 
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an 
offense,” that is, where the arrest is supported by probable 
cause. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). 
Probable cause is determined “with reference to the facts and 
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge at the time of the 
investigative stop or arrest.” United States v. Laville, 480 F.3d 
187, 194 (3d Cir. 2007). “[W]e do not evaluate probable cause 
in hindsight, based on what a search does or does not turn up.” 
Fla. v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 249 (2013). So here, we cannot 
consider the fact that the officers did not uncover any 
marijuana paraphernalia, residue, or other evidence of 
marijuana use in Outlaw’s car. We can only consider the facts 
within Castro’s knowledge when he decided to search 
Outlaw’s person.  
The Government urges that the marijuana odor and 
smoke emanating from the driver’s side window created 
probable cause to arrest Outlaw. In support of this argument, 
the Government points to United States v. Ramos, where we 
said that “the smell of marijuana alone, if articulable and 
 
2 As Outlaw rightly points out, the fruits of the search 
themselves (the firearm and marijuana) cannot provide 
probable cause for the arrest. See Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 
543 (1990). But the Government does not advance that dead-
end argument here. 
7 
 
particularized, may establish not merely reasonable suspicion, 
but probable cause.” 443 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2006).  
The Government reads Ramos to say that marijuana 
odor alone creates probable cause to arrest. But that ignores the 
phrase “if articulable and particularized.” Id. We now clarify 
the import of that phrase and join our Sister Circuits in 
concluding that, while the smell of marijuana alone can create 
probable cause to search a vehicle,3 there must be facts that 
connect the smell to an individual passenger for there to be 
probable cause to arrest that passenger. See Paige, 870 F.3d at 
700; United States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 749 (8th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 659–60 (4th 
Cir. 2004).4 In other words, for a search of a vehicle (or other 
 
3 United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 186 (3d Cir. 2018); 
United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 184 (4th Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Johnson, 707 F.3d 655, 658 (6th Cir. 2013); 
Long v. United States, 847 F.3d 916, 921 (7th Cir. 2017); 
United States v. Beard, 708 F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Snyder, 793 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2015); 
United States v. Stancil, 4 F.4th 1193, 1199 (11th Cir. 2021); 
cf. United States v. Sheffield, 832 F.3d 296, 305 (D.C. Cir. 
2016) (probable cause to search vehicle where officer “smelled 
the ‘faint’ scent of ‘fresh marijuana,’ and saw an abnormally 
large number of air fresheners throughout the car”). 
4 Of course, in both circumstances, the smell of marijuana can 
only establish probable cause when an officer has training and 
experience relevant to identifying such a smell. See Green, 897 
F.3d at 183, 186. Here, it is undisputed that Castro was “aware 
of the smell of marijuana” “[d]ue to [his] training and 
experience” in “hundreds” of “narcotics arrests[ and] 
investigations[.]” App. 62. 
8 
 
confined space), the odor must be particularized to that space, 
and for an arrest or search of a person, the odor must be 
particularized to that person. See Ramos, 443 F.3d at 308; cf. 
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (“Where the standard 
is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be 
supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that 
person.”). When the odor is particularized to a vehicle, and an 
individual is alone in that vehicle, this distinction is immaterial. 
But where, as here, there are multiple individuals within the 
vicinity of the smell, there is not probable cause of marijuana 
possession particularized to any one person absent additional 
facts.5 See Humphries, 372 F.3d at 659. 
 
5 To be clear, this scenario is distinct from that in Maryland v. 
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003). There, the officers found $763 
in cash and five plastic baggies containing cocaine in a vehicle 
and arrested all three of the vehicle’s occupants despite not 
knowing to whom the cash and drugs belonged. Id. at 368. The 
Court concluded that the officers had probable cause to arrest 
the three men, as it was “reasonable . . . to infer a common 
enterprise” because “[t]he quantity of drugs and cash in the car 
indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an enterprise to which 
a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent person with 
the potential to furnish evidence against him.” Id. at 373; see 
also United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d 864, 871 (8th Cir. 
2005) (inferring common criminal enterprise among vehicle’s 
passengers based on odor and observation of “seeds, stems, and 
sandwich bags on the floor of the van, and a scale inside a 
grocery bag hooked to the passenger seat”); United States v. 
Myers, 986 F.3d 453, 454–55 (4th Cir. 2021) (inferring 
common criminal enterprise among vehicle’s passengers 
where officers found over 300 grams—a “distributable 
amount”—of fentanyl in a vacuum-sealed plastic bag in the 
9 
 
