197 research outputs found
The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment Revisited
No full textWe study the optimal use of fines and imprisonment when wealth varies across individuals and may be observable or not. When wealth is observable, the optimal total sanction includes the maximum fine and either zero or maximum imprisonment. Imprisonment often complements the fine, therefore the total sanction increases with wealth. However, with unobservable wealth, total sanctions must weakly
decrease with wealth to satisfy incentive compatibility constraints. The total sanction for low-wealth individuals may include maximum imprisonment, while high-wealth individuals may face no imprisonment and often less than maximum fines. The inability to observe wealth aligns policy prescriptions with actual enforcement policy and lowers social welfare
Victim Interdependence in the Accident Setting
No full textThis paper considers the case that potential victims affect each other by taking care. Analyzing standard liability rules, we show that strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence is in the best position to induce the efficient outcome, i.e., this liability rule ensures efficiency if victims affect each other negatively - care by one victim increases the accident exposure of other victims - and makes the attainment likely if victims affect each other positively - if care by one victim decreases the accident exposure of other victims. In contrast, the other standard liability rules fail to induce first-best care.victim interdependence, care incentives, liability rules, tort law,
Lost job, lost trust? On the effect of involuntary job loss on trust. Journal of Economic Psychology 2021
No full textThis directory contains Stata code that replicates the tables and figures for the following paper:
Title: Lost job, lost trust? On the effect of involuntary job loss on trust? Journal of Economic Psychology 2021.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2021.102369
Author: Tim Friehe & Jan Marcu
Lost job, lost trust? On the effect of involuntary job loss on trust. Journal of Economic Psychology 2021
No full textThis directory contains Stata code that replicates the tables and figures for the following paper:
Title: Lost job, lost trust? On the effect of involuntary job loss on trust? Journal of Economic Psychology 2021.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2021.102369
Author: Tim Friehe & Jan Marcu
Lost job, lost trust? On the effect of involuntary job loss on trust. Journal of Economic Psychology 2021
No full textThis directory contains Stata code that replicates the tables and figures for the following paper:
Title: Lost job, lost trust? On the effect of involuntary job loss on trust? Journal of Economic Psychology 2021.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2021.102369
Author: Tim Friehe & Jan Marcu
Switching Consumers and Product Liability: On the Optimality of Incomplete Strict Liability
No full textThis article shows that it may be socially optimal to grant accident victims less than full compensation. In our framework, firms are liable under product liability but also invest in care to prevent consumers switching to competitors. Affecting the partition of consumers by means of care-taking is not desirable from a social standpoint. Consequently, it may be optimal to reduce liability below full compensation in order to adjust firms’ care incentives.Tort law; product liability, care level, asymmetric information, switching
Correlated payoffs in the inspection game: some theory and an application to corruption
No full textInspection game, Crime, Payoff correlation, Corruption, Incentives, K42, H00, C72,
On judgment proofness in the case of bilateral harm
No full textCare incentives, Judgment proofness, Bilateral harm, Bilateral care, Tort law, K13, H23, C72,
Escalating penalties for repeat offenders: a note on the role of information
No full textOptimal law enforcement, Escalating sanctions, Repeat offender, Imperfect information, K42, H23,
Sequential torts and bilateral harm
No full textThis paper analyzes care incentives of individuals in a bilateral-harm setting if care choices are sequential. We find that the efficient outcome is not guaranteed under any liability rule considered, irrespective of whether information is perfect or imperfect. Furthermore, it is no longer possible to generally rank liability rules according to their induced social costs. These findings are in strong contrast to the sequential-torts setting in which harm is unilateral.Care incentives Sequential care Bilateral harm Tort law
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