1,721,197 research outputs found
Nombramiento de Susan Rose-Ackerman como Profesora Honoraria
No full textPor Resolución Rectoral 10-10, de fecha 26 de febrero de 2010, la norteamericana Susan Rose-Ackerman fue nombrada Profesora Honoraria de la Universidad Peruana de Ciencias Aplicadas. Profesora emérita de Yale, destacó en derecho y economía investigando la corrupción y la gobernanza pública. Su legado transformó el análisis institucional, influyendo en políticas anticorrupción globales y en la comprensión del comportamiento burocrático y regulatorio
\u3cem\u3eRethinking the Progressive Agenda: The Reform of the American Regulatory State.\u3c/em\u3e Susan Rose-Ackerman.
Get PDFSusan Rose-Ackerman. Rethinking the Progressive Agenda: The Reform of the American Regulartory State. New York: Free Press, 1993. $24.95 hardcover
Susan Rose-Ackerman Recommends “Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets” by Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel
No full textExternality and framing effects in a bribery experiment
Get PDFUsing a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are increased bribes are less likely to be offered and accepted. And when the game is presented as a bribery scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered and accepted. We discuss two possible reasons as to why our experiment leads to the identification of these effects while previous experiments did not.Corruption; Economic experiment; Social preferences.
The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment
Get PDFUsing a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered. Higher negative externalities are also associated with less bribe acceptance. However, framing has no effect on bribe acceptance, suggesting that the issue of artificiality first raised by Bardsley (2005) may be of particular importance in bribery experiments.Corruption; Economic experiment; Social preferences.
Mackerels in the moonlight. A model of corrupt politicians
Get PDFThis paper examines causes of the persistence of corruption among elected politicians in democracies. We study a theoretical model of competition between two candidates who differ both in ability and popularity in a probabilistic voting setup. Each candidate proposes a tax rate and a public good level. The elected candidate's ability determines the cost of producing the public good. The budget constraint implies that taxes collected must equal the sum of public good cost and the amount stolen by the elected politician. We solve for the tax rates chosen by the candidates and how much each candidate chooses to steal depending on his ability and popularity. We, then, analyze the effects of various commonly discussed reforms as potential ways of deterring political corruption. We identify conditions under which (i) imposing tax rate limits, (ii) increasing compensation of elected politicians, and (iii) raising legal penalties for corruption, will increase corruption and/or reduce the social welfare. Under certain conditions, the reforms that will reduce corruption will not be supported by either corrupt or honest politiciansProbabilistic voting, corruption, constitutional constraints, reform
Experimenting with Independent Commissions in a New Democracy with a Civil Law Tradition: The Case of Taiwan
No full textTrade, Productivity and Institutional Quality: Issues and Empirics
Get PDFWe estimate the relationship between productivity and trade for a panel of countries over the period 1980 to 2000 using instrumental-variables estimation of a productivity equation. We note that some estimates of productivity gains attributed to trade capture instead the roles of institutions and geography. The endogeneity of trade and institutional quality is accounted for by using instruments. We extend the Frankel and Romer (1999) specification, using real openness to measure trade (following Alcala and Ciccone, 2004), which allows for identification of channels through which trade and production scale affect productivity. The trade instrument is based on a ?theoretically motivated? gravity equation. The instruments for institutional quality come from Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson (2004). Contrary to Alcala and Ciccone, our results suggest no robust relationship between real openness and labour productivity in the 1980s. Conversely, the relationship between productivity and real openness appears to be robust from 1990 onwards and similarly in the case of institutional quality. We also find evidence implying that countries with low-quality institutions are also able to benefit from openness to trade. --
Constraining Managers without Owners: Governance of the Not-for-Profit Enterprise
Get PDFIn the absence of owners, how effective are the constraints imposed by the state in promoting effective firm governance? This paper develops state-level indices of the legal and reporting rules facing not-for-profits and examines the effects of these rules on not-for-profit behavior. Stronger non-distribution constraints are associated with greater charitable expenditures and foundation payouts while more stringent reporting requirements are associated with lower insider compensation. The paper also examines how governance influences an alternative metric of not-for-profit performance -- the provision of social insurance. Stronger governance measures are associated with intertemporal smoothing of resources and greater activity in response to negative economic shocks.
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