Villanova University School of Law: Digital Repository

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-7-2025 
Servis One Inc v. OKS Group International PVT Ltd 
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Recommended Citation 
"Servis One Inc v. OKS Group International PVT Ltd" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 189. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/189 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-1301 
____________ 
 
SERVIS ONE INC, d/b/a BSI Financial Services, Inc.; BSI FINANCIAL HOLDINGS, INC.; 
ENTRA SOLUTIONS PVT LTD; GAGAN SHARMA, 
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
OKS GROUP LLC; OKS GROUP INTERNATIONAL PVT LTD; VINIT KHANNA 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 2:20-cv-04661) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mark A. Kearney 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 10, 2024 
____________ 
 
Before:  BIBAS, CHUNG, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed March 7, 2025) 
____________ 
 
OPINION1 
____________ 
CHUNG, Circuit Judge. 
This case turns on whether lawyers had their client’s express authorization to enter 
 
1 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
into a settlement agreement.  The District Court found that they did not, and because this 
finding is not clearly erroneous, we will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND2 
 
Servis One, Inc., d/b/a BSI Financial Services, Inc. (“BSI”) hired OKS Group, 
LLC (“OKS”) to provide data entry support in India.  When BSI ended the relationship, 
OKS responded by accusing BSI of misappropriating trade secrets and breaching their 
contract.  OKS brought its claims against BSI via three actions: (1) an arbitration 
proceeding in Philadelphia, (2) a civil action in India, and (3) a criminal complaint in 
India.  In connection with these actions, OKS hired U.S. attorneys from Duane Morris 
LLP.  OKS also hired Indian attorney Aditya Wadhwa to assist in the criminal action.   
In July 2018, the night before arbitration was to begin, the parties seemingly 
agreed to a settlement in principle.  The settlement would have resolved all three actions.  
However, Wadhwa advised OKS’s CEO and lawyers from Duane Morris that OKS could 
not withdraw or settle the Indian criminal action without running afoul of Indian law and 
suggested that OKS “handle the Indian disputes independently.”  JA1341.  Accordingly, 
the parties never signed the agreement.   
Attempting to enforce the July 2018 settlement in principle, BSI sued OKS in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in August 2019.  In 
response to that action, OKS argued that though the parties had reached a settlement in 
 
2 Because we write for the parties, we recite only facts pertinent to our decision.  
While BSI challenges several of the District Court’s findings of fact, we rely here only 
upon uncontested factual findings or facts drawn directly from the record. 
 
3 
principle, they had both operated under a mutual mistake of law concerning OKS’s 
ability to withdraw the Indian criminal action.   
Meanwhile, the parties continued to try to reach a settlement.  Attempts at 
settlement intensified beginning in December 2019 and continuing through March 10, 
2020.  During that time, the attorneys for the parties negotiated through a series of emails 
and phone calls.  The negotiations primarily focused on how the settlement agreement 
would address the Indian criminal proceeding.  Throughout this period, the Duane Morris 
attorneys continued to communicate with OKS through its CEO and their discussions 
likewise focused on addressing the Indian criminal action, as well as other OKS 
demands.   
The Duane Morris attorneys and OKS’s CEO scheduled a call for March 10, 2020, 
to discuss the settlement agreement and the CEO’s concerns relating to the Indian 
criminal proceedings.  Despite concerns about potentially “jump[ing] the gun,” less than 
two hours before the call with their client, a Duane Morris attorney authorized BSI’s 
attorney to sign and file a letter notifying the Court that the parties had agreed to a 
settlement.  JA642–43.  Believing the case was settled, the Court dismissed the case with 
prejudice.   
OKS’s CEO continued to communicate with the Duane Morris attorneys, 
expressing concerns with the settlement, particularly with respect to the Indian criminal 
action, and requesting changes to it.  Unbeknownst to OKS, these requests were futile 
because the case had already been dismissed.  OKS’s CEO was not made aware of the 
dismissal until months later.   
 
4 
BSI filed this action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to enforce the alleged 
new 2020 settlement agreement.  The Court held a bench trial and heard testimony from 
BSI’s attorney, OKS’s CEO, and two Duane Morris attorneys.  The Court found that 
“OKS had not authorized a settlement as of Friday, March 6, 2020,” JA13 (FOF 56), nor 
did OKS authorize the Duane Morris attorneys to agree to the March 10 settlement.   
BSI timely appealed.  BSI argues that a settlement agreement was formed between 
BSI and OKS on either February 20 or March 4 of 2020.  Thus, BSI challenges the 
District Court’s finding that “OKS had not authorized a settlement as of Friday, March 6, 
2020.”  JA13 (FOF 56). 
II. DISCUSSION3 
 
This background belies a relatively simple factual issue:  did the Duane Morris 
attorneys have express authorization from OKS to enter into the purported settlement 
agreement?  The District Court concluded that the answer was “no,” and because this was 
not clear error, we will affirm. 
Under Pennsylvania law,4 a lawyer can bind a client to a settlement agreement 
only if the client has expressly authorized the lawyer to do so.  Reutzel v. Douglas, 870 
A.2d 787, 789–90 (Pa. 2005).  The scope of an agency relationship, including the 
presence of express authority, is a question of fact.  Volunteer Fire Co. of New Buffalo v. 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
4 We apply state law to determine the scope of an attorney’s authority to enter into a 
settlement agreement.  Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1032–33 (3d Cir. 1991).  Both 
parties assume that Pennsylvania law applies, and we agree.   
 