While it is a close question, we agree with the District 
Court that Castro’s testimony does not establish probable 
cause.6 Before he approached the car, Castro did not observe 
or detect any evidence of marijuana ingestion (other than the 
odor), nor did he see Outlaw or the passenger move furtively 
or attempt to discard any evidence. True, when he walked 
towards the car, Castro saw smoke come from the driver’s side 
window and noticed that the odor became more pungent. But 
who’s to say that it was necessarily Outlaw’s smoke, rather 
than that of the passenger? Moreover, after Outlaw got out of 
the car, Castro did not smell marijuana on his person, clothing, 
or breath, and did not see evidence indicating that Outlaw was 
 
vehicle and previous surveillance raised suspicion of drug 
dealing). Differently, here, smoke and marijuana odor alone do 
not evince a common criminal enterprise. While a drug dealer 
would be unlikely to expose an innocent person to evidence of 
their criminal activities, we cannot say the same of a casual 
marijuana user. 
6 We reject Outlaw’s argument that the District Court did not 
find Castro’s testimony credible. True, the District Court noted 
that Castro’s testimony was “somewhat contradictory” and 
“seemingly conflicting.” App. 24 & n.16. But it also stated that 
it “found no indicia, in Detective Castro’s body language, tone, 
or otherwise, that he was being anything but forthright and 
honest at the Hearing when providing his testimony;” and 
“therefore . . . f[ound] Detective Castro’s testimony credible.” 
Id. at 23 n.14. It then reiterated that it “found Detective Castro 
to be credible,” id. at 24 n.15. In light of these statements, we 
cannot read the District Court’s opinion as Outlaw does. In the 
absence of clear error, we too accept Castro’s testimony as 
credible.  
10 
 
under the influence of marijuana. If the smoke from the 
driver’s side window heightened Castro’s suspicion that 
Outlaw (not the passenger) was smoking marijuana, the lack of 
a smell on Outlaw’s person or other signs of recent ingestion 
should have dispelled such suspicions. 
In cases where courts have concluded that marijuana 
odor was sufficiently localized to the arrestee, the connection 
to the arrestee was not in doubt. And, in those cases, events 
leading up to the arrest increased or confirmed the officer’s 
individualized suspicion, whereas here, they undermined it. In 
Humphries, which we relied on in Ramos, 443 F.3d at 308, the 
officers smelled “a strong odor of marijuana” when they were 
about 20 feet from Humphries. 372 F.3d at 659. There was not 
probable cause to arrest Humphries at that point, however, as 
he “was not alone on the street, . . . so the odor could not 
initially be tied to [him] alone.” Id. But there was probable 
cause to arrest him once the officer followed him and, from 5 
to 10 feet away, smelled “the same strong odor of marijuana . 
. . coming off his person.” Id. Likewise, in United States v. 
Paige, there was probable cause to arrest Paige where the 
officer smelled marijuana coming from his person and no other 
people were around. 870 F.3d at 700–01. And in United States 
v. Perdoma, there was probable cause to arrest Perdoma where 
the officer smelled marijuana emanating from his person 
during a brief one-on-one conversation. 621 F.3d at 747–49. In 
each of those cases, the officer could reasonably discount the 
possibility that the odor came from someone other than the 
arrestee. This case would be analogous if Outlaw had been 
alone in his car. But he was not. There was a very real 
possibility that the passenger’s actions, not Outlaw’s, created 
the marijuana odor and smoke. We therefore conclude that 
probable cause was lacking, and the search violated Outlaw’s 
Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court was right to 
11 
 
suppress the fruits of Castro’s unlawful search. See United 
States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 730 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010). 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s 
order granting Outlaw’s motion to suppress. 


