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Le partage des compétences juridictionnelles pour le contentieux des actes individuels détachables des contrats privés relatifs au domaine privé – note sous TC, 7 avr. 2025, n° C4331, Assoc. foncière de remembrement de Courtempierre
No full textThe Stick-Breaking and Ordering Representations of Compositional Data: Copulas and Regression models
Full text linkCompositional Data (CoDa) is usually viewed as data on the simplex and is studied via a log-ratio analysis, following the classical work of Aitchison (1986). We propose to bring to the fore an alternative view of CoDa as a stick breaking process, an approach which originates from Bayesian nonparametrics. The first stick-breaking approach gives rise to a view of CoDa as ordered statistics, from which we can derive “stick-ordered” distributions. The second approach is based on a rescaled stick-breaking transformation, and give rises to a geometric view of CoDa as a free unit cube. The latter allows to introduce copula and regression models, which are useful for studying the internal or external dependence of CoDa. These stick-breaking representations allow to effectively and simply deal with CoDa with zeroes. We establish connections with other topics of probability and statistics like i) spacings and order statistics, ii) Bayesian nonparametrics and Dirichlet distributions, iii) neutrality, iv) hazard rates and the product integral, v) mixability
Human-Robot Interactions in Investment Decisions
No full textWe study the introduction of robo-advising on a large set of Employee Saving Plans. Differently from many services that fully automate portfolio decisions, our robo-advisor proposes investment and rebalancing strategies, leaving investors free to follow or ignore them. The resulting human-robot interactions occur both at the time of the subscription and over time, as the robot sends alerts when the investor’s portfolio gets too far from the target allocation. We show that the robo-service is associated with an increase in investors’ attention and trading activities. Following the robot’s alerts, investors change their rebalancing behaviors so as to stay closer to their target allocation, which results in larger portfolio returns. Counterfactual returns induced by automatic rebalancing by the robot would be only slightly higher, suggesting that on average the financial cost of letting investors retain control is not large
Do carbon emissions affect the cost of capital?
No full textWe empirically study whether carbon emissions affect firms’ cost of capital raised on conventional bond markets. We find that firms with higher carbon emissions face higher spreads in the secondary market but not in the primary market. We show that this gap is related to uncertainty about climate concerns that affects differently primary and secondary market. This gap is also affected by the reputation of underwriting dealers: high reputation promotes the incorporation of climate concerns into bond yields. Our findings imply that, on average, carbon emissions do not affect the cost of capital in bond markets, thereby reducing firms’ financial incentives for decarbonization
Façonner la norme à l'ère de la législation gouvernementale. Quelques observations sur l'activité de législation de l'exécutif et la valeur du contexte
No full textL’appartenance au domaine public routier des parcs de stationnement publics souterrains – note sous TC, 17 juin 2024, n° C4312, Ville de Paris c/ Cnie parisienne de service
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From Cooptation to Violence: Managing Competitive Authoritarian Elections
Full text linkAutocratic elections are often marred with systematic intimidation and violence towards voters and candidates. When do authoritarian regimes resort to violent electoral strategies? I argue that electoral violence acts as a risk-management strategy in competitive authoritarian elections where: (a) the regime's prospects for coopting local elites, competitors, and voters are weak, and (b) the expected political cost of electoral violence is low. I test these propositions by explaining the subnational distribution of electoral violence during the most violent election in Mubarak's Egypt (1981-2011): the 2005 Parliamentary Election. The results indicate that electoral violence is higher in districts where: the regime has a lower capacity for coopting local elites, it faces competition from ideological (rather than rent-seeking) challengers with no cooptation potential, clientelistic strategies are costlier and less effective, and citizens' capacity for non-electoral mobilization is low. The conclusions provide lessons for containing electoral manipulation and violence in less democratic contexts