1,721,144 research outputs found
Natural resource depletion and the resource curse
Full text linkThis thesis studies the relationship between natural resources and economic wealth, in two
parts. Previous studies have found a negative relationship between natural resources and
economic wealth, a phenomenon known as the curse of natural resources. Later studies
reject the resource curse, in its simplest form, as their findings show a positive relationship
when measuring economic wealth by GDP levels instead of growth. The argument
is that the inclusion of initial GDP, when using GDP growth as measurement, will result
in biased estimates due to the short time horizon. However, a third group of studies
advocates the existence of a resource curse conditional upon institutional quality. In this
case, resource endowment only affects the economic welfare negatively if the quality of
institutions is sufficiently bad.
In this thesis the measurement of economic wealth is further expanded. Taking into
account that extraction of resources is a negative flow of the nation’s wealth gives a
better understating of the change in welfare, and removes some of the positive bias of
exploiting natural resources on economic wealth. An empirical analysis, utilizing data on
a total of 263 countries in year 2000, is conducted to find whether the resource curse is
still rejected when including depletion of natural resources to the analysis. None of the
estimation methods or model specifications in this thesis are able to confirm the existence
of a resource curse, and in its simplest form the rejection is supported. Also the
conditional resource curse is rejected by the data material, meaning that countries with
poor institutions do not seem to have a more negative, or less positive, impact of natural
resources on GDP levels adjusted for depletion of natural resources than countries with
good institutions. However, be aware of the limitations of the data, in particular the
absence of a truly exogenous variable of resource endowment
Nye kapitaldekningsregler: Strategier og virkninger for LOKALBANK Alliansen
Full text linkI 2025 vil det nye kapitaldekningskravet CRR3/CRD 6 tre i kraft i Norge gjennom EØS. Regelverksendringene er ventet å gi små og mellomstore banker en betydelig reduksjon i kapitalkravet. Det betyr at norske sparebanker kan bli mer konkurransedyktige og kan nærme seg de store forretningsbankenes interne risikovekter (IRB). Oppgaven er skrevet i samarbeid med Lokalbank alliansen for å finne forventede endringer i kapitaldekning for de 10 bankene i alliansen. Oppgaven diskuterer også hvordan de bør tilpasse seg endringene. Vi benytter data levert av bankene som omfatter hovedsakelig bankenes eksponeringer og belåningsgrader (LTV).
Vi finner at alle bankene kan forvente kapitallettelser, men de eksakte virkningene varierer. I snitt kan bankene i Lokalbank forvente 1,93 prosent økning i kapitaldekning, der endringen varierer fra 0,45 prosent til 4,07 prosent. I resultatene diskuterer vi hvorfor bankene opplever ulike økninger i kapitaldekning. Studien fremhever viktigheten av å være fleksible og tilpasningsdyktige for å maksimere fordelene og minimere ulempene ved de nye reguleringene.In 2025, the new capital adequacy requirements CRR3/CRD 6 will come into effect in Norway through the EEA. The regulatory changes are expected to provide significant reductions in capital requirements for small and medium-sized banks. This means that Norwegian savings banks may become more competitive and approach the internal ratings-based (IRB) of large commercial banks. The study, conducted in collaboration with the Lokalbank alliance, aims to identify expected changes in capital adequacy for the 10 banks in the alliance. It also discusses how banks should adapt to these changes. We utilize data provided by the banks, primarily consisting of their exposures and Loan-To-Value (LTV) ratios.
