1,721,038 research outputs found
Living with lower productivity growth: Impact on exports
No full textThis paper investigates the impact of sustained lower productivity growth on exports, by looking at the role of the productivity distribution and allocative efficiency as drivers of export performance. It follows and goes beyond the work of Barba Navaretti et al. (2017), analysing the effects of productivity on exports depending on the dynamics of allocative efficiency. Low productivity growth is a well-documented stylised fact in Western countries - and possibly a reality likely to persist for some time. What could be the impact of persistent sluggish growth of productivity on exports? To shed light on this question, this paper examines the relationship between the productivity distribution of firms and sectoral export performance. The structure of firms within countries or even sectors matters tremendously for the nexus between productivity and exports at the macroeconomic level, as the theoretical and empirical literature documents. For instance, whether too few firms at the top (lack of innovation) or too many firms at the bottom (weak market selection) drives slow average productivity at the macro level has very different implications and therefore demands different policy responses
Unite, defend, grow : memos to the European Union leadership 2024-2029
No full textPublished online: 04 September 2024Every five years – after the European elections but before a new European Commission takes office – we take stock of the state of affairs of policies related to EU economic prosperity, reflect on the main challenges facing the EU and make recommendations on how the new EU leadership should address them. Except for the two opening memos – one to the Presidents of the European Commission, European Council and European Parliament, the other to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Commission Vice President – the memos are addressed to incoming commissioners responsible for specific policy areas. As Commission portfolios relevant to economic prosperity have grown in scope, so have our memos. This edition covers 18 individual policy areas in addition to the two flagship memos, up from 11 in 2009 and 2014, and 14 in 2019. By coincidence, each election to the European Parliament in the last 15 years – and hence each edition of our memos – was roughly aligned with a turning point in the EU economy. The 2009 memos were written after the global financial crisis had hit Europe with full force, but before the onset of the euro debt crisis (a risk that we clearly flagged). In 2014, the crisis had been overcome, but unemployment remained high, banking systems weak and Economic and Monetary Union governance reforms were a work in progress. Five years later, the EU had succeeded in significantly reducing unemployment and lowering the risk of renewed financial instability. But the challenge of invigorating medium-term growth remained and the EU was confronted with new challenges: mounting geopolitical tensions, the need to accelerate the green transition and the social consequence of digital transformation. Accordingly, our 2019 memos implored EU policymakers to be ‘braver, greener, fairer’.-- Foreword -- Memo to the Presidents of the European Commission, Council and Parliament -- Memo to the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy -- Memo to the commissioner responsible for defence -- Memo to the commissioner responsible for trade -- Memo to the commissioners responsible for international partnerships and reform of the multilateral development banks -- Memo to the commissioner responsible for enlargement -- Memo to the commissioner responsible for the internal market -- Memo to the commissioner responsible for financial services -- Memo to the commissioner responsible for competition -- Memo to the commissioner responsible for research and innovation -- Memo to the commissioner responsible for digital affairs -- Memo to the commissioner responsible for employment and social rights -- Memo to the commissioner responsible for health -- Memo to the commissioner responsible for migration -- Memo to the commissioner responsible for energy -- Memo to the commissioner responsible for climate policy -- Memo to the commissioner responsible for environment policy -- Memo to the commissioner responsible for economic and financial affairs -- Memo to the commissioner responsible for tax policy -- Memo to the commissioner responsible for the European Union budge
Impacto de la Política Monetaria sobre el Tipo de Cambio Bilateral: Chile y Estados Unidos
No full textEste artículo analiza la reacción del tipo de cambio entre pesos chilenos y dólares estadounidenses a las medidas de política monetaria que se adoptan en Chile y Estados Unidos. Se corre una regresión a la variación del tipo de cambio frente a un anuncio de política, sobre la variación de la tasa de interés de mercado como respuesta al mismo anuncio. Las acciones de política de Estados Unidos que suben en un punto porcentual la tasa del T-bill a tres meses ocasionan una depreciación del peso chileno de entre 1.5 y 2 puntos porcentuales. El tipo de cambio también reacciona a las medidas de política monetaria en Chile, pero la respuesta parece ser menor, y no se puede estimar con mucha precisión con la muestra disponible
Ist der Euro noch zu retten? : Vorschläge für eine neue europäische Wirtschaftspolitik
No full textJeromin Zettelmeye
The impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate: evidence from three small open economies
No full text
European financial infrastructure in the face of new challenges
No full textThis book critically analyses, reviews and debates the internal and external disruptions that may be putting Europe’s financial system under stress. Papers collected in this book focus on the topics of Extra-Territoriality and Financial Infrastructure, Collective Action Clauses and Sovereign Debt Restructuring, and the European Safe Asset. This book collects the contributions of the speakers at the conference ‘European Financial Infrastructure in the Face of New Challenges’, which was held at the EUI in Florence, Italy, on 25 April 2019.-- Keynote speech - Sovereign Fragility (Lee C. Buchheit)
-- Dinner Speech - European Financial Architecture and the European Safe Asset (Vítor Constâncio)
-- PART I - Extra-Territoriality and Financial Infrastructure
-- Financial Market Infrastructures: Supporting Global Markets While Respecting Financial Sanctions Restrictions (James H. Freis, Jr.)
