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La codification face aux principes d’identité et spécialité normatives
No full texthttps://www.senat.fr/rap/r24-759/r24-7591.pd
Le steak végétal en procès. Par-delà le mot et la chose, nommer est-ce penser ?
No full textUn steak peut-il être végétal ? Question nominaliste, à la confluence du droit de la santé et des droits du consommateur. L'étude analyse le raisonnement juridique de la CJUE, et pousse jusqu'à la philosophie du langage
Experimental Evidence That AI-Managed Workers Tolerate Lower Pay Without Demotivation.
No full textExperimental evidence on worker responses to AI management remains mixed, partly due to limitations in experimental fidelity. We address these limitations with a customized workplace in the Minecraft platform, enabling high-resolution behavioral tracking of autonomous task execution, and ensuring that participants approach the task with well-formed expectations about their own competence. Workers (N = 382)
completed repeated production tasks under either human, AI,
or hybrid management. An AI manager trained on humandefined evaluation principles systematically assigned lower performance ratings and reduced wages by 40%, without adverse effects on worker motivation and sense of fairness.
These effects were driven by a muted emotional response to AI evaluation, compared to evaluation by a human. The very features that make AI appear impartial may also facilitate silent exploitation, by suppressing the social reactions that normally constrain extractive practices in human-managed work
Sequential pricing on multisided platforms
No full textMultisided platforms have emerged as an increasingly important market structure with the rise of the digital economy. In this paper, we consider sequential price setting behavior by platforms and demonstrate sequential pricing outcomes Pareto dominate simultaneous pricing outcomes in terms of firm and industry profits. We compare policy implications and find prices are more balanced across the platform and average prices are higher under sequential pricing than under simultaneous pricing. We also demonstrate that pricing power can be considered independently on each side of the market under multihoming behavior
Bubbles and Crashes with Partially Sophisticated Investors
No full textWe analyze bubbles and crashes in a model in which some investors are partially sophisticated. While the expectations of such investors are endogenously determined in equilibrium, these are based on a coarse understanding of the market dynamics. We highlight how such investors may endogenously switch from euphoria to panic and how this may lead to equilibrium bubbles and crashes even in a purely speculative market in which information is complete and it is commonly understood that the bubble cannot grow forever. We also show how this setting can match stylized empirical facts, and we investigate whether bubbles may last longer when the share of fully rational traders increases
Economic Incentives to Develop and to Use Diagnostic Tests: A Litterature Review
No full textThis survey examines the economic literature on the incentives that shape both the use and the development of diagnostic tests, with a particular focus on companion (biomarker) tests central to precision medicine. Misdiagnosis, underdiagnosis, and overdiagnosis represent a substantial global burden, driving healthcare costs and adverse patient outcomes. The study synthesizes theoretical, empirical, and experimental evidence to assess how healthcare providers’ decisions regarding diagnostic tests are influenced by payment schemes, altruism, and time constraints. Fee-for-service arrangements are shown to encourage excessive testing, while capitation and salary-based contracts help contain costs, though sometimes at the expense of quality.
Physicians’ non-monetary motivations, such as altruism and reputational concerns, interact with financial incentives in complex ways, occasionally leading to unintended consequences such as undertesting. From a normative perspective, the literature highlights the trade-offs inherent in reimbursement design: mandating even costless diagnostic tests is not always optimal, and greater altruism does not necessarily enhance welfare. Current practices, such as reimbursing biomarker tests separately from associated treatments in the U.S., are criticized for discouraging their adoption. At the industry level, the survey explores incentives for developing innovative tests. Pre-approval companion tests can improve drug approval prospects and justify higher prices, whereas post-approval test development faces weaker incentives due to reduced market size. Competition among firms strengthens incentives relative to monopolistic settings, but test introduction may also dampen price competition.
The findings suggest that pay-for-performance schemes, procurement design, and value-based pricing can help better align private and social incentives for both test use and development. Overall, the survey underscores the importance of carefully designed reimbursement mechanisms and policy tools to promote the efficient integration of diagnostic innovations into healthcare systems
Buyer-Optimal Algorithmic Recommendations
No full textWe study how recommendation algorithms affect trade and welfare in markets characterized by algorithmic consumption, such as e-commerce platforms and AI assistants. Our analysis begins with a model of bilateral trade in which a single product is exchanged between a buyer and a seller under uncertainty about product value and seller cost. An algorithm recommends the product based on its price and estimated buyer value, thereby steering purchasing decisions. We characterize the buyer-optimal algorithm and show that it deliberately biases recommendations to amplify buyer price sensitivity, inducing lower seller prices. This optimal algorithm strategically deviates from the ex post optimal rule to exploit price pressure and enhance buyer surplus
Endogenous Quality in Social Learning
No full textWe study a dynamic reputation model with a fixed posted price where only pur-chases are public. A long-lived seller chooses costly quality; each buyer observes the purchase history and a private signal. Under a Markov selection, beliefs split into two cascades—where actions are unresponsive and investment is zero—and an interior region where the seller invests. The policy is inverse-U in reputation and produces two patterns: Early Resolution (rapid absorption at the optimistic cascade) and Dou-ble Hump (two investment episodes). Higher signal precision at fixed prices enlarges cascades and can reduce investment. We compare welfare and analyze two design levers: flexible pricing, which can keep actions informative and remove cascades for patient sellers, and public outcome disclosure, which makes purchases more informa-tive and expands investment