1,721,103 research outputs found
A legal analysis of the <i>Gauweiler</i> case: between monetary policy and constitutional conflict
In Gauweiler, in response to the first ever preliminary reference made by the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht; FCC), the Court of Justice gave the green light to the ECB's power to selectively purchase Eurozone government bonds in secondary markets (OMT programme). Whilst the Court of Justice sets some limits to European Central Bank's (ECB) authority relying on the golden standard of proportionality, it is a judgment of institutional empowerment. The tensions and instability arising from the separation of competences in monetary and economic policy gravitate to the advantage of the Union. By placing emphasis on the objectives rather than the effects of the programme and linking OMT power to conditionality, Gauweiler builds on Pringle providing normative legitimization to the austerity model whilst granting the ECB a distinct role not only in monetary policy but also in shaping the general economic policy of the Union. The Court of Justice's ruling also indicates a measured but firm response to the dialogue of conflict initiated by the FCC. </jats:p
Remedies before national courts
Examines the decentralised enforcement of EU law, that is, the way in which national courts uphold the rights it confers on litigants
Public Policy Justifications and Imperative Requirements:A Sliding Scale of Review of Restrictions on Free Movement of Persons
This chapter critically examines the interaction between the two main categories of justification grounds for restrictions on free movement of persons in the EU (ie. express derogations and judge-made overriding requirements in the public interest). It critically assesses the highly nuanced, or even incoherent, approach adopted by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in striking a balance between the internal market freedoms and the Member States’ regulatory autonomy, including a diversity of standards and a variable intensity applied to the judicial review of justifications of restrictions and their burden of proof, and especially the assessment of whether they comply with the principle of proportionality. The chapter introduces and develops the doctrine of a sliding scale of review, which depends on the level of EU harmonisation and/or the level of discretion enjoyed by national authorities in the pursuit of the public interest objective(s) in question. This may range from a centralised (pre-emptive) or (more) stringent review by the CJEU to a growing tendency for judicial restraint and deference to the national authorities’ margin of appreciation, allowing the scaling down of the intensity of scrutiny of Member States’ action, and/or an increasing decentralisation of the decisions regarding the justification and the proportionality of restrictions to national courts. The analysis explores the interplay of the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination – or other related limits arising from the principles of consistency, transparency or prohibition of abuse – and lays the foundations of an original taxonomy of public interest justifications depending on the varying intensity of judicial review they are likely to attract
Damages and Liability Actions in EU law
Damages actions against defaulting Member states and against EU institutions
Public Policy Justifications and Imperative Requirements:A Sliding Scale of Review of Restrictions on Free Movement of Persons
This chapter critically examines the interaction between the two main categories of justification grounds for restrictions on free movement of persons in the EU (ie. express derogations and judge-made overriding requirements in the public interest). It critically assesses the highly nuanced, or even incoherent, approach adopted by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in striking a balance between the internal market freedoms and the Member States’ regulatory autonomy, including a diversity of standards and a variable intensity applied to the judicial review of justifications of restrictions and their burden of proof, and especially the assessment of whether they comply with the principle of proportionality. The chapter introduces and develops the doctrine of a sliding scale of review, which depends on the level of EU harmonisation and/or the level of discretion enjoyed by national authorities in the pursuit of the public interest objective(s) in question. This may range from a centralised (pre-emptive) or (more) stringent review by the CJEU to a growing tendency for judicial restraint and deference to the national authorities’ margin of appreciation, allowing the scaling down of the intensity of scrutiny of Member States’ action, and/or an increasing decentralisation of the decisions regarding the justification and the proportionality of restrictions to national courts. The analysis explores the interplay of the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination – or other related limits arising from the principles of consistency, transparency or prohibition of abuse – and lays the foundations of an original taxonomy of public interest justifications depending on the varying intensity of judicial review they are likely to attract
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