USA v. Abdul Outlaw

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-4-2025 
Roseanna Sias v. Secretary New Jersey Department of State 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Roseanna Sias v. Secretary New Jersey Department of State" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 450. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/450 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-3125 
__________ 
 
ROSEANNA A. SIAS; EILEEN L. MCMENAMIN; BASILIA  
TSIKENTZOGLOU; PAUL TESTA; JOHN C. WONG, 
          Appellants 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF STATE, in her official capacity as 
Lt. Governor and Secretary of State the State of New Jersey; NEW JERSEY DIVISION 
OF ELECTIONS, Donna Barber, in her official capacity as Acting Director for the New 
Jersey Division of Elections 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-08747) 
District Judge:  Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 27, 2025 
Before:  BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 4, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellants, Roseanna A. Sias, Eileen L. McMenamin, Basilia Tskikentzoglou, 
Paul Testa, and John C. Wong, were New Jersey presidential elector candidates who had 
pledged their votes to aspiring presidential candidate Shiva Ayyadurai.  On July 11, 2024, 
Ayyadurai filed a petition with the New Jersey Secretary of State nominating Appellants 
as electors for himself as an independent candidate on the November 5, 2024 general 
election ballot.  Following an objection to the petition, an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) found that Ayyadurai was ineligible to hold the office of the President because he 
is not a natural-born citizen of the United States.1  The New Jersey Secretary of State 
adopted the ALJ’s decision and rejected Ayyadurai’s petition.  Ayyadurai filed 
applications for emergent relief in the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, 
and the New Jersey Supreme Court, but both applications were denied.    
On August 26, 2024, Appellants filed a complaint in the District Court against the 
New Jersey Secretary of State and the New Jersey Division of Elections.  They sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that Appellees had violated their First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights by excluding them from the New Jersey ballot for the 
 
1 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen 
of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to 
the Office of President. . . .”).  
 
 
3 
 
November 5, 2024 general election.  Along with their complaint, Appellants filed a 
motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Appellees from removing them 
from the ballot.  The District Court denied the motion.  Appellants appealed.   
 The appeal is moot.  “[F]ederal courts are without power to decide questions that 
cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.”  North Carolina v. Rice, 404 
U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (per curiam).  In their motion for a preliminary injunction, 
Appellants sought only to enjoin Appellees from removing them from the November 5, 
2024 general election ballot.  Because that election is now over, no live controversy 
remains.  While we recognize that there is an exception to the mootness doctrine for 
challenges to actions that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” see Spencer v. 
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998), the action Appellants challenge does not evade review; 
rather, Appellants’ underlying suit is ongoing in the District Court.  They may continue to 
litigate their legal challenges there.   
For these reasons, we will dismiss the appeal.   


Roseanna Sias v. Secretary New Jersey Department of State

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-6-2025 
Trustees of the General Assembly of the Church of v. Anthonee 
Patterson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Trustees of the General Assembly of the Church of v. Anthonee Patterson" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 467. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/467 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-1306 
__________ 
 
THE TRUSTEES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE CHURCH OF THE 
LORD JESUS CHRIST OF THE APOSTOLIC FAITH, INC.; CHURCH OF THE 
LORD JESUS CHRIST OF THE APOSTOLIC FAITH 
 
v. 
 
ANTHONEE PATTERSON; ROCHELLE BILAL, in her  
official capacity as Sheriff of Philadelphia County 
 
ANTHONEE PATTERSON, 
    Third Party Plaintiff 
v. 
 
