1,720,983 research outputs found
La place de la responsabilité civile en droit polonais
No full textSzpunar Adam. La place de la responsabilité civile en droit polonais. In: Revue internationale de droit comparé. Vol. 19 N°4, Octobre-décembre 1967. pp. 861-874
La responsabilité sans faute dans le droit civil polonais.
No full textSzpunar Adam. La responsabilité sans faute dans le droit civil polonais.. In: Revue internationale de droit comparé. Vol. 11 N°1, Janvier-mars 1959. pp. 19-33
L'indemnisation des victimes des accidents de la route en droit polonais
No full textSzpunar Adam. L'indemnisation des victimes des accidents de la route en droit polonais. In: Revue internationale de droit comparé. Vol. 28 N°1, Janvier-mars 1976. pp. 61-71
La responsabilité civile, dans le projet de nouveau code polonais
No full textSzpunar Adam. La responsabilité civile, dans le projet de nouveau code polonais. In: Revue internationale de droit comparé. Vol. 15 N°1, Janvier-mars 1963. pp. 19-29
Remarks on the from required for evidence purposes
Full text linkThe provisions on the form required for evidence purposes (ad probationem) belong
to those which should be subject to critical evaluation in the course of works
on the Civil Code reform. The article presents the history of the form ad probationem
in Polish law, the form which is the manifestation of the French adage
„lettres passent témoins". The said form was included into the Civil Code despite
strong criticism. The author presents arguments for and against the said form. The present Art. 74 of the Civil Code provides for the moderate type of the
form for evidence purposes. The interdiction to admit evidence in the form of witnesses
or in the form of statements by the parties concerning the fact of concluding
the transaction allows three exceptions: 1) if both sides express their consent
in that respect, 2) if the fact of concluding the transaction is authenticated by means
of a document, 3) if a court deems it necessary due to the particular circumstances
of a case. The author analyses the above exception in detail, and reaches the conclusion
that they mitigate the severity of the rule itself
The author also discusses Art. 77 of the Civil Code which reads that if a contract
was concluded in writing, its supplementation, change or dissolution by consent
of both parties, as well as its renunciation, must be set down in writing. The author
presents the views of the doctrine and the case law in that respect.
The author criticizes Art. 75 of the Civil Code which requires the form for
evidence purposes when a legal transaction contains a disposition of a right, the
value of which exceeds 10 000 zloties, as well as when a legal transaction concerns
an obligation to pay an amount exceeding 10 000 zloties. In the author's opinion,
Art. 75 is a dead letter in practice.
In conclusion the author does not put forth the postulate to eliminate the form
ad probationem in its present shape. Yet, he is of the opinion that Art. 75 should be
abrogated. Only in case of a loan exceeding 100 000 zloties should the contract be
drawn up in writing.Digitalizacja i deponowanie archiwalnych zeszytów RPEiS sfinansowane przez MNiSW w ramach realizacji umowy nr 541/P-DUN/201
Of support obligations between divorced spouses
Full text linkThe Supreme Court's Guidelines of Dec. 16, 1987 encourage to examine once
again some basic questions concerning the duty of alimony between the divorced
spouses. The analysis of the Guidelines is preceded by the presentation of main
views expressed in Polish legal writings with respect to ex-spouses' support obligations.
Thus, the author distinguishes four groups of problems:
1) Attention should be focused on the question about the source of support
obligations between the ex-spouses. Some authors maintain that such a source
should be seen in the very fact of divorce. However, the author subscribes to
a prevailing view that the source of the divorced spouses' duty of alimony is
their former marriage. The Guidelines support the latter view.
2) Related to the above is the question whether there exists a marital duty of
support during the marriage. The author answers in the affirmative. He analyses
the marital duty of contribution to the support of the family, (Art. 27 of the Family
and Guardianship Code) referring frequently to other views expressed in legal writings.
3) According to Art. 60 of the Family and Guardianship Code, a distinction
should be made between a regular and qualified duty of support. A qualified duty
of support (Art. 60 § 2 of the Family and Guardianship Code) is vested in a spouse
considered to be solely guilty of the breakdown of marriage. The author analyses
the premises of a qualified duty of support. In his opinion, the Guidelines have
shed light on some important matters. The most important was the explanation of
the statutory formula that the innocent spouse, whose material situation deteriorated
considerably in consequence of the divorce, may demand that the solely guilty spouse should contribute to the satisfaction of the justified needs of the innocent
spouse, even though the latter is not in poverty.
