1,720,966 research outputs found
On Ethical Product Differentiation with Asymmetric Distance Costs
Dato un modello di differenziazione etica di prodotto in cui due duopolisti, uno che massimizza i propri profitti (PMP) e l’al- tro socialmente responsabile (SR), competono in prezzi e caratter- istiche di responsabilità sociale dei prodotti, il PMP trova ottimale ridurre il prezzo dopo l’entrata del produttore SR, quando il suo grado di eticità è fisso.
Inoltre si costruisce un gioco sequenziale in cui il produttore SR è un leader à la Stackelberg. Si dimostra che, quando i costi della distanza etica dei consumatori sono sufficientemente alti, si ha un equilibrio con differenziazione minima di prezzo, imitazione etica e differenziazione etica non minima.In our model of ethical product differentiation two duopolists, a profit maximizing producer (PMP) and a “socially responsible” (SR) producer, compete over prices and “socially and envi- ronmentally responsible” features of their products. We show that the PMP finds it optimal to reduce his price after the SR producer’s entry when his location is fixed.
We also outline equilibria in a sequential game in which the SR producer is a Stackelberg leader. We show that, when consu- mers’ perceived costs of ethical distance are high enough, equilibria have three main features: minimum price differentiation, ethical imitation and non minimal ethical differentiation
A Traditional Profit Maximizing Producer and CSR
We examine the behaviour of a profit maximizing monopolist in a product differentiation model in which consumers differ in their degree of social respon- sibility (SR) and consumers SR is dynamically influenced by habit persistence. The model outlines parametric conditions under which (consumer driven) corpo- rate social responsibility is an optimal choice compatible with profit maximizing behaviour
On Ethical Product Differentiation with Asymmetric Distance Costs
In our model of ethical product differentiation two duopolists, a profit maximizing producer (PMP) and a “socially responsible” (SR) producer, compete over prices and “socially and environmentally responsible” features of their products. We show that the PMP finds it optimal to reduce his price after the SR producer's entry when his location is fixed. We also outline equilibria in a sequential game in which the SR producer is a Stackelberg leader. We show that, when consumers’ perceived costs of ethical distance are high enough, equilibria have three main features: minimum price differentiation, ethical imitation and non minimal ethical differentiation
Corporate Social Responsibility and Profit Maximizing Behaviour
We examine the behavior of a profit maximizing monopolist in a horizontal differentiation model in which consumers differ in their degree of social respon- sibility (SR) and consumers SR is dynamically influenced by habit persistence. The model outlines parametric conditions under which (consumer driven) corpo- rate social responsibility is an optimal choice compatible with profit maximizing behavior
Consumer Driven Market Mechanisms to Fight Inequality: the Case of CSR/Product Differentiation Models with Asymmetric Information
The bottom up pressure of "concerned" consumers and the rise of "socially responsible" products represents a new market mechanism to fight inequality and promote social inclusion. To analyze the new phenomenon of competition in corporate social responsibility (CSR) amid doubts on consumer tastes and of the effective corporate SR stance we adopt a horizontal differentiation approach in which the Hotelling segment is reinterpreted as the space of product SR characteristics and consumer tastes are uncertain. We find equilibria of the pure location and of the price-location games and show what changes when we move from a duopoly of profit maximizing producers to a mixed duopoly. Our findings illustrate that a nonzero degree of CSR is the optimal choice of profit maximizing corporations under reasonable parametric intervals of consumers’ "costs of ethical distance", corporate cost of CSR and uncertainty about consumer tastes
Product Differentiation when "Quality is a Matter of Tastes": the Case of Corporate Social Responsibility with Asymmetric Information
To analyze the new phenomenon of competition in corporate social responsibility (CSR) we adopt a product differentiation approach in which the Hotelling segment is reinterpreted as the space of product SR characteristics and consumer tastes are uncertain. We find equilibria of the pure location and of the price-location games and show what changes when we move from a duopoly of profit maximizing producers to a mixed duopoly. Our findings illustrate that a nonzero degree of CSR is the optimal choice of profit maximizing corporations under reasonable parametric intervals of consumers’ concern for SR, corporate cost of CSR and uncertainty about consumer tastes. Our model of location with unidirectional costs applied to competition in CSR may be generalised to a larger class of "hybrid" (horizontal/vertical) differentiation models in which the perception of a costly investment as a "quality" improvement is a matter of tastes
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