1,735,578 research outputs found
Veto-Based Delegation
Get PDFIn a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers, I establish the Veto-Power Principle: any incentive-compatible outcome can be implemented through veto-based delegation with an endogenously chosen default decision. This result demonstrates the exact nature of commitment powers required by the principal: (1) to design the default outcome and (2) to ensure that she has almost no formal control over the agent's decisions
Veto-Based Delegation
Get PDFIn a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers, I establish the Veto-Power Principle: any incentive-compatible outcome can be implemented through veto-based delegation with an endogenously chosen default decision. This result demonstrates the exact nature of commitment powers required by the principal: (1) to design the default outcome and (2) to ensure that she has almost no formal control over the agent's decisions.veto power; asymmetric information; principal-agent relationship; no monetary transfers.
The Line Item Veto and Public Sector Budgets: Evidence from the States
Get PDFRecent proposals assume that endowing the U.S. President with a line item veto will reduce spending. Analysis of a rich set of state budget data indicates that long run budgets are not altered by an item veto. In the short run, the item veto's potency is contingent upon the political setting. Governors with political incentives to use an item veto alter spending and revenues in a statistically significant and quantitatively important fashion. These results suggest that adoption of the line item veto, in general, is unlikely to reduce the size of the federal government.
Curbing Power or Progress? Governing with an Opposition Veto
Get PDFVeto institutions are often dominated by government opponents with rival electoral and policy interests (e.g. \divided government"). I investigate the tradeoff between policy control and policy blockade when both the government and the veto party may cater to opposing special interests. The value of an opposition veto depends on whether electoral accountability can discipline bad type politicians. When this is not the case, a veto is beneficial only if the government's special interests are expected to be harmful. In contrast, when bad types care about (re-)election, a veto always increases expected welfare, providing a new rationale for the frequent occurrence of "divided government". Without policy rivalry, an opposition veto fares even better.Political Accountability, Opposition, Veto, Divided Government
On monotonic core allocations for coalitional games whith veto players
Get PDFWe characterize a monotonic core concept defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted versions of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of monotonic core concepts for veto balanced games and we show that, in general, the nucleolus per capita is not monotonic.monotonicity, core, nucleolus per capita, TU games
Veto Players and Policy Trade-Offs- An Intertemporal Approach to Study the Effects of Political Institutions on Policy
Get PDFThe capacity to sustain policies over time and the capacity to adjust policies in the face of changing circumstances are two desirable properties of policymaking systems. The veto player approach has suggested that polities with more veto players will have the capacity to sustain policies at the expense of the ability to change policy when necessary. This paper disputes that assertion from an intertemporal perspective, drawing from transaction cost economics and repeated game theory and showing that some countries might have both more credibility and more adaptability than others. More generally, the paper argues that, when studying the effects of political institutions on policy outcomes, a perspective of intertemporal politics might lead to predictions different from those emanating from more a-temporal approaches.Political institutions, Public policies, Veto players, Policy adaptability, Policy stability, Intertemporal, Credibility, Repeated games
Replication data for: Testing Theories of Congressional-Presidential Interaction with Veto Override Rates
No full textReplication data for Martin, 2012, "Testing Theories of Congressional-Presidential Interaction with Veto Override Rates
PriVeto: a fully private two round veto protocol.
Get PDFVeto is a prerogative to unilaterally overrule a decision. A private veto protocol consists of a number of participants who wish to decide whether or not to veto a particular motion without revealing the individual opinions. Essentially all participants jointly perform a multi-party computation (MPC) on a boolean-OR function where an input of "1" represents veto and "0" represents not veto. In 2006, Hao and Zieli´ nski presented a two round veto protocol named Anonymous Veto network (AV-net), which is exceptionally efficient in terms of the number of rounds, computation and bandwidth usage. However, AV-net has two generic issues: 1) a participant who has submitted a veto can find out whether she is the only one who vetoed; 2) the last participant who submits her input can pre-compute the boolean-OR result before submission, and may amend her input based on that knowledge. These two issues generally apply to any multi-round veto protocol where participants commit their input in the last round. In this paper, we propose a novel solution to address both issues within two rounds, which are the best possible round efficiency for a veto protocol. Our new private veto protocol, called PriVeto, has similar system complexities to AV-net, but it binds participants to their inputs in the very first round, eliminating the possibility of runtime changes to any of the inputs. At the end of the protocol, participants are strictly limited to learning nothing more than the output of the boolean-OR function and their own inputs
