579 research outputs found

    The Financial Crisis and the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies : A European Banking Perspective

    No full text
    Credit rating agencies (CRAs) bear some responsibility for the financial crisis that started in 2007 and remains ongoing. This is acknowledged by policymakers, market participants, and by the agencies themselves. It soon became clear that, given the depth of the crisis, CRAs would not be able to satisfy policymakers by eliminating flaws in their rating methods and improving corporate governance. Although the CRAs were more or less unregulated before the outbreak of the financial crisis, after the crisis started, politicians became increasingly vocal in demanding regulation. Initially, these demands were confined to a more binding form of self-regulation. But as the crisis progressed, the calls for state regulation grew ever louder. It became apparent after the November 2008 G-20 summit in Washington that state regulation could no longer be avoided. In Europe, the course had been set in this direction even before then. Since European policymakers saw the crisis as evidence that the Anglo-Saxon approach to the financial markets had failed, they believed they were now strongly placed to have a decisive influence on shaping a new international financial order. It is remarkable to note the shift in European policy from a self-regulatory approach, which was comparatively liberal in international terms, to quite rigorous state regulation of CRAs. Both the European Commission and the European Parliament drew up far-reaching plans. Although European policymakers knew that only globally consistent regulation would be appropriate for a new world financial order, their initial draft legislation was geared more toward stand-alone European regulation. While the final version of the European Union Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies focuses firmly on the European arena, the key point for all market participants is that this is unlikely to have an adverse effect on the global ratings market. It must nevertheless be recognized that the scope of the selected regulatory approach is extremely narrow. Certainly, it has the potential to improve the corporate governance of CRAs and prevent conflicts of interests. But it can do nothing to address the repeated calls for greater competition or for CRAs to be made liable for their ratings.credit rating agencies, financial crisis, financial regulation, European Regulation

    The Financial Crisis and the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: A European Banking Perspective

    No full text
    Credit rating agencies (CRAs) bear some responsibility for the financial crisis that started in 2007 and remains ongoing. This is acknowledged by policymakers, market participants, and by the agencies themselves. It soon became clear that, given the depth of the crisis, CRAs would not be able to satisfy policymakers by eliminating flaws in their rating methods and improving corporate governance. Although the CRAs were more or less unregulated before the outbreak of the financial crisis, after the crisis started, politicians became increasingly vocal in demanding regulation. Initially, these demands were confined to a more binding form of self-regulation. But as the crisis progressed, the calls for state regulation grew ever louder. It became apparent after the November 2008 G-20 summit in Washington that state regulation could no longer be avoided. In Europe, the course had been set in this direction even before then. Since European policymakers saw the crisis as evidence that the Anglo-Saxon approach to the financial markets had failed, they believed they were now strongly placed to have a decisive influence on shaping a new international financial order. It is remarkable to note the shift in European policy from a self-regulatory approach, which was comparatively liberal in international terms, to quite rigorous state regulation of CRAs. Both the European Commission and the European Parliament drew up far-reaching plans. Although European policymakers knew that only globally consistent regulation would be appropriate for a new world financial order, their initial draft legislation was geared more toward stand-alone European regulation. While the final version of the European Union Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies focuses firmly on the European arena, the key point for all market participants is that this is unlikely to have an adverse effect on the global ratings market. It must nevertheless be recognized that the scope of the selected regulatory approach is extremely narrow. Certainly, it has the potential to improve the corporate governance of CRAs and prevent conflicts of interests. But it can do nothing to address the repeated calls for greater competition or for CRAs to be made liable for their ratings.regulation credit rating agencies; europe credit rating agency; european bank financial crisis; financial crisis; credit rating agency

    Deformation Behavior and Damage Modeling of Polypropylene and Polycarbonate

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    Author Philipp Siegfried StelzerKurzfassungen in deutscher und englischer SpracheMasterarbeit Universität Linz 201

    Henri Temianka Correspondence; (siegfried)

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    This collection contains material pertaining to the life, career, and activities of Henri Temianka, violin virtuoso, conductor, music teacher, and author. Materials include correspondence, concert programs and flyers, music scores, photographs, and books.https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/temianka_correspondence/4165/thumbnail.jp

