1,721,055 research outputs found
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Full text link“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
Full text linkWe provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
The articulation between the logical and the ‘mystical’ aspects of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus : form and origins of the distinction between saying and showing
No full textLa présente thèse de doctorat propose une interprétation du Tractatus logico-philosophicus qui prend pour fil directeur l'analyse de la distinction opérée par Ludwig Wittgenstein entre « ce qui peut être dit » et « ce qui se montre ». Il s'agit, à partir d'une étude de la relation entre les développements logiques du Traité et son aspect « mystique » (c'est-à-dire ses considérations concernant la notion de valeur absolue), de poser le problème de son unité structurelle. L'unité du premier ouvrage de Wittgenstein s'avère étroitement liée à la distinction entre dire et montrer en laquelle résident selon l'auteur l'« argument principal » de son livre et le « problème cardinal de la philosophie ». Afin d'expliquer l'unité du Tractatus, ce travail de recherche s'efforce d'élucider la nature de la distinction dire/montrer, d'abord par une analyse de ses applications dans les remarques dont le Traité est composé, puis par une enquête sur ses origines dans les œuvres de Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Arthur Schopenhauer, Otto Weininger, William James et Léon Tolstoï. Selon la lecture du texte ici présentée, tous les emplois de cette distinction participent d'une forme commune qui est liée à la notion de réflexivité (ou d'autoréférence).This PhD thesis deals with Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophicus and intends to construct an interpretation of the book by using the distinction between ‘what can be said' and ‘what shows itself' as a central thread. Starting from a study of the relationship between the logical developments of the treatise and its ‘mystical' aspect (i.e. its remarks on the idea of an absolute value), the thesis raises the problem of the structural unity of Wittgenstein's early work. It appears that this unity is intimately related to the distinction between saying and showing, which is, according to Wittgenstein, the ‘main point' of his book and ‘the cardinal problem of philosophy'. To explain the unity of the Tractatus, the present work tries to elucidate the nature of the say/show distinction—first, through an analysis of its use in the book, and second, through an investigation into its origins in the works of Frege, Russell, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Weininger, James, and Tolstoy. According to the reading presented here, all the uses of this distinction pertain to a common form, which is linked to the concept of reflexiveness (or self-reference)
Dispelling the Myths Behind First-author Citation Counts
Full text linkWe conducted a full-scale evaluative citation analysis study of scholars in the XML research field to explore just how different from each other author rankings resulting from different citation counting methods actually are, and to demonstrate the capability of emerging data and tools on the Web in supporting more realistic citation counting methods. Our results contest some common arguments for the continued
use of first-author citation counts in the evaluation of scholars, such as high correlations between author rankings by first-author citation counts and other citation
counting methods, and high costs of using more realistic citation counting methods that are not well-supported by the ISI databases. It is argued that increasingly available digital full text research papers make it possible for citation analysis studies to go beyond what the ISI databases have directly supported and to employ more
sophisticated methods
koamabayili/VECTRON-author-checklist: VECTRON author checklist
No full textWe have done our best to complete the author checklist relating to the use of animals in the hut study. Note that the objective for the hut study was to evaluate the IRS treatment applications for residual efficacy against Anopheles mosquitoes, including the local An. coluzzii mosquito population. Cows were only used to attract mosquitoes into the huts and no tests were carried out directly on the cows. The author checklist is intended for use with studies where experiments are carried out on animals, which is why we have had such difficulty in completing this for the hut study, as many of the questions do not relate to how the cows were used
L'explication ordinaire des actions humaines : recherches sur l'intention pratique et la grammaire des concepts psychologiques
