1,720,973 research outputs found
No Conservative View Left
This study delves into the ideological alignment of partisans, a phenomenon of some beneficial and multiple troubling consequences within European political landscapes. I hypothesize a substantial asymmetry in ideological alignment between partisans on the left and right ends of the political spectrum, with profound implications for our understanding of political polarization and party strategies across Europe. Utilizing conventional methods and innovative belief network modeling, I analyze data from the fourth and eighth waves of the European Social Survey (2008, 2016), supplemented by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and Manifesto Project, covering 15 European countries, 131 political parties, and 23,586 partisans, to test this hypothesis. My findings reveal that supporters of new left parties exhibit a more consistent and coherent set of beliefs compared to their right-wing counterparts. However, the study also uncovers the limits of this asymmetry in a significant shift in ideological alignment on sociocultural issues on the right, indicating the emergence of a deeper, broader ideological conflict. Furthermore, my analysis demonstrates the limited impact of strategies like position blurring and programmatic nicheness, showing only a small effect on ideological alignment in economic matters. These insights highlight the propensity of new left supporters for some worrisome consequences of high belief homogeneity, such as echo chambers and lack of cross-cutting ties, and stress the pivotal role of both the new left and the radical right in the ideological conflict across Europe
Everybody Hates an Ideologue?
More and more evidence suggests that opinion disagreement is an essential predictor of partisan animosity. Pundits have used terms such as ideological disagreement and policy disagreement interchangeably in this research vein or simply denoted the disagreement on many issues as "ideological". However, this is at odds with the literature on belief constraint that posits that not all people are opinionated and hold stable attitudes. There is a low disagreement with a fellow ideologue and a person disinterested in politics. I rectify the situation by incorporating non-attitudes in a survey experimental design. Using evaluations of hypothetical profiles of fellow citizens, I disentangle the effects of policy disagreement and belief constraint on partisan animosity in a representative sample of the US population. By showing the unique effect of ideology, this study opens a new avenue of belief structures for polarization research largely missing from the discussion
New Threat of Culture Wars? The Religious Roots of Public Opinion Polarization on Culture War Issues in Europe
Cultural polarization divides European public opinion on moral issues, such as Italy’s refusal to register children of same-sex couples and abortion protests in Poland, rooted in historical church-state conflicts across different religious cultures. This polarization is particularly pronounced in Catholic countries compared to Protestant ones. Using data from 19 European democracies, I demonstrate a persistent gap between Catholic and Protestant countries, while finding limited effects of economic prosperity—developed countries no longer lead in moral issue divisions, with recent surveys showing no or even reversed differences. Furthermore, younger generations in Catholic contexts remain principled on moral issues, with cohort differences in polarization significantly increasing between 2008 and 2017, underscoring the enduring influence of religious traditions among younger cohorts
One More Constrained Than The Other: Beliefs of Left-Wing Partisans Are More Ideologically Aligned
This study examines the ideological alignment of beliefs within opposing partisan camps in Europe. Integrating multiple types of research, I hypothesize that partisans on the ideological left exhibit greater alignment in their beliefs compared to those on the right—an asymmetry that extends across various issues. I argue that on the scale of ideological contention, it matters if partisans on one ideological pole are more aligned in beliefs than those on the other. Only the less ideological of opposing camps determines the extent of mutual disagreement. Utilizing conventional methods and innovative belief network modeling, I analyze survey data from the fourth and eighth waves of the European Social Survey (2008, 2016). To test the hypothesis, I match partisans with the data on their party's ideology, covering partisans from 131 parties in 15 European countries to test this hypothesis. My findings reveal that, both at the European level and within national contexts, there is a broad and substantive asymmetry between the right and the left across ideological dimensions and issues. However, the study also uncovers the limits of this asymmetry, highlighting a significant shift in ideological alignment on sociocultural issues on the right, indicating the emergence of a deeper, broader ideological conflict in that dimension. Furthermore, my analysis demonstrates the marginal influence of strategies like position blurring and programmatic nicheness. These insights shed light on the nature of partisan contention in Europe and how it disproportionately depends on ideological alignment on the right
Everybody Hates An Ideologue?
More and more evidence points to opinion disagreement as an important predictor of partisan animosity. Partisan camps imagine different resolutions of daily political agenda and have colliding visions of their country’s future. However, extant research does not differentiate between disagreement on individual policies and broader ideological disagreement. In current designs, ideological disagreement is typically conflated with policy disagreement. This is problematic because respondents may assume other qualities accompanying the status of an ideologue (such as close-mindedness) that go beyond simple disagreement on individual policies. Despite its relevance, the variation in ideological thinking is largely lacking in the literature on sources of partisan animus. In this study, I test how several aspects of ideological thinking contribute to affective polarization
I Don't Need Your Attitude (Study 2)
An expanding body of evidence indicates that substantive disagreement plays a crucial role in fueling partisan animosity. Pundits, however, were often negligent in using terms such as ideological disagreement, which often denotes the disagreement on many issues as "ideological." This approach, however, does not align with studies on belief constraint, which argue that not everyone holds or organizes their opinions in the same manner. There is a minimal disagreement between a staunch ideologue and someone apathetic toward politics, and it's common for individuals' beliefs to defy straightforward ideological categorization. Substantive disagreement might be significant between ideologues of differing views or between individuals whose beliefs are disorganized yet fundamentally opposed. Addressing this issue, my study distinguishes between ideological and non-ideological disagreements through a survey experiment with a representative sample of the US population. Using evaluations of hypothetical profiles of fellow citizens, my research demonstrates that the alignment of beliefs and the presence of ambivalence significantly influence personal affinity, even amid identical levels of policy disagreement. I found that ideologues, unlike various moderates, experience heightened animosity even with minimal substantive disagreement and show aversion towards individuals with ambivalent viewpoints
Hatred Takes An Ideologue: Recognizable Belief Patterns Lead to More Animosity and Disagreement
An expanding body of evidence indicates that substantive disagreement fuels political animosity. However, pundits often use terms like 'ideological disagreement' to describe a broad range of phenomena, diverging from how the concept is understood in classical Conversian literature on beliefs and their structures. This literature suggests that individuals do not uniformly hold or organize their opinions. Building on this foundation, I argue for a critical distinction between disagreements among ideologues—who are opinionated and aligned in their beliefs—and disagreements among others. I hypothesize that disagreements among ideologues result in higher expected disagreement and greater mutual animosity. To test this hypothesis, I conducted two survey experiments with representative U.S. samples (N = 2,000 each, in January 2024 and May 2024). Using evaluations of hypothetical profiles of fellow citizens, I demonstrate that opinionatedness and ideological alignment of beliefs significantly reduce interpersonal affinity in contexts of disagreement. In the first study, disagreements with centrists elicit nearly four times less animosity than disagreements with opinionated counterparts. Furthermore, ideological alignment generates almost three times more intense negative feelings at equivalent levels of substantive disagreement. In the second study, I find that ideologically aligned individuals anticipate higher levels of disagreement with one another compared to non-ideologues, when they observe the same level of disagreement as them. This effect is particularly pronounced among ideologues capable of recognizing ideological patterns in others' beliefs. These findings highlight the role of opinionatedness and recognizable belief structures, offering a new approach that is generalizable to other divided democracies.
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