Partisan veto players in Australia, Denmark, Finland and Germany: Government status and legislative behavior
Get PDFIn parliamentary systems, parties compete for votes and offices in the electoral arena but in many systems they also cooperate in the legislative arena. This paper examines the question of whether the government status of parties affects their legislative behaviour and, hence, policy outcomes. We develop a simple veto player model that includes parties' positional goals (vote, office, etc.) to formalize the notion of accommodating legislative behaviour. The model predicts that government parties are most accommodating while opposition parties are least accommodating. The hypothesis is then tested by comparing two pairs of most similar political systems: Danish and Finnish coalition governments, as well as German and Australian bicameralism. The case studies support the main hypothesis that government status systematically affects parties' level of accommodation. We conclude that this has important implications for the two major approaches in comparative institutional analysis advanced by Lijphart (1999) and Tsebelis (2002). Whilst Lijphart's distinction between joint and divided responsibility cannot provide a consistent theoretical rationale of his twodimensional map of democracies, Tsebelis' conception of purely policy-seeking actors may be insufficient to adequately identify veto players in comparative research. -- In parlamentarischen Systemen konkurrieren Parteien um Wählerstimmen und Ämter, aber in vielen Systemen kooperieren sie auch in der legislativen Arena. Das Papier untersucht die Frage, ob der Regierungs- versus Oppositionsstatus von Parteien ihr legislatives Verhalten und somit Politikergebnisse beeinflusst. Wir entwickeln ein einfaches Vetospielermodell, das positionale, das heißt auf Wählerstimmen oder Ämter bezogene, Erwägungen in den Politikpräferenzen von Parteien berücksichtigt und damit die verbreitete Vorstellung von (nicht-)akkommodierendem legislativem Verhalten formalisiert. Das Modell impliziert, dass Regierungsparteien am stärksten akkommodierend sind, Oppositionsparteien am wenigsten. Die Hypothese wird mit Hilfe zweier Vergleiche in einem most similar case Design getestet. Der erste Vergleich stellt dänische und finnische Koalitionsregierungen einander gegenüber, der zweite das deutsche und das australische Zweikammersystem. Die Fallvergleiche stützen die Hypothese, dass der Regierungsstatus von Parteien beeinflusst, wie akkommodierend sie sich verhalten. Das Ergebnis hat wichtige Implikationen für zwei bedeutende Ansätze in der vergleichenden Analyse politischer Institutionen: Lijpharts' Unterscheidung von Mehrheitsund Konsensdemokratien und Tsebelis' Vetospielertheorie. Lijpharts theoretische Gegenüberstellung von 'gemeinsamer' und 'getrennter' Verantwortung für Politikergebnisse liefert keine konsistente theoretische Begründung für seine zweidimensionale Messung moderner Demokratien; Tsebelis' Konzeption von Akteuren, die nur an Verbesserungen im Policy-Raum interessiert sind, scheint nicht hinreichend, um in vergleichenden Studien Vetospieler angemessen zu identifizieren.
Veto for the ZEPLIN-III dark matter detector
Get PDFCold dark matter in the form of weakly interacting massive particles
(WIMPs) is a favoured explanation to the galactic dark matter puzzle
and could account for a large proportion of the missing mass of the
Universe. There are currently numerous detectors around the world
attempting to observe a WIMP signal. The ZEPLIN-III detector is
one such device. Utilising liquid xenon as a target medium, identification
is based on extraction of scintillation and electroluminescence
signals from the two-phase xenon target caused when WIMPs scatter
and has recently completed its first science run (FSR). With no
WIMP signal observed, ZEPLIN-III has excluded a WIMP-nucleon
spin-independent cross section above 8.1 × 10−8 pb (90% confidence
limit) for a WIMP mass of 60 GeV/c2 and also set a 90% confidence
upper limit of a pure WIMP-neutron spin-dependent cross section of
1.9 × 10−2 pb for a 55 GeV/c2 WIMP mass. However, the focus of
this thesis is the future of the ZEPLIN-III detector with regards to
the second science run (SSR).
As with all dark matter detectors, background reduction from neutrons
and gamma-rays plays a significant part in obtaining competitive
WIMP detection sensitivities. The author has contributed
significantly to the design, development and testing of a low radioactivity
veto for the ZEPLIN-III detector, to be retrofitted in time
for the SSR. It will detect neutrons and gamma-rays in coincidence
with the ZEPLIN-III target allowing these events to be removed as
candidate WIMP events.
This thesis describes the author’s contribution to the design, construction,
testing and evaluation of the veto. Also discussed is the
development of a comprehensive Monte Carlo simulation, utilised to
aid in the design process, to determine the background rates emanating
from the veto components (and therefore possible impact on the
low sensitivity running of ZEPLIN-III), and to provide an accurate
estimation of the overall veto efficiency to reject coincident neutrons and gamma-rays. The veto will have a neutron rejection factor of
67%, reducing the expected neutron background in ZEPLIN-III from
0.4 neutrons/year to 0.14 neutrons/year, a significant factor in the
event of a possible WIMP observation.
In addition to the work performed on the ZEPLIN-III veto, the author
has also contributed to the first science run analysis program by
profiling the historical evolution of the electron lifetime throughout
the FSR, and implementing consideration of this to improve the data
quality
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