955 research outputs found
Racial Bias in Newspaper Ratings of Professional Football Players
No full textData in STATA format with accompanying STATA do-file. Replicates the analysis in: Principe, F. and J.C. van Ours (202x) Racial Bias in Newspaper Ratings of Professional Football Players, European Economic Review, forthcoming. </em
How sensitive are sports fans to unemployment?
No full textThe datsets in combination with the R-syntax file allow for the replication of the tables and graphs in the paperReade, J.J. and J.C. van Ours (202x) How Sensitive are Sports Fans to Unemployment? Applied Economics Letters.</div
Replication archive Peeters and van Ours (2021) De Economist
No full textThis record contains the replication archive for the paper "Seasonal Home Advantage in English Professional Football; 1974–2018" by Thomas Peeters and Jan van Ours, which appeared in De Economist in 2021. Please read the explanation file first
Replication Data for: J.C. van Ours and M. van Tuijl (2024) Incentives matter sometimes, Sports Economics Review
No full textSTATA-data and do-file to replicate: Jan C. van Ours, Martin van Tuijl (2024) Incentives matter sometimes: On the differences between league and Cup football matches, Sports Economics Review.
The article is open access:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.serev.2024.10003
Do-file and datasets of PlosOne publication "Common international trends in football stadium attendance"
No full textDatasets and do-file for the paper "Common international trends in football stadium attendance" in PlosOne, 2021. For description of the dataset, please see the Readme-file
Johan Cruyff superstar
No full textData and do-file are provided to replicate the analysis about Johan Cruyff and his contribution to success and stadium attendance at Feyenoord. The paper is published as a Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper and (in shorter version) in Applied Economics Letters. The excel-file provides a description of the data.DOI for Applied Economics Letters paper: https://https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2021.1967275 </div
Bias in expert product reviews
No full textThe STATA-dataset is used in the article "Bias in expert product reviews". There is also a STATA-do file. In combination this recreates all tables in the article. The files are self-explanatory.
Article abstract: Many expert reviews of products such as cars, books, movies and restaurants are non-blind. Whether such reviews can be taken at face value is questionable, but hard evidence on the presence of reviewer bias is rare. This holds particularly true for conflicts of interest that are thought to be common in non-blind product reviews but are not readily observable: ad hoc relationships between reviewers and producers. We present a textbook case of a long-running expert product review in the food service industry for which we know the reviewer’s conflict of interest: being affiliated to one particular producer. As is typical, only insiders were aware of the possible source of bias in the review. The review resembles other non-blind tests of product quality. We find evidence of a sizable bias in the reviewers’ ratings. Our findings suggest that reviewers’ ad hoc relationships with producers, often dismissed as ‘coming with the job’, can be very harmful.</p
The economics of imperfect labor markets
No full textThe novelty of our book is that from the start the focus is on labor market institutions operating in imperfect labor markets, that is, markets that depart from perfect competition. Unlike competitive markets, imperfect labor markets allow employers and employees to enjoy rents, and hence a job is a big deal. Losing a job for a worker or having to replace an employee leaving the firm is costly in such markets, while employees and employers involved in this type of events would not suffer any loss in competitive labor markets. Imperfect markets are also characterized by the presence of many labor market institutions, that is, systems of laws and programs that shape the behavior of individual workers and employers. Institutions result from a political process aimed at (1) increasing economic efficiency and (2) achieving some redistributive goal. Efficiency is achieved by remedying market imperfections, such as excessive monopsonistic power, informational asymmetries that give rise to moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and externalities associated with social customs or the job-matching process, as well as transaction costs and frictions that restrict the size of markets. Redistribution provides a rationale for these institutions even when there are no market imperfections. In imperfect markets redistribution sometimes can be achieved while pursuing efficiency, as in the case of institutions, such as minimum wages or employment subsidies, that counteract excessive monopsonistic power. In most cases, however, the traditional trade-off between efficiency and equity arises. Actually, the redistribution operated by these institutions may well not promote a more egalitarian society or represent the interests of the median voter. There are frequent policy failures in the design of labor market institutions that give disproportionate representation to some pressure group pursuing very specific interests. This book also takes into account that institutions rarely operate in isolation. Hence, from a positive standpoint, the effects of each institution on the labor market are investigated by considering not only its direct effects on employment, unemployment, and wages, but also its indirect effects, mediated by the presence of other institutions. For example, a change in the generosity of the unemployment benefit system affects unemployment directly by reducing search intensity and increasing the reservation wage of job seekers and indirectly by increasing the bargaining power of unions and the level of the efficiency wage. This, incidentally, provides a third rationale for the presence of some institutions: they are created to counteract or complement the effects of other institutions. Policy failures may arise also in this context because the institutions that are responsible for the distortions are rarely reformed. Often the political process creates chains of distortions and clusters of institutions whereby institutions are used to compensate for undesirable effects of other institutions
Replication archive Peeters and van Ours (2021) De Economist
No full textThis record contains the replication archive for the paper "Seasonal Home Advantage in English Professional Football; 1974–2018" by Thomas Peeters and Jan van Ours, which appeared in De Economist in 2021. Please read the explanation file first
The Impact of high temperatures on performance in work-related activities
Full text linkHigh temperatures can have a negative effect on work-related activities because workers may experience difficulties concentrating or have to reduce effort in order to cope with heat. We investigate how temperature affects performance of professional tennis players in outdoor singles matches in big tournaments. We find that performance significantly decreases with ambient temperature. This result is robust to including wind speed and air pollution in the analysis. There are no differences between men and women. However, there is some heterogeneity in the magnitude of the temperature effect in other dimensions. In particular, we find that the temperature effect is smaller when there is more at stake. Our findings also suggest that the negative temperature effect is smaller if the heat lasts, i.e. there is some adaptation to high temperatures
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