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    Medical Errors: Mandatory Reporting, Voluntary Reporting, or Both?

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    microeconomic theory, agency, iatrogenic injury,

    Soil Conservation as an Investment in Land

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    Most studies on the problem of optimal soil conservation have analyzed soil conservation measures as being time-limited in their effect. This paper extends previous analyses of the soil conservation decision by allowing farmers to make investments in soil conservation structures such as terraces, bundles and ditches. It shows that the main conclusions arrived at in previous studies remain valid. The long-term effects of unanticipated permanent changes in prices and discount rates may go either way independent of whether conservation measures are time-limited or have lasting effects on the soil base.Land degradation; investment in structures; comparative statics.

    Medical Errors: Getting the Incentives Right

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    This work examines the role of penalties as providers of incentives to prevent medical errors and ensure that such incidents, once they occur, become common knowledge. It is shown that a scheme with two penalties (accountability and non-report) induces the first-best solution. However, this scheme does not necessarily imply a punitive environment, but may, under given circumstances, yield insignificant and even negative penalties. Alternative sanction systems, such as voluntary reporting and immunity, are found to have less desirable properties. An exception is confidentiality (anonymity) which turns out to be an optimal scheme. Finally, the examination of various penalty restrictions (scope and scale) shows that such barriers may promote both tougher and softer sanction schemes. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005reporting incentives, immunity, confidentiality, voluntary reporting,

    Soil Depletion Choices under Production and Price Uncertainty

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    This paper studies soil depletion incentives in a dynamic economic model under two different sources of revenue uncertainty (production- and output price risk). The focus is on the long-term effects of risk averse preferences. The land manager is assumed to posses three classes of instruments to control natural topsoil fertility over time. Each instrument is also assumed to have implications for expected short-run production. The analysis shows that the forces at play are different across the three agricultural activities considered and varies for the two sources of risk analysed. In order to predict how risk aversion may influence soil conservation incentives detailed information is needed about input use and cultivation practices and the farmers' perception of their risk implications. If higher output is associated with higher levels of soil degradation, risk averse preferences will strengthen the incentives for soil conservation under output price uncertainty, and the same outcome is likely under production uncertainty. If higher levels of outputs is associated with lower levels of soil degradation, risk averse preferences will induce a farmer to conserve less soil under output price uncertainty, while the likely outcome of production uncertainty is the oppositeRisk aversion; farm behaviour; resource management.

    Medical Errors: Responsibility and Informal Penalties

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    Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis

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    The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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