Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) Digital Library
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8-5.4 AA17.
Map is part of the following document: Operational Monograph on the Leyte Mop-up Operation. This document can be viewed at : https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/5360/rec/
8-5.4 AA17.
Map is part of the following document: Operational Monograph on the Leyte Mop-up Operation. This document can be viewed at : https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/5360/rec/
8-5.4 AA17.
Map is part of the following document: Operational Monograph on the Leyte Mop-up Operation. This document can be viewed at : https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/5360/rec/
N12174, Sept - Oct 44.
This document contains G-3 reports for the time period of September - October 1944.
Reports 73 to 41 cover September 17, 1944 to October 19, 1944. Each report is followed by an overlay. Many of the overlays were washed out and have been photoshopped to extract the existing data. The overlay for report 41 is completely washed out and no data was retrieved. This collection is not complete and has gaps
Command.
Text of a lecture delivered by Brigadier General Edward, L. King, Commandant, The General Service Schools to the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, September 11, 1925
21 Army Group training letter #2.
Contents: weapon training; Royal Armoured Corps; tank gunnery; crew commanders courses; training of drivers in maneuvering into and out of landing craft; aircraft recognition; smoke; artillery cooperation with units of Royal Armoured Corps; anti-tank artillery; minefields in exercises; field documentation; bomb lines; street fighting; PIAT anti-tank ammunition; security of documents; message writing; future issues of 21 Army Group training letter; smoke in the attack; street fighting in Russia; and extracts from an order issued by General Headquarters Middle East
Lessons from the Tunisian Campaign.
The material in this publication represents a summary of the main lessons of the Tunisian Campaign digested from reports of division, separate, and subordinate unit commanders. Table of contents: introduction; infantry units; field artillery units; armored force units; tank destroyer units; mine warfare and booby traps; and defense against air attack
Combined weekly intelligence summary.
Part I- land: the progress of operations in Sicily; enemy dispositions; enemy intentions enemy losses; enemy morale; the movement of enemy supplies to Sicily; movement of Axis divisions in the Mediterranean Area (Italy, France, Austria); resume of Axis order of battle in Italy (German, Italian); the political situation in Italy; and biographical sketch of Marshal Badoglio. Part II- air: enemy air activity (fighters, reconnaissance, bombers); and Axis air dispositions as at August 7th (Sardinia, Italy south of 42, S. France and Italy north of 42). Part III- naval: movements of Italian naval units; attacks on enemy shipping; bombardments; and general
Report on Operation "Bingo", 6 November 1944.
By October 1944, maintaining a state of interdiction on the all-important Innsbruck-Verona Brenner Pass rail route had proved to be a difficult, nearly impossible, task. The absence of any great number of points vulnerable to air attack made it possible for German engineers to concentrate bridging materials near all target sites, and to repair even extensive damage in a very short time. In addition, rail diversions had been constructed, or were under construction, around most of the vulnerable points. Weather was on the side of the enemy, for during the fall and winter months there were few days when this area was not cloud obscured. It was anticipated that weeks would pass before attacks could be repeated, weeks during which the Germans would have ample time to effect complete repairs on the line, and to move great quantities of war materials south to replenish the stores of the Armies fighting south of the PO. Thus the effects of temporary interdiction would be nullified. It was believed that if a bombing program could be carried out that would permanently reduce the capacity of the Brenner line in conjunction with the program of establishing blocks, it would cause depletion of stock in dumps south of the Alps and greatly augment the administrative problems besetting the enemy. With this in view, a careful study of power stations on the Innsbruck-Verona line was made
Canned vegetables: a case history in central procurement at the Chicago Quartermaster Depot during World War II. CQMD historical studies.
The mighty task of procuring subsistence for the Army, one of the main functions of the Quartermaster Corps, has undergone radical changes in method since the national defense program was intensified in mid-1940. Not the least unusual of the changes has occurred in the purchasing of canned fruits and vegetables, classed as non-perishable subsistence. Contents include: canned vegetables, procurement before World War II; procurement during the emergency, 1940-1941- development of centralized buying; procurement for war- the set aside order provides the pattern; field buying in its trial period- 1942; and development of the field buying system- 1943. Tables detail estimated government requirements out of 1942 pack of fruits and vegetables and experience and background of procurement specialists in Canned Vegetables Section, Grocery Branch, Chicago Quartermaster Depot, as of 1942