5 
Hilltop Oil Co., 602 A.2d 1348, 1351–52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); see Gillian v. Consol. 
Foods Corp., 227 A.2d 858, 861 (Pa. 1967); King v. Driscoll, 296 A.3d 1178, 1185 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2023).  Therefore, we review the District Court’s finding that the Duane 
Morris attorneys lacked express authority for clear error.  United States v. U.S. Sugar 
Corp., 73 F.4th 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2023).  A finding is clearly erroneous when we are “left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  United States 
v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between 
them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Scully v. US WATS, Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 506 (3d Cir. 
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
First, BSI argues that on February 20, 2020, the parties entered into an oral 
settlement agreement with express authority from OKS.  The Duane Morris attorneys do 
not dispute that they called attorneys for BSI and orally agreed to terms offered by BSI.5  
These attorneys did so after they explained newly proposed terms of the settlement to the 
CEO of OKS and he “responded by saying something like ‘that’s fine.’”  JA8 (FOF 
35.b).  Wadhwa was not on the call.  According to BSI, this utterance was a grant of 
 
5 Apart from any issue of express authority, the parties dispute whether the February 
20 oral agreement was an enforceable final settlement.  OKS also contends that BSI 
cannot raise its argument that an enforceable agreement was reached on February 20 
because it failed to make that argument in the District Court.  Because we hold that the 
District Court did not clearly err in finding that the Duane Morris attorneys were not 
authorized to enter into a final settlement agreement on February 20, we need not 
determine whether the February 20 phone call would have constituted a final settlement 
agreement or if BSI can even raise this argument. 
 
 
6 
express authority to settle.   
In Pennsylvania, express authority “must be the result of explicit instructions 
regarding settlement.”  Tiernan, 923 F.2d at 1033 (citing Senyshyn v. Karlak, 299 A.2d 
294, 297 (Pa. 1973)).  We cannot conclude that the District Court clearly erred in finding 
that “something like ‘that’s fine’” fell short of this standard.  JA8 (FOF 35.b).  In the 
context of the record of prolonged negotiations, “that’s fine” may have signaled approval 
of one or more specific proposed changes6 discussed on the call, yet fallen short of 
providing “explicit instructions regarding settlement,” especially when considering the 
consistent concerns voiced by OKS and Wadha that the Indian criminal matter be kept 
separate from the settlement.  While the District Court could have found that “that’s fine” 
was express approval, it did not and its finding is a permissible view of the evidence that 
is, therefore, not clearly erroneous.  See Scully, 238 F.3d at 506.7 
Turning to March 4, 2020, the analysis is much the same.  BSI claims that the 
Duane Morris attorneys entered into a written settlement agreement via a series of emails 
 
6  These proposed changes included deleting a clause regarding the criminal case and 
adding a clause permitting BSI to terminate the settlement if police in India prosecuted 
BSI.   
 
7 We do not consider two arguments forfeited by BSI.  One argument is forfeited 
because BSI did not raise it below (arguing that Duane Morris attorneys’ reasonable 
belief they received express authorization to settle itself established express authority) 
and the other is forfeited because it was raised for the first time in BSI’s reply brief 
(arguing that OKS ratified settlement by not repudiating emails from the Duane Morris 
attorneys stating that the parties were “in conceptual agreement” and had “verbally 
acceded in principle,” BSI Reply Br. 9 n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Doe v. 
Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 558 (3d Cir. 2017) (arguments not raised in the 
District Court); Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 204 n.29 (3d Cir. 
1990) (arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief). 
 
7 
on March 3 and 4 of 2024.  BSI argues that this agreement was expressly authorized 
because, on March 2, 2020, the Duane Morris attorneys told the CEO of OKS that they 
would “respond to BSI’s counsel, advising that we are amenable to the settlement 
agreement as drafted, with the exception of a request for clarification.”  BSI Op. Br. 33 
(quoting JA12 (FOF 48)).  The CEO responded by stating “Keep it simple,” cutting and 
pasting the Duane Morris attorneys’ language explaining their proposed course of action, 
and then writing “OK.”  Id. (quoting JA12 (FOF 49)). 
Again, we perceive no clear error in the District Court’s choice between two 
permissible views of the CEO’s email; namely that it fell short of the required “explicit 
instructions regarding settlement.”  Tiernan, 923 F.2d at 1033 (citing Senyshyn, 299 A.2d 
at 297).  Like the statement on February 20, this language could be read to signal 
approval of a specific proposed change, rather than explicitly approving a final 
settlement.  This is especially apparent when examining the immediately preceding 
emails between OKS’s CEO and the Duane Morris lawyers, which reveal persistent 
disagreement and concerns by OKS regarding the impact of the settlement on the Indian 
criminal action.   
The same can be said regarding BSI’s argument that OKS ratified the agreement 
when OKS’s CEO responded to a Duane Morris email containing the Duane Morris 
attorneys’ counteroffer to BSI with the words “Understood” and “Works.”  BSI Op. Br. 
34 (quoting JA1614).  Again, “Understood” and “Works” do not render the District 
 
8 
Court’s choice between two permissible findings clearly erroneous.8 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
8 BSI also argues that the District Court clearly erred in describing the terms of the 
settlement agreement proposed at various times.  BSI Op. Br. 42–47.  Even assuming 
such errors were made, they do not affect our conclusion that the District Court did not 
clearly err in determining that OKS did not expressly authorize the Duane Morris 
attorneys to settle the case.  In other words, any error was harmless because “it is highly 
probable that the error did not affect the outcome of the case.”  Brennan v. Norton, 350 
F.3d 399, 416 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 


English

Servis One Inc v. OKS Group International PVT Ltd

Alvaré, Helen M.

Religious Freedom and the Status/Conduct Problem in Nondiscrimination Cases

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

Linda Atiyeh v. Borough of Gettysburg

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-18-2025 
Christopher Forman v. District Attorney Philadelphia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"Christopher Forman v. District Attorney Philadelphia" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 213. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/213 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 23-2587 
_____________ 
 
CHRISTOPHER FORMAN, 
Appellant 
v. 
 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY PHILADELPHIA; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA; 
SUPERINTENDENT FRACKVILLE SCI 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 2:21-cv-04707) 
District Judge: Hon. Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 2, 2024 
_____________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 18, 2025) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
 