LUTHER WEAVER Esq., individually, in his role as attorney; FOX ROTHSCHILD 
LLP; L.E. WEAVER & ASSOCIATES, P.C.; JOHN/JANE DOES 1-30; MICHAEL 
TWERSKY ESQ., individually and in his role as attorney for The Trustees of the General 
Assembly; STRADLEY RONON STEVEN & YOUNG; DANIELLE BANKS ESQ., 
individually and in her role as attorney for Kenneth Shelton, individually and as General 
Overseer and President of the board of Trustees, Stradley Ronon Steven & Young; 
ROBERT A. BURKE; ANTHONY LAMB, individually and in his role as Trustee of the 
Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith; JOHN CARLTON THOMAS, 
individually and in his role as Trustee of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the 
Apostolic Faith; JAMES BROWN, individually and in his role as Trustee of the Church 
of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith; LEON BLIGEN, individually and in his 
role as Trustee of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith; JOHNNY 
BROWN ESQ., individually, in his role as attorney, and in his role as Trustee of the 
Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith,  
     Third Party Defendants 
 
Anthonee Patterson, 
  Appellant 
____________________________________ 
     
 
2 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-00634) 
District Judge:  Honorable Karen S. Marston 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 10, 2025 
 
Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 6, 2025) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
The Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith (the “Church”) is a 
religious society located in Philadelphia.  The Trustees of the General Assembly of the 
Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith (the “Corporation”) hold in trust 
and manage real and personal property for the Church’s use.  In 1991, a succession 
dispute arose within the Church between Kenneth Shelton (“Shelton”) and Roddy Nelson 
Shelton, both of whom claimed that they were the new General Overseer.  Some 
congregants followed Roddy Nelson and the appellant, Anthonée Patterson, to a new 
church located in Darby, Pennsylvania, while other congregants remained with Shelton in 
Philadelphia.   
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
3 
 
In 1995, Patterson attempted to take control of the Church by suing Shelton in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for violations of Pennsylvania’s 
Nonprofit Corporations Law (the “Patterson Action”).  Patterson and Shelton eventually 
agreed to resolve the dispute via arbitration.  In 2006, an arbitrator found that Shelton had 
diverted Church funds and ordered all Church property held by the Corporation to be 
transferred to Patterson’s control.  The parties continued to litigate issues surrounding the 
succession dispute for another decade.  Ultimately, in 2017, a state court held that the 
order confirming the arbitration award and the arbitration award itself represented the last 
valid judgments in the Patterson Action.  Patterson then obtained a writ of possession, 
and the Philadelphia Sheriff’s Office posted an eviction notice on the Church’s 
headquarters.   
In response, the Church and Corporation initiated this action in the District Court. 
They asserted that because they were not parties to the Patterson Action, execution of the 
writ of possession against them would violate their rights under the First, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments, as the Church would be forced to accept Patterson’s leadership 
and control.  They requested a preliminary injunction preventing Patterson from 
executing on the arbitration judgment, as well as a declaratory judgment that enforcement 
of the arbitration judgment against them would be unconstitutional.  
Following a hearing, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction precluding 
Patterson from attempting to take control of the Church or Corporation.  In issuing the 
injunction, the District Court concluded that (1) the Church and Corporation had 
4 
 
demonstrated a likelihood of succeeding on their claim that the arbitration award could 
not be enforced against them because they were not parties to the Patterson action; (2) the 
Church and Corporation would be irreparably injured by the denial of injunctive relief 
because Patterson intended to take control of the Church; (3) Patterson would not suffer 
greater harm than they would if an injunction were granted, as an injunction would 
merely preserve the status quo; and (4) an injunction would be in the public’s interest 
insofar as the public has an interest in ensuring that judgments are enforced only against 
those who are parties or privies to prior actions; the public has an interest in allowing 
individuals to have their day in court; and the public has an interest in ensuring that 
religious groups can choose who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out 
their mission.   
Patterson appealed, arguing that the District Court lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that collateral estoppel barred the 
Church and Corporation from relitigating issues decided by the state courts.  We rejected 
both arguments and affirmed.  Trustees of Gen. Assembly of Church of Lord Jesus Christ 
of Apostolic Faith, Inc. v. Patterson, No. 21-1662, 2021 WL 6101254, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec. 
21, 2021).   
Patterson then filed numerous motions in the District Court challenging the 
preliminary injunction, all of which were denied.  He also filed an answer asserting 
several counterclaims, including, as relevant here, a counterclaim requesting a 
declaratory judgment that the arbitration award was immediately enforceable against the 
5 
 
