120 research outputs found
Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals, Second Version
Prior research on “strategic voting” has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off. We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous, i.e., independent of the voting rule used. We depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote, and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off. Moreover, in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposing individual better off even when he has diametrically opposing preferences. In this case, unanimity is the Pareto dominant voting rule. Voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal. The proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher.Strategic voting; agenda setting; multilateral bargaining
Two-stage threshold representations
We study two-stage choice procedures in which the decision maker first preselects the alternatives whose values according to a criterion pass a menu-dependent threshold, and then maximizes a second criterion to narrow the selection further. This framework overlaps with several existing models that have various interpretations and impose various additional restrictions on behavior. We show that the general class of procedures is characterized by acyclicity of the revealed "first-stage separation relation."Peer reviewe
Information Aggregation and Preference Heterogeneity in Committees
This paper is concerned with the efficiency of information aggregation in a committee whose members have heterogeneous preferences over a binary decision variable. In a first stage, agents may exchange private (decision-relevant) information which is assumed to be verifiable. Then they reach a decision via majority voting. We study different information environments and identify conditions under which full information aggregation is possible. In particular, if preferences are common knowledge and each committee member is endowed with information full information aggregation is possible despite preference heterogeneity.Information aggregation, committee decisions, preference heterogeneity
AC loss in MgB2-based fully superconducting electric machines
Superconducting electric machines have shown potential for dramatic increases in specific power for applications such as offshore wind generation, turbo-electric distributed propulsion in aircraft, and ship propulsion. Superconductors exhibit zero loss in dc conditions, though ac current produces considerable loss due to hysteresis, eddy currents, and coupling. For this reason, many present designs for such machines are partially superconducting, meaning that the dc field components are superconducting while the ac armature coils are normal copper conductors. A fully superconducting machine would involve both superconducting field and armature components for higher specific power, though this would introduce the previously mentioned ac losses. This research aims to characterize the expected losses in the components of fully superconducting machines based on partially superconducting designs described in prior work. Various factors are examined, such as motor geometry and operating frequency, and two low-loss designs are proposed based on the analysis.Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'U of I Access', the embargo will last until 2019-05-01The student, Matthew Feddersen, accepted the attached license on 2017-04-19 at 11:23.The student, Matthew Feddersen, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2017-04-19 at 11:29.This Thesis was approved for publication on 2017-04-24 at 10:06.DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #10828 on 2017-08-10 at 15:05:56Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-10T20:33:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 3
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Previous issue date: 2017-04-24Embargo set by: Colleen Fallaw for item 102776
Lift date: 2019-08-10T21:27:21Z
Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD systemU of I Only Restriction Lifted for Item 102776 on 2019-08-11T09:15:32Z
Effecting Cooperation
There is a large repeated games literature illustrating how future interactions provide incentives for cooperation. Much of this literature assumes public monitoring: players always observe precisely the same thing. Even slight deviations from public monitoring to private monitoring that incorporate differences in players’ observations dramatically complicate coordination. Equilibria with private monitoring often seem unrealistically complex. We set out a model in which players accomplish cooperation in an intuitively plausible fashion. Players process information via a mental system — a set of psychological states and a transition function between states depending on observations. Players restrict attention to a relatively small set of simple strategies, and consequently, might learn which perform well.Repeated games, private monitoring, bounded rationality, cooperation
Disney Crisis Exercise
The Disney Crisis Exercise is not revealed here because it is entirely an in-class experience; students should not have access to any details prior to the exercise. Complete information is available to instructors in the teaching note. In this real-time exercise, student teams will advise Disney how to respond to a crisis precipitated by vocal and well-organized influence groups that threaten its brand as part of their advocacy on behalf of social causes. The crisis occurs against a backdrop of dynamic industry and company changes, many of which have important consequences for Disney.After completing this exercise, students should be able to:</jats:p
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