We find that all banks can expect capital relief, but the exact effects vary. On average, banks in the Lokalbank Alliance can expect a 1.93 percent increase in capital adequacy, with changes ranging from 0.45 percent to 4.07 percent. In the results, we discuss why banks experience different increases in capital adequacy. The study highlights the importance of being flexible and adaptable to maximize the benefits and minimize the disadvantages of the new regulations
The middle-income trap, democracy and human capital : a study of Korea
No full textIn this thesis, we examine factors that are important for a country to escape or avoid a middle-income trap, and whether democracy and human capital are necessary conditions for a country to achieve high economic growth. We use results from two economic models; one by Wang (2016), and the second by Saint-Paul and Verdier (1992), and extend the latter to include the decision to democratize as an endogenous variable. From the extended model, we conclude that a high level of human capital in the population, investment in education and a relatively equal income distribution increases the probability of democratizing. Wang concludes that a country will democratize if the private sector capital is larger than the state sector capital. In both models, the economic growth rate will be higher in a democracy than in an authoritarian regime. We compare the evidence from Korea with the extended model by Saint-Paul and Verdier and the model by Wang, and find that these models are consistent with the empirical evidence. However, the models do not include all aspects that may have been important in the democratization process in Korea, which invested extensively in R&D and education, and experienced pressure to democratize from the international market and by collective actions in the population. Our analyses indicate that democracy induce higher economic growth, which may have prevented Korea from being caught in a middle-income trap
Globalization and Democracy - a factor based approach
No full textThis thesis uses panel data for 217 countries between 1960 and 2007 to examine how relative factor endowments of countries affect whether democratization is an option when a non democratic country starts opening up to globalization. The analysis is based on the theory by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), and uses a wide specter of econometric methods to see if the data points in the same direction as the model. In accordance with the model, the countries in the data set are divided into two groups: one group containing labor abundant countries, and the other groups containing capital and land abundant countries. The statistical results indicate that globalization is positively associated with democratization among labor abundant countries, but that globalization is negatively associated with democratization in capital and land abundant countries. The result are robust, and thus this thesis concludes that the evidence in support of Acemoglu and Robinsons (2006) argument is present
An evaluation of how "Samoverskudd" calculates the economic surplus in the Norwegian power market
Full text linkDen nøytrale renten i Norge - Har den nøytrale renten i Norge falt siden 1980
No full textI denne oppgaven ønsket jeg å finne ut av om den nøytrale renten i Norge har falt siden 1980. Den nøytrale renten defineres som det realrentenivået som over en konjunktursykel vil gi lukket produksjonsgap og konstant inflasjon. Jeg finner at den nøytrale renten i Norge blir kraftig påvirket av utviklingen i den nøytrale renten globalt, ettersom Norge er en liten åpen økonomi. Den norske nøytrale renten vil allikevel ikke nødvendigvis være identisk med den globale nøytrale renten, ettersom økonomiske faktorer innad i landet også vil påvirke den norske nøytrale renten. Basert på teori om hva som påvirker den nøytrale renten og empiriske resultater som forklarer hvorfor realrenten har falt siden 1980 konkluderer jeg med at den globale nøytrale renten har falt siden 1980. Estimatene mine viser det samme for Norge, nemlig at den nøytrale renten i Norge har falt fra rundt 4% i 1980 til 1-1,5% i 2017. Årsaken til dette fallet i den norske nøytrale renten er både at den blir dratt ned av internasjonale faktorer (avtakende vekst i potensiell produksjon, økt ønsket sparing og redusert ønsket investering globalt sett) og av nasjonale faktorer (avtakende vekst i potensiell produksjon og avtakende aktivitetsnivå i oljesektoren). Jeg forventer en liten økning i de nøytrale rentene over de kommende årene som følge av passerende trender, men jeg tror de norske nøytrale rentene vil holde seg betydelig lavere enn de var i 1980 i lang tid fremover.Abstract:
In this thesis, I wanted to find if the neutral rate of interest had fallen in Norway since 1980. The neutral rate of interest is defined as the real interest rate level that is consistent with a closed output gap and constant inflation over a business cycle. As a result of Norway being a small and open economy I find that the Norwegian neutral rate of interest is strongly influenced by the development of the global neutral interest rate. The Norwegian neutral rate of interest will not necessarily be identical to the global neutral rate of interest, as economic factors in Norway will influence the Norwegian neutral rate of interest as well. Based on theory about which economic factors influence the neutral rate and empirical data on which factors caused the fall in the real rate of interest since 1980 I find that the global neutral rate of interest has fallen since 1980. My estimations find the same results for Norway. The Norwegian neutral rate of interest has fallen from around 4% in 1980 to about 1-1,5% in 2017. The reason for this fall is both a reduction in the global neutral rate of interest (caused by a decrease in the growth of potential output, increased demand for saving, and reduced demand for investment) and because of domestic factors (decrease in the growth of potential output and reduced activity in the oil sector). I expect a small increase in the Norwegian neutral rate of interest in the coming years as some of the cyclical trends passes, but I believe that the Norwegian neutral rate of interest will stay significantly lower than they were in 1980 for a long time to come
Natural resource depletion and the resource curse
Full text linkThis thesis studies the relationship between natural resources and economic wealth, in two
parts. Previous studies have found a negative relationship between natural resources and
economic wealth, a phenomenon known as the curse of natural resources. Later studies
reject the resource curse, in its simplest form, as their findings show a positive relationship
when measuring economic wealth by GDP levels instead of growth. The argument
is that the inclusion of initial GDP, when using GDP growth as measurement, will result
in biased estimates due to the short time horizon. However, a third group of studies
advocates the existence of a resource curse conditional upon institutional quality. In this
case, resource endowment only affects the economic welfare negatively if the quality of
institutions is sufficiently bad.