4) In the last part of his article the author considers the premisses of prolonging
the 5-year-period of the duty of alimony between innocent spouses (Art.
60 § 3 of the Family and Guardianship Code).
3Digitalizacja i deponowanie archiwalnych zeszytów RPEiS sfinansowane przez MNiSW w ramach realizacji umowy nr 541/P-DUN/201
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Entering in the rights of the satisfied creditor
Full text linkA third person, who pays off a creditor, acquires the paid-off claim up to
the amount of the given payment (art. 518 § 1 of the civil code). It is the case
of a statutory subrogation which covers a wide range of various situations. It is
aimed to strengthen a position of the person paying off a creditor. At the outset
the author analyses a question of separating the statutory subrogation from allied
institutions. He is advocating for a position according to which we are dealing
here with a recourse claim (in a wide sense). The statutory subrogation is therefore
a specific type of claim.
Next, particular instances of the statutory subrogation are analyzed by the
author. His remarks are started with a discussion of a guarantors claim who
satisfied a creditor. He represents the opinion that in this case the guarantor
fulfils his own obligation and at the same time he pays another's debt for which
he is liable personally. This position implies a solution of secondary questions
related to the guarantor's recourse. If the guarantors are few, the provisions of
joint and several debt are to be applied to their mutual relations in case of paying
off a credit by one of them.In turn the author presents those instances where a third person is liable
for a paid-off debt with certain material objects. A pledge and a real estate
mortgage come into consideration. The author represents the opinion that a construction
of the so called real obligation has to be adopted in this type of real
securities. It implies that a pledger or an owner of mortgaged estate are real
debtors bearing a limited liability to the creditor. The author also dwells on
complex problems related to paying off a secured debt (in the light of the new
act of 1982). A conclusion is reached that a mortgage expires when a creditor is
redeemed by the owner of the estate.
Next questions deal with paying off a claim which has a priority in settlement.
Its practical effect is presently unimportant. A case of paying off a creditor
by a third person with the consent of a debtor is eased in the present laws.
It is the instance of the so called conversion. The payment is in a way imposed
upon a creditor who cannot refuse acceptance of a performance which is already
enforceable.
In the final remarks the author dwells on premises of a recourse claim of an
insurance institution vs. an injurer. It is the instance of property and not of
personal insurance. In the result of subrogation the legal position of a debtor
cannot be deteriorated and is entitled to all defences he had against the creditorDigitalizacja i deponowanie archiwalnych zeszytów RPEiS sfinansowane przez MNiSW w ramach realizacji umowy nr 541/P-DUN/201
Some Remarks on Revocation of a Donation
No full textThe task of the article is the discussion of essential problems regarding revocation
of a donation by a donor by reason of a flagrant ungratitude of a donee.
The questions as to which the opinions of literature are concurrent were disregarded.
The deliberations focus on the question of the results of revocation of the
executed donation. Does the revocation cause the transfer of ownerships back onto
the donor (a real effect) or oblige only the donee to the return (obligational effect)?
The views of literature on that subject are divided.
First, the author presents the evolution of judicature. After the initial hesitations,
the decision of 7 judges of the bench in the Supreme Court of January 7,
1967, recognized that the revocation of a donation creates only the obligational duty, to return the object of the donation,, concerning real estate, in particular. The
author studies the merits of the decision in a great detail as well as the position
adopted by the doctrine. Many representatives of the doctrine accept the premises
of the decision, but at the same time question some arguments quoted by the Supreme
Court. There are also others who criticize the theses of the resolution. It
can be neverthelles adopted that the position of judicature is settled in that matter.
The author analyses other decisions proving that these questions have their
weightform the legal and social point of view.
Many discussions are raised by the issue whether the revocation of a donation
is permissible as regards one of the spouse, if a given object had entered their joint
estate.The judicature is of an opinion a flagrant ungratitude towards the donor. In
that case the donated object does not enter the joint estate of the spouses. It becomes
the object of co-ownership of both spouses in equal parts. The donor can claim
that a share in that object be transferred onto him, if it was not possible then the
claim would be for the return of the value. The author questions the position adopted
by the judicature and quotes numerous counterarguments.Digitalizacja i deponowanie archiwalnych zeszytów RPEiS sfinansowane przez MNiSW w ramach realizacji umowy nr 541/P-DUN/201
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