2,245 research outputs found
De eeuwige vragen van de filosofie
Full text linkOratie uitgesproken door prof. dr. Bart Streumer op 3 juni 2022 bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van hoogleraar Ethiek aan de Faculteit Wijsbegeerte Rijksuniversiteit GroningenFilosofen stellen al eeuwenlang dezelfde vragen zonder dat ze het eens worden over de antwoorden. Wat is waarheid? Wat is kennis? Wat is de relatie tussen onze gedachten en de werkelijkheid? Wat zijn normen? En ga zo maar door.Hoe komt het dat filosofen het niet eens worden over de antwoorden op deze vragen? Misschien doordat de vragen te abstract geformuleerd zijn, of doordat ze verborgen aannames bevatten die niet kloppen, of doordat we ze alleen maar stellen omdat we in de war worden gebracht door onze taal.In zijn oratie zal Bart Streumer een andere mogelijkheid onderzoeken: dat er wel juiste antwoorden zijn op deze vragen, maar dat we die antwoorden niet kunnen geloven. Dat zou kunnen verklaren waarom filosofen het niet eens worden over wat de juiste antwoorden zijn. Met alle antwoorden die we kunnen geloven is iets mis, terwijl we het enige antwoord waarmee niets mis is niet kunnen geloven.Streumer zal vooral ingaan op vragen waarop we het juiste antwoord wellicht niet kunnen geloven om een specifieke reden: omdat als we proberen het juiste antwoord te geloven, we daardoor automatisch een ander antwoord op dezelfde vraag gaan geloven waarmee iets mis is. Hij past dit toe op de theorie van George Berkeley, die het bestaan van materie ontkende en beargumenteerde dat alleen denkers en hun gedachten bestaan, en op de theorie van Simon Blackburn, die beargumenteert dat uitspraken over de objectiviteit van normen uitingen van gevoelens zijn.De oratie is een pleidooi om te blijven proberen de eeuwige vragen van de filosofie te beantwoorden, ook al worden we het misschien nooit eens over de antwoorden
Can Streumer simply avoid supervenience?
Full text linkIn his defence of an error theory for normative judgements,
Bart Streumer presents a new 'reduction' argument against nonreductive normative realism. Streumer claims that unlike previous versions, his 'simple moral theory' version of the argument doesn’t rely on the supervenience of the normative on the descriptive. But this is incorrect; without supervenience the argument does not succeed
Non-Reductive Realism, Primitivism, and the Reduction Argument : Commentary on Bart Streumer, Unbelievable Errors
No full textIn Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer defends the error theory by rejecting all competitors to it. My aim here is to defend one brand of realism from Streumer's objections: primitivim. The primitivist holds that there exist sui generis normative properties that do not supervene on any descriptive properties. It is argued that Streumer's objections to primitivism can be met.</p
Blameless wrongdoing and agglomeration: a response to Streumer
No full textBart Streumer argues that a certain variety of consequentialism – he calls it ‘semi-global consequentialism’ – is false on account of its falsely implying the possibility of ‘blameless wrongdoing’. This article shows (i) that Streumer's argument is nothing new; (ii) that his presentation of the argument is misleading, since it suppresses a crucial premiss, commonly called ‘agglomeration’; and (iii) that, for all Streumer says, the proponent of semi-global consequentialism may easily resist his argument by rejecting agglomeration
Blameless Wrongdoing and Agglomeration: A Response to Streumer
No full textBart Streumer argues that a certain variety of consequentialism he calls it semi-global consequentialism is false on account of its falsely implying the possibility of blameless wrongdoing . This article shows (i) that Streumer s argument is nothing new; (ii) that his presentation of the argument is misleading, since it suppresses a crucial premiss, commonly called agglomeration ; and (iii) that, for all Streumer says, the proponent of semi-global consequentialism may easily resist his argument by rejecting agglomeration.
Multiplying co-intensional properties : a reply to Streumer
Full text linkBart Streumer employs a reductio ad absurdum to show that a hyperintensional conception of properties has a multiplication problem; roughly, this conception of properties leads to the absurd result that we can multiply distinct but co-intensional properties without end. In this paper, I will explain why Streumer’s reductio fails to convince.Peer reviewe
Streumer on Non-Cognitivism and Reductivism About Normative Judgement
Full text linkBart Streumer believes that the following principle is true of all normative judgements: When two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of them is correct. Streumer argues that noncognitivists are unable to explain why is true, or our acceptance of it. I argue that his arguments are inconclusive. I also argue that our acceptance of is limited in the case of instrumental and epistemic normative judgements, and that the extent to which we do accept for such judgements can be explained by an assumption of shared standards of correctness. Finally, I argue that reductivists can appeal to the same ideas to defend their view that instrumental and epistemic normative judgements describe non-normative relations
A very good reason to reject the buck-passing account
Full text linkThis paper presents a new objection to the buck-passing account of value. I distinguish the buck-passing account of predicative value from the buck-passing account of attributive value. According to the latter, facts about attributive value reduce to facts about reasons and their weights. But since facts about reasons’ weights are themselves facts about attributive value, this account presupposes what it is supposed to explain. As part of this argument, I also argue against Mark Schroeder's recent account of the weights of reasons, which purports to explain the weights of reasons in terms of further reasons without circularity. I then argue that if we abandon the buck-passing account of attributive value, it would be ad hoc and unjustifiable to continue to endorse the buck-passing account of predicative value. In short, there seems to be little hope for the buck-passing account in either form. The paper ends by sketching a novel alternative theory according to which reasons are analysed in terms of the attributive value of motives. I suggest that a normative reason to φ is something that would be a good motive for φ-ing. At least at first glance, this view has numerous merits and few problem
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