Church and Corporation.  When Patterson demanded a jury trial on that claim, the 
District Court denied the request because it was both untimely and sought only equitable 
relief. 
Meanwhile, the Church and Corporation moved the District Court to convert the 
preliminary injunction against Patterson into a permanent injunction.  The District Court, 
emphasizing that Patterson had not presented any new evidence since the preliminary-
injunction proceedings, gave preclusive effect to its findings in those proceedings and 
granted the motion.  The District Court also issued a declaratory judgment that 
enforcement of the arbitration award against the Church and Corporation was 
unconstitutional and denied Patterson’s counterclaim for declaratory judgment.  The 
District Court denied Patterson’s appeal.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District 
Court’s order granting the Appellees’ motion for a permanent injunction and its rulings 
on the parties’ opposing requests for declaratory judgment for an abuse of discretion.  See 
NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011); Kelly v. 
Maxum Specialty Ins. Grp., 868 F.3d 274, 281 (3d Cir. 2017).  We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s application of issue preclusion.  Jean Alexander Cosms., 
Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 2006).   
“In deciding whether to grant a permanent injunction, the district court must 
consider whether: (1) the moving party has shown actual success on the merits; (2) the 
moving party will be irreparably injured by the denial of injunctive relief; (3) the granting 
6 
 
of the permanent injunction will result in even greater harm to the defendant; and (4) the 
injunction would be in the public interest.”  Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 
(3d Cir. 2001).   
Findings made during a preliminary-injunction proceeding can have preclusive 
effect in litigation on the merits in the same proceeding “if the circumstances make it 
likely that the findings are ‘sufficiently firm’ to persuade the court that there is no 
compelling reason for permitting them to be litigated again.”  Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. 
Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 126 F.3d 461, 474 n.11 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Dyndul 
v. Dyndul, 620 F.2d 409, 411–12 (3d Cir. 1980)).  “Whether the resolution in the first 
proceeding is sufficiently firm to merit preclusive effect turns on a variety of factors, 
including ‘whether the parties were fully heard, whether the court filed a reasoned 
opinion, and whether that decision could have been, or actually was appealed.’”  Id. 
(quoting In re Brown, 951 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir. 1991). 
We see no error here.  As the District Court explained, its findings in the first 
proceeding were sufficiently firm to merit preclusive effect.  The District Court held a 
three-day-long hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction and heard extensive 
testimony from multiple witnesses—including Patterson himself.  After the parties were 
heard, they submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The District Court then 
issued an exhaustive eighty-five-page opinion concluding that the arbitration award could 
not be enforced against the Church and Corporation because they were not parties to the 
Patterson Action nor in privity with Shelton.  And, finally, we saw no error in the District 
7 
 
Court’s findings on appeal.  In light of these considerations, the District Court was 
permitted to give the findings preclusive effect.  See Hawksbill Sea Turtle, 126 F.3d at 
474 n.11. 
With these findings, the District Court acted within its discretion in converting the 
preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction.  In doing so, the District Court 
emphasized that Patterson had not presented any new evidence that would call its 
previous findings into question.  The District Court then properly determined that the 
Church and Corporation had succeeded on the merits by showing that the arbitration 
award could not be enforced against them.  The District Court also reasonably determined 
that the balance of the equities favored them.  See Shields, 254 F.3d at 482.   
Patterson now argues, as he did in his prior appeal, that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction over this case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits a district 
court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction when a state-court loser essentially seeks 
federal-court review of the state-court judgment, see Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox 
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010).  We previously rejected this 
argument, explaining that since the Church and Corporation were not parties to the 
Patterson Action, they could not be considered losers in that action.  While Patterson 
contends that he presented new evidence in the District Court demonstrating that the 
Church and Corporation were, in fact, parties to the Patterson Action, he does not identify 
any evidence that sufficiently supports his position.  We have considered Patterson’s 
8 
 