  
 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
Eliezer Colon returned home to find his front door deadbolted from the inside. At 
the back door, two men were dragging away his gun safe. Both fled, but Colon pursued 
and restrained Christopher Forman until police arrived. A jury convicted Forman of 
burglary of an “occupied structure . . . in which at the time of the offense any person is 
present.” See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3502(a)(1)(ii). This aggravated form of burglary carried 
an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence because Forman had been convicted of a 
crime of violence before his arrest. See 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 9714(a)(1).  
Forman appealed, arguing there was insufficient evidence that anyone was present 
inside the home during the burglary. Commonwealth v. Forman, No. 3389 EDA 2019, 
2020 WL 6281755, at *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2020). The Pennsylvania Superior 
Court rejected this argument by analogizing to its prior holding that “when a homeowner 
is seated on the back porch of her home at the time it is burglarized, the homeowner is 
present ‘within the structure.’” Id. at *4 (quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 585 A.2d 
533, 534 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)). And “the potential for greater mischief and violence,” 
the statutory scheme’s purpose, was “actually realized” when Colon caught Forman in 
the act. Id. at *5. Forman then timely filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising 
the same challenge. The District Court denied Forman’s petition but issued a certificate 
of appealability.1  
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. Where, as here, the District Court did not conduct an 
evidentiary hearing, our review is plenary. Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 99 (3d Cir. 
2005).  
3 
 
A petitioner challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for a state criminal 
conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is entitled to relief if “upon the record evidence 
adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). But the findings “must 
be gauged in the light of applicable [state] law defining the element.” Id. And “it is not 
the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-
law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991). 
Based on his unrebutted testimony, a rational jury could conclude that Colon 
stepped onto the porch and attempted to enter his home during the burglary. Forman 
agrees but argues that because Colon never made it across the threshold, he was merely 
present at his house and not in it. However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court considered, 
and rejected, Forman’s construction of the statute. Forman, 2020 WL 6281755, at *5. We 
lack the authority to reconsider that determination of Pennsylvania law on habeas 
review.2 See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–68; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, we 
will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
 
2 To the extent Forman raises a constitutional challenge based on the insufficiency 
of the evidence to support his conviction, this argument fails. As stated above, under the 
relevant Pennsylvania burglary statute, a person is “present” when he returns home after 
the defendant has already entered his home. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stepp, 652 A.2d 
922, 923–24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). “[V]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution,” see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, any rational trier of fact could have found 
that a person was “present” at the time of the burglary, based on the evidence that the 
victims 1) returned home during the offense, 2) attempted to enter their home but could 
not, 3) drove to the back of their home where they encountered Forman, and 4) ultimately 
chased and apprehended him. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the 
conviction. 


Christopher Forman v. District Attorney Philadelphia

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-21-2025 
Emile Dominique, IV v. DOD 
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Recommended Citation 
"Emile Dominique, IV v. DOD" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 223. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/223 
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Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
ALD-102        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-3087 
___________ 
 
EMILE J. DOMINIQUE, IV, 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-05752) 
District Judge:  Honorable John M. Younge 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 13, 2025 
Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 21, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
 The District Court dismissed Emile J. Dominique IV’s complaint as frivolous 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We will summarily affirm. 
 Dominique’s complaint asserts various federal constitutional claims against the 
United States Department of Defense (DOD) and seeks $40 trillion in compensatory and 
punitive damages. The complaint alleges that the DOD engaged in targeted, continuous, 
publicly broadcasted surveillance of Dominique, who claims to be the Messiah. The 
District Court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismissed it 
with prejudice as factually frivolous. This timely appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s 
sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present a 
substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Dominique’s complaint as 
frivolous. “To be frivolous, a claim must rely on an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory’ 
or a ‘clearly baseless’ or ‘fantastic or delusional’ factual scenario.” Mitchell v. Horn, 318 
F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 
(1989)); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992). The complaint relies 
on a clearly baseless or delusional factual scenario, alleging that the DOD placed 
Dominique “on live TV[] that anyone could access” and allowed the public to watch 
Dominique’s everyday activities, all in an effort “to ensure that [C]hristianity[] gets 
 
3 
 
wiped out as a whole.” Complaint at 6. The District Court thus did not err in dismissing 
these claims as frivolous. 
Given the nature of Dominique’s filings in the District Court and in this Court, we 
conclude that providing leave to amend the complaint would have been futile. See 
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 


Emile Dominique, IV v. DOD

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-21-2025 
David Hatchigian v. Exelon Corp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"David Hatchigian v. Exelon Corp" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 224. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/224 
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Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2025 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
ALD-100        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2776 
__________ 
 
DAVID HATCHIGIAN; JOAN RANDAZZO; BRIDJETTE CANNADY; MARIO 
RULLO; JACLYN MAHONEY; JOSEPH J. BRANCONI; MICHELLE D. MAHONEY, 
TYRONE ZACHARY; LETICA S. MARKS; JOHN GARDNER; TIMMY SMITH; 
LARRY VELENTE; CHRIS GROGAN; GABRIEL R. SAFFIOTI; ROBERT H. LEVY; 
CAROLYN BOXMEYER; JOHN J. FLANNERY; OLIVER YOUNG 
 
DAVID HATCHIGIAN  
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
EXELON CORP.; MUNICIPAL INSPECTION CORP.; PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC 
UTILITY COMMISSION; GLADYS BROWN DUTRIEUILLE, in her capacity as 
Chairman and Commissioner of PAPUC; JOHN F. COLEMAN, in his capacity as Vice 
Chairman and Commissioner of PAPUC; RALPH V. YANORA, in his capacity as 
Commissioner of PAPUC; PECO ENERGY CO., an Exelon Co. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-2170) 
District Judge:  Honorable Chad F. Kenney 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 
10.6 
March 13, 2025 
Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed March 21, 2025) 
___________ 
 
 
2 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant David Hatchigian appeals from the District Court’s denial of his motion 
for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). For the 
following reasons, we will affirm.  
I 
 In 2022, after failing to obtain relief in state court and before the Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Commission (PUC), Hatchigian filed what purported to be a class action in 
the District Court against the Appellees arising out of the loss of electrical service to a 
multi-occupant house he owned and rented. The Appellees filed motions to dismiss, 
which the District Court granted on July 12, 2023. Hatchigian did not appeal.   
 Hatchigian moved for relief from judgment almost a year later, on July 10, 2024, 
under Rule 60(b)(1). He claimed: (1) the District Court erred in dismissing his claims 
against PECO for lack of state action; (2) the amended complaint sufficiently alleged that 
PUC was a state actor; and (3) the District Court overlooked his malicious prosecution 
and abuse of process claims. 
On September 3, 2024, the District Court denied the motion on the grounds that it 
was untimely. The District Court determined that Hatchigian was attempting to use Rule 
60(b)(1) improperly as a substitute for an appeal and that as such it was untimely. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
3 
 
Hatchigian then filed this appeal. Appellees have filed a timely motion for summary 
affirmance to which Hatchigian has not responded.  
 
