Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) Digital Library
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Extracts from operational history, Second Armored Division, phase I, Operation "Cobra", 26 July - 31 July 1944.
No full textThe operation Cobra began on 25 July 1944. Saturation bombing of the area between Marigny and St. Gilles preceded the advance. The general plan for the VII Corps was to penetrate the enemy defenses between St. Gilles and Marigny and to seize and hold the line Coutances-Marigny in order to cut off enemy forces facing the VIII Corps whose sector extended west to the coast, to assist the VIII Corps in the destruction of these forces, and to block along the line Cerences, Tessy-Survire, St. Lo, any enemy reinforcements from the south or east from interfering with the operation. The keynote of a history of the 2nd Armored Division's role in this now historic breakthrough must necessarily be the terrible devastation caused to the enemy in both personnel and material by its rapid and unexpected advance
Armor in the attack of fortified positions. A research report prepared at The Armored School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1949-1950.
No full textThis committee herein presents two studies of the assault of fixed fortified defenses by the U.S. Armored Forces during World War II. Topics include the action of the Third Armored Division (events leading to the attack, breaching the line and logistics), action of the 735th Tank Battalion (Metz and Fort Driant, preparation for the assault, as assault of Fort Driant), and conclusions and recommendation. Appendices: First Army troop list; German order of battle; terrain analysis; 3d Armored Division troop list; Combat Command A troop list; Combat Command B troop list; reserve command troop list; terrain analysis area of Fort Driant; German order of battle (030730 October 1944); U.S. order of battle (030730 October 1944) XX Corps (051800 October 1944); battle losses 5th Infantry Division; and battle losses 735th Tank Battalion
Reports by observers on current operations in North Africa.
No full textThe first detailed report is titled "Lessons learned from recent amphibious operations in North Africa". The second in the document is "Report on the supply situation in the North African theater of operations as of March 15, 1943". The final report- "Corrective action based on recent amphibious operation in North Africa"
Luzon campaign, I Corps Artillery.
No full textOn 2 October 1944, the 289th Field Artillery Observation Battalion (less Sound and Flash Platoons) arrived in Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea and was attached to I Corps for the operation. This organization was to take over the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Sound Ranging Platoons which were then in the theater, inactivate these organizations, and form a normal Observation Battalion. Because one battery would operate with the XIV Corps for the operation, and because there was little time to train organic flash ranging platoons, it was decided to organize two batteries of two sound ranging platoons each. Each Corps would then have its normal two sound ranging arcs, and emergency flash ranging could be done by the sound platoons. The battalion was ordered to be prepared to furnish four sound platoons which would be self-supporting organizations complete with messing facilities. In addition the battalion was to be prepared to furnish survey and meteorological services
Pacific Area materiel.
No full textThis booklet was written and illustrated for use of ordnance officers. It presents data on performance and the principal characteristics of each item. This booklet aids in selection of weapons for individual missions which are especially adapted for use in the Pacific Area, and some particularly suitable for cave warfare. The various types of materiel included are divided into the following categories: self-propelled and amphibious materiel; artillery; rockets; ammunition; rifles, grenade launchers, bullets; body armor, and paracrates, parachests, paracaissons
Field order 34, Headquarters Sixth Army, 20 November, 1944 (M-1 operation).
No full textField order 34, Headquarters Sixth Army, 20 November, 1944 (M-1 operation)
Petroleum facilities of Sumatra.
No full textThe information included in this report presents all available significant aspects of the petroleum economy and facilities of the island of Sumatra and the adjacent small islands of Banka and Billiton. The facts and figures relate to the prewar industry. Information is included on geographical features, conditions in the fields and general conditions in Sumatra, which, although not pertaining directly to oil or petroleum facilities, is of interest to the study
90th Division gas officer reports.
No full textSubjects included in the document: use of gas in offensive operation; gas casualties; gas attack on battalion sector Oct. 2, 1918; gas shells used by artillery; gas training; extracts from reports of Lt. Col. Gilchrist relative to recent gas attacks on the British Front and sections of the American fronts; and enemy gas shelling, St. Mihiel sector
92nd Division gas officer reports.
No full textMustard gas bombardment and gas attacks on the front are highlighted in this document
World War records, 1st Division American Expeditionary Forces: summaries of intelligence.
No full textThe pages following comprise a complete file of the Summaries of Intelligence of the First Division. The gaps which exist cover the occupation of the Sommerviller Sector, the Aisne- Marne operation and the Mouzon-Sedan operation. During these periods, no summaries were published by the Division. During the occupation of the Sommerviller Sector, the Intelligence function was exercised by the 18th French Infantry Division, under whose command the First Division served. In its participation in the Aisne-Marne counter offensive, the Intelligence personnel, according to statements of General Staff officers then serving with the Division, were too completely engaged in the examination of prisoners and in assisting the G-3 section with the preparation of situation maps to render formal reports. Due to the rapidity of movement and inadequacy of communications during the Mouzon-Sedan operation, no formal reports were possible. Available information was furnished Corps Headquarters by wireless, telephone and messenger