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    Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis

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    The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed

    Variations on the Author

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    “Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship

    Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis

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    We provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis

    Dispelling the Myths Behind First-author Citation Counts

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    We conducted a full-scale evaluative citation analysis study of scholars in the XML research field to explore just how different from each other author rankings resulting from different citation counting methods actually are, and to demonstrate the capability of emerging data and tools on the Web in supporting more realistic citation counting methods. Our results contest some common arguments for the continued use of first-author citation counts in the evaluation of scholars, such as high correlations between author rankings by first-author citation counts and other citation counting methods, and high costs of using more realistic citation counting methods that are not well-supported by the ISI databases. It is argued that increasingly available digital full text research papers make it possible for citation analysis studies to go beyond what the ISI databases have directly supported and to employ more sophisticated methods

    Author Index

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    koamabayili/VECTRON-author-checklist: VECTRON author checklist

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    We have done our best to complete the author checklist relating to the use of animals in the hut study. Note that the objective for the hut study was to evaluate the IRS treatment applications for residual efficacy against Anopheles mosquitoes, including the local An. coluzzii mosquito population. Cows were only used to attract mosquitoes into the huts and no tests were carried out directly on the cows. The author checklist is intended for use with studies where experiments are carried out on animals, which is why we have had such difficulty in completing this for the hut study, as many of the questions do not relate to how the cows were used

    The Violence of Bright Lines

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    The U.S. Supreme Court interprets the Eighth Amendment to prohibit members of certain groups from serving extreme punishments, such as the death penalty and life without parole. For example, the Court has long banned death sentences for people with intellectual disability and for those who were under eighteen years old at the time of their crime. More recently, in Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama, the Court extended this reasoning to sentences of life without parole for those under eighteen—prohibiting the sentence altogether for nonhomicide crimes and barring its mandatory imposition for homicides. Many scholars and advocates have applauded these decisions as necessary to constrain judges and juries from imposing such punishments on members of vulnerable, less culpable groups. They have argued that, for the members of these groups, traditional aims of punishment, such as deterrence and retribution, are less applicable. Although we agree with this underlying logic, we write to raise questions about the potential costs of these “categorical bars,” which draw bright lines to separate those who are constitutionally deserving of mercy and redemption from those who are not. We have found that, although the Court may have sought to make extreme punishment less arbitrary, such stark demarcation often contributes to arbitrariness by tying punishment more to birth date than to culpability. These bright lines favor blunt administrability at the cost of nuanced, individualized sentencing determinations. In drawing these conclusions, we rely not only on research but on lived experience. One of us, Terrell (“Rell”) Woolfolk, was sentenced to life without parole for a crime committed as a young man in his twenties. Following Graham and Miller, Rell was initially buoyed by the Court’s recognition that brain development impacted both crime and culpability. However, he grew disenchanted with the decision to draw a hard line at eighteen—an age not supported by the very same neuroscience that the Court’s opinion appeared to rest on. Rell saw firsthand how the Court’s jurisprudence resulted in arbitrary outcomes: relief bestowed on people who had committed intentional murder at age seventeen but denied from those only a few months older, whose killings were unintentional. The other of us, Kathryn Miller, experienced the Graham and Miller decisions from a more privileged position. As a criminal defense attorney, she attempted to seek relief for qualifying individuals. Although she interviewed potential clients at the same facility at which Rell was incarcerated, their paths never crossed because Rell’s age categorically barred him from consideration as a potential client. Through a critical inventory of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, scholarship, and experience, we argue for state solutions to this constitutional myopia. States should blur the lines associated with sentencing relief. Rather than focus on a person’s age, they should create individualized sentencing opportunities for anyone facing sentences of death by incarceration whose stories exhibit the characteristics underlying the reasoning of Graham and Miller. Individuals who can demonstrate that they possessed the immaturity, impulsivity, or vulnerability that the Court recognized reduces culpability, along with the changeability that demonstrates their redemption, should qualify for sentencing relief

    The Violence of Bright Lines

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    The U.S. Supreme Court interprets the Eighth Amendment to prohibit members of certain groups from serving extreme punishments, such as the death penalty and life without parole. For example, the Court has long banned death sentences for people with intellectual disability and for those who were under eighteen years old at the time of their crime. More recently, in Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama, the Court extended this reasoning to sentences of life without parole for those under eighteen—prohibiting the sentence altogether for nonhomicide crimes and barring its mandatory imposition for homicides. Many scholars and advocates have applauded these decisions as necessary to constrain judges and juries from imposing such punishments on members of vulnerable, less culpable groups. They have argued that, for the members of these groups, traditional aims of punishment, such as deterrence and retribution, are less applicable. Although we agree with this underlying logic, we write to raise questions about the potential costs of these “categorical bars,” which draw bright lines to separate those who are constitutionally deserving of mercy and redemption from those who are not. We have found that, although the Court may have sought to make extreme punishment less arbitrary, such stark demarcation often contributes to arbitrariness by tying punishment more to birth date than to culpability. These bright lines favor blunt administrability at the cost of nuanced, individualized sentencing determinations. In drawing these conclusions, we rely not only on research but on lived experience. One of us, Terrell (“Rell”) Woolfolk, was sentenced to life without parole for a crime committed as a young man in his twenties. Following Graham and Miller, Rell was initially buoyed by the Court’s recognition that brain development impacted both crime and culpability. However, he grew disenchanted with the decision to draw a hard line at eighteen—an age not supported by the very same neuroscience that the Court’s opinion appeared to rest on. Rell saw firsthand how the Court’s jurisprudence resulted in arbitrary outcomes: relief bestowed on people who had committed intentional murder at age seventeen but denied from those only a few months older, whose killings were unintentional. The other of us, Kathryn Miller, experienced the Graham and Miller decisions from a more privileged position. As a criminal defense attorney, she attempted to seek relief for qualifying individuals. Although she interviewed potential clients at the same facility at which Rell was incarcerated, their paths never crossed because Rell’s age categorically barred him from consideration as a potential client. Through a critical inventory of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, scholarship, and experience, we argue for state solutions to this constitutional myopia. States should blur the lines associated with sentencing relief. Rather than focus on a person’s age, they should create individualized sentencing opportunities for anyone facing sentences of death by incarceration whose stories exhibit the characteristics underlying the reasoning of Graham and Miller. Individuals who can demonstrate that they possessed the immaturity, impulsivity, or vulnerability that the Court recognized reduces culpability, along with the changeability that demonstrates their redemption, should qualify for sentencing relief
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