1,720,963 research outputs found
Information design
Full text linkIn many economic and social settings one person or institution is in charge of communicating with and disclosing information to multiple agents who are engaged in a strategic interaction. This communication takes the form of information provision about an issue or an object of common interest – the fundamental – which impacts the payoffs of the interaction
Essays on strategic communication
Full text linkThis thesis consists of three chapters, each of which is self-contained and studies
a distinct theoretical setting. All chapters are linked by a common focus on
strategic communication, where private information is communicated strategically.
CHAPTER 1: OPTIMAL BONUS STRUCTURE UNDER STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION
Bonus structures are a common tool used by organizations to incentivize workers’
efforts. Halac, Lipnowski, and Rappoport (2021) assumes workers cannot
observe each other’s contracts and derives the optimal bonus structure that
uniquely implements work. In reality, however, workers can strategically communicate
with each other before exerting effort. I study the optimal bonus
structure that uniquely implements work when communication is allowed. I
model the interaction as a two-stage game: a communication stage where workers
communicate with each other, and an action stage where workers choose
whether to work. I show that the optimal bonus structure is robust to communication
that takes the form of Bayesian persuasion and cheap talk, in the
sense that the unique equilibrium involves workers sharing no information in
the communication stage and always working in the action stage.
CHAPTER 2: EVALUATING EXPERTS UNDER IMAGE CONCERNS
An expert with image concern wishes to persuade others that he holds a certain
opinion, which could result in the expert failing to report his opinion truthfully.
Can we learn about the expert’s true opinion under such image concern
by evaluating him appropriately? I characterize robust evaluation rules that
implement truth-telling equilibrium under any level of image concern. I further
derive robust evaluation rules that minimize the cost of incentivizing truthtelling
and show that such evaluation rules always provide a higher material
payoff to a dissenting report.
CHAPTER 3: THE MARKET FOR EXPERT ENDORSEMENT
When experts are hired as tools of persuasion, how are their incentives to
reveal information affected? This paper studies a three-party model (expert,
manager, public) where an expert, either informed or uninformed, is hired by
a manager to persuade the public about an uncertain state. The expert wish
to be perceived as informed. In a baseline setting, I show that the reputation
concern lead to the expert providing endorsement inconsistent with his private
beliefs. In the second and third settings. I show that information control
power is only beneficial to the manager when combined with commitment
power, in which case, the uninformed expert becomes more valuable than
the informed expert to the manager in terms of increasing the probability
of successful persuasion
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Full text link“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
Full text linkWe provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
Information design
Full text linkIn many economic and social settings one person or institution is in charge of communicating with and disclosing information to multiple agents who are engaged in a strategic interaction. This communication takes the form of information provision about an issue or an object of common interest – the fundamental – which impacts the payoffs of the interaction
Information design
Full text linkA designer commits to a signal distribution that is informative about a payoff-relevant state. Conditional upon the privately observed signals, agents take actions that affect their payoffs as well as those of the designer. We show how to derive the (designer) optimal information structure in static finite environments. We fully characterize it in a symmetric binary setting for a parameterized game. In this environment, conditionally independent private signals are never strictly optimal
Dispelling the Myths Behind First-author Citation Counts
Full text linkWe conducted a full-scale evaluative citation analysis study of scholars in the XML research field to explore just how different from each other author rankings resulting from different citation counting methods actually are, and to demonstrate the capability of emerging data and tools on the Web in supporting more realistic citation counting methods. Our results contest some common arguments for the continued
use of first-author citation counts in the evaluation of scholars, such as high correlations between author rankings by first-author citation counts and other citation
counting methods, and high costs of using more realistic citation counting methods that are not well-supported by the ISI databases. It is argued that increasingly available digital full text research papers make it possible for citation analysis studies to go beyond what the ISI databases have directly supported and to employ more
sophisticated methods
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