Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) Digital Library
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Joint air-ground action, Ground Liaison Officer School, part 1.
No full textGentlemen, it is with great pleasure that I welcome you here to the Ground Liaison Officers School. The school was started in January of 1944 as a result of an overseas demand for Ground Force officers who had been trained to function in a liaison capacity with the Air Force. The need for these highly trained and rather specialized officers was early recognized as our Ground and Air Forces grew and began to work as a team. The mission of the school in training specialized liaison personnel has now been almost completed. Our mission, at present, is one of general orientation of Ground and Air officers in the many intricate problems involved in joint air-ground action. The basic problem involved in joint air-ground action is the preparation and execution of a fire plan which is so designed as to render maximum aid to the infantry in attaining their objective. To date there is nothing to indicate that a war can be won except by the defeat of the enemy's armed forces and the occupation of his home territory. All military and naval action therefore has this ultimate aim, the occupation of the enemy's country. It is the school's problem to make clear to you the intricate teamwork of all forces necessary to achieve the above aim
Report of NEID Team – AN/TRC-6, 19 August 1945 - Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Middle Pacific.
No full textPart I: team organization, history of first 30 days, and description of demonstration. Part II: NEID outline report. Part III: table of troubles. Part IV: map of Oahu showing circuit path, profiles, and site pictures
2605: Japan.
No full textIn all 2605 years of its history, Japan had never before been so humiliated. Negotiations for effectuating the surrender under the terms of the POTSDAM Ultimatum began on 10 August. Formal surrender of the Japanese Imperial Government, Imperial GHQ, and all Japanese and Japanese controlled armed forces wherever located was signed on the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay at 0908 I, 2 September, 1945. As in "2604", published by this office on 30 June 1945, this publication is divided into three parts. In part one the MIDPAC advance on Tokyo is chronicled, followed in part two by summaries of contemporary activity in Burma, China, SOWESPAC and Manchuria. In part three an effort is made to show the effect, as seen in MIDPAC, of the last 8 months of World War II on Japanese tactics, ground strength and dispositions, organization, casualties, fleet strength, organization and dispositions, merchant shipping, air strength, propaganda efforts, and allied psychological warfare and battlefield propaganda
Engineer history, Mediterranean Theater, Fifth Army, vol II.
No full textThis is the story of the Fifth Army Engineers. No campaign in military history has presented more engineering problems than the battle of Italy. No one contributed more to the successful conclusion of this campaign than the Fifth Army Engineers. The table of contents includes sections on the Arno through the winter static phase, the Po campaign, and lessons learned in the Italian campaign
Report on German civil defense under heavy air attack.
No full textThe object has been to study German experience of heavy air attacks and to derive any lessons likely to be of value to future British and American Passive Air Defense, Civil Defense, and Fire Defense policy
Activities report of Engineer Section, Advance Section Communications Zone, European Theatre of Operations, 7 February 1944 to 30 June 1945.
No full textThis is a report of activities of the Engineer Section, Advance Section Communications Zone in Europe from its date of activation, 7 February 1944 to the date of deactivation, 30 June 1945. The report is divided into thirteen sections: administration; intelligence and maps; command and control; troops and training; port reconstruction; bulk POL installations; railroads; roads and highway bridges; general construction and utilities; coal mining; miscellaneous operations; supply; and real estate and labor
Staff study of operations of the Japanese 102d Division on Leyte and Cebu.
No full textThis is a rather loosely-knit study, having more to do with the organization of the 35th Japanese Army and the 102d Division than with the operations of the Division. The interrogation of Major Kaneko reveals a wealth of detail on division organization and movement. Some valuable observations (from Japanese viewpoint) on guerrilla activity are made, the study as a whole lacks unity, but some of the detail is valuable. The presentation is as impersonal and objective as might be expected under the circumstances
Theater intelligence directive no. 2 (supersedes theater intelligence directive no. 1, 13 October 1942).
No full textThe mission of ETOUSA and the missions of it components are communicated in directives. The general situation is contained in intelligence summaries and reports distributed periodically. The document details intelligence, counterintelligence, censorship, reports, maps and funds, and 3 appendixes (a map of regional districts, regional security liaison officers, and a G-2/G-3 written report on enemy action against U.S. forces)
Staff study of Japanese operations on Luzon.
No full textThis study is composed of statements and transcriptions of interrogations of 4 Japanese Army officers. It covers in some detail, the occupation of the Philippines, outline plan of defense, and operations against the American Army. This study is of value to anyone making a study of this phase of World War II. Even though the material is based on statements and opinions of captured officers, the whole seems to be entirely forthright, objective and impersonal, with little or no bias or obvious misrepresentation of facts
C.B. 04050/43 (3): monthly anti-submarine report, March 1943.
No full textSections include information on the U-boat offensive, counter-measures, convoys, narratives, miscellaneous information, materiel and personnel, and return of U-boat casualties