    Siegfried Jacoby Family Collection 1880-1960

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    This collection contains the papers of members of the Siegfried Jacoby family, depicting the family's private lives as well as their literary work. Most prominent among the papers here are many unpublished manuscripts, family correspondence, and Siegfried Jacoby's herbarium. There is also personal correspondence with others, some professional correspondence, official and personal papers, newspaper clippings, and a few notebooks and family photographs.Siegfried Jacoby was born on February 2, 1877 in Marggrabowa, East Prussia (now Olecko, Poland). He lived in Berlin, where he worked as an advertiser and businessman under the nomme de travail "Fritz Blum." In addition, Siegfried was a prolific author, writing numerous plays, short stories, essays, and poems, as well as writing for several newspapers. Siegfried's chief hobby was botany, in the course of which he assembled many journals of plant pressings and descriptions. On April 10, 1906, Siegfried married Selma (spelled Sellma on the birth certificate) Cohn from Schwerin an der Warthe (now Skwierzyna, Poland). Siegfried and Selma had two children. Their son, Friedrich Walther (Fritz), was born on June 1, 1909. Fritz died in Wernigerode in 1929. The Jacobys' daughter, Ursula Ellen (usually known as Ursel, also called Ulle), was born on October 25, 1907. Ursel was quite well-educated, being fluent in English and French. She followed in her father's literary footsteps as an author and translator. As a child, Ursula won or placed in several youth writing contests. As a young women in the 1920s, she worked as a translator for several regional papers. Between March and May 1927, Ursel went to Paris.In October 1932, Ursel married Max Bunzl, son of the Viennese Kommerzialrat Martin and Margrete (Grete) Bunzl. Max worked for his father's company. Ursel and Max lived in Frankfurt am Main and thereafter in Vienna. In December 1934, Ursula and Max had a son, Tom (Tommy). On October 3, 1937, the Bunzls had another son, Claudi (also known as Clausi or Klausi). The next year, the family left Austria for England. From there, Max went to Palestine (where he had relatives) and Ursula and Claudi went to Argentina (where Claudi became Claudio).In 1939, Selma and Siegfried Jacoby left Germany, travelling like their daughter to London. Later that year, the Jacobys joined their daughter and grandson in Argentina. The Jacoby-Bunzls lived in Buenos Aires, Conesa, and Rio Caballos while in Argentina. Siegfried, or Sigfrido, continued to write in German and Spanish, sometimes using the nomme du plume "Siegfried Jacoby-Wilde" (Sigfried may have been fond of Oscar Wilde). Eventually, Max (or Maximo) joined his family in Argentina.Little information is available about the Jacobys or Bunzls after the war. In 1947, Ursula returned to Europe, although it is unclear where. By the 1960s she had moved to London. The fate of her parents, husband, and child is unclear.digitize

    Der Verlust der Identität:Zu den Romanen von Siegfried Lenz

    No full text
    The article focuses on the topic of identity crises in the novels of German author Siegfried Lenz. He presents no solution of the identity problem, which is reflected both in a private and in a historical dimension, but has a distinct preference for nostalgic ways of life

    The path to European Monetary Union: An institutional economics approach

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    The planned broadening of the common internal market into an economic and monetary union as proposed in the Delors Plan means a significant qualitative leap in the process of European integration, which should ultimately lead to political union in Europe. Is this objective realistic? In what ways could it be achieved

    The financial crisis and the regulation of credit rating agencies: A European banking perspective

    No full text
    Credit rating agencies (CRAs) bear some responsibility for the financial crisis that started in 2007 and remains ongoing. This is acknowledged by policymakers, market participants, and by the agencies themselves. It soon became clear that, given the depth of the crisis, CRAs would not be able to satisfy policymakers by eliminating flaws in their rating methods and improving corporate governance. Although the CRAs were more or less unregulated before the outbreak of the financial crisis, after the crisis started, politicians became increasingly vocal in demanding regulation. Initially, these demands were confined to a more binding form of self-regulation. But as the crisis progressed, the calls for state regulation grew ever louder. It became apparent after the November 2008 G-20 summit in Washington that state regulation could no longer be avoided. In Europe, the course had been set in this direction even before then. Since European policymakers saw the crisis as evidence that the Anglo-Saxon approach to the financial markets had failed, they believed they were now strongly placed to have a decisive influence on shaping a new international financial order. It is remarkable to note the shift in European policy from a self-regulatory approach, which was comparatively liberal in international terms, to quite rigorous state regulation of CRAs. Both the European Commission and the European Parliament drew up far-reaching plans. Although European policymakers knew that only globally consistent regulation would be appropriate for a new world financial order, their initial draft legislation was geared more toward stand-alone European regulation. While the final version of the European Union Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies focuses firmly on the European arena, the key point for all market participants is that this is unlikely to have an adverse effect on the global ratings market. It must nevertheless be recognized that the scope of the selected regulatory approach is extremely narrow. Certainly, it has the potential to improve the corporate governance of CRAs and prevent conflicts of interests. But it can do nothing to address the repeated calls for greater competition or for CRAs to be made liable for their ratings
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