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    "In principio erat Verbum". Philosophy and Theology in the Commentaries on the Gospel of John (II-XIV Centuries)

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    The fourth Gospel is one of the philosophically denser texts in the Bible. It gives the occasion to ancient and medieval thinkers to speculate philosophically about such themes as the nature of God and Christ, the connection between Logos and the second Person of the Trinity, the Son, the exact meaning and function of the Word in God and, by contrast or by analogy, in human beings, the significance of the theme of ‘light’ or ‘charity’, or even the most correct way of reading the Holy Scripture (literally or symbolically). The contributors to this book have been invited to choose some important exponents within the tradition of the Commentaries on the Gospel of John and to look at them from a philosophical perspective, bringing to light the philosophical topics that occur in the Prologue or in other places of the Gospel. Contributions extend from 3rd to 14th century and focus on several commentators, from Origen to Meister Eckhart, passing through Augustine, John Scotus Eriugena, the School of Laon, Rupert of Deutz, Stephan Langton, Hildegard of Bingen, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, William of Altona, Peter of John Olivi and Peter Auriol

    Guglielmo di Ockham, l'onnipotenza divina e l'intuizione del non-esistente

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    In this essay, we reconsider two themes particularly discussed by the interpreters of Ockham: that of divine omnipotence and the hypothesis of the intuitive cognition of non-existent things. The purpose is to show that the hypothetical case considered by Ockham was subjected to opposite interpretations. For theological reasons, Ockham attributes not only to God but also to human beings the possibility of having acts of intuitive cognition of things that do not exist; nonetheless, he holds that it is contradictory for God to give us the evident cognition of things that appear to be present when they are actually absent. Walter Chatton opposes this conclusion, arguing that no contradiction ensues from that hypothesis. Instead, he believes that it is impossible for God to give us the intuition of things that absolutely do not exist or are in no way present to us. Ockham’s arguments include some difficulties that Chatton acutely sees and discusses. In particular, Chatton calls into question Ockham’s missed distinction between the existence and the presence of the intuited thing

    A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics

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    In fourteen substantial essays this volume reconstructs the late medieval reception of this work, by focusing on the main medieval commentators and a common set of metaphysical topics

    Tommaso d'Aquino e le origini del linguaggio

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    L'articolo propone una ricostruzione sistematica della posizione di Tommaso d'Aquino sull'origine del linguaggio umano. In particolare, esso mostra la centralità che il linguaggio parlato e scritto, simbolico e convenzionale, ricopre per Tommaso, rispetto al linguaggio naturale, che si profila come un insieme di stati, processi e operazioni mentali che presiedono al corretto proferimento, apprendimento e funzionamento del linguaggio parlato e scritto

    Alexander of Alessandria's Commentary on the Metaphysics

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    The chapter presents Alexander of Alessandria's commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics and discusses the peculiarities of his commentary. Alexander, an Italian Franciscan theologian, writes his commentary at the very beginning of XIV century and is the first to reconcile Thomas Aquinas's and Averroes's interpretations of Aristotle's work

    Ockham and Chatton on the Origin of Logical Concepts

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    In the fourteenth century, many philosophers discuss the hypothesis of the existence of mental language. This kind of language is commonly described as expressing the logical structure of our conventional languages. While medieval logicians agree to a certain extent on the natural origin of the concepts that are the constitutive elements (subject and predicate) of mental language, they disagree on the origin of so-called ‘syncategorematic concepts’, that is, the concepts corresponding to the logical operators (e.g. copula, connectives, quantifiers, modalities, and so on). If, for example, William of Ockham seems uncertain about the natural or conventional origin of syncategorematic concepts, and his position seems to evolve across time, his confrère Walter Chatton convincingly defends their natural origin. Stating that our logical concepts are innate or instead that they result from the internalization of a conventional language paves the way to different treatments of mental language. In this paper, we shall compare Ockham’s and Chatton’s views of logical concepts
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