In this thesis the measurement of economic wealth is further expanded. Taking into
account that extraction of resources is a negative flow of the nation’s wealth gives a
better understating of the change in welfare, and removes some of the positive bias of
exploiting natural resources on economic wealth. An empirical analysis, utilizing data on
a total of 263 countries in year 2000, is conducted to find whether the resource curse is
still rejected when including depletion of natural resources to the analysis. None of the
estimation methods or model specifications in this thesis are able to confirm the existence
of a resource curse, and in its simplest form the rejection is supported. Also the
conditional resource curse is rejected by the data material, meaning that countries with
poor institutions do not seem to have a more negative, or less positive, impact of natural
resources on GDP levels adjusted for depletion of natural resources than countries with
good institutions. However, be aware of the limitations of the data, in particular the
absence of a truly exogenous variable of resource endowment
Den nøytrale renten i Norge - Har den nøytrale renten i Norge falt siden 1980
No full textI denne oppgaven ønsket jeg å finne ut av om den nøytrale renten i Norge har falt siden 1980. Den nøytrale renten defineres som det realrentenivået som over en konjunktursykel vil gi lukket produksjonsgap og konstant inflasjon. Jeg finner at den nøytrale renten i Norge blir kraftig påvirket av utviklingen i den nøytrale renten globalt, ettersom Norge er en liten åpen økonomi. Den norske nøytrale renten vil allikevel ikke nødvendigvis være identisk med den globale nøytrale renten, ettersom økonomiske faktorer innad i landet også vil påvirke den norske nøytrale renten. Basert på teori om hva som påvirker den nøytrale renten og empiriske resultater som forklarer hvorfor realrenten har falt siden 1980 konkluderer jeg med at den globale nøytrale renten har falt siden 1980. Estimatene mine viser det samme for Norge, nemlig at den nøytrale renten i Norge har falt fra rundt 4% i 1980 til 1-1,5% i 2017. Årsaken til dette fallet i den norske nøytrale renten er både at den blir dratt ned av internasjonale faktorer (avtakende vekst i potensiell produksjon, økt ønsket sparing og redusert ønsket investering globalt sett) og av nasjonale faktorer (avtakende vekst i potensiell produksjon og avtakende aktivitetsnivå i oljesektoren). Jeg forventer en liten økning i de nøytrale rentene over de kommende årene som følge av passerende trender, men jeg tror de norske nøytrale rentene vil holde seg betydelig lavere enn de var i 1980 i lang tid fremover
African Leaders and Economic Growth: An Empirical Study of Economic Growth under Post-Colonial Leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa
Full text linkDenne teksten utforsker forholdet mellom tre vanlige typer postkoloniale ledere i Afrika sør for Sahara og økonomisk vekst. Motivasjonen bak forskningen er å oppnå en dypere forståelse av de potensielle mekanismene og virkningene Afrikas statsledere har på økonomien i deres respektive land. Det er gjort lite forskning på de mulige økonomiske konsekvensene av afrikansk lederskap, i forhold til både nåværende og historiske perspektiver, innen økonomisk litteratur. Denne teksten kan derfor fylle et hull i debatten angående økonomisk vekst i Afrika. Tema kan virke noe trivielt, men denne har teksten har vist at det er et tema som er vært verdt større utforskning.
Data fra Verdensbanken, Emergency Events Database, Nasdaq, Center for Systemic Peace og et unikt utarbeidet datasett om afrikanske ledere har blitt brukt for å gjennomføre en empirisk studie angående forholdet mellom militære ledere, utdannede ledere, ledere som overtok makten etter voldelige konflikter, og økonomisk vekst. Analysen avslører en negativ sammenheng mellom militære ledere og økonomisk vekst, med en nedgang på opptil -0,8329 årlige prosentpoeng. Utdannede ledere viser derimot en positiv sammenheng med økonomisk vekst, med en økning på opptil 1,1034 årlige prosentpoeng. Det er imidlertid ikke funnet noen betydelige resultater for ledere som overtar makten etter voldelige overganger. Disse resultatene forblir konsistente når det tas hensyn til avvik i data.This paper explores the connection between three common types of post-colonial Sub-Saharan African leaders and economic growth. The motivation behind this research is to gain a greater understanding of the potential influence of Africa's designated leaders on the economy. Little research has been done on the possible economic consequences of the African leadership environment, considering both present and historical perspectives, in economic literature. While the topic might sound somewhat trivial, this paper has demonstrated that it is worthy of greater exploration.
This paper combines data from The World Bank, the Emergency Events Database, Nasdaq, the Center for Systemic Peace, and a uniquely crafted dataset on African leaders to conduct an empirical study on the relationship between military leaders, educated leaders, leaders who assumed power after violent conflict, and economic growth. The analysis reveals a negative association between military leaders and economic growth, with a decrease of up to -0.8329 annual percentage points. In contrast, educated leaders show a positive association with economic growth, with an increase of up to 1.1034 annual percentage points. No significant results are however found for leaders who assume power after violent transitions. These results remain consistent when accounting for outliers
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