II 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Summary action is appropriate if 
there is no substantial question presented in the appeal. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4. We review 
a district court’s denial of a motion under Rule 60(b)(1) for abuse of discretion. See 
Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008). 
III 
Under Rule 60(b)(1), a party may move for relief from judgment based on a 
“mistake,” which includes legal error. See Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 533-34 
(2022). Such a motion, however, must be filed within a reasonable time and no more than 
one year after entry of the judgment that is challenged. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). But 
absent exceptional circumstances, Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for appeal. See Morris v. 
Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 343 (3d Cir. 1999). Where allegations of legal error could have been 
raised on appeal, they should not be raised instead in a Rule 60(b)(1) motion filed after 
the time to appeal has expired. See Kemp, 596 U.S. at 538; Blitch v. United States, 39 
F.4th 827, 834 (7th Cir. 2022) (noting that “a Rule 60(b) motion filed after the time to 
appeal has run that seeks to remedy errors that are correctable on appeal will typically not 
be filed within a reasonable time”) (citation omitted). As the District Court explained, all 
of the arguments in Hatchigian’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion could have been raised on appeal. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.     
 
4 
 
Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we grant the 
Appellees’ motion for summary affirmance and will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.   
 


David Hatchigian v. Exelon Corp

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-21-2025 
USA v. Anderson Coutinho-Silva 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Anderson Coutinho-Silva" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 225. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/225 
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Digital Repository. For more information, please contact reference@law.villanova.edu. 
 
 
ALD-101        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-2247 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ANDERSON JOSE COUTINHO-SILVA, 
    Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Criminal No. 2:10-cr-00002-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable John M. Younge 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 13, 2025 
Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed March 21, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Anderson Jose Coutinho-Silva appeals pro se from the District Court’s denial of 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
his motions for a sentence reduction.  The Government has filed a motion for summary 
action.  For the reasons that follow, we grant the Government’s motion and will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
Coutinho-Silva is serving a 207-month sentence for his convictions for Hobbs Act 
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), using a firearm during and in relation to a 
crime of violence under § 924(c), and being an alien in possession of a firearm under 
§ 922(g)(5)(A).  His convictions stem from the October 8, 2009 armed robbery of a 
Philadelphia pizza shop, when he shot a customer in the chest. 
In December 2023 and May 2024, Coutinho-Silva filed motions for a sentence 
reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), arguing that retroactive changes to the 
Sentencing Guidelines allowed him to qualify for a reduction to his sentence.  In 
response, the Government acknowledged that Coutinho-Silva was eligible for a reduction 
but argued that the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed against granting 
any reduction.  The District Court agreed and denied Coutinho-Silva’s motion on that 
basis. Coutinho-Silva has appealed.   
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a district court’s 
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is plenary, while our review of the ultimate 
decision to grant or deny an authorized sentence reduction is for abuse of discretion.  See 
United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009).  We may summarily affirm a 
district court’s decision if the appeal fails to present a substantial question.  Murray v. 
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
We grant the Government’s motion for summary action.  The parties do not 
 
3 
 
dispute that Coutinho-Silva was eligible for a sentence reduction.  However, as required 
by § 3582(c)(2), the District Court then considered the sentencing factors under 
§ 3553(a).  See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010) (explaining that, after 
determining whether a litigant is eligible for a sentence modification, “§ 3582(c)(2) 
instructs a court to consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in 
its discretion, the reduction authorized . . . is warranted in whole or in part under the 
particular circumstances of the case”).  Those factors include “the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), as well as the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect for the law, . . . to provide just punishment for the offense,” 
“to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” and “to protect the public from 
further crimes of the defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C). 
The District Court noted that Coutinho-Silva was given a sentence at the highest 
end of the guideline range to reflect the severity of his offense, as he near-fatally shot the 
bystander victim during a robbery.  The victim needed extensive rehabilitation to recover 
from the shooting and strongly opposes Coutinho-Silva’s early release. Coutinho-Silva 
was also on probation for a burglary offense at the time that he committed this robbery.   
Further, the District Court discussed Coutinho-Silva’s extensive post-incarceration 
disciplinary record, which suggests that he continues to pose a danger to the public, as he 
has been repeatedly disciplined for setting fires, assault, fighting and disruptive behavior, 
and failure to comply with orders.  The District Court concluded that all of these factors 
weighed strongly against a sentence reduction and showed that Coutinho-Silva’s original 
 
4 
 
sentence appropriately reflected the seriousness of his conduct. 
On appeal, Coutinho-Silva argues that he is not a danger to the community 
because he will be deported once his sentence is complete, and because he insists that 
none of his post-incarceration disciplinary infractions were serious. However, he provides 
no evidence in support of those arguments, and we discern no abuse of discretion in the 
District Court’s decision to deny a sentence reduction under the circumstances of this 
case. 
We are satisfied that the District Court “carefully articulated its reasons for not 
granting [a] reduction” and thus undertook the kind of “reasoned appraisal to which we 
defer on review.”  See United States v. Styer, 573 F.3d 151, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  Because this appeal does not present a substantial 
question, we grant the Government’s motion for summary action, and we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s judgment.1 
 
1  The Government’s request to be excused from filing a brief is granted. 


USA v. Anderson Coutinho-Silva

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-21-2025 
Quintez Talley v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
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"Quintez Talley v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 229. 
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CLD-096        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 22-3337 
___________ 
 
