115 research outputs found
Industrial Upgrade, Employment Shock and Land Centralization in China
No full textThis paper investigates the relationships among industrial upgrading, mid-aged peasants’ non-farm employment, and land conversion systems. We prove that China’s efforts to upgrade its industries generate a negative employment shock on mid-aged peasant workers, forcing some of them to return to their home villages. The current lump-sum land acquisition system, however, will neither help peasant workers deal with the adverse employment shock nor promote land centralization for industrial and urban uses. On contrary, land cooperation, an emerging land centralization system, will help peasant workers mitigate the adverse employment shock and centralize rural land for nonagricultural purposes.Peasant workers; Industrial upgrade; Employment; Land centralization
Industrial Upgrade, Adverse Employment Shock and Land Centralization
No full textTraditional Development Economics defines economic development in the view of transferring rural surplus labor force. It implies the industrialization is in a static state at a certain level while it is in a process of continuous industrial upgrade in reality. Under the circumstances, we analyze phenomenon followed by the upgrading of industrial structure such as return migration and mid-aged rural labors’ difficulty in job-hunting and demonstrated the influence of land centralization based on the practice of industrial upgrade and rural change in Suzhou. Finally it come to the conclusion that because of the extensive competition on simple-labor market, the industrial upgrade will make a adverse employment shock upon mid-aged rural labor which will lead to the more uncertainty of peasants to get jobs in the industrial section . If government takes an improper policy of land centralization, peasants will lose guarantee in the future and resist the land centralization. After the comparison between one-off compensation and land cooperation, a further demonstration show that the method of one-off compensation will depress peasants’ enthusiasm in land centralization while the form of land cooperation can guarantee and promote peasants’ welfare under the given institution of land ownership. As a result, land cooperation allows the smooth operation of land centralization and supports the industrial upgrade to some extent.Over-confidence，Regional Government Competition，Redundant Construction，Yangzte River Delta
Three essays on advertising, search and economic policy
No full textThis dissertation uses search theory framework to study advertising, pricing and related pol-icy issues. It consists of three relatively independent essays across fields such as industrial organization, labor economics and monetary economics. In the first essay (Chapter 2), I study the interaction between information disclosure and information acquisition and the welfare implication of transparency policies. As the equilibrium market outcome, partial information disclosure is adopted when search cost is low and the equilibrium price is non-monotonic in search cost. Transparency policies may reduce consumer surplus due to resulted high price. In the second essay (Chapter 3), a directed search model is extended to incorporate imperfect observability and costly advertising. The equilibrium advertising and pricing patterns when sellers are capacity constrained are derived. The result on matching probability and expected payoffs also partly proves the robustness of canonical directed search models. The last essay (Chapter 4) explores the optimal fiscal and monetary policies in a money search model where search frictions present in both product market and labor market. I show that the first-best allocation might be achieved in both product market and labor market if a generalized Hosios’ rule is met
Informative Advertising, Consumer Search and Transparency Policy
No full textInformation about a new or non-frequently purchased product is often produced by both sides of the market. We construct a monopoly pricing model consisting of both seller's information disclosure and consumer's information acquisition. The presence of consumer search, which lowers the probability of making sales, creates incentive for the monopolist to deter search. In contrast with most previous literature, we show that, partial information disclosure arises in equilibrium when the search cost is low. As the search cost increases to medium level, the monopolist hides information but lowers the price to prevent consumers from searching. When the search cost is very high, the monopolist charges high price and hides all information. The equilibrium price is thus non-monotonic in search cost. Information disclosure and consumer search co-exist only when the search cost is low, and thus complement each other. We show that transparency policies on advertising cannot improve social welfare. Nevertheless, they benefit consumers in a wide range of values of the search costs by improving matching quality and reducing the expense of searching. But for some medium levels of search costs, transparency policies hurt consumers due to the induced high price in equilibrium
Platform Investment and price parity clauses*
No full textPlatforms use price parity clauses to prevent sellers setting lower prices when selling through other channels. They claim these restraints are needed so platforms have incentives to invest in providing search services—without them, consumers would search on the platform but then switch to buy in a cheaper channel. In a model incorporating these effects, we find that wide price parity clauses lead to excessive platform investment while narrow (or no) price parity clauses lead to insufficient platform investment. Taking these investment effects into account, wide price parity clauses lower consumer surplus but have ambiguous effects on total welfare.</p
A Rationale for Non-Monotonic Group-Size Effect in Repeated Provision of Public Goods
No full textThis paper analyzes the impact of a group-size change on contributing incentives
in repeated provision of pure public goods. We develop a model in which the group members interact repeatedly and might be temporarily constrained to contribute to the public goods production. We show that an increase in the
group size generates two opposite effects - the standard free-riding effect and
the novel large-scale effect, which enhances cooperative incentives. Our results
indicate that the former effect dominates in relatively large groups whilethe latter in relatively small groups. We provide therefore a rationale for nonmonotonic group-size effect which is consistent with the previous empirical
and experimental findings
Inflation Uncertainty and Monetary Policy in China
No full textThis paper uses a stochastic volatility model, structural break tests with unknown point, and a counterfactual simulation method to discuss the significant decline in inflation uncertainty in China over 1978-2009. We attempt to quantify the contributions of better monetary policy and smaller structural shocks (including demand, supply and policy impacts) on the reduced inflation uncertainty. Empirical results in the present paper suggest that improved monetary policy accounts for only a small fraction of the reduction in inflation uncertainty from the pre-1997 period to the post-1997 period in China. The bulk of the significant moderation in inflation uncertainty arises from smaller shocks. This finding indicates that the quiescence of inflation in China over the past decade could well be followed by a return to a more turbulent inflation era. Therefore, the use of preemptive monetary policy to anchor inflationary expectations and keep moderate inflation uncertainty is warranted. Copyright (c) 2010 The Author Journal compilation (c) 2010 Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
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