No full textCe travail a pour objectif d'éclaircir, par la voie d'une enquête sur le langage de l'action intentionnelle et la grammaire des concepts psychologiques, la nature de notre capacité ordinaire à assigner un sens aux actions humaines et les conditions de son exercice. À l'heure actuelle, les débats sont dominés par une conception causaliste de l'action et de son explication qui innerve des problèmes tels que celui de la causalité mentale, de la réalité des états mentaux ou du statut de la « psychologie populaire ». Le causalisme pose que la différence entre une action et un simple mouvement corporel tient au fait que la première est causée par certains antécédents mentaux, distincts du mouvement, qui rendent compte de son caractère intentionnel. Expliquer une action consisterait dès lors à donner des raisons référant à ces états. Renouant avec l'approche logico-grammaticale issue de Wittgenstein et développée par Anscombe, nous entendons montrer que cette conception est erronée. Son principal défaut est de succomber à une image mentaliste selon laquelle les prédicats psychologiques utilisés dans les explications ordinaires ont toujours pour fonction de dénoter des états, des processus ou des événements internes à l'agent, distincts de l'action et pouvant entrer dans des chaînes causales. Contre cela, nous voulons établir que la différence entre action et mouvement corporel est une différence entre deux modes de description. Le mode intentionnel dans lequel se disent les actions se caractérise de façon essentielle par l'asymétrie de la première et de la troisième personnes. Expliquer une action consiste à en donner une description qui l'identifie dans sa dimension téléologique. Notre démarche est la suivante. Le premier mouvement de notre étude est consacré à la clarification des liens conceptuels entre intention et action. Après avoir rappelé les origines modernes de la conception causaliste, nous critiquons les arguments proposés par Davidson en sa faveur. Récusant leur mentalisme sous-jacent, nous montrons que le caractère intentionnel d'une action ne dépend pas de la présence d'un « ingrédient » mental. Puis nous rendons compte de la force explicative des descriptions intentionnelles en les mettant en rapport avec la spécificité du raisonnement pratique et de la connaissance d'agent. Dans un second mouvement, nous revenons sur la nature de la capacité à formuler des jugements psychologiques au sujet d'autrui. Nous examinons successivement la thèse selon laquelle les agents possèdent une théorie de l'esprit et celle selon laquelle ils recourent à un principe de charité interprétative. Contre ces approches intellectualistes, nous soutenons que l'usage sensé des termes psychologiques est un savoir-faire qui doit être mis en relation avec l'expressivité naturelle du corps humain, la dimension intrinsèquement sociale et institutionnelle de la vie humaine et l'existence de formes d'action et d'expression partagées faisant autorité. Reconnaître les conditions actionnelles de l'intelligibilité d'autrui exige de se défaire de l'illusion moderne d'un « sujet désengagé ».My objective is to elucidate, by means of a grammatical inquiry into the language of intentional action and the use of psychological concepts, the nature of our ordinary capacity to make sense of human actions, as well as the conditions of its exercise. In contemporary debates prevails a causalist view of action and its explanation, which underlies the discussions about mental causation, the reality of mental states or the epistemic status of so-called folk psychology. Causalism holds that an action differs from a mere bodily movement by its being caused by some mental antecedents, distinct from movement, which account for its intentional character. Explaining an action would thus consist in giving reasons ultimately referring to those states. In line with the wittgensteinian logico-grammatical approach developed by Anscombe, I intend to show that this view is misconceived. Its main defect lies in its mentalism, i.e. the tendency to see psychological predicates as always functioning to denote internal episodes or events, distinct from action and liable to figure in causal chains as links bringing about the agent's behaviour. Against this, I want to establish that the distinction between action and mere movement is to be seen as a difference between two modes of description. The intentional mode in which are couched action descriptions is essentially characterized by the first/third-person asymmetry. Explaining an action consists in identifying it by a description exhibiting its teleological features. My plan is the following. The first main move is to clarify the conceptual relations between intention and action. Having brought to light the modern roots of causalism, I consider the arguments Davidson put forward in its favour, so as to refute their underlying mentalism. I show that for an action, being intentional does not depend on any occurrence of a separate mental component. Then I proceed to account for the explanatory force of intentional descriptions by relating them to the specificity of practical reasoning and agent knowledge. The second main move tackles the question to know what the capacity of making sense of others consists in. I successively consider the idea that agents possess a theory of mind and the thesis as to which they must rely on a principle of interpretative charity. Against those intellectualist views, I claim that sensible use of psychological concepts is a practical skill which is to be related to the sensibility to the natural expressivity of human body, the intrinsically social and institutional features of human life and the existence of shared standards of expression and action. Acknowledging the action-based conditions of others' intelligibility requires to dispose of the modern illusion of a « disengaged subject »
Author-wise bibliometric analysis based on entropy.
No full textAuthor-wise bibliometric analysis based on entropy.</p
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