-- Extraterritorial Application or Regulation in the Area of Financial Market Infrastructure: The Case for Cross-Border Cooperative Oversight (Klaus Löber)
-- Supranational Financial Supervision: A Pipe Dream, or an Idea Whose Time has Come? (Nicolas Véron)
-- PART II - Collective Action Clauses and Sovereign Debt Restructuring
-- The Road to Euro Area Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Aitor Erce)
-- Collective Action Clauses and Sovereign Debt Restructuring Frameworks: Why and When is Restructuring Appropriate (Giampaolo Galli)
-- CACs and Doorknobs (Anna Gelpern and Jeromin Zettelmeyer)
-- Using the Local Law Advantage in Today’s Eurozone (Yannis Manuelides)
-- PART III - Towards a European Safe Asset?
-- Completing the Economic and Monetary Union with a European Safe Asset (Gabriele Giudice),
-- Does the Euro Area Need a Safe Asset? Does the Euro Area Banking System Need a ‘European’ Safe Asset? (Daniel Gros)
-- Time Consistent Solutions to the Euro Area Doom Loop (Michala Marcussen and Lorenzo Bini Smaghi)
-- A Common Safe Asset for Eurozone Bank Stability (Marco Pagano
Haircuts: Estimating investor losses in sovereign debt restructurings, 1998-2005
No full textWe calculate investor losses ("haircuts") and recovery values in recent debt restructurings in Russia, Ukraine, Pakistan, Ecuador, Argentina, and Uruguay. Haircuts are computed as the percentage difference between the present values of old and new instruments, discounted at the yield prevailing immediately after the exchange. Recovery value means value received in terms of outstanding principal. We find average NPV haircuts ranging from 13% (Uruguay external exchange) to 73% (2005 Argentina exchange); recovery values range from 30% to about 75%. We also find within-exchange variations in haircuts and recovery values, depending on the bond tendered. With a few exceptions, domestic residents do not appear to have been treated systematically better (or worse) than foreign residents.
Making a Voluntary Greek Debt Exchange Work
Full text linkWithin the next couple of months, the Greek government, is supposed to persuade private creditors holding about EUR 200bn in its bonds to voluntarily exchange their existing bonds for new bonds that pay roughly 50 percent less. This may work with large creditors whose failure to participate in a debt exchange could trigger a Greek default, but may not persuade smaller creditors, who will be told that their claims will continue to be fully serviced if they do not participate in the exchange. This paper proposes an approach to dealing with this free rider problem that exploits the fact that with some probability, the proposed exchange might be followed by an involuntary restructuring some time in the future. The idea is to design the new bonds that creditors are offered in the exchange in a way that make them much harder to restructure than the current Greek government bonds. This is easy to do because the vast majority of outstanding Greek government bonds lack standard creditor protections. Hence, creditors would be offered a bond that performs much worse than their current bond if things go according to plan, but much better if things do not. They will accept this instrument if (1) the risk of a new Greek debt restructuring in the medium term is sufficiently high; and (2) there is an expectation that the next restructuring probably will not be voluntary
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