1,721,064 research outputs found
Domestic Pressure and International Climate Cooperation
Full text linkIn the wake of 25 UN Climate Change Conferences of the Parties (and counting), international cooperation on mitigating greenhouse gas emissions to avoid substantial and potentially irreversible climate change remains an important challenge. The limited impact that the Kyoto Protocol and its successor, the Paris Agreement, have had on curbing emissions demonstrate both the difficulties in negotiating ambitious environmental agreements and the reluctance of countries to comply with their agreed emission targets once they have joined the treaty. Therefore, a better understanding of the obstacles and opportunities that the interactions between domestic and international policy pose for the design of successful international climate cooperation is of utmost importance. To shed light on the roots of the stalemate (and suggest possible ways out), this article reviews, and draws lessons from, a growing theoretical, experimental and empirical literature that accounts for the hierarchical interplay between domestic political pressure and international climate policy
Das Märchen von den Kosten des Klimaschutzes schadet der Schweiz
No full textTechnologien, auch im Klimabereich, entwickeln sich oft exponentiell. In der Folge überschätzen wir die Kosten genauso massiv wie wir das Tempo der Implementierung unterschätzen. Da die Welt so oder so klimaneutral werden muss, führt kein Weg an einer raschen Dekarbonisierung vorbei, um den Wohlstand in der Schweiz zu sichern
Gute Klimapolitik lässt die Wirtschaft wachsen
No full textLange kam die internationale Klimapolitik nicht vom Fleck. Doch seit einigen Jahren verordnen sich immer mehr Länder ein Netto-null-Ziel. Der Grund: Der Klimaschutzsektor ist der Wachstumsmarkt der Zukunft
Professor für Mikroökonomie Ralph Winkler: „Unternehmen haben den Anreiz in erneuerbare Energien zu investieren, weil eine Nachfrage besteht“
No full textOn the Relationship between Adaptation and Mitigation
No full textMany poor countries are ill-adapted to the current leave alone a changing future climate, because they lack the necessary financial means to invest in efficient and cost-effective safeguarding measures. International endeavours to fund institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund, to provide financial assistance in this respect have not been as successful has hoped for. In this paper, I set up a simple two-player two-stage model, in which a rich country (North) can invest into adaptation measures in a poor country (South). I show that a necessary condition for North to invest into adaptation investments in South is that this results in decreasing equilibrium emissions of South. I find that this can only happen if the funded adaptation measures also have a flavor of mitigation, i.e., apart from safeguarding South from climate damages they have to reduce South’s marginal abatement costs. My results have important policy implications for the selection of adaptation and mitigation projects by international adaptation funding organizations, such as the Green Climate Fund
Now or Never. Environmental Protection under Hyperbolic Discounting
Full text linkThe author analyzes the optimal investment in environmental protection in a model of an infinite series of non-overlapping hyperbolically discounting agents. He shows that without a commitment mechanism society is eventually stuck in a situation where all agents prefer further investment in the long run, yet neither present nor future agents will actually ever invest. Such an outcome is not only unsatisfactory for each generation but may also be inefficient in a Pareto sense. The author's results are consistent with real world observations, and thus provide a new explanation for weak environmental policy performance
Strategic behavior in IEAs: When and why countries joined the Kyoto Protocol
Full text linkWe empirically analyze the formation of international environmental agreements within a political economy framework. We develop a theoretical model of state dependent net benefits of ratification predicting (i) strategic behavior with respect to the timing of ratification and (ii) that ratification per se is not necessarily a stronger signal of support compared to signature. Analyzing the signature and ratification process via generalized binary and ordered response models, we find significant evidence for our theoretical predictions. In addition, we show that a wide selection of determinants including economic and political factors influences the decision whether to sign and when to ratify
Political influence on non-cooperative international climate policy
Full text linkWe analyze non-cooperative international climate policy in a setting of political competition by national interest groups. In the first stage, countries decide whether to set up an international emission permits market, which only forms if it is supported by all countries. In the second stage, countries non-cooperatively decide on the number of tradable or non-tradable emission allowances, depending on the type of regime. In both stages, special interest groups try to sway the government in their favor. We find that (i) both the choice of regime and the level of aggregate emissions only depend on the aggregate levels of organized stakes in all countries and not on their distribution among individual interest groups, and (ii) an increase in lobbying influence by a particular lobby group may backfire by inducing a change towards the less preferred regime
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