QUINTEZ TALLEY, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; FAYETTE COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA; 
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA; PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE; 
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
FAYETTE COUNTY; FAYETTE COUNTY DEFENDER ASSOCIATION; FAYETTE 
COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS; JUDGE LINDA R. CORDARO; TROOPER 
ROBERT SCHMID; D.A. RICHARD BOWER; A.D.A. SEAN M. LEMENTOWSKI; 
A.D.A. WENDY O’BRIEN; CHIEF DEFENDER P.D. JAYNES; CISM TRAVIS 
KNAPP; PSS SCHALIP; CAPT. SALLIAY; CAPT. WILLIAM TIFT; LT. JOSHUA 
POSKA; LT. FREDERICK ST. JOHN; SGT. LOUIS DOBISH; C.O. CHAD 
HARBAUGH; C.O. WILLIAM ROGERS; C.O. ANDREW HIGINBOTHAM; 
UNKNOWN ADA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-01208) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 6, 2025 
 
Before:  KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 21, 2025) 
 
 
 
 
2 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Quintez Talley, a Pennsylvania state prisoner and a frequent pro se filer, appeals 
pro se from the District Court’s decision dismissing his civil complaint.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will summarily affirm that judgment. 
I. 
 In 2019, Talley was charged in Pennsylvania state court with arson and related 
offenses after he set fire to his prison cell at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette.  
In 2021, a jury found him guilty of all those offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to 
six to twelve more years in prison.  Shortly thereafter, he filed a civil complaint in the 
District Court, raising various claims stemming from the investigation into, and 
prosecution for, the fire he set in his cell.  He filed the complaint on behalf of himself and 
“Pennsylvanians with Mental Illness,”1 and he named the following defendants:  the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the County of Fayette, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections, the Pennsylvania State Police and one of its troopers (who investigated the 
arson), multiple Pennsylvania state courts, the trial judge, the Fayette County District 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 Talley avers that he himself suffers from an unspecified mental illness. 
 
 
3 
Attorney’s Office and a few of its employees, Fayette County’s public defender’s office 
and its chief public defender, and numerous prison officials. 
Talley’s complaint alleged that his constitutional rights were violated because “his 
arrest and prosecution were not supported by probable cause,” “the evidence used against 
him was perjured, inaccurate, and/or unlawfully obtained or presented to the jury,” and 
“he was not granted the process that he was due at trial.”  Mag. J. Report entered Apr. 13, 
2022, at 12 [hereinafter Mag. J. Report].  He also alleged that various defendants 
“violated the [Americans with Disabilities Act (‘ADA’)] and [the Rehabilitation Act 
(‘RA’)] on account of his serious mental illness” by “arresting and prosecuting him for 
setting [the] fire,” “precluding him from presenting evidence of insanity or mental 
infirmity to the jury at his criminal trial,” “failing to testify that [he] set the fire not as an 
intentional criminal act, but as a result of his serious mental illness,” “revealing [his] 
confidential information during trial,” and “failing to provide adequate representation 
during [his] underlying criminal proceeding.”  Id. at 23-24.  Additionally, Talley raised 
multiple claims under Pennsylvania state law. 
 The District Court referred the complaint to a United States Magistrate Judge, who 
screened it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.  The Magistrate Judge then issued a report, 
recommending that the District Court (1) dismiss “Pennsylvanians with Mental Illness” 
from the lawsuit, (2) dismiss Talley’s constitutional and federal claims pursuant to 
§ 1915A(b) because they were frivolous, failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted, and/or sought monetary relief from a defendant who was immune from suit, and 
 
 
4 
(3) and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims.  On 
August 5, 2022, the District Court overruled Talley’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 
report, adopted the report and its recommendations, and closed the case.  This timely 
appeal followed.2   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of 
the District Court’s August 5, 2022 decision is plenary.  See Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 
217, 223 (3d Cir. 2023).  We may take summary action if this appeal fails to present a 
substantial question.  See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 We agree with the District Court’s decision to dismiss this case.  For one thing, 
Talley, as a non-lawyer proceeding pro se, could not bring any claims on behalf of 
“Pennsylvanians with Mental Illness.”  See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. 
of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Winkelman ex 
rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007).  Furthermore, for 
substantially the reasons provided by the Magistrate Judge, which the District Court 
 
2 Talley’s notice of appeal was initially due in September 2022.  See Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(1)(A).  But on November 29, 2022, the District Court granted his motion to reopen 
the time to appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) based on his 
failure to receive a copy of the District Court’s August 5, 2022 decision.  The order 
granting reopening gave Talley until December 13, 2022, to appeal, and he filed his 
notice of appeal before that deadline.  Shortly thereafter, Talley moved to proceed in 
forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this appeal and to stay the appeal.  The Clerk granted the stay 
motion, and the appeal was held in abeyance pending the resolution of IFP-related issues 
in some of Talley’s other appeals.  In October 2024, the Clerk lifted the stay and granted 
Talley’s IFP motion in this appeal. 
 
 
5 
adopted, Talley’s own claims for relief under the United States Constitution, the ADA, 
and the RA were subject to dismissal under § 1915A(b).  As the Magistrate Judge 
explained, (1) Talley’s constitutional claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 
477 (1994), because their success would call into question the validity of his conviction, 
and (2) his ADA and RA claims failed to allege non-conclusory facts establishing “that 
any of the actions taken by the Defendants w[ere] done so on the basis of his mental 
illness.”  Mag. J. Report 24.  And since all of Talley’s constitutional and federal claims 
were subject to dismissal, it was appropriate for the District Court to decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims.  See Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 
123 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s judgment.3 
 
3 To the extent that Talley challenges any other order entered by the Magistrate Judge or 
the District Court in this case, we see no reason to disturb any such order.  And to the 
extent that Talley seeks any other relief from us, that relief is denied.  


