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Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Signaling Games
No full textSignaling games are characterized by asymmetric information where the more informed player has a choice about what information to provide to its opponent. In this paper, decision trees are used to derive Nash equilibrium strategies for signaling games. We address the situation where neither player has any pure strategies at Nash equilibrium, i.e. a purely mixed strategy equilibrium. Additionally, we demonstrate that this approach can be used to determine whether certain strategies are part of a Nash equilibrium containing dominated strategies. Analyzing signaling games using a deci-sion-theoretic approach allows the analyst to avoid testing individual strategies for equilibrium conditions and ensures a perfect Bayesian solution
Detail from Cincinnatus Monument at VMI
No full textThe Cincinnatus Monument stands in front of Preston Library, honoring the service of the citizen-soldier. Each year, the Cincinnati Medal is awarding to the graduating cadet who "has demonstrated to the greatest degree excellence of character and efficient of service". Thise image shows the list of medal recipients through 201
VMI Cadet. February 1, 2013
No full textVolume 106, number 13Weekly during academic year, except during examinations and vacation
VMI Cadet. September 6, 2013
No full textVolume 107, number 1Weekly during academic year, except during examinations and vacation
New Cadets training on obstacle course, August 2013
No full textNew cadets, or Rats, face physical training challenges during the Rat Crucibl
VMI Cadet. November 22, 2013
No full textVolume 107, number 11Weekly during academic year, except during examinations and vacation
Institute Report. June 2013
No full textA publication of the VMI Office of Communications and Marketing containing news and events information. Volume XLI, Number
Community annotation and the evolution of cooperation: how patience matters
No full textWe investigate why biologists fail to contribute to biological databases although almost all of them use these databases for research. We find, using evolutionary game theory and computer simulations, that (a) the initial distribution
of contributors who are patient determines whether a culture of contribution will prevail or not (b) institutions (where institution means “a significant practice, relationship, or organization in a society or culture”) that incentivize patience and
therefore limit free riding make contribution more likely and, (c) a stable institution, whether it incentivizes patience or not, will increase contribution. As a result we suggest there is a trade-off between the benefits of changing institutions to incentivize patience and the costs of the change itself. Moreover, even if it is possible to create institutions that incentivize patience among scientists such institutions may nevertheless fail. We create a computer simulation of a population of biologists based on our theory. These simulations suggest that institutions should focus more on rewards rather than penalties to incentivize a culture of contribution. Our approach therefore provides a methodology for developing a practical blueprint for organizing scientists to encourage cooperation and maximizing scientific output
VMI Cadet. October 4, 2013
No full textVolume 107, number 5Weekly during academic year, except during examinations and vacation
VMI Cadet. November 1, 2013
No full textVolume 107, number 8Weekly during academic year, except during examinations and vacation