1,721,564 research outputs found
Percorsi del positivismo giuridico. Hart, Kelsen, Ross, Scarpelli (Estratto da Il positivismo giuridico contemporaneo. Una antologia)
Full text linkLa presente raccolta costituisce un estratto del testo "Il positivismo giuridico contemporaneo. Una antologia" (a cura di Aldo Schiavello e Vito Velluzzi, Giappichelli, Torino, 2005). L’introduzione a questo estratto riproduce con alcune modifiche e integrazioni il capitolo introduttivo alla parte I dell’antologia edita nel 2005
Legal Issues in the COVID-19 Pandemic
No full textThe legal issues arising from the COVID-19 outbreak are mostly unexperienced, with several fields of law involved—from human rights to market regulation—all with consequences that need to be further scrutinized. In their chapters, Aldo Schiavello and Guido Smorto investigate two, complementary, legal questions connected with the current pandemic. In his contribution on “Rights, balancing and certainty,” Aldo Schiavello analyzes the legal measures taken by Italian public authorities to contrast the virus, by focusing on indeterminacy as one of the main characteristics of the law in contemporary constitutional States. According to the author, the ways in which the legislator, at different levels, faces the COVID-19 current pandemic offer an interesting perspective to analyze the positive and negative effects produced by the indeterminacy of contemporary law. In doing this, the chapter ponders on the challenges to the objectualist conceptions of law that reduce law to a system of norms or a set of facts, and on those conceptions that regard the law as an interpretative social practice. Legal systems’ constitutionalization, as the chapter argues, increases legal flexibility at the expense of legal certainty, and it imposes to legislators, judges and individuals the responsibility and the associated risks of individuating the law. In the second article of the section titled “The right to health and resource allocation. Who gets what and why in the COVID-19 pandemic,” Guido Smorto reflects on the right to health and resource allocation during the pandemic. As the COVID-19 outbreak has led to a worldwide, substantial increase in the demand for resources that are essential to deliver health care—pharmaceuticals, hospital beds, ventilators, medical supplies—the article scrutinizes the rationales for prioritization of these resources in times of severe shortage, such as during a global pandemic. When needs suddenly exceed demand worldwide, resources may quickly become scarce in relation to potential demand, so that strict rationing is the only viable response. Against this backdrop, the paper scrutinizes the rationales for prioritization of scarce resources, with a special focus on the COVID-19 vaccine, and it questions the actual role and reach of the market with regard to resources that are essential to deliver health care, especially in times of severe shortage, such as during a global pandemic
Sobre «Algunos argumentos a favor de una ciencia jurídica interpretativa», de Aldo Schiavello
No full textThis paper aims to make some critical remarks about Aldo Schiavello work published in this journal, which represents a defense of the interpretative model of legal science. It starts making a reconstruction of the arguments offered by Schiavello to then critically analyzing three of his thesis. The first concerns the relationship between the conception of science and the method of legal scholars. Then, the arguments offered by the author in favor of the practicality of legal science are analyzed. Finally, the scope of the thesis defending that legal science would be an interpretative discipline is analyzed. The text ends with a critique of the interpretative model of legal science, beyond the Schiavello thesis.El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo realizar algunos comentarios críticos a un trabajo de Aldo Schiavello publicado en esta misma Revista, que constituye una defensa del modelo interpretativo de ciencia jurídica. Se comienza realizando una reconstrucción de los argumentos que ofrece Schiavello para, a continuación, analizar críticamente tres de sus tesis. La primera de ellas se refiere a la relación entre la concepción de la ciencia y el método de los estudiosos del derecho. A continuación, se analizan los argumentos que ofrece el autor en favor de la practicidad de la ciencia jurídica. Por último, se analiza el alcance de la tesis según la cual la ciencia jurídica sería una disciplina interpretativa. El texto finaliza con una crítica al modelo interpretativo de ciencia jurídica, más allá de las tesis de Schiavello
Non c’è diritto senza fiducia. In difesa di una concezione fiduciaria dl diritto
No full textThe author critically discusses some main points of Tommaso Greco’s book La legge della fiducia. Greco distinguishes two models of law – the fiduciary model and the anti-fiduciary one – and supports the first model with good arguments. This review, while endorsing Greco’s conclusions, emphasizes some reason for perplexity and claims that the anti-fiduciary model of law helps to maintain a critical attitude towards the law
Vulnerability, concept of law and clinical-legal approach
Full text linkDoes a clinical legal approach tell us something interesting about the nature and the concept of law? Is it possible to re-think the relationship between law and morals starting from the legal clinics experience? Is the juxtaposition between doctors and jurists convincing? These are the main questions that will be addressed here. They are questions concerning legal epistemology and legal philosophy in the strict sense that seems not to be so interesting for clinical jurists. Indeed, clinical jurists above all emphasize the importance of legal clinics from the viewpoint of education and social justice, but neglect the contribution that a clinical legal method can offer with respect to the knowledge of law. Nevertheless, dealing with this latter question could be useful to strengthen contemporary legal clinical movement
L’educazione del giurista contemporaneo
Full text linkIl tema dell’educazione giuridica presuppone che si risponda alla domanda “che cos’è il diritto?”.