Quintez Talley v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-24-2025 
Ashley Georges v. Helen Godby 
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Recommended Citation 
"Ashley Georges v. Helen Godby" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 231. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2025/231 
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DLD-091        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 24-1884 
___________ 
 
ASHLEY GEORGES, 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
HELEN C. GODBY; YVONNE SMITH SEGARS 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-13561) 
District Judge:  Honorable Evelyn Padin 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 27, 2025 
Before:  RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 24, 2025) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
Appellant Ashley Georges, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 
pauperis, appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint. For the 
following reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
Georges is currently incarcerated at South Woods State Prison, New Jersey, where 
he is serving an aggregate term of life imprisonment with a thirty-year period of parole 
ineligibility for his convictions for murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. In 
September 2020, Georges filed a complaint, later amended in October 2020, under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging interference with his right to access the courts during his post-
conviction relief (PCR) proceedings in state court and related petition for writ of habeas 
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal court. The District Court screened the 
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismissed it without prejudice and 
with leave to amend. Georges filed a second amended complaint in March 2022 repeating 
some of his earlier claims and adding more against various defendants, including state 
and county agencies, individual public defenders and prosecutors, and individual New 
Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC) employees. The District Court dismissed 
some of these claims with prejudice and some without, and gave Georges one final 
chance to amend his complaint.  In September 2023, Georges filed his third amended 
complaint alleging § 1983 claims against two public defenders, Helen Godby and 
Yvonne Segars. Georges stated that Godby, an attorney in the New Jersey Office of the 
3 
 
Public Defender’s (NJOPD) Intake Unit, misinformed him about the status of his appeal 
and filed an untimely notice of appeal (NOA) in his PCR proceedings. This delay caused 
the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. He 
also stated that Segars, as the then-Supervisor of the NJOPD, created a policy or custom 
allowing or encouraging the untimely filing of indigent defendants’ PCR appeals, and/or 
failed to supervise or train NJOPD employees to prevent these untimely filings. 
The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a 
claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and without leave to amend. Georges timely filed his 
notice of appeal. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Georges’ claims under § 1915(e)(2). 
See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 2020). To survive dismissal, a 
complaint must set out “sufficient factual matter” to show that its claims are facially 
plausible. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  We accept all factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012), and we construe 
Georges’ filings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).  
We may summarily affirm “on any basis supported by the record” if the appeal fails to 
4 
 
present a substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  
III. 
We first review the previously filed claims, dismissed with prejudice,1 against the 
following defendants: the NJOPD, the New Jersey Supreme Court (NJSC), the NJDOC, 
the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office (ECPO), ECPO attorneys Thomas McTigue and 
Barbara Rosenkrans, and NJOPD attorneys Susan Bohrod and Joan Buckley. 
The Eleventh Amendment immunizes state agencies from suit in federal court. See 
Est. of Lagano v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 769 F.3d 850, 857 (3d Cir. 2014). The 
NJOPD, NJSC, and NJDOC are New Jersey state agencies and thus immune from 
Georges’ claims.   
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a “person” acting under 
color of state law deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States. See id. at 854. A local government body, such 
as a county prosecutor’s office, is not a person for § 1983 purposes if it is acting as an 
“arm of the [s]tate.” Id. “[W]hen [New Jersey] county prosecutors engage in classic law 
 
1 In Georges’ third amended complaint, he named only two defendants, Godby and 
Segars. The claims against other defendants that the District Court dismissed in prior 
orders with prejudice are preserved for our review. See U.S. ex rel. Atkinson v. PA. 
Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 516 (3d Cir. 2007). But the claims that were dismissed 
without prejudice are not. See id. at 517-18. 
5 
 
enforcement and investigative functions, they act as officers of the State.” Id. at 855 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1505 (3d Cir. 
1996)). Georges’ claims against the ECPO are based on its investigative and 
prosecutorial actions, and it therefore cannot be considered a person for § 1983 purposes. 
Individual prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 claims arising from 
their activities which are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 
process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). This includes withholding 
exculpatory evidence, even during post-conviction proceedings if the prosecutor 
continues in the role of an advocate, see Yarris v. Cnty. of Del., 465 F.3d 129, 137 (3d 
Cir. 2006), as well as malicious prosecution, see Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 208 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (“[I]n initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor 
is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.”) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 
431). Georges’ claims against ECPO attorney Thomas McTigue2 include malicious 
prosecution as well as concealing exculpatory evidence during trial. Georges also states 
that ECPO attorney Barbara Rosenkrans concealed exculpatory evidence during his PCR 
and habeas proceedings. Both McTigue and Rosenkrans have absolute immunity from 
these claims.  
 
2 We address only those claims against McTigue which the District Court dismissed with 
prejudice in its July 7, 2023 opinion. 
6 
 
Finally, it is well established that “a public defender does not act under color of 
state law [for § 1983 purposes] when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as 
counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 
325 (1981). Georges’ claims against Susan Bohrod and Joan Buckley arise out of their 
actions and omissions as litigators during Georges’ PCR and PCR appeal proceedings, 
respectively, and thus they did not act under color of law for § 1983 purposes. 
We therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the foregoing claims. 
IV. 
We turn now to the claims in Georges’ third and final amended complaint. 
Georges alleges that Godby told him that the NOA for his PCR proceedings was timely 
filed when it had not actually been filed yet, nor would it be filed for many more months. 
During that time, Georges’ one-year statute of limitations under AEDPA eventually ran 
out. Filing (or not filing) an NOA is within a lawyer’s traditional functions, as is 
communicating about it with a client. Though it “may be” possible for a public defender 
to act under color of law for § 1983 purposes “while performing certain administrative 
and possibly investigative functions,” id. at 325, Godby’s actions do not fall within this 
narrow exception.  
Even assuming Segars’ actions could be considered administrative, cf. Powell v. 
Davis, 415 F.3d 722, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2005) (“the public defender’s case management 
priorities are not the type of administrative measures, like hiring and budgetary decisions, 
7 
 
that would make the office a state actor under the administrative-action exception for 
public defenders identified in Polk County”), Georges has nevertheless failed to meet the 
relevant pleading standard. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. He makes bare assertions that 
Segars created a policy or custom of filing untimely NOAs and/or failed to train or 
supervise NJOPD attorneys to prevent the untimely filings. He has not provided any facts 
to support these conclusions other than Godby’s failure to timely file his NOA. Even 
construed liberally and in the light most favorable to Georges, this is not enough to make 
claims of an office-wide policy nor failure to train or supervise facially plausible. See, 
e.g., Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 133 (3d Cir. 2010). 
We therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of these claims as well. 
V. 
Finally, considering the foregoing, the District Court did not abuse its discretion or 
otherwise err in dismissing the complaint without leave to amend after determining 
that further amendment would have been futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 
293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  


