1,720,986 research outputs found
La regolamentazione tariffaria dei servizi di fornitura dell’energia elettrica: un difficile trade-off tra equità ed efficienza
No full textLa regolamentazione tariffaria dei servizi di fornitura dell’energia elettrica: un difficile trade-off tra equità ed efficienza
No full textINCENTIVE PRICE REGULATION IN PRESENCE OF COST HETEROGENEITY: SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE BASIS OF PRICE REGULATION OF THE WATER SERVICE IN ITALY
No full textThis work draws on the analysis of price regulation of water services in Italy, the so-called
Metodo Normalizzato, to examine the issues related to the definition of a regulatory mechanism when the
costs of providing the service depend on exogenous variables which are geographically differentiated. The
first part describes the Metodo Normalizzato and derives, on the basis of the model, the effects of its
application in the case of perfect information of the regulator about the exogenous supply costs. The second
part of the paper considers the case of asymmetry of information between the regulator and the service
provider; its purpose is to identify the features that a regulatory mechanism, based on the Price Cap,
should meet to incentivize the minimization of operating costs to induce a tariff reduction, so to ensure
tariff uniformity and service provision in each area
Acquisition of information and investment in network industries: the role of regulation and public asset ownership
No full text
Access price cap mechanisms and industry structure with information acquisition
No full textThis paper tackles the issue of the welfare desirability of downstream integration versus separation when facing the problem of socially valuable information acquisition on the upstream cost in regulated network industries. I consider an upstream natural monopoly with cost uncertainty, regulated through an access price cap mechanism, and a downstream unregulated Cournot competition. Cost information improves the performance of the regulatory mechanism but it can only be acquired by the monopolist; the information acquisition is unobservable. I show that the access price cap mechanism provides a vertically integrated firm with greater incentives to acquire information and this favours integration
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