Come questa domanda ammette risposte diverse, a seconda dei tempi, dei luoghi e dell’ideologia
di chi risponde, allo stesso modo non esiste un modello unico, o un ideal tipo, di educazione
giuridica. Il giurista cambia, e deve cambiare, a seconda della pratica giuridica e della cultura
giuridica in cui si trova a operare. Una riflessione sull’educazione giuridica non può dunque
prescindere dal contesto.Legal education solicits the search for a preliminary answer to the question “what is the law?”.
As this latter question allows different answers depending on times, places and personal
ideology, in the same way there is no unique model or an ideal-type of legal education. Jurists
change – and they must change – depending on the legal practice and legal culture in which they
operate. As a consequence, legal education cannot ignore the context, it must adapt to it
Recensione di FRANCESCA PIAZZA, La parola e la spada. Violenza e linguaggio attraverso l’Iliade, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2019, pp. 232
No full textPiazza riflette sui rapporti tra violenza e linguaggio usando come ambito di indagine l’Iliade. La scelta – azzeccata – è supportata da tre ragioni. Innanzitutto l’Iliade è «[...] il racconto di una guerra che ha acquistato nei secoli [...] il sapore di una guerra archetipica e ha svolto il ruolo di fonte inesauribile del nostro immaginario, non solo poetico» (p. 41). Inoltre, la società narrata nei poemi omerici è caratterizzata dalla competitività e dalla ricerca della vittoria, da ottenersi sia attraverso la forza fisica sia attraverso la capacità argomentativa. Infine, quest’opera non è letteratura in senso moderno ma un “documento antropologico”: «[...] un testo nel quale sono depositate le conoscenze, i costumi, i valori – in una parola la cultura – di una certa comunità» (ibidem)
Norma de reconocimiento, convención y obligación. Aquello che Shapiro todavía puede aprender de los errores de Hart
Full text linkShapiro works out a version of legal positivism taking as
its starting point Hart’s practice theory of law. Some serious limits of
Hart’s practice theory of norms concern the conception of legal obligation
and normativity of law. In this paper I analyze the limits of Hart’s
conception of legal normativity and I appraise whether the planning
theory of law indicates the correct direction for overcoming them. To
anticipate the conclusion, my effort is to show that Shapiro replicates
Hart’s mistakes on this subject-matters. The paper is divided in three
main sections. First, I will present briefly a critical reconstruction of
Hart’s conception of normativity, reconstruction which is partially
different from that given by Shapiro in Legalida d. I will analyze either
the original conception of normativity sketched out by Hart in The
Concept of Law and the (partially) different conception which can be
drawn by the Postscript. Then, I will deepen the conceptions of legal
obligation and authority of law associated with the planning theory
of law. Few concluding remarks will be devoted to some Shapiro’s
assumptions on legal positivism.Shapiro elabora una versión del positivismo jurídico tomando
como punto de partida la teoría del derecho como práctica social
de Hart. Algunos de los límites de la teoría de Hart se refieren a su
concepción de la obligación jurídica y de la normatividad del Derecho.
En este escrito analizaré los límites de la concepción de Hart de
la normatividad del derecho y evaluaré si la teoría del derecho como
plan indica el camino correcto para evitar estos límites. Anticipando la
conclusión, intentaré demostrar cómo Shapiro reproduce los errores de
Hart sobre estas cuestiones. En los siguientes párrafos se presenta una
reconstrucción crítica de la concepción de la normatividad de Hart en
parte distinta a la propuesta por Shapiro en Legalidad. El último párrafo
se dedica a la realización de un análisis crítico de las concepciones de
la obligación jurídica y de la autoridad del derecho asociadas a la teoría
del derecho como plan
On «Some Arguments in favor of a Interpretative Legal Science» by Aldo Schiavello
Full text linkEl presente trabajo tiene como objetivo realizar algunos comentarios críticos a un trabajo de Aldo Schiavello publicado en esta misma Revista, que constituye una defensa del modelo interpretativo de ciencia jurídica. Se comienza realizando una reconstrucción de los argumentos que ofrece Schiavello para, a continuación, analizar críticamente tres de sus tesis. La primera de ellas se refiere a la relación entre la concepción de la ciencia y el método de los estudiosos del derecho. A continuación, se analizan los argumentos que ofrece el autor en favor de la practicidad de la ciencia jurídica. Por último, se analiza el alcance de la tesis según la cual la ciencia jurídica sería una disciplina interpretativa. El texto finaliza con una crítica al modelo interpretativo de ciencia jurídica, más allá de las tesis de Schiavello.This paper aims to make some critical remarks about Aldo Schiavello work published in this journal, which represents a defense of the interpretative model of legal science. It starts making a reconstruction of the arguments offered by Schiavello to then critically analyzing three of his thesis. The first concerns the relationship between the conception of science and the method of legal scholars. Then, the arguments offered by the author in favor of the practicality of legal science are analyzed. Finally, the scope of the thesis defending that legal science would be an interpretative discipline is analyzed. The text ends with a critique of the interpretative model of legal science, beyond the Schiavello thesis.Esta publicación forma parte del proyecto de investigación Fondecyt 11120311 del Programa Conicyt chileno sobre Realismo jurídico e indeterminación del derecho
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