Ashley Georges v. Helen Godby

2025 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-26-2025 
Bruce Mason v. State of Delaware 
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Recommended Citation 
"Bruce Mason v. State of Delaware" (2025). 2025 Decisions. 234. 
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 24-2162 
____________ 
 
BRUCE MASON, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE; SUPERINTENDENT JAMES T. VAUGHN 
CORRECTIONAL CENTER; ATTORNEY GENERAL DELAWARE 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. No. 1:21-cv-00864) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory B. Williams 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 25, 2025 
____________ 
 
Before:  BIBAS, PHIPPS, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 26, 2025) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. 
About twenty-five years after his conviction for statutorily raping a thirteen-year-
old girl, an inmate discovered that the victim had been involuntarily committed to a mental 
health facility before and during the trial at which she testified against him.  The inmate 
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming that the 
Government violated its duty to disclose exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963), by not turning over the report discharging her from the facility.  On 
procedural default grounds, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of the petition. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In February 1993, a Delaware grand jury indicted Bruce Mason on four counts of 
first-degree unlawful sexual intercourse, see Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 775 (1993), and one 
count of first-degree kidnapping, see id. § 783A (1993).  Those charges were related to his 
alleged statutory rape of a minor: forcing her to engage in penetrative vaginal sex, forcing 
her to engage in penetrative anal sex, forcing her to perform oral sex on him, and forcibly 
performing oral sex on her; and unlawfully restraining her with the intent to sexually abuse 
her.  In June 1994, the case went to trial.   
The victim, R.R., provided a firsthand account at trial on June 21.  She described 
how one summer night after seventh grade, when she was thirteen years old, Mason, who 
was nineteen, drove her to his apartment under the pretense of needing help feeding his 
dog.  R.R. explained that she brought along her younger stepbrother and younger sister 
even though Mason objected and told her that he wanted only her to join him.  She also 
recounted how at his apartment, she grew concerned and asked her stepbrother not to leave 
her alone with Mason.  But, as R.R. detailed, Mason brought her into a bedroom, locked 
her stepbrother out, and sexually assaulted her.   
3 
Three other witnesses testified against Mason.  R.R.’s stepbrother described how 
while at Mason’s apartment, R.R. asked him not to leave her alone with Mason but that 
Mason locked him out of the bedroom.  Her stepbrother further recounted that he heard his 
sister crying through the locked door and watched her later exit, sniffling, with her hair 
disheveled.  Two other witnesses – one of whom was Mason’s friend and the other of 
whom was R.R.’s boyfriend – both testified that Mason told them, separately, that he 
sexually assaulted R.R.1 
The jury ultimately convicted Mason of three counts of first-degree unlawful sexual 
intercourse related to penetrative vaginal sex and oral sex.  The jury acquitted him of the 
first-degree unlawful sexual intercourse count for forced penetrative anal sex but could not 
reach a verdict on the kidnapping count.2  In August 1994, after denying Mason’s post-trial 
motion for acquittal or a new trial contesting the guilty verdicts on the three counts, see 
State v. Mason, 1994 WL 1877137, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 1994), the Delaware 
Superior Court sentenced him to 48 years, suspended after serving 45 years for three years 
of probation. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In the years that followed, Mason challenged his conviction through civil collateral 
attacks.  His petitions under Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 for postconviction 
relief initiated in 1996 and 1998 were unsuccessful.  See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61; 
Mason v. State, 692 A.2d 413 (Table), at *2 (Del. 1997) (denying Mason’s first petition for 
postconviction relief); Mason v. State, 725 A.2d 442 (Table), at *1, *3 (Del. 1999) 
(denying Mason’s second motion for postconviction relief).  But about twenty years later, 
 
1 R.R.’s sister, who was about three years old at the time of the incident and was described 
as being asleep the entire time, did not testify.   
2 The Government later entered a nolle prosequi on the kidnapping charge.   
4 
in June 2018, R.R. wrote a letter in support of Mason’s release, and from the statement, 
Mason learned that R.R. had been admitted to a mental health facility shortly before and 
during his trial.  See Mason v. Ceresini, 2024 WL 2832501, at *9 (D. Del. June 4, 2024).  
He investigated, and by January 2019, he obtained a key record related to her stay: the 
Discharge Summary.  Id.  That document, dated August 6, 1994, indicated that for about 
five days in June of 1994 – from the 19th to the 23rd – R.R. was admitted to a mental health 
facility for suicidal ideation.  That document also provided a report of the mental 
examination performed while R.R. was admitted.  It stated that “[s]he was fully oriented” 
and that “[a]ll tests of memory were good.”  Discharge Summ. 2 (App. 43). 
Nevertheless, Mason believed that R.R.’s commitment before and during his trial 
was exculpatory for him as a means of undermining R.R.’s credibility.  He formalized his 
claim for a Brady violation related to the suppression of material exculpatory evidence by 
filing a third Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief on February 20, 2019.3 
The Delaware Superior Court summarily dismissed that motion.  See State v. Mason, 
2019 WL 6353372, at *7 & n.52 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 25, 2019), aff’d, 244 A.3d 681 
(Table) (Del. 2020).  It explained that under Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i), 
subsequent motions for postconviction relief are barred “unless the motion pleads with 
particularity the existence of new evidence that creates a strong inference of actual 
innocence.”  Id. at *3 (citing Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2) & (5), (i)).  And after 
concluding that Mason had failed to provide evidence that created such an inference, see 
id. at *7, the Superior Court did not analyze Mason’s motion on the merits, see id. at *3.  
 