remaining arguments on the Rooker-Feldman question and conclude that they are 
meritless.   
We also previously rejected Patterson’s contention that collateral estoppel bars the 
Church and Corporation from relitigating issues decided by the state courts.  Collateral 
estoppel prevents parties from litigating the same issue again when a “court of competent 
jurisdiction has already adjudicated the issue on its merits.”  Witkowski v. Welch, 
173 F.3d 192, 198 (3d Cir. 1999).  As we explained, that doctrine does not bar this suit 
because the Church and Corporation were neither parties to the Patterson Action nor in 
privity with Shelton.   
Patterson next contends that the District Court erred by entering the permanent 
injunction and denying his request for a declaratory judgment without affording him “the 
trial to which he was entitled.”  Br. 40, ECF No. 22.  As explained above, however, the 
District Court was permitted to give its rulings from the preceding hearing preclusive 
effect without holding a second hearing.  In any event, there is no right to trial by jury 
when a party seeks equitable relief in a declaratory judgment action.  See AstenJohnson, 
Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 562 F.3d 213, 223–24 (3d Cir. 2009).  
We have considered Patterson’s remaining challenges to the District Court’s 
subject-matter jurisdiction in this case and conclude that they are meritless.  These 
arguments, like his others, fail because the Church and Corporation were not parties to 
the Patterson Action.  Patterson’s motion to certify questions to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court is denied. 


Trustees of the General Assembly of the Church of v. Anthonee Patterson

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-9-2025 
USA v. Leevander Wade 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Leevander Wade" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 470. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/470 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
No. 24-2461 
_______________ 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
LEEVANDER WADE, 
    Appellant  
_______________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2:18-cr-00703-002) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael E. Farbiarz 
_______________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on June 6, 2025 
Before: HARDIMAN, BIBAS, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
(Filed: June 9, 2025) 
_______________ 
OPINION* 
_______________ 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge.  
LeeVander Wade was charged with racketeering conspiracy for his role in helping the 
Bloods gang deal drugs and kill three people. He was also charged with a dozen related 
 
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 
precedent. 
2 
crimes, but those charges were dismissed by the Government when he pleaded guilty to 
racketeering conspiracy. Though his Guidelines sentencing range was life in prison, the 
plea agreement called for 33 to 38 years. The District Court sentenced him to about 36 and 
a half years. Wade appealed. Now, his lawyer has asked to withdraw because there are no 
non-frivolous issues for appeal. We agree and affirm. 
In ruling on an Anders motion, we ask two questions. First, we decide whether Wade’s 
attorney “thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues” and explained 
“why the issues are frivolous.” United States v. Brookins, 132 F.4th 659, 666 (3d Cir. 
2025). He has. His facially adequate brief reflects a thorough review of the record, identi-
fies several issues, and explains that they would be frivolous on appeal. See United States 
v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564, 569 (3d Cir. 2022). The government points out that the District 
Court erred because it “did not personally discuss the appellate waiver” with Wade, instead 
delegating that task to the prosecutor. United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 929 (3d Cir. 
2008) (discussing Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N)). In a supplemental brief, Wade’s lawyer 
explains that this issue would be reviewed only for plain error and thus would fail on ap-
peal.  
Second, we ask whether there are any non-frivolous issues on our review of the record. 
Langley, 52 F.4th at 569. We agree with counsel that there are none. For one, the Rule 11 
mistake did not affect Wade’s substantial rights. See Corso, 549 F.3d at 929–30. In open 
court, at the District Court’s instruction, Wade discussed the waiver extensively with the 
prosecutor and confirmed that he understood the consequences of his plea. For another, we 
are sure that the plea hearing was fair. Id. at 931–32. Plus, Wade’s sentence fell within the 
3 
stipulated range and below the Guidelines range, and we perceive no sentencing errors. So 
he has no legitimate arguments to attack the plea, the appellate waiver, or his sentence. 
Even if the appellate waiver is invalid, his appeal would be frivolous.  
For these reasons, we will grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.  


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