97 research outputs found
Replication Data for: Measuring Discretion and Delegation in Legislative Texts: Methods and Application to U.S. States
No full textThis repository contains the materials needed to replicate the results presented in Vannoni, Ash, and Morelli (2020), "Measuring Discretion and Delegation in Legislative
Texts: Methods and Application to U.S. States", forthcoming in Political Analysis
Replication Data for: Morelli Osnabrugge Vannoni 2018 Legislative Activity and Private Benefits: A Natural Experiment in New Zealand
No full textManuscript conditionally accepted. This is the full set of replication files (data set, do or program files etc.)
appendix-supplementary – Supplemental material for Where Are the Revolving Doors in Brussels? Sector Switching and Career Progression in EU Business–Government Affairs
No full textSupplemental material, appendix-supplementary for Where Are the Revolving Doors in Brussels? Sector Switching and Career Progression in EU Business–Government Affairs by David Coen and Matia Vannoni in The American Review of Public Administration</p
Replication Data for: Using Sequence Analysis to Understand Career Progression: an Application to the UK House of Commons
No full textReplication package containing the dataset, the scripts and the logs (along with a word document with the instructions for the replication)
Replication Data for: Using Sequence Analysis to Understand Career Progression: an Application to the UK House of Commons
No full textReplication package containing the dataset, the scripts and the logs (along with a word document with the instructions for the replication)
Business and government: an inter-disciplinary and multi-level perspective
No full textBusiness and government relations are central to both politics and the economy. This chapter discusses the increasing role of business in our day-to-day life and introduces the key
concepts used to study this role in this book: the concepts of asset specificity and market
concentration in economics; institutional complementarities and interest intermediation in
comparative political economy; revolving doors in political economy; the concepts of
political lobbying in political science; and the strategic deployment of resources and
capabilities in management
Three myths about business lobbying in the European Union busted
No full textIn this post, David Coen, Professor of Public Policy at UCL, Dr. Alexander Katsaitis, Fellow in Public Policy & Administration at the LSE, Dr. Matia Vannoni, Lecturer in Public Policy at KCL, dispel three myths around business lobbying in the EU to reveal how it’s instead based on a nuanced and layered interaction
A costly commitment: populism, economic performance, and the quality of bureaucracy
Full text linkWe study the consequences of populism for economic performance and the quality of bureaucracy. When voters lose trust in representative democracy, populists strategically supply unconditional policy commitments that are easier to monitor for voters. When in power, populists try to implement their policy commitments regardless of financial constraints and expert assessment of the feasibility of their policies, worsening government economic performance and dismantling resistance from expert bureaucrats. With novel data on more than 8,000 Italian municipalities covering more than 20 years, we estimate the effect of electing a populist mayor with a close-election regression discontinuity design.
We find that the election of a populist mayor leads to smaller repayments of debts, a larger share of procurement contracts with cost overruns, higher turnover among top bureaucrats – driven by forced rather than voluntary departures – and a sharp decrease in the percentage of graduate bureaucrats
Legislative activity and private benefits: a natural experiment in New Zealand
Full text linkWe examine the causal effect of legislative activity on private benefits, which have been largely neglected by previous research in legislative studies. By relying on a natural experiment in New Zealand, where randomly selected Members of Parliament (MPs) are given the opportunity to propose legislation, we find evidence for a causal relation between proposing a (successful) bill and the private benefits MPs receive, in terms of gifts and payments for services. We conclude that the allocation of private benefits depends on legislative performance
Replication Data for: Divided Government, Delegation, and Civil Service Reform
No full textThis paper sheds new light on the drivers of civil service reform in U.S. states.
We first demonstrate theoretically that divided government is a key trigger of
civil service reform, providing nuanced predictions for specific configurations of
divided government. We then show empirical evidence for these predictions using
data from the second half of the 20th century: states tended to introduce these reforms
under divided government, and in particular when legislative chambers (rather than
legislature and governor) were divided
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