61 research outputs found
Reanimation and Copyright. Rob Scholte’s Work. Part II.
No full textA viable way to defend the rights of later picture makes to use and change the works of their predecessors is by reference to the artistic merit of the later works. Rob Scholte intentionally infringes on copyright law by making new works, and it is the artistic merit of his work that should give him that liberty
\u27In een groen groen groen groen knollen-knollenland ...\u27
No full textRecensie van: Rob van Gerwen, Kennis in schoonheid. Een inleiding in de moderne esthetica. Amsterdam, Boom 1992.Recensie van: Rob van Gerwen, Kennis in schoonheid. Een inleiding in de moderne esthetica. Amsterdam, Boom 1992
Fort Esthetica
No full textRecensie van: Rob van Gerwen, Art and experience. Publications of the Department of Philosophy. Dissertatie, Universiteit Utrecht, 1996, 221 pp.Recensie van: Rob van Gerwen, Art and experience. Publications of the Department of Philosophy. Dissertatie, Universiteit Utrecht, 1996, 221 pp
Copyright and Watch Duty. Rob Scholte's Work. Part I.
No full textImage right is maintained by comparing the outward appearance of pictures, not their meaning. But images are made to make people watch them. Logos are a clear example: people must watch these images, and must answer to their persuasive force. With the right to protect an image from copying, the copyright, comes, therefore a duty to watch. But a duty to watch goes against our freedom of perception. It is unclear how the law protects that freedom. Rob Scholte's works address such issues by making art of pre-existing images
Introduction
No full textIntroduction to the special issue, "The Birth of the Discipline", guest edited by Endre Szécsényi with Rob van Gerwen, of Aesthetic Investigations
The Spectator in the Picture
No full textThis paper considers whether pictures ever implicitly represent internal spectators of the scenes they depict, and what theoretical construal to offer of their doing so. Richard Wollheim's discussion (Painting as an Art, ch.3) is taken as the most sophisticated attempt to answer these questions. I argue that Wollheim does not provide convincing argument for his claim that some pictures implicitly represent an internal spectator with whom the viewer of the picture is to imaginatively identify. instead, I defend a view on which the external spectator simply imagines herself interacting, psychologically and otherwise, with the depicted scene. I explore some of the consequences of the two positions for pictorial aesthetics, arguing that the view I favour is at least as competent as Wollheim's at accommodating those phenomena we have any reason to think hold
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