3 Mason also alleged that the statement R.R. wrote in favor of his release contradicted her 
earlier trial testimony and thus constituted exculpatory evidence, but the District Court did 
not grant a certificate of appealability for that issue.  See Mason, 2024 WL 2832501, at 
*13. 
5 
Mason appealed that ruling, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed it.  See Mason, 
244 A.3d 681. 
Mason then sought collateral review at the federal level by filing a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 17, 2021.  The District Court denied the 
petition on the grounds that Mason’s claim had been procedurally defaulted and that he 
could not overcome that default.  See Mason, 2024 WL 2832501, at *10.  The District 
Court did, however, grant Mason a certificate of appealability on the question of whether 
the Government’s failure to disclose the Discharge Summary constituted a Brady violation.  
See id. at *13.  That certificate of appealability, coupled with Mason’s timely appeal, 
triggered this Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253(a).   
DISCUSSION 
Because the Delaware state courts determined that Mason’s third petition for 
postconviction relief was barred by Rule 61,4 the Brady challenge he now brings is deemed 
exhausted.5  But satisfying the exhaustion requirement by virtue of a state procedural rule 
that bars collateral review in state court comes with a consequence: it exposes a federal 
petitioner’s § 2254 claim to dismissal on procedural default grounds.  See McCandless v. 
Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999); Ross v. Adm’r E. Jersey State Prison, 118 F.4th 
 
4 See Mason, 2019 WL 6353372, at *3 (applying Rule 61 to determine that “Mason’s 
claims raised [in his motion for postconviction relief] should be summarily dismissed 
because they fail to meet the pleading requirements for proceeding with the motion on its 
merits”). 
5 See McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999) (“When a claim is not 
exhausted because it has not been ‘fairly presented’ to the state courts, but state procedural 
rules bar the applicant from seeking further relief in state courts, the exhaustion 
requirement is satisfied because there is ‘an absence of available State corrective process.’” 
(quoting in the second instance 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b))); Ross v. Adm’r E. Jersey State 
Prison, 118 F.4th 553, 565 (3d Cir. 2024) (explaining that a “habeas claim is deemed 
exhausted” when “additional state-court review” is not available).  See generally 
Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131 (1987) (explaining that § 2254 exhaustion is non-
jurisdictional). 
6 
553, 565 (3d Cir. 2024).  In that circumstance, the general rule is that the petition must be 
dismissed absent a showing of cause and prejudice sufficient to excuse the default.  See 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); accord McCandless, 172 F.3d at 260.6   
Here, the requirements for procedural default have been met.  This Court has already 
determined that a denial of a postconviction collateral challenge on Rule 61(i) grounds is 
a procedural ruling.  See Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 710, 717 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(“Subsection (i) of Rule 61 establishes the procedural bars to relief.”).  And Rule 61(i) was 
the basis for the Delaware courts’ rejection of Mason’s third Rule 61 motion.  See Mason, 
2019 WL 6353372, at *3, *7 & n.52 (summarily dismissing Mason’s Brady claim based 
on Rules 61(d)(2) and (i)); see also Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (explaining that a 
subsequent motion for postconviction relief may not be considered unless it satisfies the 
requirements of Rule 61(d)(2)). 
By contrast, the cause-and-prejudice exception does not apply here.  To make the 
cause-and-prejudice showings for an asserted Brady violation, a § 2254 petitioner must 
establish two of the elements of a Brady violation: (i) that the Government suppressed 
evidence and (ii) that the suppressed evidence is material.  See Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 
117, 128 (3d Cir. 2013).  Although it is unclear how the Discharge Summary, which was 
dated after Mason’s trial, could have been suppressed before or during trial, the 
Government asserts procedural default on the basis of only the materiality prong.   
 
6 A § 2254 petitioner may also avoid procedural default by demonstrating a “fundamental 
miscarriage of justice,” but that requires a showing that “that he is actually innocent of the 
crime by presenting new evidence of innocence,” and Mason has not attempted such proof.  
Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d 408, 415–16 (3d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (internal citations 
omitted).   
 
7 
Mason comes up short in that respect.  To establish that a suppressed document is 
material, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).  And evidence pertaining to 
a witness’s mental health cannot be material unless “it ‘undermines [the witness’s] 
reliability . . . or calls into question [her] ability to perceive, remember[,] and narrate 
perceptions accurately.’”  Lesko v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 34 F.4th 211, 233 (3d Cir. 
2022) (first alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125, 141 
(3d Cir. 2015)).  The Discharge Summary did not contain that information; to the contrary, 
it indicated that “[a]ll tests of memory were good.”  Discharge Summ. 2 (App. 43).   
Undeterred by that dead end, Mason contends that based on the Discharge 
Summary, R.R. must have exaggerated her conditions to gain admission to the mental 
health facility.  Even assuming arguendo that the Discharge Summary could be read to 
support that inference and its consequences for R.R.’s credibility, “[t]he materiality of 
Brady material depends almost entirely on the value of the evidence relative to the other 
evidence mustered by the state.”  Johnson, 705 F.3d at 129 (quoting Rocha v. Thaler, 
619 F.3d 387, 396 (5th Cir. 2010)).  And it is well established that evidence that “would be 
used to impeach testimony of a witness whose account is strongly corroborated is generally 
not considered material for Brady purposes.”  Id.  At trial, R.R.’s testimony was strongly 
corroborated.  Her stepbrother testified about what happened the night of the assault.  And 
two other witnesses – one of whom was Mason’s friend – testified that Mason described 
his sexual assault of R.R. to them.  Thus, even if the Discharge Summary could support the 
inference that R.R. exaggerated her symptoms, the other witnesses corroborated the key 
aspects of her testimony, and so that document would not be material. 
8 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the Rule 61(i) dismissal of Mason’s petition for postconviction 
relief constitutes a state procedural ruling that bars consideration of Mason’s § 2254 claim, 
and Mason has not made one of the requisite showings needed to overcome procedural 
default. 


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