1,721,515 research outputs found
La théorie des contrats dans un contexte expérimental : un survol des expériences sur les relations « principal-agent »
No full text[fre] Les expériences qui ont testé les prédictions du modèle principal-agent, ont révélé que la plupart des contrats offerts ne respectaient pas la contrainte d'incitation, à la fois dans les situations où l'interaction entre un principal et un agent est répétée pendant plusieurs périodes et dans les situations où l'interaction est limitée à une seule période. Dans ce dernier cas les contrats proposés sont souvent favorables à l'agent, en réduisant ses chances de réaliser des pertes et en induisant un partage plus équitable du surplus du contrat que ce que prédit la théorie. Dans les cas où les interactions sont répétées, la probabilité d'acceptation du contrat par l'agent est croissante avec le niveau des rémunérations offertes par le principal, et lorsque le contrat est accepté l'agent fournit souvent un niveau d'effort plus élevé que celui qui est prédit par les contraintes d'incitation. Nous suggérons plusieurs alternatives pour prendre en compte ces observations d'un point de vue théorique. [eng] Most experiments designed to test the predictions of the principal-agent model have shown that the observed contract offers usually don't satisfy incentive compatibility, both when interactions between the principal and the agent are repeated and when the interaction is one-shot. In one-shot interaction experiments, most contracts avoid that the agent suffers losses. They also give the agent a larger share of the surplus of the contract than predicted by contract theory. When interactions are repeated, the probability that the contract will be accepted by the agent is increasing with the level of the payments offered by the principal. If the contract is accepted, the effort level chosen is often larger than the one predicted by incentive compatibility. Several theoretical possibilities to explain these results are suggested.
Principals’ principles when agents’ actions are hidden
No full textWe examine the behavior of subjects in a simple principal–agent game with hidden action. While subjects in the role of agents tend to choose the actions which maximize their expected profits, subjects in the role of principals offer contracts which differ from the theoretical predictions. We identify three principles of contract design: (1) the agent’s remuneration for the better outcome is at least as high as the remuneration for the worse outcome. (2) The agent must not risk making a loss. (3) The net profit of the agent should not be higher than the net profit of the principal
Experimental investigation based on the investment game
No full textWe compare the results of a one-shot investment game, studied earlier by Berg et al. [Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995) 122], for France and Germany. In this game, player A is the trustor and player B the trustee. The average level of investment is significantly larger in Germany, but the level of reciprocity is not significantly different between the two countries. This implies that German B-players earned significantly more than French B-players. Furthermore, in both countries B-players earned significantly more than A-players. Our results support Fukuyama’s conjecture that the level of trust is higher in Germany than in France, a situation which can explain a higher rate of investment and a higher level of performance. However, our results also show that the increased revenue which is attributable to the higher level of trust, is not shared in a more equitable way, but essentially increases B-players’ payoffs. Finally, based on an intercultural trust experiment, we show that French A subjects did not find German B subjects less trustworthy and German A subjects did not find French B subjects less trustworthy
Experiments on moral hazard and incentives: reciprocity and surplus-sharing
No full textIn the standard principal–agent model with moral hazard (Holmström 1979; Grossman and Hart 1987) the principal, who cannot observe the agent's effort, generally has an interest in proposing a contract with a variable remuneration that is a function of the realized profit. The model is based on the assumption of a stochastic relationship between the realized profit and the agent's effort; this relationship is common knowledge. As the agent's effort is unobservable to the principal, the contract has to provide an incentive for the agent to choose the effort level that is desired by the principal. In other words, the contract has to satisfy an incentive constraint. It also has to provide the agent with an expected utility that is as least as high as his utility without the contract. This is called the participation constraint. If the principal offered a contract with a fixed remuneration that is independent of the realized profit, the agent would provide the effort level that is least costly to him, which is in general the lowest possible effort. If the principal wants to induce a higher and more costly effort level by the agent, the contract has to be designed such that the agent maximizes his expected utility by choosing this effort level. Contract theory predicts that the principal keeps the entire expected surplus of the contract for himself and makes the agent just indifferent between rejecting and accepting the contract with the provision of the induced effort level. This solution is based on the assumption that the stochastic relationship between the principal's profit and the agent's effort is common knowledge
Expérimentations sur les choix séquentiels : application à " l'effet irréversibilité".
No full textThe Irreversibility Effect (IE) predicts that an expected utility maximizer who expects to obtain additional information before his future choices, will choose a "more flexible" (or "less irreversible") position in the current period. Results of an experimental investigation of the IE are presented. The aim of this study was to provide empirical evidence about the IE without making specific assumptions about the agents' behavior. Our results support the theoretical predictions and suggest that the IE is compatible with non-expected utility maximizing behavior.L'effet irréversibilité prédit qu'un agent qui se comporte selon l'hypothèse de maximisation de l'utilité espérée, et qui anticipe un supplément d'information préalablement à ses choix futurs, adoptera une position « plus flexible » (ou « moins irréversible ») à la période présente. Dans cet article nous présenterons les résultats d'une étude expérimentale dont l'objectif est de mettre en évidence l'effet irréversibilité sur un plan empirique, sans préjuger du type de comportement adopté par les agents. Les résultats obtenus sont conformes aux prédictions théoriques, et suggèrent que l'effet-irréversibilité est compatible avec des comportements qui ne respectent pas nécessairement l'hypothèse de maximisation de l'utilité espérée.Rauchs Alexandra, Willinger Marc. Expérimentations sur les choix séquentiels : application à " l'effet irréversibilité". In: Revue économique, volume 47, n°1, 1996. pp. 51-71
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Full text link“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
Full text linkWe provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
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